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31 Oct 01:18

As ilusões que Dilma, Marina e Aécio vendem como realidade

by Alexandre Versignassi

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Dilma avisou que o Mantega está fora de um eventual segundo mandato. Então ficamos assim: pela primeira vez na história do mundo, um ministro da Fazenda é demitido com quatro meses de aviso prévio. E não foi demitido por causa das medidas inflacionárias em que, a essa altura da vida, ele ainda insiste. Nem por usar o mais anacrônico dos artificialismos econômicos, o congelamento de preços, como o centro de sua política. Nem por ter quebrado uma das indústrias mais promissoras do país, a do etanol. Não. Foi demitido porque caiu um avião com um candidato dentro, e a substituta dele virou a favorita. Não quero fazer campanha aqui. Acho que os três candidatos têm pontos positivos e negativos – e respeito quem confia em cada um dos três. Mas quem está no governo é a Dilma. E, com essa atitude, ela mostrou que não, não está no governo.

No fundo, isso é mais um problema que emerge daquilo que a nossa democracia tem de mais podre: colocar sempre a aparência à frente da realidade. Primeiro constrói o marketing, depois vê no que dá. É isso que Dilma faz ao vestir o manto da “mudança”, por mais que isso desafie a lógica  – quando você vota na situação, afinal, vota na continuidade de um projeto; se a situação se traveste de oposição, o que temos é marketagem rasteira. Não é diferente de maquiar as contas públicas com truques contábeis para transformar déficits em superávits, outra arte em que o governo tem se esmerado.

Mas o problema não é só nessa candidatura, claro. Aécio e Marina, que têm basicamente o mesmo programa para a economia, prometem um desafio às leis da física: fomentar o crescimento ao mesmo tempo em que apertam as rédeas contra a inflação. Um exemplo: as equipes econômicas dos dois dizem que vão tomar providências para aumentar as exportações. A providência que existe para isso é deixar o dólar subir – quanto mais caro fica o dólar aqui, mais baratos os nossos produtos ficam lá fora, e as exportações sobem. O problema é que deixar o dólar subir significa jogar mais reais dentro da nossa economia.

Só para a gente visualizar: o cara que importa US$ 100 milhões de soja converte seus dólares em reais para fazer a compra. Com o dólar a R$2, ele troca o dinheiro verde que tem na mão por R$ 200 milhões. E essa grana extra começa a circular na praça. Se o PIB crescer o equivalente a R$ 200 milhões em produtos e serviços enquanto esse dinheiro novo estiver girando, maravilha: esses reais vão ser absorvidos pela economia. Se não, se o PIB continuar na mesma, vamos ter R$ 200 milhões a mais circulando para comprar a mesma quantidade de produtos e serviços que existia antes. O que acontece, então? O preço desses produtos e serviços aumenta. O dinheiro novo gera inflação. Bom, se você vai lá e desvaloriza o real para vender mais soja, o risco de gerar inflação aumenta. Com o dólar a R$ 3, aqueles mesmos R$ 100 milhões vão se transformar em R$ 300 milhões. Para o produtor de soja fica tudo bem: ele ganha mais reais e pronto. Mas, para o resto, o efeito é menos bacana: mais pressão inflacionária.

Mesmo assim, a ideia de desvalorizar o real para bombar as exportações não é ruim. No fundo, vamos produzir mais soja (e mais de tudo o que a gente exporta). Mais produção = mais empregos. Beleza. Mas a pressão inflacionária também cresce, como a gente viu. O que um governo faz, então, para aliviar essa pressão? Aumenta os juros. Subir juros significa tirar dinheiro de circulação. Com menos dinheiro por aí, menor o incentivo para que os preços subam. Mas isso também tem um efeito colateral. Com menos dinheiro girando, os bancos passam a ter menos crédito para vender. E menos crédito na praça = menos investimentos em produção. Menos produção, menos empregos.

Nenhum dos dois candidatos da oposição promete menos empregos para 2015. Mas se a ideia é priorizar o combate à inflação, um arrocho na criação de vagas faz parte do pacote. E tem o outro lado da moeda: se não, se a ideia for bombar a produção, o que vem de brinde é o risco de a inflação crescer.

Isso não significa uma maldição. Se tudo der certo, uma hora toda a produção do país, em todas as áreas, passa a crescer num ritmo mais forte. Aí é o melhor dos mundos: o próprio aumento do PIB passa a ser o agente que segura a inflação. E o governo não precisa mais usar os juros como freio de mão. O problema é que isso não acontece no momento em que alguém novo ganha as chaves do Palácio da Alvorada. É um processo que dura anos, e deixa mortos e feridos no caminho. A oposição sabe disso, tão bem quanto a Dilma sabe que demitiu o Mantega por marketing eleitoral. Mas eles não vão te dizer, porque não estão ali para falar de realidade. Estão ali para vender sonhos, e depois ver no que dá.

Isso já é algo grave em si. Por outro lado, não tem jeito: faz parte do jogo. O que não faz é chegar lá e governar deixando o marketing em primeiro plano, e a realidade em último. Mas tudo indica que vamos conviver cada vez mais com essa prática, por mais que ela só tenha um prognóstico possível: nunca dar em nada.

 

 

 

13 Oct 20:59

Teach for America has faced criticism for years. Now it’s listening — and changing.

Robert Schwartz loved being a Teach for America teacher. After his two-year commitment to the organization was up, he continued to teach for five more years at Stevenson Middle School in East Los Angeles, where he worked with Latino kids living in poverty. He left the classroom a believer. "TFA was a great thing for me," Schwartz said.

Robert Schwartz loved being a Teach for America teacher. After his two-year commitment to the organization was up, he continued to teach for five more years at Stevenson Middle School in East Los Angeles, where he worked with Latino kids living in poverty. He left the classroom a believer. "TFA was a great thing for me," Schwartz said.

But then he took a job as an administrator at an LA-based charter school network called the Inner City Education Foundation. It was there that he started asking questions. He realized he wasn't interested in hiring brand-new Teach for America corps members. He wanted to hire experienced teachers who were familiar with his students' neighborhoods — not fresh recruits to the profession, most from other cities, who'd been through just five weeks of training and could only be counted on to stay for two or three years.

"My argument was: let's take the resources you're investing in a corps member — tens of thousands of dollars per year — and put that into professional development for training current staff on campuses," Schwartz said. "You'll see teachers that are going to stick around longer and are really invested in the community."

Today, Schwartz is a consultant working in educational technology — one of the 32,000 Teach for America alums still working in education. And he is not alone is criticizing the organization he admires. Since its founding in 1989, critics both from within and outside the tight-knit Teach for America family have called for the group to reassess its model of recruiting elite young college graduates and career-changers to teach for two years in low-income schools after a brief summer crash course. They have argued that teaching is a complex skill that cannot be adequately taught in such a short period of time. They have said that asking young people to commit just two years to the job sends the wrong message: that teaching is temporary missionary work, not a respectable, lifelong profession. They have also urged TFA to send its corps members only to schools facing true teacher shortages, such as those in rural areas or in smaller towns, and not to cities like Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York, which are now experiencing teacher layoffs and hiring freezes.

These questions have always been debated — vigorously — by Teach for America's leaders. But the organization's charismatic founder, Wendy Kopp, felt the group's ability to attract top college students was a function, in part, of how easy Teach for America made it to become a teacher: no special coursework; no long training period; in charge of a classroom right from the start. Teach for America did evolve over the years, improving how it trains corps members to teach. But the core quick-prep, short-commitment model did not budge. Until now.

With its track record of turning Ivy Leaguers into do-gooders, Teach for America once enjoyed rhapsodic media coverage. Yet as the economic conditions for public schools changed during the recent recession, so did perceptions of the group, which charges districts and charters $2,000 to $5,000 for each corps member they hire. Last year, Olivia Blanchard's essay in The Atlantic, declaring, "I Quit Teach for America," went viral. "I don't believe that American education can be saved by youthful enthusiasm," she wrote. Catherine Michna, another TFA alum, announced on her blog that as a professor of education at Tulane, she refuses to write recommendation letters for students who want to join the program. "TFA members do not work in service of public education," she argued. "They work in service of a corporate reform agenda that rids communities of veteran teachers, privatizes public schools, and forces a corporatized, data-driven culture upon unique low-income communities with unique dynamics and unique challenges." Slate picked up Michna's essay, and it garnered 30,000 Facebook likes and 1,300 tweets. This year, two large school districts, Pittsburgh and Durham, North Carolina, rescinded contracts with TFA, citing corps members' lack of preparation and low retention rates. At the same time, a number of young TFA alumni, especially in Detroit, were becoming active in charter school unionization efforts, the type of old-fashioned lefty politics anathema to the technocratic parent organization.

In May 2013, I emailed a Teach for America spokesman — one who no longer works for TFA — to say I was reporting on the organization for my book, The Teacher Wars. I explained that I would like to observe several Teach for America events, including "Institute," the five-week training course held in 11 cities each summer. We set up a phone call. After a cursory greeting, he asked if I planned to write a hit piece attacking the organization.

Yet despite the initial nervousness, to its credit, Teach for America allowed me to attend an alumni conference in Detroit and an Institute session in the Bronx. What I saw surprised me. From the outside, Teach for America looked defensive, but internally, it was engaged in profound self-exploration and self-critique. In response to many of the arguments against Teach for America — that it is white and elitist, short on pedagogical seriousness, and disdainful of career educators — the organization, under new leadership for the first time in its history, was considering a significant policy change.

Everything about Teach for America is being subjected to internal debate, from the length of the five-week training and two-year placements to the very language it uses to describe its mission and impact. What does TFA's evolution mean for a national school reform movement built upon the organization's ideals?

In the fall of 1988, Princeton senior Wendy Kopp was the editor in chief of Business Today, a nationally distributed magazine for college students. Kopp had joined her classmates in applying to jobs on Wall Street and with consulting firms. (Princeton had a teacher certification program, but she hadn't heard much about it.) Then, at Business Today's fall conference, an event where students interested in corporate careers networked with executives, Kopp attended a session on the national teacher shortage. As Kopp and the other conference-goers learned about the crisis in teaching — 12 percent of first-year teachers across the country were uncertified, clustered in urban and rural areas — they started to discuss whether they should teach. Most said they'd be open to the idea, as long as they didn't have to major in education. Though their cohort of college students had been parodied as the Me Generation, motivated by money above all else, they were also enthusiastic about community service. In the senior thesis she crafted proposing Teach for America, Kopp called this ethos "the new idealism," a "yuppie volunteering spirit" that inspired New York City bankers to staff soup kitchens. What if elite young college graduates could be convinced to do more — to teach in low-income public schools, even for a short period of time?

Author Dana Goldstein talks about the history of the belief that teachers can solve poverty

The organization, which launched its first cohort of teachers in 1990, has succeeded in harnessing that idealistic impulse. About 10 percent of Ivy League seniors apply to the program, and nationwide, on average, less than 15 percent of Teach for America applicants are accepted each year. By redefining urban teaching, at least on a two-year basis, as prestigious and cool, Kopp helped solve the teacher shortage problem; today, in many cities, there is actually a surplus of certified teachers for most subjects and grades.

And then, Kopp's rhetoric shifted. Teach for America was no longer about filling a great, unmet need for teachers. It was about recruiting superior teachers.

By the mid-1990s, Kopp was arguing that impressive academic credentials, mission-driven energy, and rising student test scores were more important measures of teacher quality than years of training or career longevity in the classroom. Teach for America also claimed that great teaching could negate the socioeconomic disadvantages that many children bring with them from home to school. In her 2011 memoir, A Chance to Make History, Kopp wrote that "education can trump poverty" as long as a teacher accepts her responsibility as the "key variable" driving measurable student outcomes. Teaching as Leadership, TFA's handbook for new recruits, states, "We" — not parents, neighborhoods, school funding, health care, racism, or stable housing — "control our students' success and failure."

Teach for America was not the first, nor the only, alternative-certification program for teachers. But its data-driven mindset, and the inspiration it drew from the culture of business schools and management consultants, attracted unparalleled support from corporate philanthropists across the political spectrum. Teach for America's major donors include the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; the Walton Family Foundation, run by the heirs to the Walmart fortune; the Eli & Edythe Broad Foundation, run by the real estate billionaire and Democratic donor; and the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, where hedge-fund dollars are used to support causes ranging from criminal justice reform to reducing the costs of public pensions (including those held by veteran teachers).

High teacher turnover is an epidemic in low-income schools. Only about half of urban teachers are still in the classroom after four years.

President Obama and his secretary of education, Arne Duncan, were fans of Teach for America dating back to their time in Chicago. Under their watch, federal funding for the program grew, and it now has 11,000 corps members teaching across the country. In 2014, it seems that in white-collar America, everyone has a daughter, nephew, colleague, or friend who "did" TFA. Indeed, the group has become so influential that much of the Obama school reform agenda echoes the Teach for America worldview: a relentless focus on raising poor children's standardized test scores, removing underperforming tenured teachers from the classroom, and recruiting impressive young people into the teaching profession, even if they don't plan to stay very long. Research had demonstrated that ineffective teachers were more likely to quit jobs in high-poverty schools than effective ones. Many reformers concluded that teacher turnover was therefore justifiable, since it weeded out bad apples and allowed potentially better candidates — like Teach for America corps members — to take their place.

But now, new social science produced using the reformers' favorite method, value-added measurement of student test scores, is calling that theory of change into question. In education, it turns out, career longevity does matter. An unprecedented eight-year study of 850,000 New York City fourth and fifth-graders found that in schools with high teacher turnover, students lost significant amounts of learning in both reading and math compared to socioeconomically and academically similar peers at schools with low teacher turnover. Unlike previous research, the 2012 study, conducted by Matthew Ronfeldt, Susanna Loeb, and James Wyckoff, looked not only at how teachers impact their own students, but also considered schools as communities, in which what happens in one classroom may affect the kids next door. It turned out that it did. Children in high-turnover schools did worse even if their own classroom teacher was not new, and even if overall teacher quality at the school remained constant. The negative effects of teacher turnover were even higher in schools with many low-achieving or black students.

In a way, these results are common sense. At high-turnover schools, principals spend more time recruiting, interviewing, and hiring, when they could be focused on improving instruction. When many teachers resign each year, institutional memory is lost, and ties to the community weaken. Effective veteran teachers spend less time working on behalf of their own students and more time training inexperienced colleagues. In short, there is less adult expertise, and it gets spread more thinly among students.

High turnover is an epidemic in low-income schools. Only about half of urban teachers are still in the classroom after four years. Even fewer Teach for America recruits — one-third — stay that long, and of those who do continue teaching, 85 percent leave their original placements to transfer to a more desirable school. That level of churn may have been acceptable in the past. In an era of high teacher unemployment, is it still?

At the COBO Center in Detroit last summer, I followed Teach for America's new co-CEOs, Matt Kramer — a former McKinsey consultant whose wife did TFA — and Elisa Villanueva Beard — who began her career as a TFA teacher in her native Rio Grande Valley — to a basement meeting room. They were scheduled to host a "listening session" with alumni. Kramer and Villanueva Beard are an effective tag team. Their patter is formulated to appeal to the mind (him) and the heart (her). He is short and balding and wears a suit; she has a heart-shaped face, makes intense eye contact, and seems kind, yet tough-minded. Since Kopp had stepped down three months earlier to launch a new organization bringing the Teach for America model to the developing world, the new CEOs had hosted dozens of these listening sessions across the country. The purpose of the tour was to open up a more honest conversation about TFA's mission; about its shortcomings as well as its successes; and about its future.

The Detroit meeting played out like a family therapy session. Some 30 alumni listened solemnly and nodded as their leaders shared some tough feedback.

Kramer began by acknowledging that 35 percent of principals nationwide who supervise Teach for America teachers complained the two-year time commitment was too short. A number of the charter schools founded by TFA alumni were underperforming. "Honestly," he said, "most of the stories we heard were about how most of the schools were still not working and not adequate for most of the kids" — no matter how many TFA teachers had been placed in them.

Now that a Teach for America placement is so coveted, the organization can raise the bar for recruits, without much diluting the applicant pool

Then Villanueva Beard took over. "Are we destabilizing communities?" she asked. "That is one question we've got to take and really critically examine. And the culturally competent piece is very real. Are we bringing teachers into the classroom who deeply understand themselves and are educating kids so they understand their role in society? Not just sticking them into white middle-class aspirations? I want it to be impossible for people to say, ‘TFA? They're just cultural tourists.'"

One of the new CEOs' first changes, Villanueva Beard told the alumni, had been to prioritize placing teachers in regions to which they had personal ties — where they had lived, attended school, or volunteered. And despite the stereotype of a Teach for America teacher as a rich white kid from Harvard, the organization had built a special recruitment team to seek candidates at 103 historically black colleges across the country. Forty percent of corps members placed in the Rio Grande Valley in 2013 were Latino.

