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30 Dec 23:00

Pouring a Thermos of Hot Tea at -40°C Near the Arctic Circle

by Christopher Jobson

ice-1

Ontario-based photographer Michael Davies timed this impressive shot of his friend Markus hurling a thermos of hot tea through the air yesterday in -40°C weather. At such frigid temperatures water freezes instantly to form a dramatic plume of ice. For the last decade Davies has worked as a photographer in the fly-in community of Pangnirtung in Canada’s High Arctic, only 20km south of the Arctic Circle, a place that sees about two hours of sunlight each day during the winter. He shares via email that almost nothing was left to chance in creating the photo, as so many things had to be perfectly timed:

Around 1pm I jumped on my skidoo along with my friend Markus and we drove 45 minutes to the top of a nearby mountain where the light (which is almost always pink near the solstice) would hit the hills. Prepared with multiple thermoses filled with tea, we began tossing the water and shooting. Nothing of this shot was to chance, I followed the temperature, watched for calm wind, and planned the shot and set it up. Even the sun in the middle of the spray was something I was hoping for, even though it’s impossible to control.

You can see more of Davies’ most recent photography over on Flickr.

23261605704_e253b00e5d_b

20 Dec 22:14

Hubble Captured the First Predicted Supernova #Space

by Stephanie

NewImage

So incredible! From Hubble Space Telescope via Gizmodo:

Many stars end their lives with a with a bang, but only a few of these stellar explosions have been caught in the act. When they are, spotting them successfully has been down to pure luck — until now. On 11 December 2015 astronomers not only imaged a supernova in action, but saw it when and where they had predicted it would be.

The supernova, nicknamed Refsdal [1], has been spotted in the galaxy cluster MACS J1149.5+2223. While the light from the cluster has taken about five billion years to reach us, the supernova itself exploded much earlier, nearly 10 billion years ago [2].

Read more

20 Dec 22:12

Comic for 2015.12.20

by Kris Wilson

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20 Dec 22:10

marketing attribution

by tomfishburne

Marketing Attribution cartoon

In the early 1900s, Philadelphia merchant John Wanamaker famously quipped, “Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted; the trouble is I don’t know which half.”

In a way, he’s the grandfather of marketing attribution — the science of giving credit to each marketing touchpoint that a customer was exposed to before a purchase. More than ever, marketers are pushing to understand what worked and what didn’t so they can invest in tactics that truly drive sales.

With the rise of data-driven marketing, marketers don’t work nearly as much in the dark as in Wanamaker’s day. But it’s still murky and often political, particularly when factoring in cross-channel behavior and trying to capture offline and online. How much credit to assign to a TV ad versus an email offer versus a paid search campaign versus an in-store promotion? Early marketing analytics brought a “last click bias”, where the final measurable touchpoint received disproportionate credit. That approach undervalues the impact of awareness channels that are more difficult to measure.

Complicating the process is the fact that marketing tactics often map to organizational silos. So, every different marketing team claims outsized influence on final revenue, which impacts how marketing budgets get assigned. If you added up all of the revenue that each team claimed credit for in their ROI predictions, you’d end up with revenues many times larger than the brand’s actual size.

So the CMO has to apply judgement and pick an attribution model. Some of this process is still guesswork, even as the technology and analytics advance by leaps and bounds. But I think what matters is the conversation around the assumptions that go into that guesswork. It’s a far more educated guess than ever before.

I’d love to hear your thoughts on marketing attribution.

19 Dec 23:01

Herbig Haro 24

Herbig Haro 24 Herbig Haro 24


19 Dec 23:00

Quando a geração do Guerra nas Estrelas governará o Brasil?

by gustavochacra

Os integrantes da geração do Guerra nas Estrelas, nascidos entre 1970 e 1979, começam a chegar ao poder ao redor do mundo, mas não no Brasil. É uma mudança de geração importante em relação aos nossos antecessores, dos baby boomers.