A sporty-looking blonde guy in his mid-thirties rose, identifying himself as an administrator for a small network of Harlem charter schools. He was proud of Teach for America; it had "injected a huge amount of human capital into education," he said. But he was deeply worried about income inequality and the fact that one-fifth of American children were living in poverty. School reformers did not often acknowledge these issues, he complained. "Poverty is not getting better, it's worse than five years ago. Unemployment is higher. Poverty is hugely influential in how kids do at school. An enormous thing we can do is help parents make more money. But we on the education reform side are being caricatured as not caring about poverty because we've made a strategic choice to focus on one part of the problem, education. ... I'm not proposing we turn TFA into an economic justice organization. But how can we expand our messaging?"

In March, Villanueva Beard and Kramer began to publicly share the soul-searching that had been taking place behind closed doors within Teach for America. They announced two pilot programs that seemed to question the group's quick-prep, high-turnover model. The first will provide a full year of pre-service training to select corps members. Called the Education for Justice Pre-Corps Pilot Program, it rolls out this year to 50 to 100 college seniors who applied early-decision to TFA and were accepted during their junior years.

According to Teach for America spokesperson Takirra Winfield, the program has three major components: discussions on the "history of inequity in the United States"; teaching recruits to view poor children's families and neighborhoods as "assets" to academic achievement, not liabilities (a concept borrowed from African American educational theorists like Lisa Delpit and Gloria Ladson-Billings); and introducing corps members to classroom management tactics. Participants may have the chance to observe real-world high-poverty schools. But because they will be spread across the country, much of the instruction will take place online, Winfield said. Corps members may play "classroom simulation games" in which they practice student discipline. (One such game presents the following scenario to prospective high school teachers: "The school is under lockdown! A student just cursed you. Respond to simulated events before encountering them in a real classroom.")

The second pilot program will encourage corps members in 12 regions-Baltimore, Charlotte, Chicago, Connecticut, D.C., Dallas, Nashville, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, San Antonio, South Carolina, and St. Louis — to commit to teach for up to five years. It will provide some of the participants with continued training and support, such as instructional coaching and stipends to pursue graduate studies in education. "Teaching beyond two years cannot be a backup plan — it has to be the main plan," Kramer said in a speech announcing the changes.

It was a conceptual shift — from five weeks of training to a full year, and from two years in the classroom to five. Just a few years earlier, Teach for America's major news had been a partnership with Goldman Sachs, in which recruits were guaranteed jobs at the investment bank directly following their two years in the classroom, and were placed in Goldman internships during the summer between their first and second years as teachers. "We're a leadership development organization, not a teaching organization," Kopp had declared in 2011, later telling me, "We spend some time around here asking ourselves if enough of our people are leaving [teaching]. Are enough of them going into policy... are enough of them going into business?"

In part, it is Teach for America's past success that makes the new pilot programs possible. Now that a TFA placement is so coveted, the organization can raise the bar for what it asks of recruits, without much diluting the applicant pool. "TFA has the most powerful brand in teaching and they've got tons of kids with great resumes lining up at the door," said Frederick Hess, director of education policy at the American Enterprise Institute. "If they say, ‘This is what the game is now, you have to do a year of preparation,' people who would have backed away 25 years ago might now say, ‘Yeah, whatever it takes.'"

The summer training schedule was grueling. At an afternoon workshop, several corps members nodded off in the back of the room.

Teach for America's messaging shifted even further this past July, at its second annual educators conference, held in Las Vegas. Villanueva Beard gave an entire speech focused on poverty, in which she acknowledged that the organization's work "is never just about academics." The speech began with the story of Adeeb Barqawi, a Houston corps member who had taught homeless students, and then, in his third year as a teacher, launched a campaign to build a community center to provide children with extracurricular activities and health care. (Barqawi's effort sounded a lot like the "wraparound services" and "community schools" that teachers' unions have been pushing for over a century.)

"There will never be superheroes in education, and you cannot change a system overnight," Villanueva Beard said in the speech. "Many of us stay in the classroom — and we encourage this — but others attack the system in other ways, and we need that, too. Some will focus on housing, others on healthcare, some on the justice system. The truth is, we need all hands on deck."

True to Villanueva Beard's commitment to recognizing the cultural differences across the many regions in which TFA places corps members, the Mississippi Delta will become a hub for training TFA teachers headed to rural areas, where the demand for first-year teachers is much higher than in many cities, and where corps members will encounter a different type of poverty. A number of TFA's newest and highest-priority regional partnerships are in rural America, such as the Piedmont Triad in North Carolina; Pueblo, Colorado; Muskogee, Oklahoma; and on Indian reservations.

Last month, TFA announced that its latest class of 5,300 recruits is far more diverse than the American teaching profession as a whole. Only 17 percent of American teachers are non-white, but in 2014, 22 percent of TFA's corps is black, 13 percent are Latino, and a third identify as first-generation college students. One hundred of the new teachers are armed services veterans, and a third are recent graduate students or career-changers, not undergrads.

"We want to be clear about the rationale for diversity," said Winfield, the spokesperson. "It's not diversity for diversity's sake," but rather an acknowledgment that Teach for America's own internal research suggests that people of color and other nontraditional teachers had "an additional impact with their students. They were influencing them in ways studies don't always illuminate. Beyond math scores. Like maybe the students stayed after class to talk. There was a relationship."

Whether Teach for America can defend its reputation depends, in part, on how seriously it rethinks the way it prepares its corps members. TFA acknowledges that it takes much more than five weeks to fully train a teacher. Teaching requires both knowledge and skill: knowledge of subject matter like biology or history, and skill to impart it to students. Though the program has long been heralded as an alternative to hidebound education colleges, with their low admission standards and overly theoretical approach, the reality is that TFA's short training has replicated many of the problems seen in traditional programs. Like some college education departments, Teach for America's Institute has suffered from a lack of subject-specific training and from short student-teaching stints with much smaller class sizes than teachers are apt to encounter in the real world.

I saw some of these challenges when I observed the 2013 summer institute at the Hyde Leadership Charter School in the Bronx. On each day of the five-week program, 70 recruits were bussed to Hyde from college dormitories in Queens, arriving by 7 a.m. They supervised the kids' breakfast, then spent the morning teaching under the watchful eyes of mentors — generally young TFA alumni with just two or three years of classroom experience. The mentors flooded the newbies with advice: Speak louder. Move around the room. Stick to your lesson plan. In the afternoons, corps members attended workshops on topics like how to teach students who are learning English (use a lot of hand gestures, they were told, and it's okay to speak the child's native language on occasion — a useless strategy for corps members who were not proficient in their students' languages). Recruits then went back to the dorm and planned the next day's lessons.

The schedule was grueling. At the afternoon workshop on English-language learners, several corps members nodded off in the back of the room.

But looking at Samantha Arpino, a petite native Brooklynite with an eyebrow ring, a nose ring, and long, dark curls, you'd have never known she was tired. Arpino, a 2013 graduate of the state University at Albany, knelt on the floor in a floral-print dress, in front of five cross-legged black and Latino first-graders, all clad in the Hyde uniform of khaki pants and navy polo shirts. (Though she was training with a group of five kids, the average first-grade class size in the New York City public schools is 25.) Arpino spoke with the nasal, drawn-out vowels of a working-class New Yorker; she was the first in her family to attend college, and she is determined that her students will be the first in their families, too, she said.

The goal of the day's lesson was to help children understand that every story has a beginning, a middle, and an end. To do that, Arpino read the kids "Beanie and the Missing Bear." It was not great literature, but rather, a stapled-together, photocopied pamphlet designed to help young children understand the basic literary concepts outlined in the new Common Core standards: setting (a house), character (Beanie and her sister), and timeline (Beanie loses her teddy bear and finds it again). Every time Arpino introduced a new idea, she repeated herself several times in a sing-song voice, answering her own question. "I'm thinking," she said, tapping her temple with her index finger, "that this happens in the middle of the story. In what part of the story does this happen? The middle, the middle, the middle." This type of teacher-centric, repetitive pedagogy — sometimes called "direct instruction" — is a hallmark of TFA's strategy.

So is strict discipline. It was almost lunchtime, and the kids were yawning and fidgety. Arpino stopped every few minutes to enforce rules on how to sit. "I'm waiting for all my scholars to sit in criss-cross-applesauce!" she demanded, "with their hands folded and back straight. We have to grow our brains for first grade! Because why? Why do we grow our brains?"

"For second grade!" said Melvin.

"Yeah, but what's the big goal?" she asked.

"College!" cried a little girl named Chanel.

"Yes, college," Arpino repeated. "And then we can change the world."

Later on, I visited the fourth-grade math class of Tarik Walmsley, a lanky University of Washington graduate who was homeschooled at his students' age. Walmsley's lesson was on the idea that multiplication and division are inverse operations: that 8x2=16 and 16÷2=8. He passed out small plastic blocks and had the kids arrange them in various groupings: four groups of four blocks each, two groups of eight blocks each. Student behavior had been a challenge, Walmsley told me. One girl sometimes got up from her seat to dance across the classroom. A boy with a special-ed diagnosis could answer problems on paper, but had trouble speaking up in front of his classmates. On a quiz, he wrote Walmsley a note: "Teacher, you think I'm stupid, but I'm not."

On the wall was a chart showing a ladder, each level representing one behavioral demerit. Step 1 is a warning. At Step 3, a child is sent to the "icebox," an isolated chair at the back of the classroom. By Step 5, a parent is notified, and the child is removed from the classroom. Each student's name was written on a wooden clothespin, and as he or she accrued demerits, the pin moved up the ladder. Like Arpino with her kindergarteners, Walmsley spent an extraordinary amount of time policing how his fourth-graders sat. Were their eyes "tracking" the teacher? Were pencils resting in the pencil groove of the desk? He didn't hesitate to give demerits for small infractions. "Remember how I was talking about chocolate milk? How milk and chocolate are our products?" he asked the students, referencing the previous day's multiplication lesson. When a boy named Anthony answered, "Yes!" he earned a demerit for speaking out of turn. By the end of the period, Anthony's clothespin had moved up the ladder, and Anthony was sitting in the icebox, scowling.

Teach for America had offered Walmsley and Arpino a prescriptive set of directions on how to manage a classroom. The most important question about these strategies is whether they help kids learn. The research consensus suggests TFA corps members are about equally effective at raising students' test scores as teachers from all other pathways, though better in math than in reading and writing. A September 2013 study from Mathematica Policy Research found that TFA middle and high school math teachers outperform other math teachers in their schools, by the equivalent of students gaining 3 points on a 100-point test. Those results are not surprising; it has long been clear that math is the subject in which teachers' own education and knowledge matter most for kids. Teach for America actively seeks recruits who have been stellar students across the curriculum. That matters.

Yet education research calls some of the organization's core practices into question. One gray area is TFA's commitment to "no excuses" incentive-driven discipline strategies. When teachers provide constant, controlling behavioral feedback, as Arpino and Walmsley were being taught to do, they waste precious time they could be spending giving feedback related to the academic content of the lesson, which is far more powerful in terms of raising student achievement. In Visible Learning, a massive summary of research on how teachers and schools impact student achievement, scholar John Hattie writes that one of the challenges of training a new teacher is convincing him that "developing a strong desire to control student behavior can be inconsistent with implementing many conceptual approaches to teaching." What's more, TFA has long defended a relatively "content-neutral" approach to teacher training — despite persuasive research showing that methods courses in specific disciplines, like the teaching of science or the teaching of writing, help teachers improve student learning.

This evolution could add much-needed nuance to the debate about teaching and school reform in America

Loosey-goosey training is particularly ill suited to teachers who will be working with special education and English-language learner students. Today, 14 percent of Teach for America teachers are assigned to special ed, ELL, or bilingual classes, in part because the oversupply of teachers in many cities has created a glut in the more mainstream subject areas.

Teach for America trainers defend the program's reliance on "no excuses" discipline, saying it is the fastest way for corps members to learn to control a classroom, and that they are free to expand their disciplinary toolkit as their practice improves over time. (Of course, it is possible that corps members in the Bronx would have been able to learn more progressive discipline strategies had their instructional mentors been drawn from a broader pool of veteran teachers, beyond those who had participated in Teach for America themselves.) But at least on curricular content and special-ed training, TFA is taking the research evidence seriously. In another pilot program, new recruits in the Chicago region will receive training tailored to the subject area in which they will teach. In March, co-CEO Matt Kramer announced that Teach for America would launch a Special Education and Ability Initiative to provide corps members with additional training on working with these students.

Some education reformers — Teach for America allies — are concerned that the organization might dilute its core mission: to make it easier to attract the smartest young people into teaching, even if they are hesitant to make a big, life-changing commitment. "There is this notion that TFA becomes the Swiss Army knife of bringing teachers into the field. What TFA is talking about doing is great. But it would be a huge loss for TFA to abandon the role it has played," said Hess of the American Enterprise Institute.

According to Winfield, the TFA spokesperson, if the pilot programs are successful, the organization may expand them to reach many more, eventually maybe all, of their recruits. If so, the Teach for America of tomorrow could look almost nothing like the Teach for America of yesterday or today. Corps members would declare their intention to become teachers during their junior year of college and receive a full year of pre-service training, targeted toward the subject matter and student population they are likely to teach. In order to avoid the ways in which high teacher turnover harms student achievement, recruits would be encouraged to teach for three to five years, and given incentives to do so. They would be as likely to head to rural placements, where there are actual shortages of teachers, as to urban ones, where teachers are being laid off. And recruits would hear, from day one, that poverty is a devastating influence on the lives of students, and that no "superhero" teacher can solve the problem through data-driven instruction alone.

This evolution could add much-needed nuance to the entire debate about teaching and school reform in America. Teachers' skill and expertise do matter just as much as their youth and enthusiasm. Schools cannot function effectively if the adults who work within them are constantly rotating in and out. And the effect of poverty on education is neither a "myth" nor an "excuse," as it has sometimes been characterized by prominent school reformers.

"Teach For America deserves a ton of credit for its longstanding commitment to continuous improvement," said Michael Petrilli, president of the Fordham Institute, an education policy think tank. "This willingness to be honest, ask tough questions, and follow the data seems baked into the organization's DNA from the beginning."

Teach for America helped build today's no-excuses, high turnover, standards-and-accountability driven school reform movement. Now it might help to revise it, to transform it, and — yes — to reform it.

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13 Oct 19:02

O Brasil não é a Venezuela - 05/09/2014 - Luiz Carlos Mendonça - Colunistas - Folha de S.Paulo

Existe hoje um clima de quase pânico em parte da elite brasileira. Sou testemunha deste fato, pois, por dever profissional, tenho contato com um grande número desses desesperados. A leitura deste pessoal é a de que estamos caminhando celeremente para o mesmo caminho trilhado pela Argentina e pela Venezuela.

O leitor sabe que não concordo com essa leitura catastrofista por várias razões. Uma delas é que a recessão que vivemos hoje nada mais representa do que o caminho natural de toda a economia de mercado depois de um período de boom econômico, como o que vivemos entre 2004 e 2011. Esse ajuste foi evitado no início do mandato da presidenta Dilma pela aplicação de doses maciças de anabolizantes com alto conteúdo de expansão do crédito dos bancos públicos e aumento dos gastos do governo.

Entre 2004 e 2007 o crédito cresceu a uma taxa de 25% ao ano nos bancos privados e de 20% no caso dos bancos públicos. Entre 2007 e 2008, esta taxa acelerou-se para mais de 35% ao ano no segmento privado, com os bancos oficiais ficando para trás, crescendo apenas 20% ao ano.

Mas, a partir do agravamento da crise americana, no segundo semestre de 2008, essas posições se inverteram, com os bancos privados pisando no freio e trazendo a taxa de expansão de seus empréstimos para menos de 10% ao ano e os bancos oficiais expandindo suas operações a uma taxa que chegou a 40% nas vésperas das eleições de 2010.

Era o governo reagindo à crise externa e defendendo a eleição de sua candidata a presidente da República. Passadas as eleições, a política econômica do governo voltou à normalidade, com os bancos públicos reduzindo a taxa de expansão de suas operações para algo próximo a 20% ao ano, a mesma verificada então nos bancos privados.

Pois foi nesse momento que a queda da atividade passou a tomar conta da economia brasileira dentro de um processo natural de ajustes, como escrevi acima. O governo, em vez de aceitá-lo -e administrar esse ajuste-, decidiu aumentar suas apostas no crescimento do consumo e, mais uma vez, os bancos públicos foram chamados a agir.

As taxas anuais de crescimento de suas operações voltaram a crescer, chegando a 30% ao ano em 2013. Neste cenário, as vendas ao consumo aumentaram, dando a impressão de que a economia -como no passado- voltaria a responder positivamente aos mesmos anabolizantes.

Ledo engano, pois as condições eram outras e a inflação apareceu com força, obrigando o Banco Central a mudar o sinal de sua política monetária. Pressionado pelos efeitos de uma inflação que, mesmo com juros mais altos, ameaçava sair do controle, o governo jogou a toalha e, nos últimos meses, ordenou que os bancos públicos normalizassem suas operações.

Hoje a taxa de expansão caiu para 18% ao ano e deve continuar a desacelerar, seguindo a direção dos bancos privados, que vem expandindo suas operações a uma taxa modestíssima para nossos padrões, de 8% ao ano.

Volto agora ao início de minha coluna e reafirmo minha posição de que esta recessão que estamos vivendo é "ainda" fruto de um ajuste natural e benéfico de nossa economia. Com uma política econômica adequada, será questão de pouco tempo voltarmos ao leito natural de crescimento, que deve ser hoje da ordem de 3% ao ano. O que nos afasta de forma clara do mesmo caminho trilhado pela Venezuela e Argentina.

E parece que essa é também a leitura do mercado internacional de capitais, pois o Brasil teve uma demanda de US$ 4,8 bilhões para a emissão de US$ 500 milhões de títulos de dez anos de prazo anunciada há poucos dias. Aproveitando-se da situação em que as ofertas de compra representaram mais de nove vezes o valor da emissão, o Tesouro vendeu um total de US$ 1 bilhão, pagando juros anuais de 3,88%, ou seja, 1,4 ponto percentual mais do que o título equivalente do Tesouro americano.

Como eu, todos os compradores destes papéis -e de outros emitidos pelo governo brasileiro no exterior e aqui no país- estão longe da histeria dos brasileiros preocupados com nosso futuro de Venezuela.

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13 Oct 19:00

Is There Such A Thing As An Achievement?

A new essay from Ta-Nehisi Coates on his experience in learning French has drawn a lot of commentary about privilege. I specifically want to address a post from Freddie deBoer, because I think he brings clarity on some things, but I find his final conclusion that socialism is the only morally acceptable system wrong.

This is I think his core correct insight:

“There is no space where privilege ends and legitimate accomplishment begins.”

And this is the core flawed conclusion  he draws from this:

“Instead, we should recognize the folly of tying material security and comfort to our flawed perceptions of other people’s value…”

In all this discussion people are mostly talking about intellectual or economic achievements, but this isn’t the only kind. I think a useful way to think about these kinds of achievements is to contrast them to virtues.

We all have a spectrum of positive and negative factors, both nature and nurture, that affect our ability to achieve things. But we all face a similar spectrum of factors affecting our ability to be virtuous. If you give to charity, or volunteer a lot, or are a good father or husband, or are honest, or are kind, etc, is this about what you choose to do and the actions you choose to take, or about factors that are outside of your control? Are these behaviors just about how your parents raised you, the community you grew up in, and importantly, how behaving in these ways makes you feel? Why should moral accomplishments be chalked up to our free will and choices while economic and intellectual ones be “legitimate accomplishment”?

The answer is of course that the murkiness Freddie sees exists in all these areas. And yet, should we not praise good behavior? Should we stop praising honesty because, like work ethic of someone who finished med school, we can’t in a rigorous way distinguish when honesty is just a product of how they were brought up?

I would say no, in both cases we should praise the achievements and think of them as such. To me it is simply common sense we should praise honest people. I would say the same applies to those with economic and intellectual achievements, but to folks like Freddie that is not the case. Much like I don’t know how to explain to someone why telling the truth is praiseworthy if they don’t see it, I can’t really explain to Freddie why having a good work ethic or the other characteristics that help make someone economic or academically successful is praiseworthy if he doesn’t see it. I can only draw parallels and ask what the differences are.

But what I do think should be visible to all is that holding aside all of these philosophical difficulties, praising moral behavior and having an economic system that rewards the creation of economic value is instrumentally valuable. A world that praises charitable behavior despite humanity’s widely differing propensities for it means we have more charitable behavior and are all better off, including those without such propensities. And a world that rewards the creation of economic value despite humanity’s widely different propensities for it means we have more economic value and are all better off, including those without such propensities.

In other words, Freddie’s socialist dream is a bad idea even I can’t convince you it’s also immoral.

But this does not mean we should live in a harsh and unforgiving meritocracy. But nor should we accept that the murky nature of achievement and virtue implies that they don’t exist.  Instead, that murkiness of achievement should make us all somewhat sympathetic to those who do not, and make those who are be somewhat humble about it. It is a reason to be more privately charitable, and to embrace some redistribution and an economic safety net. It is not much of a case for socialism or the denial that praiseworthy behavior is possible.

English: Gold Medal of vancouver2010 English: Gold Medal of vancouver2010 (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
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17 Sep 20:26

Iraq: The Outlaw State by Max Rodenbeck

Frankenstein fi Baghdad [Frankenstein in Baghdad]

by Ahmed Saadawi

Cologne: Manshurat al-Jamal, 352 pp., $32.00

The Corpse Washer

by Sinan Antoon, translated from the Arabic by the author

Yale University Press, 185 pp., $22.00; $13.00 (paper)

The Corpse Exhibition and Other Stories of Iraq

by Hassan Blasim, translated from the Arabic by Jonathan Wright

Penguin, 196 pp., $15.00 (paper)

The Struggle for Iraq’s Future: How Corruption, Incompetence and Sectarianism Have Undermined Democracy

by Zaid al-Ali

Yale University Press, 295 pp., $35.00

rodenbeck_1-092514.jpg An image from Clanking of the Swords IV, a recent film by the Sunni jihadist guerrilla group that now calls itself the State of the Islamic Caliphate, on the border of Iraq and Syria
Show them death and they will accept a fever.
—Iraqi proverb

The title Clanking of the Swords IV brings to mind a cheap costume drama. Yet the horrors depicted in this hour-long film, a recent product of the media arm of a Sunni jihadist guerrilla group that now calls itself the State of the Islamic Caliphate ( SIC ), are no medieval fantasy. The snuff action is all too real.

As we watch the film, peering along the barrel of a machine gun poking out the rear window of an SUV , it is real live rounds we see spattering into the side of the white BMW we are overtaking, shredding its windows, presumably riddling its passengers with holes, and certainly sending it careening into the ditch beside this bland stretch of Iraqi highway. We accompany an actual hit squad on a nighttime raid to the home of a “collaborator.” We witness them capture, blindfold, and humiliate a portly middle-aged man in a light brown robe. They then cut off his head, an act which requires the knife-wielding killer to jump on the victim and ride him piggy-back, with the cameraman following this ungainly pair as they stagger around the bedroom. The film spares us the final gory moments; we cut to the man’s mustachioed head, successfully detached, parked on the bed.

There are scenes of mass executions: of a row of bound, kneeling men killed with single shots to the back of the head, or of others machine-gunned where they lie, already stretched out in their own shallow graves. Some of this is set in slow motion. In one of the most chilling sequences we follow another team of killers manning a false roadblock. They are in full US-style combat gear, mimicking a crack unit of the Iraqi army. Cars are pulled over, their occupants’ names checked against a database on a laptop computer. Some are then waved on. Other drivers, not so lucky, are politely asked to get out of their cars for a further check. With the camera following they are led into a field next to the roadside and shot dead.

The State of the Islamic Caliphate was known until June as ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). It has gained notoriety not only as a particularly ruthless and efficient operator among Iraq’s motley militias, a reputation it has extended to Syria since intruding into the neighboring country’s civil war in 2012. It is also the most media-savvy power in either theater. Advertisements such as the Clanking of the Swords series have helped it recruit an unmatched number of jihadist wannabes from around the world. Unlike the others, too, SIC ’s ambition is not merely to defend some cause but to seize territory, hold it, and build a full-fledged state of its own.

The SIC has been on a roll of late. In June it captured Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul, bagging an immense hoard of arms and loot and launching a drive, joined by other Sunni insurgents, toward the Iraqi capital, Baghdad. The group has since expanded its presence across both northern Iraq and eastern Syria, swallowing up rival rebel gangs and local militias along the way or strong-arming them into submission. It has challenged and in some cases routed the highly rated but thinly spread peshmerga forces of Iraqi Kurdistan. The SIC ’s estimated 10,000–20,000 armed adherents currently control a region with about the size and population of Indiana. Its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a former theology student, now styles himself a caliph.

The title, meaning literally the “successor” to the Prophet Muhammad, implies a claim to commanding all 1.6 billion Muslim faithful. Yet Baghdadi’s is a very particular, uncompromising brand of Sunni Islam. The SIC has “cleansed” the territories it controls of Shia Muslims and other supposed infidels, chasing out the last of Mosul’s once large and prosperous Christian community. It has hounded the Yazidis, members of an ancient syncretic faith, still more cruelly. The SIC ’s capture of their remote redoubt of Sinjar on August 3 prompted thousands of terrified Yazidis to flee into barren mountains. Reports of the mass execution of male villagers and the enslavement of Yazidi “devil worshipers,” as well as of starvation among refugees, raised an international outcry and spurred deepening America involvement in the Iraq crisis, including now-regular air strikes against SIC forces.

The SIC has also systematically destroyed tombs, temples, shrines, statues, and monuments that might hint at exalting anything other than the one true God. Some of the world’s most significant archaeological sites, including the great pre-Islamic Arab city of Hatra, with its magnificent temples to pagan gods, are at risk of destruction or plunder: aside from protection rackets and kidnap ransom, the SIC has developed a lucrative sideline in antiquities smuggling.

Sad to say, Baghdadi’s fusion of the homicidal and messianic is not without precedent in Iraq. The use of seemingly gratuitous cruelty as a form of display—as a talisman of godlike power and an advertisement of worldly success—has old roots here. Some can be traced just outside of Mosul in the fields of dusty ruins that mark the sites of Nineveh and Nimrud, great cities of the ancient Assyrian empire.

For centuries before its collapse in 612 BC , Assyria controlled the upper plains between the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, a span of flat, semiarid, and hard-to-defend terrain that is possibly the most often fought-over patch of real estate on the planet, and that happens to be remarkably similar to the SIC ’s present domain. Assyria’s perpetual rival and eventual nemesis was Babylon, a kingdom that, rather like the rump Iraq now held by the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, centered on the lower reaches of the two rivers. Just as today the area around Baghdad (the city was not founded until the eighth century AD ) formed an uneasy border between them.

What stands out in the iconography of the Assyrian kingdom is its unusually frequent and detailed depiction of extreme violence. Again and again we find muscle-bound Assyrians doing terrible things to captives: slitting throats, lopping off limbs and heads, impaling, flaying alive, dis- playing corpses and body parts atop city walls. Just as in the SIC ’s propaganda, too, the smashing of enemy idols provides another common theme.

The British Museum, which houses a spectacular collection of Assyrian art, devotes an entire gallery to reliefs from the palace of Ashurbanipal at Nineveh. The image that draws most comment is a small domestic scene showing the king relaxing with his queen in a garden as a musician strums on a harp. They sit in the shade of a tree decorated with an eye-catching ornament: the severed head of a troublesome neighboring king.

In short, the country that is now Iraq—although alas not, perhaps, for much longer in its current shape—is no stranger to the ghoulish and macabre. The Mongols, famously, built pyramids of skulls when they pillaged and razed Baghdad in 1258 and again in 1401. It was in Iraq in the 1920s that Britain introduced newer, cheaper methods for keeping unruly natives under control, such as chemical weapons and aerial “terror” bombings. Saddam Hussein’s three-decade-long Republic of Fear, with its gassing of Kurdish villagers, grotesque tortures, and mass slaughter of dissidents, made the later American jailers of Abu Ghraib look downright amateur.

The SIC captures the headlines, but the group is hardly alone in its viciousness. In recent years Shia gangs have proved no less cruel than such Sunni rivals, one small example being the puritan vigilantes who have regularly and murderously attacked sex workers in Baghdad. The carnage from a raid on a brothel in the district of Zayuna on July 12 included twenty-eight prostitutes and six of their clients. In another incident on July 30, Shia militias in the town of Baaquba, northeast of Baghdad, executed fifteen Sunni men they had earlier kidnapped, strung their corpses on electricity poles, and for several days refused to let medical teams remove them.

Such atrocities represent average daily tolls for violent death in Iraq, where the total of civilian dead since the American invasion of 2003 has almost certainly mounted well beyond 100,000—no one really knows. The postwar sectarian bloodletting reached a flood in 2006–2007, as Shia death squads sought revenge for the bombing of a revered Shia shrine by one of the SIC ’s Sunni precursors. Under the impact of ceaseless bombings and tit-for-tat assassinations, Baghdad, once a pixelation of faiths, forcibly rearranged itself into monochrome sectarian blocs divided by grim concrete walls. Following a merciful lowering of the tempo of violence that lingered into 2013, the awful daily drumbeat has again quickened. Instead of wobbling slowly to recovery, a wounded Iraq has found itself staggering into new and possibly worse dangers.

Against this background it is not surprising to find contemporary Iraqi writers responding, like others before them in countries fated to prolonged periods of extreme stress, with a mix of black humor and gloomily whimsical fantasy. The winner of this year’s International Prize for Arabic Fiction (sometimes referred to as the Arabic Booker Prize), the Iraqi author Ahmed Saadawi, is a case in point. His novel Frankenstein in Baghdad recounts the tale of a ragpicker who, angered by the lack of respect paid to the corpses accumulating from repeated suicide bombings and massacres, begins to collect unwanted body parts and sew them together. His nameless creation comes to life and becomes a sort of superhero, wreaking vengeance on behalf of its component victims. But then, disturbingly, this “Shismu,” or Whatsit, discovers that it requires fresh flesh for its own survival.

Not much of such work—and none of Saadawi’s—has come into English. One fine exception is The Corpse Washer, ably translated by the author himself, Sinan Antoon, a New York–based Iraqi poet. His novel relies more on poetic allusion than magic realism. Antoon strains to capture Iraq’s tragedy in the person of his central character, a talented young artist who abandons his vocation to carry on his father’s trade preparing Shia cadavers for burial. Departures of family and friends through death or exile leave him increasingly hopeless and alone. A single pomegranate tree that stands in the courtyard of the washhouse, watered by the runoff from washing corpses, becomes a metaphor for Iraq.

Grim ironies permeate the short stories of Hassan Blasim, another Iraqi exile, but he shows a lighter touch. Although the ones chosen for The Corpse Exhibition, a selection from two earlier collections superbly translated by Jonathan Wright, are of uneven quality, Blasim, who has lived in Finland since 2004, can at his best be subtly and powerfully evocative. Revealed from a shifting array of perspectives, his characters are without exception flawed and often deeply scarred. In one story Blasim tangentially notes the impatience felt by a group of street kids for another public execution: they want a proper pair of goals for their soccer field but have only three posts, so they need the firing squad to leave behind one last bloodied wooden stake for them to steal.

rodenbeck_2-092514.jpg Magnum Photos A US soldier riding a donkey belonging to inhabitants of an isolated village in Nineveh, Iraq, where they had never seen an American patrol, 2006; photograph by Peter van Agtmael from his book Disco Night Sept. 11, published by Red Hook Editions

The setting for “The Song of the Goats” is a Baghdad radio contest for the most poignant real-life stories, which draws a ferociously competitive crowd. Pushing and shoving, they deride each other’s tales as not sufficiently grotesque or heartbreaking, making for an obliquely dark parody of the story-within-a-story narrative device of the Thousand and One Nights.

One of these brief, barely sketched would-be entries may serve to give a flavor of Blasim’s bleak humor:

The man with the beard was a teacher who went to the police one day to report on a neighbor who was trading in antiquities stolen from the National Museum. The police thanked him for his cooperation. The teacher, his conscience relieved, went back to his school. The police submitted a report to the Ministry of Defense that the teacher’s house was an al Qaeda hideout. The police were in partnership with the antiquities smuggler. The Ministry of Defense sent the report to the US Army, who bombed the teacher’s house by helicopter. His wife, his four children, and his elderly mother were killed. The teacher escaped with his life, but he suffered brain damage and lost his arms.

In another country such a story might be thought fantastical. In Iraq it could well be true; fiction here seems merely to be more concise than fact.

So one might conclude from a very different kind of book, Zaid al-Ali’s well-researched study of how Iraq has gotten into its current, worsening, and possibly terminal mess. The Struggle for Iraq’s Future is not a pretty story. Indeed it seems to be populated entirely by villains, from Saddam Hussein to criminally stupid or negligent American occupiers to the rapacious, self-serving, bloody-minded, and frequently murderous group of Iraqi politicians who have insinuated themselves into power in the Americans’ wake.

Born to an exiled Iraqi diplomat in 1977 and trained as a lawyer, Ali arrived in Baghdad, like many other hopeful Iraqi returnees following the 2003 invasion, with the idea of doing something for his country. After six years working both inside the government and with foreign aid projects, he concluded that it was a waste of time “trying to assist a state that was led by the worst elements in society.” It was not a total waste: Ali’s analytical clarity and his inside knowledge fill the gap in understanding Iraq that, for non-Iraqis at least, has widened markedly since America pulled out of its misadventure, abruptly withdrawing its last occupation troops in December 2011.

Ali proves his case with lawyerly aplomb. What he shows is that while history may have dealt Iraq a hard hand, and perhaps also subtly inculcated destructive pathologies of power and violence, the terrible failure of post-invasion Iraq is mostly a product of specific policy choices made by particular individuals. He devotes early chapters to a brief résumé of the modern country’s sad history. In this telling the 2003 occupation represents less a starting point than a punctuation mark in a slow but wretchedly steady decline.