Nos EUA, dois dos favoritos nas primárias republicanas, Marco Rubio e Ted Cruz, nasceram em 1971 e 1970, respectivamente. O premiê da Itália, Mateo Renzi, é de 1975. Alexis Tsipras, premiê da Grécia, é de 1974. Os três opositores do primeiro-ministro espanhol, Mariano Rajoy (PP), nas eleições deste domingo, também fazem parte desta geração – Pedro Sanchez (PSOE), é de 1972; Pablo Iglesias (Podemos), de 1978; Albert Rivera (Ciudadanos), de 1979.

O Brasil vive uma grave crise política neste momento. Por algum motivo, porém, não surgem lideranças novas. Cadê os membros desta geração, de Guga Kuerten e Ronaldo Fenômeno, apresentando ideias novas? Estão em São Paulo, Rio, Nova York, Belo Horizonte, Londres e mesmo em Brasília.

Sei de muitos jovens brasileiros extremamente capacitados. Basta a ver a equipe de Sergio Moro, nascido em 1972. Estes jovens têm projetos políticos, estudaram administração pública, economia, direito e outras matérias em ótimas universidades no Brasil ou no exterior , trabalharam ou trabalham em governos. Mas acabam esbarrando na velha ordem política que afundou o país caso tentem se candidatar. Sem alternativa, migram muitas vezes para a iniciativa privada, onde todo o talento e a experiência deles é usada.

Na Universidade Columbia, de Nova York, por exemplo, colaboro com um grupo extraordinário de estudantes jovens brasileiros que sonham em mudar o Brasil depois de concluir o mestrado na SIPA (School of International and Public Affairs) – eu também me formei nesta escola. Na Kennedy School, como é chamada a escola de políticas públicas de Harvard, sei de uns dez exemplos de brasileiros que estudaram lá, para, sem opção de ingressar no governo ou desiludido, tenham ido para bancos ou fundos de private equity, ou então para ONU, Banco Mundial e FMI.

Não faltam talentos no Brasil. Simplesmente, muitos desistem de Brasília e acabam em São Paulo e Rio ou mesmo em grandes empresas e bancos em Nova York e Londres ou em organizações internacionais de Genebra e Washington. De uma certa forma, o Brasil está em crise apesar de, em toda a história, nunca ter havido tantos brasileiros jovens preparados. É triste ver os ultrapassados nomes sondados para disputar prefeituras, governos e a Presidência, quando há tantos craques jovens brasileiros que poderiam mudar o país. A equipe do Moro tem conseguido, mas tem muito mais gente da geração Guerra nas Estrelas pronta para transformar o Brasil.

E não falo de ideologia. Noto que, entre os nomes citados acima, ao redor do mundo, há direitistas (Rubio e Cruz), esquerdistas (Rivera e Tsipras) e centristas (Renzi). Não há relação com ideologia. Talvez alguns cientistas políticos aqui possam me ajudar.

Obs. Voltei das férias em Portugal

Guga Chacra, blogueiro de política internacional do Estadão e comentarista do programa Globo News Em Pauta em Nova York, é mestre em Relações Internacionais pela Universidade Columbia. Já foi correspondente do jornal O Estado de S. Paulo no Oriente Médio e em NY. No passado, trabalhou como correspondente da Folha em Buenos Aires

Comentários na minha página no Facebook. E comentários islamofóbicos, antissemitas, anticristãos e antiárabes ou que coloquem um povo ou uma religião como superiores não serão publicados. Tampouco são permitidos ataques entre leitores ou contra o blogueiro. Pessoas que insistirem em ataques pessoais não terão mais seus comentários publicados. Não é permitido postar vídeo. Todos os posts devem ter relação com algum dos temas acima. O blog está aberto a discussões educadas e com pontos de vista diferentes. Os comentários dos leitores não refletem a opinião do jornalista

Acompanhe também meus comentários no Globo News Em Pauta, no Twitter @gugachacra , no Facebook Guga Chacra (me adicionem como seguidor) e no Instagram

19 Dec 21:23

Comic for 2015.12.19

by Rob DenBleyker

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19 Dec 21:22

17-08-2015

by Laerte Coutinho

19 Dec 21:22

Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal - Quantum Mechanics is Weird

by admin@smbc-comics.com

Hovertext: And lo, The Lord spake, saying, Let the fundamental equations contain an imaginary component.