Even by the standards of Iraq’s turbulent history, its past few decades have been unusually relentless. Just since 1980 Iraqis have experienced three major wars that wrecked the country’s physical infrastructure and left perhaps half a million dead; an attempt at genocide that permanently alienated Iraq’s five million Kurds; a ten-year siege under the UN’s “Oil-for-Food” program that devastated the economy, ruined the middle class, and forced the most talented into exile; an American invasion that shattered national pride and stoked bitter divisions; and a civil war that displaced as many as 4.7 million Iraqis from their homes and has driven a deep, perhaps irreparable chasm of mistrust between Iraq’s 60 percent Shia Arab majority and the once-dominant 20 percent Sunni Arab minority. Excepting perhaps the Russians from 1914 to 1953, few modern nations have been so cursed by ill luck for such an extended period.

Ali quickly dispenses with the blinding folly of Iraq’s post-invasion American administrators, a matter already devastatingly explored by authors such as Rajiv Chandrasekaran in his incomparable Imperial Life in the Emerald City. The occupation’s biggest mistakes are well known. Among them were its disbanding of the Iraqi army (which left a giant security vacuum and swelled the ranks of the unemployed with hundreds of thousands of trained soldiers and disgruntled officers), the institution of sweeping “de-Baathification” (which gutted the government’s administrative apparatus and became a tool for petty vindictiveness), and the application of sectarian and party quotas for public office (which aggravated tensions and turned government bureaus into party fiefdoms).

A more original contribution is Ali’s dissection of the Iraqi political class, who by his reckoning bear an equal if not bigger share of blame. The original sin by this account was the indulgence by the Americans of a select group of exiles based not on competence or on their popularity within Iraq but rather on subjective criteria. The anointed few were either those “most willing to engage in moral compromise” with “unrepentant and ideologically driven US officials” or those who happened to enjoy the backing of other foreign powers, including Iran.

Many among this new elect had not only scant understanding of their own wounded country but no experience of management, let alone of governance. “What was he doing all those years in Damascus?” asked a rival Iraqi politician in an interview with me last year, describing the decades spent in the Syrian capital by Nouri al-Maliki, the long-serving prime minister who on August 14 at last relinquished power to a party colleague and fellow Shiite Islamist, Haider al-Abadi. Maliki, sniffed his rival, “was nothing but a party hack sitting in Sayeda Zeinab [a poor district that houses an important Shia shrine] scribbling reports for Syrian intelligence.”

The skills at which such exiles excelled were not administrative, but of personal survival and party intrigue. The effects of this were soon felt. The American-initiated expedient of dividing responsibilities among parties became increasingly consecrated by practice. Yet not only did each political player attempt to carve out a part of the government pie. For the sake of “national unity” each administrative office had to reflect unspoken quotas: a Shia minister, for instance, was required to have both Sunni and Kurdish deputies, with all three ostensibly able to veto policy. The result was a legislative and administrative logjam, a “frozen republic” in which vital laws were never debated or issued, and policies neither coherently articulated nor executed.

Ali devotes an illuminating chapter to the rushed effort to draft and ratify the new constitution that was promulgated in 2005. By his telling a fatal mix of influences guaranteed a skewed outcome: American haste to show some positive achievement; the Republican administration’s zeal to shrink the role of the state; deal-making between Iraqi politicians who saw the exercise as chiefly a division of spoils; the eagerness of the Kurds to weaken the central government in favor of federal regions; and the disgruntled obstinacy of the newly disempowered Sunni Arab minority, which largely boycotted the process.

Among numerous constitutional flaws was a clause that vaguely designated the prime minister commander in chief of the army: “Though the drafters did not even realize it, the constitution’s lack of clarity turned the keys of the kingdom over to whoever occupied that particular position,” says Ali. Not surprisingly, Maliki, who was widely considered a weak compromise candidate when he was brought into power in 2005, subsequently exploited this loophole to the full. Fearing plots, he simply filled the crucial posts of interior and defense minister himself, running them as fiefdoms for his family, cronies, and associates of his masterfully misnamed State of Law coalition.

On paper most powers were meant to devolve to provinces rather than the central government. Yet it was to Baghdad that Iraq’s income from oil, representing 97 percent of government revenue, flowed and from where it was disbursed. This gave Maliki and his allies immense power to give or withhold favors. Iraq’s agenda for development thus became almost completely subservient to political interests, with catastrophic effects for the crumpled infrastructure. More than a decade after America’s invasion, despite billions spent to restore the country’s battered electricity grid, the only part of Iraq with anything close to a regular power supply was the Kurdish autonomous region. On more than one occasion, reports Ali, Iraqis have shown their appreciation of the absurd, protesting with mock funeral processions behind the “coffin” of electricity.

Corruption has naturally flourished in such conditions, but so have other ills. While Maliki, in a fashion reminiscent of Saddam Hussein, rewarded loyal Shia tribal chiefs with gold-plated revolvers, foes of the prime minister found their followers cut out of government jobs and contracts in a country where the state employs 60 percent of the formal workforce.

Maliki repeatedly dispatched loyalist security thugs to harass Sunni political opponents, or had them prosecuted as “terrorists” by a compliant judiciary. The sense of being not only denied a fair share but punished for complaining has fueled growing Sunni despair, to the point that when a long-smoldering Sunni rebellion erupted into war in June many Sunnis were willing to suspend their horror of the SIC as long as it advanced their cause.

As Ali points out, the flawed constitutional arrangement and its abuse by those in power helped to institutionalize sectarian differences:

Previously, sectarianism had been the principle on which the country’s new political order was established, and the mechanism that political parties had used to place their members in senior ministerial positions. But by 2011, sectarianism had acquired two different functions. First, it was used by politicians to deflect attention from their own dire performance.
Second, in the absence of genuine progress on the standard of living, government officials and their associates sometimes suggested that at least sectarian “interests” were being protected and promoted. Sectarianism had thus become the only line of defence in the face of state failure and the only objective worth pursuing: the achievement that excused all the failures of the past.

Ali wisely avoids placing blame on Maliki alone. Not only was Iraq’s strongman held in place by a peculiar ability to persuade two major but ostensibly deeply antagonistic foreign powers, America and Iran, of his indispensability. Despite their noisy opposition and often heartfelt disgust, Iraq’s other politicians were too lazy, too divisive, and too eager to capture a share of spoils to contest his domination effectively. For all Maliki’s incompetence as an administrator or as a military leader—the initial collapse of Iraq’s costly and overmanned military in the face of the SIC being all the proof needed—he proved masterful at the art of divide-and-rule.

Constant and fearsome violence has obviously added hugely to Iraq’s woes. Much of Iraq’s managerial class has by now, like Ali himself, simply abandoned ship. He describes a frustrating meeting in 2007 between European donors and a top official in the Ministry of Planning, who ends by confessing that he has no personnel left who might qualify for the professional training the Europeans offer. Yet it is shocking how feebly Iraq’s government has confronted the challenge from terrorists.

Following the American withdrawal in 2011, for instance, Maliki quickly reneged on a promise to maintain funding for local Sunni militias that had by 2008 largely succeeded in checking jihadist violence. The move not only set off protests in Sunni-majority areas where the vigilantes’ government salaries had become a mainstay of the local economy, but prepared the way for a return of Sunni extremist terror. Another example: despite enormous funding and manpower, and a crippling proliferation of checkpoints, Iraq’s multiple security agencies have failed to address the devastating menace of car bombings in Baghdad by the simple expedient of monitoring automotive workshops around the city.

Ali devotes his opening pages to one notorious example of such incompetence, the Iraqi government’s lavishing of some $85 million on the import and deployment of wand-like “bomb-detection” equipment. Even after a BBC investigation determined conclusively that the British-made devices were bogus; even after British and Iraqi courts sentenced both the manufacturer’s owner and the Iraqi official who had ordered them to stiff prison terms, Maliki continued publicly to insist that the $50,000 gadgets were effective. It was more important to save face, to sustain the illusion of mastery, than to admit reality.

The departure of Maliki, whose overstay of his welcome made him a sponge for dissent, could offer a window for reconciliation. Mainstream Sunni and Kurdish leaders, as well as some Shiites, had long demanded his exit. Yet the litany of failure that Ali describes is simply too long and wide-reaching to leave much room for optimism. Ali’s own concluding suggestions for how to right things seem sadly perfunctory. He also betrays, in occasional oversweeping judgments and in a peculiar lack of sympathy with the Kurdish yearning for independence (which seems only more justified by the ugly facts he himself reveals), an impractical wistfulness for an imaginary, whole, and complete Iraq.

What came to mind as I closed the book was the damning remark of a distinguished Iraqi exile I met in Kuwait shortly before the 2003 invasion. His father had served as prime minister under the monarchy whose overthrow in the bloody coup of 1958 had led to Iraq’s long era of turbulence. Still, he took a dim view of the looming ouster of Saddam Hussein, and held no dreams of return. “Of course the Americans will get rid of Saddam,” he said. “But what will we have then? A thousand little Saddams.”

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11 Sep 11:53

Quote For The Day II

by Andrew Sullivan

“[It is] easy for us to provoke and bait this administration. All that we have to do is to send two mujahidin to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-Qaeda, in order to make the generals race there and cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses. … This is in addition to our having experience in using guerrilla warfare and the war of attrition to fight tyrannical superpowers, as we, alongside the mujahidin, bled Russia for 10 years, until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat,” – Osama bin Laden, 2004.

10 Sep 22:23

Final Chapter of Cash Seizure Series a Repulsive Accounting of Police Misbehavior

by Scott Shackford

"I sense a 50 percent increase in overtime claims coming."On Monday I noted The Washington Post had put together a series of stories offering a deep look at the abuse by law enforcement agencies across the country of civil asset forfeiture laws and how they’ve been able to line their pockets with citizens’ money without ever actually proving said citizens had committed any crime.

The final chapter is, as teased, a collection of terrible stories of American citizens who happen to be transporting cash being stopped by law enforcement officers for relatively minor reasons and conclude with these people having said cash taken away from them. Here’s just one of several stories highlighted:

Matt Lee of Clare, Mich., got snared in an interdiction net in 2011 on Interstate 80 in Humboldt County, Nev. Lee was a 31-year-old college graduate who had struggled to find work and had moved back in with his parents to save money. When a friend promised him an entry-level job as a sales rep at a photo studio in California, Lee’s father, a postal employee, loaned him $2,500 in cash and Lee drove west in a decade-old Pontiac Bonneville.

On his third day, Lee was passing through the Nevada desert, wearing aviator sunglasses. A sheriff’s deputy raced up alongside the Bonneville, stared at Lee and then pulled him over.

Humboldt County Sheriff’s Deputy L.A. Dove, a member of the K-9 drug interdiction unit, has received instruction from the 4:20 Group, a contractor for the DEA and one of the leading interdiction trainers in the country.

Dove asked whether Lee was carrying any currency and summoned a K-9 officer. Dove told Lee, who is white, to get out of the car and stand at the edge of the desert, while a dog sniffed for drugs. The deputy told Lee that he didn’t believe his story that he was moving to California, because he was carrying so little baggage, Lee told The Post. Lee has no criminal record.

When a search turned up Lee’s remaining $2,400 in cash, Dove and his colleague exchanged high-fives, Lee said. Dove said he was taking the money under state law because he was convinced that Lee was involved in a drug run. Lee was left with only the $151 in his pocket.

Lee got an attorney and eventually they agreed to give him his money back. But his attorney ended up taking half in fees.

For other cases, when challenged, officials offer to give the citizen half the money they’ve taken back if their victim will shut up and go away. Another victim, despite winning his battle and getting all his money back (and forcing the government to pay his legal fees) still ended up screwed over. The seized cash was to be used for costs of operating his small Virginia restaurant. Without the money, he ended up having to shut it down during the course of fighting for his property back.

Read the full story here. That at least nobody got beaten or shot is about the best you can say about the tales.

10 Sep 22:21

“The Wife’s Resentment”: On Security in Marriage

by Madison Brewer

Hogarth_marriagealamodedetailThis post, and several others to appear in due course, are generously sponsored by a gentleman-scholar from County San Francisco, supportive of the production and assessment of nasty novels, dealing familiarly with gamblers, misandrists and flashy reprobates. Said gentleman-scholar has re-upped his donation, so keep pitching me, academics longing for freedom.

When I came across recent debates about marriage and the security supposedly felt by married women versus her unmarried peers on my newsfeed, the oddest thought crept into my mind: how would the many literary married femme fatales I’ve read about this past year react to these discussions? After all, early narratives about these married women often depict the husband as a man who seems perfect at first but will later prove to be unfaithful or utterly useless in fulfilling his responsibility to his wife. What makes these narratives a comfort to read alongside my newsfeed has nothing to do with the husband getting what the femme fatale believed to be his just desserts. I think there is something to be said about fiction that may be centuries old, but can still offer incredible insight into current events, and these diabolical women and their stories are no exception. I began to recall lectures about early femme fatales and noticed that motive and cultural influence were almost always underlined as important factors to consider, whether in reading a piece of fiction or a real court case (1). Centuries later, this rule of thumb still applies. 

It dawned on me that humanity has been both fascinated and appalled by violence for centuries—and if the countless shows like Criminal Minds and True Detective have anything to say about it—our thirst has only increased.  While these shows are addicting, this past year my curiosity has been held hostage by the titillating history and bodily narratives of Murderesses in British prose—specifically, women who are victims of unspeakable crimes without a prayer for justice. For the better part of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, servants of Divine law and civic duty demarcated the rare Murderess, denying her social representation and condemning her as inconceivably genderless and virtueless. As a budding Murderess scholar, I know these historic jezebels were hardly silenced by the foolish decision of the British courts to regard them as less than human. Like every story murder requires a narrative and emerging prose writers in the eighteenth century rose to the occasion. Among these authors was political satirist and rogue female spy Delariviere Manley, whose political endeavors and taste for scandal informed her biting critiques of sovereign rule during her lifetime. 

What fascinates me is Manley’s particular portrayal of sexual political scandal of the discarded woman, which revealed the innate complexity of the femme fatale criminal mind. In one such allegorical short story, “The Wife’s Resentment,” (1720) Manley readapts a fifteenth century tale of a virtuous maiden she names Violenta and a virtueless knight, Seignior Roderigo. Because England forbade any artist from criticizing her majesty’s rule, Manley had to pen this 12-page manuscript as a pseudo deposition set in another country to avoid accusations of libel. In this limited space, Violenta’s narrative weaves in graphic detail a series of horrific events that indicts the public’s compassion towards the knight/play-boy as opposed to emphasizing the condemnation of the murderess. What also separates Manley’s piece from murderess court cases is her inclusion of a public confession that is all too hard to ignore by the Duke and the public:

“Think not, most noble Duke,” added she, “that I have given you this plain relation to move your pity and prolong my life; I could for ever have escaped your justice, if I had so intended! my purpose was to have my honor as publicly cleared as it was aspersed (emphasis mine); for a terror to all young virgins, how they receive the addresses of persons so greatly above them; and to warn them how they consent to a clandestine marriage, as I have done, by which I am this day brought to ruin. I hold myself unworthy to live, after being stained with blood; though that blood was shed to wash away my stain. So far am I from desiring life that I cannot endure to live. I beg death of your justice…”(2) 

One could argue that Violenta’s crime doesn’t just represent the righteous, passionate anger of a God-fearing woman. Two sentences into her confession, Violenta holds the public partially accountable for Roderigo’s murder because of their tolerance of his debauchery and their monotonous gossip over her lost honor. In essence, her crime served as proportional response to her loss of public value and introduced a central problem with society: that value is ascribed to the wealthy play-boy because his appearance suggests eminent quality rather than ascribed to the virtuous woman because her appearance suggests poor stock. A problem, I’d like to add, that still exists today. 

To emphasize this point, Violenta’s tale doesn’t begin with the virtuous maid but with a hyperbolic depiction of Valencia and their virtueless knight. On the one hand, Valencia prides itself on being the esteemed seat for justice, faith and humanity. But on the other hand, the public doesn’t reprimand Roderigo for his unseemly behavior. On the contrary, “he was [just] so handsome, so rich, and of such eminent quality, that he still found a favorable reception amongst the ladies; each one imagining that her charms were sufficient to make a convert of him.” Use to a welcoming invitation into any woman’s embrace, Roderigo is disarmed by Violenta and her unyielding withdraw from his pursuit. His violent passion for her that can only be characterized as stalking, even forces Violenta to alter the place and hour of prayer every day and cause her to threaten to enter into the cloister if he won’t give it a rest. Meanwhile, outside of the one agent who warns Roderigo from the very beginning that Violenta is “not for his Lordship’s turn […]; her wit was more commended than her beauty, for she could both read and write, in which she took extreme delight,” no one in this reclusive province comes to Violenta’s aid or condemns Roderigo and his attempts to secure her chastity.   

Read more “The Wife’s Resentment”: On Security in Marriage at The Toast.

10 Sep 20:57

Why can't we use technology to solve social problems?

Not long after the Apollo landing, a prevalent cliche for a few years was "If we can put humans on the moon, why can't we....[insert prominent social problem such as starvation, epidemic, radical inequalities, etc.]? In 1980, in his book "Critical Path," Buckminster Fuller wrote:

"We are blessed with technology that would be indescribable to our forefathers. We have the wherewithal, the know-it-all to feed everybody, clothe everybody, and give every human on Earth a chance. We know now what we could never have known before-that we now have the option for all humanity to "make it" successfully on this planet in this lifetime."

In the contemporary zeitgeist, Fuller's claims seem naively utopian. The past century saw too much misery resulting from the attempts to build utopias. But without the belief that human civilization can improve, how could we have arrived at the point where we can formulate questions like these and exchange them around the world at the speed of light?

There are several obvious choices for answers to the question of why this question isn't asked any more:

1. We might have been able to put humans on the moon in 1969, but not today. Good point. And the reason for this circumstance — lack of political will, and the community of know-how it took NASA a decade to assemble, not lack of technical capabilities — is instructive.

2. Technology actually has solved enormous social problems — antibiotics, hygienic plumbing, immunization, the green revolution. I agree with this, and see it as evidence that it is possible to relieve twice as much, a thousand times as much human misery as previous inventions.

3. Human use of technologies have created even greater social problems — antibiotics are misused and supergerms evolved; nuclear wastes and weapons are threats, not enhancements; the green revolution swelled the slums of the world as agricultural productivity rose and global agribiz emerged.

4. There is no market for solving social problems, and it isn't the business of government to get into the technology or any other kind of business. This is the fallacy of the excluded middle. Some technologies such as the digital computer and the Internet were jump-started by governments, evolved through grassroots enthusiasms, and later become industries and "new economies."

5. Throwing technology at problems can be helpful, but the fundamental problems are political and economic and rooted in human nature. This answer should not be ignored. A tool is not the task, and often the invisible, social, non-physical aspects of a technological regime make all the difference.

There's some truth to each of these answers, yet they all fall short because all assume that we know how to think about technology. Just because we know how to make things doesn't guarantee that we know what those things will do to us. Or what kind of things we ought to make.

What if we don't know how to think about the tools we are so skilled at creating? What if we could learn?

Perhaps knowing how to think about technology is a skill we will have to teach ourselves the way we taught ourselves previous new ways of thinking such as mathematics, logic, and science.

A few centuries ago, a few people began questioning the assumption that people knew how to think about the physical world. Neither philosophy nor religion seemed to be able to stave off famine and epidemic. The enlightenment was about a new method for thinking.

Part of that new method was the way of asking and testing questions known as science, which provided the knowledge needed to create new medicines, new tools, new weapons, new economic systems.

We learned how to think very well about the physical world, and how to unleash the power in that knowledge. But perhaps we have yet to learn how to think about what to do with our tools.

HOWARD RHEINGOLD is author of The Virtual Community, Virtual Reality, Tools for Thought. Founder of Electric Minds, named by Time magazine one of the ten best web sites of 1996. Editor of The Millennium Whole Earth Catalog.

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10 Sep 18:55

Markets in everything: High-tech, sensor-based trash collection saves up to 50% compared to the traditional system

by Mark J. Perry

Here’s a good example of both creative destruction and the invisible hand – Enevo ONe, a Finnish startup, is disrupting the waste management industry with a new, innovative sensor-based trash management system. Here’s how it works (from the company’s website):

Enevo ONe is a comprehensive logistics solution that saves time, money and the environment. It uses wireless sensors to measure and forecast the fill-level of waste containers and generates smart collection plans using the most efficient schedules and routes. The solution provides up to 50% in direct cost savings.

Until now collecting waste has been done using static routes and schedules where containers are collected every day or every week regardless if they are full or not. Enevo ONe changes all this by using smart wireless sensors to gather fill-level data from waste containers. The service then automatically generates schedules and optimized routes which take into account an extensive set of parameters (future fill-level projections, truck availability, traffic information, road restrictions etc.). New schedules and routes are planned not only looking at the current situation, but considering the future outlook as well.

Here’s a Forbes article with some background on how the company got started — the same way most successful companies get started — when Finnish entrepreneur Fredrik Kekalainen had a “eureka moment.”  And most of those “eureka moments” are perfect examples of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” concept, because entrepreneurs only become successful and rich in the marketplace by figuring out ways to make other people better off through better products or services, cheaper products or services, or new products and services that improve the lives of others. If things work out, entrepreneurs like Fredrik Kekalainen get rich, but their personal wealth is usually only a fraction of the social benefits that they generate collectively for the rest of society. By pursuing their own self-interest (and their desire to become wealthy) entrepreneurs like Fredrik are led by an “invisible hand” to make the rest of us better off. And that’s the miracle of the marketplace that Steven Landsburg described Armchair Economist - the amazing phenomenon that individually selfish behavior leads to collectively efficient outcomes.

HT: Jon Murphy

10 Sep 14:08

Michael Schumacher deixa hospital depois de 254 dias internado - Esportes - Estadão

O Estado de S. Paulo

09 Setembro 2014 | 10h 52

Segundo a empresária do ex-piloto, fato está ligado à evolução do quadro clínico nas últimas semanas; tratamento continuará em casa 

Pouco mais de dois meses depois de conseguir se comunicar com os olhos, Michael Schumacher deu outra grande notícias ao fãs nesta terça-feira. O heptacampeão mundial de Fórmula 1 deixou o hospital em que estava internado, em Lausanne, na Suíça. Segundo Sabine Khem, empresária do alemão, o fato está ligado à evolução do quadro clínico nas últimas semanas.

"Daqui em diante, a reabilitação de Michael vai ser feita em sua casa. Considerando as graves lesões sofridas por ele, houve algum progresso nas últimas semanas e meses", afirmou a assessora, em comunicado.

De acordo com ela, porém, a recuperação ainda será longa e difícil. No total, o ex-piloto, que se acidentou no dia 29 de dezembro do ano passado, ficou 254 dias internado - foram 189 dias em coma, no hospital de Grenoble, na França. 

Caren Firouz/Reuters - 11/03/2006 Schumacher continuará tratamento em casa oito meses depois do acidente

"Queremos mostrar nossa gratidão a todo o time do CHUV Lausanne pelo competente trabalho. Nós pedimos que a privacidade da família de Michael continue a ser respeitada e que as especulações sobre seu estado de saúde sejam evitadas", disse Sabine.

Schumacher teve graves lesões na cabeça poucas horas depois do acidente que sofreu nos Alpes franceses, na estação de esqui de Meribel, onde o capacete que usava chegou a rachar por causa do forte impacto que teve com uma rocha no momento da queda. Com o alemão em estado grave, os médicos optaram por colocá-lo em coma induzido, para que seu cérebro pudesse repousar e que a inflamação e inchaço no local fossem reduzidas.

O heptacampeão também foi operado para eliminação de coágulos de sangue, mas alguns deles estavam muito profundos. Por isso, ainda é uma incógnita a sua situação neurológica. Aposentado pela segunda e última vez em 2012, Schumacher ostenta um recorde 91 vitórias na Fórmula 1. O ex-piloto, sua esposa e o filho de 14 anos, que estava presente na hora do acidente, moram na Suíça.

CONFIRA A NOTA NA ÍNTEGRA

Daqui em diante, a recuperação de Michael Schumacher acontecerá em sua casa. Considerando as graves lesões sofridas no acidente, houve progresso nas últimas semanas. Contudo, ainda há um longo e difícil caminho pela frente.

Gostaríamos de estender nossa gratidão a toda a equipe do Centro Hospitalar Universitário de Vaud, por seu trabalho minucioso e competente.

Pedimos que a privacidade da família de Michael continue a ser respeitada, e que as especulações sobre seu estado de saúde sejam evitadas.

As informações a seguir devem ser consideradas como complementares:

- Não se deve presumir que grandes mudanças em seu estado de saúde foram as razões para a mudança no local do tratamento.

- Não houve qualquer obra em sua residência para tornar esta mudança possível.

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10 Sep 14:02

A guerra ideológica de Haddad

by Tiago de Thuin
Adam Victor Brandizzi

Faz muito sentido.

O texto não é meu, tirei de um tópico no Skyscrapercity, mas curti. Sobre as críticas ao jeito improvisado e muitas vezes falho das ciclovias sendo construídas em São Paulo:

http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?p=117241922#post117241922




O improviso era esperado, e ele existe porque na verdade a prefeitura está numa corrida contra o tempo. Uma corrida ideológica. 


E nessa corrida, o resultado só pode ser assim nas coxas mesmo.


Explico:

1 - Existe uma ideologia cultural forte em São Paulo completamente anti-bicicleta, anti-pedestre, anti-tudo que não seja colocar o automóvel em um pedestal. 

2 - Qualquer outro político de São Paulo que não seja da esquerda petista ou pior, não vai fazer belas ciclovias permanentes, bem projetadas, tirando para sempre o espaço dos carros. Na verdade NÃO-VAI-FAZER-CICLOVIA-NENHUMA.

No máximo, como era a política até então, ciclofaixas DE LAZER, pois "bicicleta é somente lazer excêntrico de fim de semana. Dia-dia é carro, pois faz calor, tem ladeira e blablabla".


3 - Então a corrida contra o tempo é DAR O DIREITO A LOCOMOÇÃO POR BICICLETAS NA MAIOR EXTENSÃO POSSÍVEL, para que uma parte da população SE APOSSE DESSE DIREITO, de forma que depois ninguém consiga tirar dela.


A meta é entregar logo esses 400 km de ciclovias para que a próxima gestão seja obrigada a cuidar delas (apesar dos protestos dos super-coxinhas que vão querer a remoção da maioria). 

Se a meta fosse fazer bem feito apenas 20 km de ciclovia, podem ter certeza que em 2020, ao final da gestão seguinte (que não será a do Haddad), sabem quantos km de ciclovia existiram? OS MESMOS 20 KM, APENAS. 

(Salvo uma ou outra ciclovia criada por IMPOSIÇÃO contrária ao velho interesse ideológico, por compensação ambiental, como a ciclovia sob os monotrilhos. Imposição, não iniciativa)


Eu aprovo essa medida pois é uma guerra contra a ideologia atrasada dominante. E entendendo isso, acho até que a maior parte da crítica é muita frescura e exigência demais.

Andei nas ciclovias do centro e achei elas o suficiente, o suficiente para eu me locomover sem ser atropelado. É isso o que importa.

--------------------------------------------------


Obviamente essa guerra não será vencida por completo, afinal, a ideologia "only-carro" de São Paulo é defendida por grande parte da população, pela imprensa, por políticos tradicionais.

Porém é certo que na próxima gestão, dos 400 km de ciclovia, a maior parte vai permanecer. Isso é muito. São literalmente "50 anos em 5" para o mundo ciclístico em São Paulo, coisa que jamais iria acontecer em décadas de outras gestões.



10 Sep 12:40

O anti-Marcos Valério

Paulo Roberto Costa decidiu não ser o novo Marcos Valério. Decidiu também proteger a liberdade dos familiares que envolveu em seus negócios. Aos 53 anos, Valério, o publicitário mineiro celebrizado com o mensalão, foi condenado a 40 anos de cadeia. Desde o dia 29 de agosto, Costa depõe para o Ministério Público, com vídeo e áudio, em longas sessões diárias. Durante oito anos, ele dirigiu o setor de abastecimento e refino da Petrobras e a doutora Dilma disse ser "estarrecedor" que as denúncias e a confissão partam de um "quadro de carreira" da empresa. É verdade, pois ele entrou para a Petrobras em 1978. Contudo só ascendeu à diretoria porque foi indicado pelo deputado José Janene. Depois de uma militância no malufismo, Janene aliou-se ao PT do Paraná, tornando-se um dos pilares do mensalão. Isso a doutora sabia. Bastava ler jornal. Leia mais (09/10/2014 - 02h00)
10 Sep 12:33

40 dias sem casa: a vida após a queda do viaduto em BH

PAULO PEIXOTO, DE BELO HORIZONTE

“Estou apreensiva, meus móveis estão todos lá. Não voltei até hoje por medo. Meu filho ficou abalado, ele pergunta o tempo todo.”

É assim que a professora Alexandra Pereira, 35, descreve os sentimentos da família que, há cerca de 40 dias, vive em um hotel de Belo Horizonte após a queda de um viaduto na zona norte da cidade em plena Copa.

Alexandra, o marido e o filho Mateus, de 10 anos, moravam em um dos três prédios próximos à estrutura. Desde 27 de julho, eles e mais 25 famílias não podem mais preparar as refeições nem cuidar das próprias roupas –para tudo tem hora no hotel.

Em 3 de julho, quando o viaduto em obras desabou, ela e o filho Mateus assistiram o drama dos ocupantes do micro-ônibus esmagado pelo cimento e o longo resgate dos dois mortos e 23 sobreviventes.

Agora, a agonia dessas famílias tem data para acabar: após idas e vindas, a demolição da alça que ficou de pé foi marcada para este domingo (14). A expectativa é que no dia 22 todos possam voltar para suas casas.

O viaduto, inacabado, deveria ter ficado pronto para o Mundial, mas atrasou e terminou no chão.

Nenhum imóvel apresentou problemas estruturais com a queda da alça, segundo a Defesa Civil, mas os moradores temem o impacto da implosão que se avizinha.

O representante comercial Natanael Arley, 37, que está com a mulher e o filho de três meses no hotel, disse que “a preocupação continua a mesma”. “O transtorno existe, queremos voltar sem nenhum abalo [nos imóveis].”

Para a dona de casa Juscilane Alves Martins, 33, as lembranças nunca vão se apagar. “O viaduto nos marcou psicologicamente e financeiramente”, afirmou, referindo-se à desvalorização dos imóveis após o desabamento.

Veja as fotos

VIDA NO HOTEL

Ninguém se queixa do hotel, mas os hóspedes lamentam estar fora de casa.

Exceto para as famílias com filhos pequenos, os casais têm um quarto só para eles, enquanto crianças e adolescentes ficam em outro.

A situação de Natanael, por exemplo, é mais complicada –ele e a mulher dividem espaço com o berço do bebê.

As mulheres não têm afazeres domésticos, já que o hotel oferece serviço de arrumação dos quartos. E a lavanderia está incluída nas despesas da construtora.

SEGURANÇA

Das 27 famílias que foram para o hotel, apenas uma já voltou —a Defesa Civil não vetou acesso aos apartamentos.

A maioria ficou, preocupada com a segurança. “Aqui está tudo muito bem”, disse Isabela Machado Aguiar, 15, que está no hotel com a mãe.

Desde 27 de julho, ela voltou duas vezes ao apartamento onde viviam, mas não dormiu lá. A mãe dela, Ana Lúcia Aguiar, 42, disse que só volta “com segurança”.

Enquanto isso, uma van paga pela construtora leva as crianças para as escolas. Essa rotina deve acabar a partir do dia 22. Após a implosão, será necessário uma semana para retirar os escombros.

A partir de então, os moradores pretendem lutar para que a prefeitura desista de reerguer outro viaduto.

“Queremos uma pracinha”, disse o segurança Servilho Mesquita, 47.

RESPONSABILIDADES

A Polícia Civil ainda não concluiu o inquérito que vai apontar responsabilidades e causas do acidente.

Enquanto a polícia analisa o laudo da perícia técnica, as duas empresas de engenharia envolvidas na obra tentam atribuir uma à outra a responsabilidade pelo desabamento da estrutura.

A Cowan contratou uma equipe de engenheiros e calculistas para analisar as causas da queda e concluiu que houve um erro no projeto elaborado pela Consol.

A Consol, por sua vez, afirma que o viaduto não foi executado conforme o projeto.

A prefeitura diz que “agirá com firmeza e cobrará a punição e o ressarcimento por falhas em quaisquer etapas das obras”.

 

Siga o blog Brasil no Twitter: @Folha_Brasil

10 Sep 10:57

Blaming Lead, Not Hormones

by Dish Staff
Adam Victor Brandizzi

"Gasolina com chumbo causa gravidez na adolescência". Que teoria esquisitíssima!

by Dish Staff

Yglesias flags a study that links declining teen pregnancy rates to the decline of leaded gasoline:

What [researcher Jessica Wolpow Reyes] does is take advantage of the fact that leaded gasoline was phased out unevenly across states in the late-1970s and early-1980s to generate some not-quite-experimental data. You can see the results here:

Screen_shot_2014-08-11_at_4.35.03_pm

(Source: Jessica Wolpow Reyes)

Similar results are found for related “risky” behaviors such as the odds of having sex and drinking at an early age.

It’s worth reflecting on the ways in which the political system is rigged to congenitally under-regulate these kind of health hazards. If you, as a politician, take a stand that goes against the financial interests of some group of incumbent industries your reward is that significant social ills are alleviated … Fifteen to 20 years after your proposal is phased into place. No governor or president – and very few senior legislators – sticks around long enough to claim credit for these things.