New comic!
Today's News:

Wooh! The "Both Shows" for London tickets sold about 10% on day one :) Please buy soon if you want the discount!

19 Dec 01:31

How Esurance Lost Its Mascot to the Internet

How Esurance Lost Its Mascot to the Internet

Dec 18, 2015 · 77,547 views

“For God’s sake, sex and auto-insurance are not two things that go together.” 

~ Kristin Brewe, creator of Erin Esurance

If you watched TV in the mid-2000s, you probably saw Erin Esurance. 

Fitted in a leather catsuit and sporting a spunky pink haircut, the 2D-animated secret agent navigated her way through a variety of 30-second national commercial spots. The face of insurance start-up Esurance, she battled giant robots (who represented “overpriced competitors”), scaled her way up buildings, and occasionally took showers on screen for no apparent reason.

Designed to be hip, exciting, and fast-paced, Erin stood for everything Esurance believed in. She was not only the company’s answer to Geico’s ubiquitous gecko, but a formidable marketing tool for recruiting their intended demographic — 18 to 24 year-old males — into insurance policies.

Unfortunately, that demographic liked Erin so much that they made porn of her. Lots of porn. So much porn that, at the height of the mascot’s popularity, 9 of the top 10 image results in an unfiltered Google search for “Erin Esurance” ended up being these amatuer artists’ racy renderings.

Through interviews with her creator and animators, as well as several people who made her into porn, we’ve recounted the untold story of Erin Esurance. What lies ahead is a cautionary tale about what can happen to a corporate mascot when it is released into the wild free-for-all of the digital tundra.

The Innocent Birth of Erin Esurance

The voice actress of Erin Esurance poses with a cardboard cutout of the character

Launched in 1999, Esurance was touted as an early pioneer of online auto insurance. 

At the time, big insurance companies required an in-person meeting or phone call to set up a new policy; by leveraging the newfound powers of the Internet, Esurance promised to expedite and simplify this process. Early on, the company’s marketing department established that those most likely to buy insurance online were males between the ages of 18 and 24. 

After five years of solid growth, Esurance’s board of directors decided it was time to create a corporate mascot and launch a television advertising campaign targeting this demographic. To complete this task, they turned to Kristin Brewe, the company’s Director of Brand & Public Relations — a young, energetic woman intensely interested in consumer behavior. 

“The first thing I had to do,” Brewe tells us over the phone, “was attempt to understand 18 to 24 year-old men a bit better.” So, she took to gaming forums:

“I dove into ethnographic research. I knew they were into gaming, so I went to go hang out on fan sites and public forums, looking out for what people liked, and what they were looking at. It sounds creepy now that I say it, but I was just trying to understand them better.”

Brewe noticed that one figure in particular was massively popular: CIA agent Sydney Bristow, the main character from the television show Alias. Rocking red hair and tight black outfit, she held a position of great reverence with the demographic Brewe was going after.

Jennifer Garner as CIA agent Sydney Bristow in the television show ‘Alias’ (2001-2006)

“I went outside, looked out at the ocean, and thought, ‘She’s everything our demographic would want,’” says Brewe. “I needed an [animated] character that was fast-paced, action-oriented, and female.”

To create its mascot and TV campaign, Esurance had a budget of $60,000 — this, at a time when Geico and Progressive (their main competitors) were spending about $1 billion each on advertising alone. So, Brewe turned to W!ldbrain, a small, local animation studio, to help bring her concept to life.

Working off of Brewe’s suggestions, three male animators in their mid-20s and early 30s (Phil Robinson, Alan Lau, and Roque Ballesteros) designed a spunky, kick-ass, pink-haired secret agent, and named her Erin Esurance.


Early on, aesthetic questions arose in the design department: Was she too sexy? Was her outfit too scandalous? Were her “attributes” too generously proportioned? She went through a series of iterations, and ultimately, the team came up with a character design they felt best represented the excitement and energy of the company.

“We always joke that Erin got a little bit of botox along the way,” Alan Lau, one of her original animators, tells us. “We gave her small adjustments to make her look more appealing: bigger eyes, a lower hairline, a smaller chin. It was a part of the natural design process — every animated character changes a bit over time (even the Simpsons).”

Brewe insists that “using sex to sell” was never Esurance’s intent: “We just wanted to make an exciting, entertaining female heroine,” she says. “For God’s sake, sex and auto-insurance are not two things that go together.” 

***

In July of 2004, Erin Esurance made her much-anticipated television debut — a test spot in the Sacramento, California region. For 30 seconds, the two-dimensional secret agent leapt from city rooftops, warded off bad guys, and subtly touted the benefits of switching insurance policies. And for a brief moment in time, she was a perfect embodiment of everything the company wanted to stand for: agility, justice, wholesomeness. Fan letters poured in from young girls and their fathers, who were happy to see a powerful female role model on television. 

Erin Esurance was a big success — so much so, that over the ensuing 5 years, more than 30 additional commercial spots featuring her were produced. Riding her coattails, Esurance rose from 0% brand awareness to one of the most-recognized insurance companies in the world. She became an iconic mascot and, inadvertently, a sex symbol for certain young men on the Internet. Sensing this, Brewe purchased airtime on “guy-heavy” outlets — ESPN, SciFi, and Cartoon Network’s Adult Swim.

But in the dark crevices of the Internet, something else was brewing: without warning, Erin Esurance became masturbation fodder for the very demographic she was designed to target.

Erin Esurance Gets Rule 34’d 

There is an age-old decree that exists on the Internet called Rule 34: “If it exists, there is porn of it.” Erin Esurance was no exception to this. 

Within 24 hours of the cartoon’s television commercial debut, the first nude drawing of her hit the Internet. In underground “adult art” circles, the pink-haired vixen quickly became the new, exciting ‘toon on the block. 

Over the next five years, the market for lewd artistic renditions of Erin grew in tandem with her commercial ubiquity. DeviantArt and other online art hubs became something of a stomping grounds for peddlers of cartoon porn, and many artists made a healthy supplemental income by selling Erin Esurance drawings through various platforms.

“I first saw her in an [Esurance] commercial where she was in a wrestling ring, fighting some dude,” one artist, who wished to remain anonymous, tells us. “She was wearing these tiny, tight white shorts and top — her [breasts] were bursting out — and I just thought, ‘Damn, that is one fine toon!’”

The commercial inspired this particular gentleman to create a series of 15 “extremely NSFW” Erin Esurance paintings, which he later sold for up to $120 through Paheal.net, a “giant, searchable archive” of cartoon porn. (Here, cartoons live out their secret second lives: thousands of characters, ranging from My Little Pony to Aladdin, indulge in an array of carnal pleasures.)

One of the tamer adult art offerings of Erin Esurance (via Paheal.net, Pixal TriX)

More adult fan art (via Pahael)

Another artist, “Pixal TriX”, says he also had luck selling Erin Esurance pieces — particularly to “horny heterosexual guys” in their 20s. “Dudes jus' wanna see T&A on their favorite cartoon relics,” he writes us in an email. “And Erin had quite a niche following.” 

A keyword scan of Paheal turns up more than 270 incriminating images of Erin Esurance, ranging from nude poses to mildly alarming acts of toon-on-toon copulance. DeviantArt, which hosts its own community of adult artists, returns 476 similar results. The vast majority of these images were posted between 2007 and 2009, at the peak of the Erin Esurance’s popularity.