Kevin Drum, anti-lead advocate, is far from surprised:

This is not a brand-new finding. Rick Nevin’s very first paper about lead and crime was actually about both crime and teen pregnancy, and he found strong correlations for both at the national level. Reyes, however, goes a step further. It turns out that different states adopted unleaded gasoline at different rates, which allows Reyes to conduct a natural experiment. If lead exposure really does cause higher rates of teen pregnancy, then you’d expect states with the lowest levels of leaded gasoline to also have the lowest levels of teen pregnancy 15 years later. And guess what? They do. …

The neurological basis for the lead-crime theory suggests that childhood lead exposure affects parts of the brain that have to do with judgment, impulse control, and executive functions. This means that lead exposure is likely to be associated not just with violent crime, but with juvenile misbehavior, drug use, teen pregnancy, and other risky behaviors. And that turns out to be the case. Reyes finds correlations with behavioral problems starting at a young age; teen pregnancy; and violent crime rates among older children.

10 Sep 01:33

Não existem racistas na torcida do Grêmio

by Pedro Menezes

Por Pedro Menezes

Já conversei com defensores de ideias absurdas, bizarras, que fariam o leitor ter nojo, mas não lembro de um brasileiro sequer que tenha defendido abertamente a inferioridade genética dos negros e pardos. Da mesma forma, conto nos dedos quem negue que o Brasil seja um país racista. Nenhum brasileiro se reconhece como racista, mas todos sabem que a discriminação racial existe. Quando colocado dessa forma, o racismo soa como uma especial de espirito do tempo, uma ideia que ronda o ar e a todos afeta com sua metafísica, mas que não parte de ninguém. Este é mesmo um país diferente, o primeiro país racista sem racistas.

No jogo entre Grêmio e Santos, em Porto Alegre, uma torcedora gremista foi flagrada pelas câmeras chamando o goleiro adversário de macaco. Não se trata apenas de uma ofensa aleatória. O macaco traz a simbologia do primata atrasado, rude, fruto de defeito evolutivo, etc. Na época da banana jogada contra o brasileiro Daniel Alves, na Espanha, todo mundo sabia disso e a comparação entre um jogador negro e um macaco simbolizava o racismo incontestável do torcedor espanhol. #somostodosmacacos. Por aqui, ainda há quem ache exagerado dizer que a torcedora gremista foi racista, afinal, ela até tem amigos negros.

O Grêmio foi eliminado da Copa do Brasil por causa das ofensas dirigidas ao goleiro Aranha, do Santos. Alguns viram na decisão o fim do futebol brasileiro. “O futebol perdeu a graça quando se tornou politicamente correto”, é o que dizem. Sempre fui dos mais fanáticos pelo esporte, sou um tarado que acompanha uns 10 campeonatos simultaneamente, e talvez por isso não entendo que “a graça do futebol” esteja em chamar negros de macaco. E também não entendo por que insistem em enquadrar o xingamento como expressão do “politicamente incorreto”. Racismo não é politicamente incorreto. Racismo é só incorreto.

A torcedora do Grêmio talvez não seja uma pessoa ruim, e digo isso com sinceridade e até algum afeto, dado o drama vivido nestes dias de exposição nacional constante. Tudo o que ela fez foi ir ao estádio, assistir ao seu time e xingar – ao lado de milhares de pessoas – o goleiro adversário. Nada mais comum. Acho até que ela não se considera racista e seria incapaz, por exemplo, de comandar um grupo de extermínio como a Ku Klux Kan.

Mas o racismo não está apenas na criação de grupos de extermínio. O racismo está, principalmente, na naturalização de absurdos. Comparar negros e macacos, dado o histórico tenso das relações raciais no país, é cruel. Durante o jogo entre Grêmio e Santos, 20 mil pessoas assistiram a alguns torcedores racistas e nada fizeram contra eles. A torcedora do Grêmio apenas deu o azar de ter sido flagrada em close pela câmera da ESPN Brasil, numa cena de leitura labial incontestável. “Não é nada demais, é só um jogo e eu não sou racista”, ela deve ter pensado enquanto gritava. Mas os problemas decorrentes do racismo não estão apenas nos gritos de “macaco”. Eles estão na desculpa coletiva de que “não é nada demais”.

Nem todos os habitantes do Sul dos Estados Unidos participavam da Ku Klux Klan durante os anos 1920. É bastante provável que a maior parte deles tenha nascido e morrido sem jamais matar um negro. A KKK só foi um problema porque seus integrantes jamais foram reprimidos pelo que faziam. Pregar a expulsão de todos os negros dos EUA era visto como atividade política legítima, ocupação de alguns pais de família respeitáveis. Quando se diz que o Sul dos EUA é racista, a culpa não é apenas dos ex-integrantes da KKK, mas também da maioria passiva que nada fez para mudar a situação.

Em um mundo ideal, após meia dúzia de torcedores do Grêmio começarem os gritos de macaco, vinte mil torcedores ao seu redor começariam as vaias e em pouco tempo o silêncio envergonhado tomaria o estádio. Foi exatamente o que aconteceu no jogo seguinte do Grêmio. Agora que o clube foi eliminado da Copa do Brasil pelo racismo de seus torcedores, coisas do tipo não acontecerão tão cedo e manifestações racistas não serão mais acompanhadas por silêncio, mas por xingamentos – e detsa vez, os alvos serão os racistas.

Amigos, anotem o que aconteceu durante este ultimo mês. A eliminação do Grêmio é um evento digno de nota: pela primeira vez na sua história, a CBF agiu de forma exemplar.

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Pedro Menezes

Pedro Menezes é estudante, editor deste site e um dos co-fundadores da rede Estudantes Pela Liberdade no Brasil. Nascido na Bahia e radicado em São Paulo, ele diz que se interessa por teoria política, história, economia e cinema, mas divide o seu tempo livre entre o Vasco e literatura de qualidade duvidosa.

10 Sep 00:14

Could The Alibaba Model Undo The Wal-Mart Model?

by Tyler Durden

Submitted by Charles Hugh-Smith of OfTwoMinds blog,

These are questions that arise as a consequence of the digitization of the global/local supply chain in the peer-to-peer model.

Longtime correspondent Bill M. reckoned I missed the longer-term story in my piece on the Alibaba IPO: namely, that the Alibaba Model of makers selling directly to buyers could undo the Wal-Mart Model of super-stores dependent on massive inventory. My essay The China Boom Story: Alibaba and the 40 Thieves addressed the China Boom rather than the Alibaba model, so let's compare and contrast the Alibaba model and the Wal-Mart model.

We all know the Wal-Mart Model: squeeze suppliers until they're gasping for air ("sure, you're losing money on every unit you sell us, but you'll make it up on volume") and then transport all this stuff across the Pacific to a vast warehousing and shipping operation that must keep hundreds of sprawling (and costly) superstores stocked with hundreds of different items.
 
This model gained supremacy because it lowered costs to consumers by outsourcing the production of most of the inventory. Generally built outside of towns, the superstores thrived in an era of low gasoline costs and cheap credit, i.e. the past few decades.
 
Competition was held at bay by the sheer size of the superstores' purchasing might: nobody ordering small lots could buy stuff at the same price as someone ordering a million units.
 
The Alibaba Model is a peer-to-peer system that enables makers/suppliers and buyers to link up supply and demand in real time. Let's say I want 100 bicycle wheels of various sizes for my bicycle repair shop, to replace all the wheels stolen from unsecured bikes with quick-release hubs.
 
In the peer-to-peer market (the Alibaba Model), my bid for the 100 bicycle wheels is visible to a universe of makers/suppliers. Maybe some supplier has an overstock, or a manufacturer has piled up some extras or has a slack day to fill on the production line. There are any number of reasons why a maker/supplier might be able to get close to Wal-Mart's price for a small batch order.
 
Depending on my own distribution network, the 100 wheels might not even be inventoried in a warehouse: the day they arrive, I might ship them to others who already ordered wheels from me--from individuals to institutions to other repair shops.
 
The digital overhead of the transaction is near-zero, and managing the logistical supply chain is low-cost as well. There is very little overhead compared to the vast hierarchy of corporate controls and management of the superstore model.
 
This enables both the maker and the buyer to offer better prices with higher margins than either could get in the Superstore Model. In essence, the profit and overhead skimmed by the Superstore Corporation can be split between buyer and seller.
 
The Alibaba Model is not limited to China. After reading Shenzhen trip report - visiting the world's manufacturing ecosystem, Correspondent Mark G. observed: The injection mold making they discuss as a strength in Shenzhen is precisely what Phil Kerner teaches at hisThe Tool And Die Guy website. Resurrecting that supporting skill community ecology is why I regard such teaching materials from Kerner and Tubal Cain on Youtube as so vital: Index of Tubal Cain "Machine Shop Tips" videos on YouTube.
 
Toss in the ongoing revolution in affordable desktop 3-D fabrication machines, and it's not too hard to discern the price advantages of the Superstore Model eroding fast, especially if consumers wise up that "low prices" are not low if the quality is so poor the product must soon be replaced.
 
How much would I pay to avoid the weeks-long shipping delay from Asia? Does that premium enable local shops to compete with Asian workshops, despite the lower wages paid in China, Vietnam, and other emerging economies?
 
How much would I pay to have the item I want delivered to me rather than have to drive miles to the Superstore? if I add up the maintenance costs, fuel and other expenses of operating my car, and the time wasted in traffic, standing in line, etc., how much cheaper is the Superstore price?
 
How much would I pay to direct my money went to a local worker/shop owner I know and trust rather than to some supplier in a distant city?
 

These are questions that arise as a consequence of the digitization of the global/local supply chain in the peer-to-peer model. Just as we have reached Peak Central Planning and Peak Central Banking, we may have reached Peak Centralization not just in government and finance but in the corporate-cartel model of "low quality at high margins."

10 Sep 00:03

I understand why Westerners are joining jihadi movements like ISIS. I was almost one of them.


Iraqi Shiite militia fighters hold the Islamic State flag as they celebrate after breaking the siege of Amerli by Islamic State militants. (Youssef Boudlal/Reuters)

The Islamic State just released a gruesome new beheading video, again helmed by a western-bred Jihadist. As often happens, I received messages asking for explanation.

You see, I’m the jihadi who never was.

Twenty years ago, I ditched my Catholic high school in upstate New York to study at a Saudi-funded madrassa in Pakistan. A fresh convert, I jumped at the chance to live at a mosque and study Qur’an all day.

This was in the mid-1990s, during an escalation of the Chechen resistance against Russian rule. After class, we’d turn on the television and watch feeds of destruction and suffering. The videos were upsetting. So upsetting that soon I found myself thinking about abandoning my religious education to pick up a gun and fight for Chechen freedom.

It wasn’t a verse I’d read in our Qur’an study circles that made me want to fight, but rather my American values. I had grown up in the Reagan ’80s. I learned from G.I. Joe cartoons to (in the words of the theme song) “fight for freedom, wherever there’s trouble.” I assumed that individuals had the right — and the duty — to intervene anywhere on the planet where they perceived threats to freedom, justice and equality.

For me, wanting to go to Chechnya wasn’t reducible to my “Muslim rage” or “hatred for the West.” This may be hard to believe, but I thought about the war in terms of compassion. Like so many Americans moved by their love of country to serve in the armed forces, I yearned to fight oppression and protect the safety and dignity of others. I believed that this world was in bad shape. I placed my faith in somewhat magical solutions claiming that the world could be fixed by a renewal of authentic Islam and a truly Islamic system of government. But I also believed that working toward justice was more valuable than my own life.

Eventually, I decided to stay in Islamabad. And the people who eventually convinced me not to fight weren’t the kinds of Muslims propped up in the media as liberal, West-friendly reformers. They were deeply conservative; some would call them “intolerant.” In the same learning environment in which I was told that my non-Muslim mother would burn in eternal hellfire, I was also told that I could achieve more good in the world as a scholar than as a soldier, and that I should strive to be more than a body in a ditch. These traditionalists reminded me of Muhammad’s statement that the ink of scholars was holier than the blood of martyrs.

The media often draw a clear line between our imagined categories of “good” and “bad” Muslims. My brothers in Pakistan would have made that division much more complicated than some could imagine.These men whom I perceived as superheroes of piety, speaking to me as the authorized voice of the tradition itself, said that violence was not the best that I could offer.

Some kids in my situation seem to have received different advice.

It’s easy to assume that religious people, particularly Muslims, simply do things because their religions tell them to. But when I think about my impulse at age 17 to run away and become a fighter for the Chechen rebels, I consider more than religious factors. My imagined scenario of liberating Chechnya and turning it into an Islamic state was a purely American fantasy, grounded in American ideals and values. Whenever I hear of an American who flies across the globe to throw himself into freedom struggles that are not his own, I think, What a very, very American thing to do.

And that’s the problem. We are raised to love violence and view military conquest as a benevolent act. The American kid who wants to intervene in another nation’s civil war owes his worldview as much to American exceptionalism as to jihadist interpretations of scripture. I grew up in a country that glorifies military sacrifice and feels entitled to rebuild other societies according to its own vision. I internalized these values before ever thinking about religion. Before I even knew what a Muslim was, let alone concepts such as “jihad” or an “Islamic state,” my American life had taught me that that’s what brave men do.

Bookmarked at brandizzi Delicious' sharing tag and expanded by Delicious sharing tag expander.
09 Sep 20:18

Relevance

Last week there were a bunch of great posts expounding on the staying power of blogs and RSS. It seems we’re not the only people comparing social media platforms to the open web and we gained a lot of valuable new insight.

All weekend I’ve been thinking about relevance. When Twitter first took off, it delivered. So much of my Twitter feed was filled with timely, interesting material that it became addictive.

But over time Twitter became more of a platform for self-promotion, corporate advertisement, and random, passive-aggressive posts from college roommates. It went from “check out this amazing article I read” to “look at me because I said so.” That’s just not relevant to me.

Facebook never really delivered on relevance, but it was at least new and fresh for a while. Now it feels like an obligation. Happy Birthday. Yes, I like your new hat. Congratulations on your anniversary. Oooh, she’s so cute. And, of course, buy this stuff from Nordstrom.

But blogs and RSS, like email and websites, remain. They are solely focused on delivering relevant information. Could they be better? Heck yes. Check out my queue after I spent several hours reading yesterday:

image

Yikes, that’s a lot of reading left to do. But that’s 2,619 posts with the highest signal to noise ratio I’m going to see all day. We’re hard at work with ideas to make that even better. And we believe that social is going to be the key in improving that ratio.

We’ll have more on that in the future. But for now, let’s all get back to blogging and reading. May your screen be filled with relevance.

09 Sep 20:16

What Conspiracy Theory Research Gets Wrong About the Paranoid

Adam Victor Brandizzi

EU SABIA! EU AVISEI MAS ELES FIZERAM COM QUE NÃO ME DESSEM OUVIDOS!!1!

JFK's funeral. What does believing JFK conspiracies say about you? It's hard to say.

Photo by Universal History Archive/Getty Images

In the run-up to last year’s Italian elections, the country’s senate did not—I repeat: did not—pass a bill giving legislators 134 billion euros “to find a job in case of defeat.” But a satiric story along those lines spread on social media, and not everyone who passed it along understood that it was a spoof. In just one day, 36,000 people signed a petition against the alleged law. Soon it was being invoked at anti-government protests.

Their confusion caught the eye of a quintet of scholars, who were observing how a large sample of Italian Facebook users engaged with different sorts of stories: articles from the mainstream media, articles from alternative outlets, articles from political activists, and fake news crafted by satirists and trolls. In March, MIT’s Technology Review covered the researchers’ work in a piece headlined “Data Mining Reveals How Conspiracy Theories Emerge on Facebook.” The article began with the tale of that imaginary Italian bill and the people who believed it was real, wrapping up the anecdote with the line, “Welcome to the murky world of conspiracy theories.”

This was an odd way to frame the issue. The rumor involved a bill that had supposedly been passed by the legislature, not a secret plan being hatched by some invisible cabal; it was not in any meaningful sense a story about a conspiracy. The larger study was concerned with the transmission of false stories, whether or not they involve conspiracies; the word conspiracy and its variants appear only four times in the paper. Yet the Technology Review piece brushes past this distinction, then compounds the problem by generalizing rather expansively from the research. “Conspiracy theories,” the writer speculates, “seem to come about by a process in which ordinary satirical commentary or obviously false content somehow jumps the credulity barrier. And that seems to happen through groups of people who deliberately expose themselves to alternative sources of news.” Evidently more than one credulity barrier has been breached.

If Technology Review defined the phrase “conspiracy theory” too broadly, other outlets adopt definitions that are too narrow. In 2013, Fairleigh Dickinson University’s PublicMind Poll concluded that 63 percent of America’s registered voters “buy into at least one political conspiracy theory.” The press duly reported that exact-sounding number, though it wasn’t really accurate: What the survey actually found was that 63 percent of voters believed at least one of the four theories featured in the poll. The number who believe in “at least one” conspiracy is surely far higher.

These aren’t the only times researchers or the reporters who cover them have made this sort of mistake. For decades, psychologists and social scientists have been studying conspiracy theories and the people who believe them. They have unearthed a lot of interesting data, and they have sometimes theorized thoughtfully about the results. But they have repeatedly run into a problem: The world they’re studying is not the same size and shape as the world of conspiracy belief.

Conspiracy theories feature a wide range of masterminds. In The United States of Paranoia, my history of paranoid American folklore, I divided those conspirators into five categories. There is the Enemy Outside, an alien force based outside the community’s borders; the Enemy Within, fellow citizens who cannot be easily distinguished from friends; the Enemy Above, plotting at the top of the power structure; the Enemy Below, conspiring in the underclass; and the Benevolent Conspiracy, which isn’t an enemy at all.

Needless to say, this is hardly the only way conspiracy stories can be sorted. And in practice, those five types frequently overlap with one another: The Enemy Outside, for example, might be accused of pulling the Enemy Below’s strings, as when various prominent Americans blamed the Communist bloc for the urban riots of the ’60s. But it’s a useful typology, with plenty of historical examples of each kind.

In these studies, though, Enemy Above stories tend to be overrepresented. And that in turn can skew the results. When researchers draw conclusions about people who are especially prone to seeing conspiracies, they might actually be telling us about people prone to seeing a particular kind of conspiracy.

Sometimes this bias is stated baldly. In 2010, for example, the Rutgers sociologist Ted Goertzel wrote an article for EMBO Reports, a journal of molecular biology, that said conspiracy logic tends to “question everything the ‘establishment’—be it government or scientists—says or does.” He backed this up on the rather thin grounds that a recent pop text, The Rough Guide to Conspiracy Theories, mostly discusses theories about “political, religious, military, diplomatic or economic elites.”

But that “establishment” has conspiracy theories of its own, even if the Rough Guide overlooked them. At moments of moral panic, it is common for the government and the mainstream media to blame a folk devil—frequently cast in conspiratorial terms—for a real or alleged crisis. Examples range from the white slavery panic of a century ago, when a vast international syndicate was believed to be conscripting thousands of girls into sexual service, to the Satanism scare of the 1980s and early ’90s, when politicians, prosecutors, juries, and the press were persuaded that devil-worshipping cabals were molesting and killing children. Often the conspiracy stories believed by relatively powerless people are mirrored by conspiracy stories believed by elites. At the same time that American slaves were afraid that white doctors were plotting to kidnap and dissect them, the planter class was periodically seized by fears of slaves secretly plotting revolution. While the Populist Party was denouncing East Coast banking cabals, many wealthy Easterners were wondering whether a conspiracy was behind Populism.

Apparently it isn’t easy to generalize about a group as large as “people who believe in conspiracies.”

With that in mind, consider the academic literature on conspiracy believers. In 1992 Goertzel surveyed 348 residents of New Jersey about 10 conspiracy theories that were circulating at the time. Seven of the 10 were Enemy Above theories, in which the government was guilty of murdering Martin Luther King, deliberately spreading AIDS, covering up UFO activity, or otherwise injuring the public interest. Two more—one where a conspiracy killed John F. Kennedy, one where Anita Hill was part of a plot against Clarence Thomas—could take either an Enemy Above form or another shape, depending on the version of the story the person surveyed believed. Only one of the 10 was definitely not an Enemy Above theory: “The Japanese are deliberately conspiring to destroy the American economy.” (That one was, interestingly, one of the most popular items in the list, with 46 percent of respondents declaring it either definitely or probably true.)

This does not mean that Goertzel’s data are useless or that he didn’t produce an interesting paper. But when he writes, say, that conspiratorial beliefs are correlated with anomie and insecurity about unemployment, has he really uncovered a couple of conspiracist traits? Or has he simply been asking about conspiracy theories that people experiencing anomie and economic insecurity are more likely to believe?

Goertzel also noted, “People who believed in one conspiracy were more likely to also believe in others.” This idea has become a staple of the literature: As Michael Wood, Karen Douglas, and Robbie Sutton put it in a 2012 paper for Social Psychological and Personality Sciences, “the most consistent finding in the work on the psychology of conspiracy theories is that belief in a particular theory is strongly predicted by belief in others—even ostensibly unrelated ones.” It has become a staple of pop-science coverage too, appearing in venues ranging from Bloomberg to Newsweek.

Anecdotally speaking, it’s a plausible idea: While everyone is capable of conspiracy thinking, some people do seem more prone to it than others. But are they really more likely to embrace conspiracy theories in general, or just conspiracy theories of a certain sort?

Consider a 2013 paper by the British psychologists Robert Brotherton, Christopher French, and Alan Pickering. The participants in the team’s initial investigation gave their views on 59 conspiratorial claims. The list was deliberately composed to reveal a broad, generic interest in conspiracies rather than an interest in specific events (such as Sept. 11) or specific villains (such as the CIA). It was also wide-ranging enough for the researchers to break down the theories by type: stories about government malfeasance, about extraterrestrial cover-ups, about malevolent global forces, about threats to personal health and liberty, and about efforts to control the flow of information. It is, in short, one of the most thorough efforts around. Even so, the vast majority of the items are clear-cut Enemy Above theories, and the remainder are, with one exception, phrased in such a way that the respondent can insert either an Enemy Above or a different sort of conspiracy into the villain role—for example, “Some of the people thought to be responsible for acts of terrorism were actually set up by those responsible.”

Or consider the study that another two British psychologists, Patrick Leman and Marco Cinnirella, published in Frontiers in Psychology last year. In that one, the respondents’ conspiratorial attitudes were determined by their responses to a Belief in Conspiracy Theories scale. Of the six items on the list that affirmed rather than denied the existence of a conspiracy, five were Enemy Above stories. The other—“The European Union is trying to take control of the United Kingdom”—is an Enemy Outside claim, but its adherents typically believe that British elites are complicit in the conspiracy.

The contents of such lists may explain why these studies sometimes come to drastically different conclusions about conspiracy believers. A 1999 paper, for example, included a wider range of theories in its questionnaire, asking its subjects not just about government plots but about Jewish cabals, terrorist infiltrators, and the Mafia. It found an association between conspiracy theories and authoritarian attitudes. Other researchers, using a different list of theories, found that conspiracy theorists tended toward defiance of authority and strong support for democratic values. Apparently it isn’t easy to generalize about a group as large as “people who believe in conspiracies.”

By now some readers are ready to shout, “BUT WHAT ABOUT CONSPIRACIES THAT ARE REAL?” Some of those readers may have abandoned this article already and gone to write something to that effect in the comment thread, capital letters and all. And it’s a fair point. Some conspiracies are real. The word conspire is in the language for a reason. And that adds further complications to the question of just whom we mean when we talk about conspiracy believers.

Many of these papers, to their credit, do raise this issue, noting that real conspiracies exist and that it is not innately irrational to believe in them. Goertzel’s EMBO article discusses the subject in detail, offering some sensible thoughts on how to distinguish a plausible conspiracy claim from an implausible one. Last year, in a special issue of the PSYPAG Quarterly devoted to the psychology of conspiracy believers, Brotherton wrote an entire article on the question of how to define “conspiracy theory,” noting that we do not typically apply the phrase to, say, the idea that a conspiracy of terrorists led by Osama Bin Laden plotted the 9/11 attacks. A conspiracy theory, Brotherton suggests, is not merely a theory that invokes a conspiracy; it is “an unverified claim of conspiracy which is not the most plausible account of an event or situation, and with sensationalistic subject matter or implications. In addition, the claim will typically postulate unusually sinister and competent conspirators. Finally, the claim is based on weak kinds of evidence, and is epistemically self-insulating against disconfirmation.” This is a much more limited definition than I would offer—and it opens a whole new can of worms about which theories should or shouldn’t be included in a study—but it does have the advantage of establishing what exactly the researchers are investigating.

Still, there are drawbacks to excluding conspiracies that are widely acknowledged to exist. Earlier this year, the Journal of the American Medical Association published a paper that surveyed Americans about several medically themed conspiracy theories, from “The CIA deliberately infected large numbers of African Americans with HIV under the guise of a hepatitis inoculation program” to “Health officials know that cell phones cause cancer but are doing nothing to stop it because large corporations won’t let them.” The researchers concluded that “conspiracism correlates with greater use of alternative medicine and the avoidance of traditional medicine.”

It’s a straightforward, respectable piece of research. Yet I can’t help wondering what would have happened if that list of medical plots had also included these items:

  • As part of a series of mind control experiments, the CIA administered LSD to unwitting subjects, a program it continued even after it led to illness and death.
  • In a 40-year ruse, the Public Health Service told hundreds of black sharecroppers that it would give them free health care. Rather than inform the patients that they had syphilis, the doctors deliberately left the disease untreated in order to study whether the illness affects blacks and whites in different ways.
  • For a decade and a half, scientists used students at a New York school for the developmentally disabled as guinea pigs, deliberately infecting them with hepatitis in hopes of finding ways to combat the sickness.

All three of those tales are true. The first was one of the most explosive revelations in the Senate’s mid-1970s investigation of the CIA. The second is the infamous Tuskegee experiment of 1932–1972, which set off an uproar when it was revealed. The third, which took place from 1956 to 1971 at the Willowbrook State School, is brought up frequently in debates about informed consent: The parents agreed to the experiments, but the kids were in no position to understand what they were getting into.

If those items had been included in the JAMA study, what would the results reveal? Would people aware of real medical misbehavior be more likely to buy into the fictional stories, or would they be grounded in the evidence in a way the other believers are not? Would their beliefs also correlate with an interest in alternative medicine, or would there be a noticeable difference between their behavior and that of the original study’s conspiracy believers? How, in short, does an awareness of real conspiracies affect “conspiracist” ideas?

Just as the Facebook paper reminds us that not every false story involves a conspiracy, this alternate version of the JAMA study would remind us that not every conspiracy story is false. It could reveal a lot in the process. But to get there, you have to change your scope.

This article is part of Future Tense, a collaboration among Arizona State University, the New America Foundation, and SlateFuture Tense explores the ways emerging technologies affect society, policy, and culture. To read more, visit the Future Tense blog and the Future Tense home page. You can alsfollow us on Twitter.


JFK's funeral. What does believing JFK conspiracies say about you? It's hard to say.

Photo by Universal History Archive/Getty Images

In the run-up to last year’s Italian elections, the country’s senate did not—I repeat: did not—pass a bill giving legislators 134 billion euros “to find a job in case of defeat.” But a satiric story along those lines spread on social media, and not everyone who passed it along understood that it was a spoof. In just one day, 36,000 people signed a petition against the alleged law. Soon it was being invoked at anti-government protests.

Their confusion caught the eye of a quintet of scholars, who were observing how a large sample of Italian Facebook users engaged with different sorts of stories: articles from the mainstream media, articles from alternative outlets, articles from political activists, and fake news crafted by satirists and trolls. In March, MIT’s Technology Review covered the researchers’ work in a piece headlined “Data Mining Reveals How Conspiracy Theories Emerge on Facebook.” The article began with the tale of that imaginary Italian bill and the people who believed it was real, wrapping up the anecdote with the line, “Welcome to the murky world of conspiracy theories.”

This was an odd way to frame the issue. The rumor involved a bill that had supposedly been passed by the legislature, not a secret plan being hatched by some invisible cabal; it was not in any meaningful sense a story about a conspiracy. The larger study was concerned with the transmission of false stories, whether or not they involve conspiracies; the word conspiracy and its variants appear only four times in the paper. Yet the Technology Review piece brushes past this distinction, then compounds the problem by generalizing rather expansively from the research. “Conspiracy theories,” the writer speculates, “seem to come about by a process in which ordinary satirical commentary or obviously false content somehow jumps the credulity barrier. And that seems to happen through groups of people who deliberately expose themselves to alternative sources of news.” Evidently more than one credulity barrier has been breached.

If Technology Review defined the phrase “conspiracy theory” too broadly, other outlets adopt definitions that are too narrow. In 2013, Fairleigh Dickinson University’s PublicMind Poll concluded that 63 percent of America’s registered voters “buy into at least one political conspiracy theory.” The press duly reported that exact-sounding number, though it wasn’t really accurate: What the survey actually found was that 63 percent of voters believed at least one of the four theories featured in the poll. The number who believe in “at least one” conspiracy is surely far higher.

These aren’t the only times researchers or the reporters who cover them have made this sort of mistake. For decades, psychologists and social scientists have been studying conspiracy theories and the people who believe them. They have unearthed a lot of interesting data, and they have sometimes theorized thoughtfully about the results. But they have repeatedly run into a problem: The world they’re studying is not the same size and shape as the world of conspiracy belief.

Conspiracy theories feature a wide range of masterminds. In The United States of Paranoia, my history of paranoid American folklore, I divided those conspirators into five categories. There is the Enemy Outside, an alien force based outside the community’s borders; the Enemy Within, fellow citizens who cannot be easily distinguished from friends; the Enemy Above, plotting at the top of the power structure; the Enemy Below, conspiring in the underclass; and the Benevolent Conspiracy, which isn’t an enemy at all.

Needless to say, this is hardly the only way conspiracy stories can be sorted. And in practice, those five types frequently overlap with one another: The Enemy Outside, for example, might be accused of pulling the Enemy Below’s strings, as when various prominent Americans blamed the Communist bloc for the urban riots of the ’60s. But it’s a useful typology, with plenty of historical examples of each kind.

In these studies, though, Enemy Above stories tend to be overrepresented. And that in turn can skew the results. When researchers draw conclusions about people who are especially prone to seeing conspiracies, they might actually be telling us about people prone to seeing a particular kind of conspiracy.

Sometimes this bias is stated baldly. In 2010, for example, the Rutgers sociologist Ted Goertzel wrote an article for EMBO Reports, a journal of molecular biology, that said conspiracy logic tends to “question everything the ‘establishment’—be it government or scientists—says or does.” He backed this up on the rather thin grounds that a recent pop text, The Rough Guide to Conspiracy Theories, mostly discusses theories about “political, religious, military, diplomatic or economic elites.”

But that “establishment” has conspiracy theories of its own, even if the Rough Guide overlooked them. At moments of moral panic, it is common for the government and the mainstream media to blame a folk devil—frequently cast in conspiratorial terms—for a real or alleged crisis. Examples range from the white slavery panic of a century ago, when a vast international syndicate was believed to be conscripting thousands of girls into sexual service, to the Satanism scare of the 1980s and early ’90s, when politicians, prosecutors, juries, and the press were persuaded that devil-worshipping cabals were molesting and killing children. Often the conspiracy stories believed by relatively powerless people are mirrored by conspiracy stories believed by elites. At the same time that American slaves were afraid that white doctors were plotting to kidnap and dissect them, the planter class was periodically seized by fears of slaves secretly plotting revolution. While the Populist Party was denouncing East Coast banking cabals, many wealthy Easterners were wondering whether a conspiracy was behind Populism.

Apparently it isn’t easy to generalize about a group as large as “people who believe in conspiracies.”

With that in mind, consider the academic literature on conspiracy believers. In 1992 Goertzel surveyed 348 residents of New Jersey about 10 conspiracy theories that were circulating at the time. Seven of the 10 were Enemy Above theories, in which the government was guilty of murdering Martin Luther King, deliberately spreading AIDS, covering up UFO activity, or otherwise injuring the public interest. Two more—one where a conspiracy killed John F. Kennedy, one where Anita Hill was part of a plot against Clarence Thomas—could take either an Enemy Above form or another shape, depending on the version of the story the person surveyed believed. Only one of the 10 was definitely not an Enemy Above theory: “The Japanese are deliberately conspiring to destroy the American economy.” (That one was, interestingly, one of the most popular items in the list, with 46 percent of respondents declaring it either definitely or probably true.)

This does not mean that Goertzel’s data are useless or that he didn’t produce an interesting paper. But when he writes, say, that conspiratorial beliefs are correlated with anomie and insecurity about unemployment, has he really uncovered a couple of conspiracist traits? Or has he simply been asking about conspiracy theories that people experiencing anomie and economic insecurity are more likely to believe?

Goertzel also noted, “People who believed in one conspiracy were more likely to also believe in others.” This idea has become a staple of the literature: As Michael Wood, Karen Douglas, and Robbie Sutton put it in a 2012 paper for Social Psychological and Personality Sciences, “the most consistent finding in the work on the psychology of conspiracy theories is that belief in a particular theory is strongly predicted by belief in others—even ostensibly unrelated ones.” It has become a staple of pop-science coverage too, appearing in venues ranging from Bloomberg to Newsweek.

Anecdotally speaking, it’s a plausible idea: While everyone is capable of conspiracy thinking, some people do seem more prone to it than others. But are they really more likely to embrace conspiracy theories in general, or just conspiracy theories of a certain sort?

Consider a 2013 paper by the British psychologists Robert Brotherton, Christopher French, and Alan Pickering. The participants in the team’s initial investigation gave their views on 59 conspiratorial claims. The list was deliberately composed to reveal a broad, generic interest in conspiracies rather than an interest in specific events (such as Sept. 11) or specific villains (such as the CIA). It was also wide-ranging enough for the researchers to break down the theories by type: stories about government malfeasance, about extraterrestrial cover-ups, about malevolent global forces, about threats to personal health and liberty, and about efforts to control the flow of information. It is, in short, one of the most thorough efforts around. Even so, the vast majority of the items are clear-cut Enemy Above theories, and the remainder are, with one exception, phrased in such a way that the respondent can insert either an Enemy Above or a different sort of conspiracy into the villain role—for example, “Some of the people thought to be responsible for acts of terrorism were actually set up by those responsible.”

Or consider the study that another two British psychologists, Patrick Leman and Marco Cinnirella, published in Frontiers in Psychology last year. In that one, the respondents’ conspiratorial attitudes were determined by their responses to a Belief in Conspiracy Theories scale. Of the six items on the list that affirmed rather than denied the existence of a conspiracy, five were Enemy Above stories. The other—“The European Union is trying to take control of the United Kingdom”—is an Enemy Outside claim, but its adherents typically believe that British elites are complicit in the conspiracy.

The contents of such lists may explain why these studies sometimes come to drastically different conclusions about conspiracy believers. A 1999 paper, for example, included a wider range of theories in its questionnaire, asking its subjects not just about government plots but about Jewish cabals, terrorist infiltrators, and the Mafia. It found an association between conspiracy theories and authoritarian attitudes. Other researchers, using a different list of theories, found that conspiracy theorists tended toward defiance of authority and strong support for democratic values. Apparently it isn’t easy to generalize about a group as large as “people who believe in conspiracies.”

By now some readers are ready to shout, “BUT WHAT ABOUT CONSPIRACIES THAT ARE REAL?” Some of those readers may have abandoned this article already and gone to write something to that effect in the comment thread, capital letters and all. And it’s a fair point. Some conspiracies are real. The word conspire is in the language for a reason. And that adds further complications to the question of just whom we mean when we talk about conspiracy believers.

Many of these papers, to their credit, do raise this issue, noting that real conspiracies exist and that it is not innately irrational to believe in them. Goertzel’s EMBO article discusses the subject in detail, offering some sensible thoughts on how to distinguish a plausible conspiracy claim from an implausible one. Last year, in a special issue of the PSYPAG Quarterly devoted to the psychology of conspiracy believers, Brotherton wrote an entire article on the question of how to define “conspiracy theory,” noting that we do not typically apply the phrase to, say, the idea that a conspiracy of terrorists led by Osama Bin Laden plotted the 9/11 attacks. A conspiracy theory, Brotherton suggests, is not merely a theory that invokes a conspiracy; it is “an unverified claim of conspiracy which is not the most plausible account of an event or situation, and with sensationalistic subject matter or implications. In addition, the claim will typically postulate unusually sinister and competent conspirators. Finally, the claim is based on weak kinds of evidence, and is epistemically self-insulating against disconfirmation.” This is a much more limited definition than I would offer—and it opens a whole new can of worms about which theories should or shouldn’t be included in a study—but it does have the advantage of establishing what exactly the researchers are investigating.

Still, there are drawbacks to excluding conspiracies that are widely acknowledged to exist. Earlier this year, the Journal of the American Medical Association published a paper that surveyed Americans about several medically themed conspiracy theories, from “The CIA deliberately infected large numbers of African Americans with HIV under the guise of a hepatitis inoculation program” to “Health officials know that cell phones cause cancer but are doing nothing to stop it because large corporations won’t let them.” The researchers concluded that “conspiracism correlates with greater use of alternative medicine and the avoidance of traditional medicine.”

It’s a straightforward, respectable piece of research. Yet I can’t help wondering what would have happened if that list of medical plots had also included these items:

  • As part of a series of mind control experiments, the CIA administered LSD to unwitting subjects, a program it continued even after it led to illness and death.
  • In a 40-year ruse, the Public Health Service told hundreds of black sharecroppers that it would give them free health care. Rather than inform the patients that they had syphilis, the doctors deliberately left the disease untreated in order to study whether the illness affects blacks and whites in different ways.
  • For a decade and a half, scientists used students at a New York school for the developmentally disabled as guinea pigs, deliberately infecting them with hepatitis in hopes of finding ways to combat the sickness.

All three of those tales are true. The first was one of the most explosive revelations in the Senate’s mid-1970s investigation of the CIA. The second is the infamous Tuskegee experiment of 1932–1972, which set off an uproar when it was revealed. The third, which took place from 1956 to 1971 at the Willowbrook State School, is brought up frequently in debates about informed consent: The parents agreed to the experiments, but the kids were in no position to understand what they were getting into.

If those items had been included in the JAMA study, what would the results reveal? Would people aware of real medical misbehavior be more likely to buy into the fictional stories, or would they be grounded in the evidence in a way the other believers are not? Would their beliefs also correlate with an interest in alternative medicine, or would there be a noticeable difference between their behavior and that of the original study’s conspiracy believers? How, in short, does an awareness of real conspiracies affect “conspiracist” ideas?

Just as the Facebook paper reminds us that not every false story involves a conspiracy, this alternate version of the JAMA study would remind us that not every conspiracy story is false. It could reveal a lot in the process. But to get there, you have to change your scope.

This article is part of Future Tense, a collaboration among Arizona State University, the New America Foundation, and SlateFuture Tense explores the ways emerging technologies affect society, policy, and culture. To read more, visit the Future Tense blog and the Future Tense home page. You can alsfollow us on Twitter.

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09 Sep 20:15

Google's latest object recognition tech can spot everything in your living room

Google object recognition spots items in a living room

Automatic object recognition in images is currently tricky. Even if a computer has the help of smart algorithms and human assistants, it may not catch everything in a given scene. Google might change that soon, though; it just detailed a new detection system that can easily spot lots of objects in a scene, even if they're partly obscured. The key is a neural network that can rapidly refine the criteria it's looking for without requiring a lot of extra computing power. The result is a far deeper scanning system that can both identify more objects and make better guesses -- it can spot tons of items in a living room, including (according to Google's odd example) a flying cat. The technology is still young, but the internet giant sees its recognition breakthrough helping everything from image searches through to self-driving cars. Don't be surprised if it gets much easier to look for things online using only vaguest of terms.

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09 Sep 11:50

Quote For The Day

by Andrew Sullivan

“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is,” – T.E. Lawrence.

08 Sep 19:33

Kingdom Lost

by boulet










































08 Sep 18:44

Invasive Installation

by John

Invasive Installation

08 Sep 18:28

What The Economist should have read before suggesting that US slavery wasn’t always so bad

by Chris Blattman

First, remind me, when I’m writing my first book, to try to get The Economist to write a racially insensitive review. I’m pretty sure Edward Baptist’s sales are pretty terrific right now.

The Economist has withdrawn the offending book review and apologized (the book in question, and the article and apology). Here’s the uncontroversial bit:

Mr Baptist, an historian at Cornell University, is not being especially contentious when he says that America owed much of its early growth to the foreign exchange, cheaper raw materials and expanding markets provided by a slave-produced commodity. But he overstates his case when he dismisses “the traditional explanations” for America’s success: its individualistic culture, Puritanism, the lure of open land and high wages, Yankee ingenuity and government policies.

Nothing in history (least of all the growth of the largest economy humankind has ever known) has a single explanation. Academics like to overstate their case and need to be reined in a little.

Even so, here’s the jawdropping finale:

…Slave owners surely had a vested interest in keeping their “hands” ever fitter and stronger to pick more cotton. Some of the rise in productivity could have come from better treatment. Unlike Mr Thomas, Mr Baptist has not written an objective history of slavery. Almost all the blacks in his book are victims, almost all the whites villains. This is not history; it is advocacy.

What could have shed light on this, had The Economist writer bothered to read the literature (and had the academics bothered to write in comprehensible prose)?

First, when do employers use coercion and how well does it work? There’s a pretty new and exciting literature here:

  • Violence and pain work better in labor markets where people have really poor options, and are easily controlled, like children or the least educated. You see this in child labor during British industrialization, or even in child soldiering in Uganda (my own work). Here’s a graph of how long someone stayed with a rebel army in Uganda based on his age of conscription. The paper argues that ones you can scare and indoctrinate the easiest (in this case, kids) stay longest:

Screen Shot 2014-09-05 at 10.07.24 AM

  • Adults will tend to escape if you use violence, so slavery and serfdom work best when the overlords control the legal system or can hunt you down. You see this with servants in 19th century Britain or with European feudalism and US slavery
  • When you make it harder for employers to use force, wages go up. You see this in 19th century Puerto Rico coffee growing, or in the Emirates today
  • It’s not unusual to see a mix of rewards and coercion. For instance, in the child soldiering paper, rewards are more likely for the people who can run away, and they’re also useful (with violence) if you’re trying to indoctrinate and brainwash.
  • And when you turn the entire system against them, yes, whipped people work harder. Here’s an unpublished graph from Suresh Naidu from one US plantation and the correlation between the number of whippings a slave received and her productivity at cotton picking:whipping

So a moral of the story is that yes, rewards can be a substitute for violence, but in a coercive labor market, better pay or food is just service to your larger evil plan to enslave more people more profitably.

Then, on the longer term consequences of slavery (again, hat tip to Suresh, who breathes this stuff):

ilo

Is anyone else feeling depressed and hopeless?

More suggestions welcome.

The post What The Economist should have read before suggesting that US slavery wasn’t always so bad appeared first on Chris Blattman.

08 Sep 08:38

Fulanizar antes do conteúdo

A presidente Dilma sugeriu que em um segundo mandato trocará a equipe econômica. Parece que a motivação é acalmar o mercado, preocupado com a persistente piora dos fundamentos econômicos nos últimos anos.

Trata-se de fulanização da saída de um auxiliar antes que saibamos por que, exatamente, a troca será necessária.

O auxiliar em questão, o ministro da Fazenda, Guido Mantega, participa do governo desde 2003. Foi ministro do Planejamento, presidente do BNDES e finalmente ministro da Fazenda. No período que ficou no BNDES não havia os vultosos aportes do Tesouro Nacional ao BNDES.

Qual exatamente é o conteúdo da saída do ministro? Algo saiu errado na política econômica? Afinal, a crise internacional sem precedentes não explica todos os nossos problemas? Ou, de fato, precisamos recuar da nova matriz econômica?

Um caso parecido ocorre com a candidatura de Marina Silva. A candidata tem das mais belas biografias de quantas este país produziu. Tem carga simbólica que, provavelmente, na política brasileira, somente Lula tem.

Mas exatamente o que significa a nova política da candidata? Ela irá criar uma forma diferente de operar a política. O que seria esta nova política? Um governo cesarista ou ela vai melhorar a qualidade da gestão de nosso presidencialismo de coalizão, nos padrões que vigoraram ao longo do governo FHC?

Melhorar a gestão do presidencialismo de coalizão significa, como bem apontado em excelente artigo do cientista político Marcus Melo, construir a base de sustentação partidária com menor heterogeneidade ideológica e, portanto, construir um gabinete de ministros com maior proporcionalidade entre a distribuição de cargos e responsabilidades administrativas e o peso de cada partido na base de sustentação do governo. É a maneira de a gestão da política não se limitar ao varejão cotidiano.

Assim, antes que nós fulanizemos a saída do ministro ou a Presidência da candidata, é importante que estes movimentos sejam dotados de conteúdo político e programático.

Meu colega Mansueto Almeida contabilizou algumas das medidas defendidas pelo programa da candidata Marina e obteve necessidade de aumento da carga tributária de pouco mais de 3% do PIB. Todas as medidas defendidas são meritórias e importantes.

Iremos praticar mais uma rodada de elevação da carga tributária? Não tenho nada contra. Como já me pronunciei mais de uma vez neste espaço, considero que a decisão de elevação da carga tributária não é técnica. Mais ou menos impostos é algo que envolve escolhas que um profissional de economia não foi preparado para fazer. Trata-se de decisão puramente política, sobre a qual cada um se pronuncia na capacidade de cidadão.

Certamente mais impostos é melhor do que inflação. Continuo a achar que somente guerra civil é menos civilizado do que a inflação como maneira de administrarmos o conflito distributivo. Tributar de uns e transferir para outros de forma clara e transparente, como consequência de escolhas do Congresso, é a forma civilizada de gestão do conflito distributivo. Nunca demonizarei o aumento da carga tributária.

A candidatura que defendo, do senador Aécio Neves, descende de um governo que esteve no poder por oito anos. Teve que fazer escolhas difíceis e se haver com a herança de uma década de hiperinflação e de desmonte do Estado em razão das enormes dificuldades que a sociedade enfrentou no período anterior, de redemocratização.

Dentro das circunstâncias e dadas as heranças, avalio que fizemos o melhor possível inclusive na área social, como argumentei na coluna de 17 de agosto. Nosso fulano está repleto de conteúdo.

06 Sep 17:31

Deal wi… NOPE!



Deal wi… NOPE!

06 Sep 11:51

'Good' Beats 'Innovative' Nearly Every Time

By Scott Berkun

One troubling recent phenomenon is the push for everyone to be innovators. I suspect more books have been sold with the word innovation in their title in the last 10 years than in the previous 50, including, I confess, one of my own. And while much has changed, it's hard to say the quality of things in the world has improved as fast. Keen-eyed consumers bemoan the low quality of many of the things we buy and try to use. Web sites divide short articles across 25 ad-filled pages. Gadgets quickly run out of power. Smartphones have anemic reception or fragile screens. Many things we buy and use never work in the way we're promised, which suggests there are opportunities in merely being good: Much of what's made falls short of that mark.

From my studies of the history of business innovation, I'm convinced you can beat competitors and even dominate markets without fancy tricks. All you need is the ability to make things that are good consistently, since few companies do.

While we're fond of trumpeting the praises of Apple (AAPL), whose iPod revolutionized music, we forget how dismal the competition was. It was not a field of masterpieces; it was a motley crew of ugly, clunky, painfully hard-to-use devices. Apple applied basic design sense to an immature field at a time when the world was ready for something better. Firefox, which rekindled innovation in Web browsing, arose from Microsoft's near abandonment of its Internet Explorer Web browser after the browser war with Netscape ended. Their version 6.0 release was a major step backward, opening the door for someone to win by merely providing something good, which Firefox did in 2004. Google (GOOG) was launched a decade after the invention of search engines; Amazon (AMZN) was not the first online bookstore. But they were both the first to do a good job at selling their good services for a good profit. In retrospect, their successes seem amazing, but at the time, the goals were simple and the objective humble and clear: Be good, or at least better than the other guys. For they knew that alone was hard enough.

Loose Usage

The word "innovation" is used to mean many different things, which is part of the problem. Executives and consultants throw it around like magic dust, hoping to cover their ignorance of why products and companies have done well or failed. But it's clear most companies fail not because of their lack of inventiveness; it's their lack of basic competence. Most leaders fail to prevent bureaucracy, hubris, and too many cooks from killing good ideas before they ever get a chance to make it out the door, resulting in the mediocrity we know too well.

Innovation, in the simplest definition, means new or novel, to take an approach others have not seen before. But by this definition, the iPod and Firefox barely qualify. Even the iPad is late in the game of tablet computers, as Microsoft's Tablet PC and Amazon's Kindle have been aiming at this market for years. In all cases, these are entrants into fields of established players. Their creators borrowed parts and ideas from other products and even from other companies. Their success or failure is driven less by revolutionary ideas or radical disruptive breakthrough thinking and more by a focus on making solid, reliable, simple, good products that solve real needs people have.

If your competitors are mediocre, the merely good can seem exceptional. All things being equal, in a battle between a good product and an innovative one, the good one will usually win. The makers of the good are less worried about abstract perceptions of how novel they are. Instead, they focus on results, caring less about whether the ideas involved are new, old, or recycled. Those obsessed with innovation contract the disease of hubris, ignoring many good ideas because they have been used before. They forget that an old idea cleverly reused, or borrowed from a different field, will be new to the world. Most projects aimed at innovation fail because creators become distracted by their egos from the true goal: to solve real problems for real people.

Solving a Problem

If you insist on doing something new, take this advice: Start with the important problems your customers, or your competitors' customers, have and try to solve them. If conventional approaches fail, you'll be forced to invent and be creative as a side effect of your goal. If you ask the creators of so-called breakthrough ideas, this is a common reason they found those breakthroughs in the first place. Their ambition wasn't to be called an innovator. They weren't planning to be disruptive or game changing. They merely had a tough problem to solve on their way to beating the competition in the forgotten practice of simply making better things.

Making better things is difficult enough. Learn to do that well, and when you're done, and your customers and stockholders love you, the label "innovator" will magically land next to your name.

Scott Berkun is the bestselling author of The Myths of Innovation and Confessions of a Public Speaker. His blog and lectures can be found at scottberkun.com.

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06 Sep 01:39

Not a big fan but this always makes me laugh.i

06 Sep 00:39

Seven

The days of the week are Monday, Arctic, Wellesley, Green, Electra, Synergize, and the Seventh Seal.