By 2007, Internet forums were abuzz with Erin Esurance porn talk. “I’m sure the majority of you have seen...that chick Erin Esurance,” wrote one forum user in 2007. “I would totally hit that. Thoughts? Opinions?”

There were many:

Forum members on Bluelight discuss their desire to “hit that” in a 2007 conversation about Erin Esurance

Comments on an Erin Esurance YouTube video (2007)

For “Andy”, a man in his mid-30s from the Idaho panhandle, these admirers provided a stream of revenue when he needed it most.

After losing his collision repair business in the recession of 2008, Andy took on various odd jobs, but still found himself $200 short of his monthly bills. To make ends meet, he resorted to an old hobby: drawing sexy cartoon characters. “I was a crappy artist, but one thing you can do to bypass that is to draw things naked,” he tells us. “It’s a sad state of affairs, but it’s true.”

Andy realized he could pump out these naked cartoon drawings quickly, then sell them for $5 to $10 each on eBay. In 2009, his big break came: after posting a “lesbian bondage scene” of Erin Esurance to his website, a floodgate of commissioned requests came in. “People just kept contacting me repeatedly, [demanding] Erin Esurance,” he says. “I sold 6 or 7 of them for $40 a piece, and was able to pay my bills for a few months.” 

Then, something truly extraordinary happened: Andy’s dirty drawings of Erin gained so much traction on the Internet that they overtook Esurance’s original campaign in Google’s search results. “At the time, if you did an [unfiltered] image search for ‘Erin Esurance’, 9 of the top 10 images were nudes,” he says. “And the worst ones — the truly startling ones — were all mine.”

Goodnight, Sweet Erin

In June of 2010, at the crescendo of Erin’s pin-up popularity, Esurance randomly announced that it was killing her off.

“We’ve leveraged great brand equity in Erin over the years," Esurance’s President and CEO, Gary Tolman, said in a press release, “and she’s played a significant role in making us the third-most shopped auto insurance brand among online consumers.”

According to Kristin Brewe, the mascot’s demise was the result of a few converging reasons.

“After 5 years, Erin had lived a great life, but our target market had shifted,” she says. “She was also starting to die off a bit, and then all that was left was the porn.”

While the porn community was head over heels for Erin, polls conducted in late 2009 indicated that the general public were fed up with her. Gauged with other popular corporate mascots, she fared poorly in a personality test: 30% of consumers found her to be “annoying” (nearly double the industry average), and she fell far shy of the industry averages for “believable”, “funny”, and “sincere.” She did, however, score a 19% in the “sexy” category — 19x the industry average.

Based on the responses of 1,500 consumers aged 13-49 (E-Poll Market Research)

When we contacted Esurance, asking whether the promulgation of porn affected their decision to discontinue Erin, a spokesperson declined to comment. But given the gravity and scope of Erin Esurance porn at the time, it is not unreasonable to surmise that her “death” was related. At least, that’s what Andy, the aforementioned artist, believes.

“It all felt wrong to me,” he says, with regret in his voice. “I was making money off of someone else’s efforts, someone else’s intellectual property. Someone spent so much time making her, and I came along, like an idiot, and killed her off with my $40 drawings. It had to be because of the porn.”

“If the person who actually invented Erin wants to punch me in the face,” he adds wistfully, “I wouldn’t blame her one bit.”

Wrestling With the Pigs

Today, Kristin Brewe runs her own brand consultancy in London. Looking back, she doesn’t harbor any animosity for the artists who stripped down Erin Esurance — her creation. In Brewe’s opinion, protecting a brand from public manipulation simply isn’t possible in the digital world:

“People are going to do what they do. If you make a corporate icon that interacts with people, it isn’t a one-way street anymore. This is the nature of two-way communication: people are creators in and of themselves. As an advertiser, you’ve got to be cool with that. It’s going to happen. You can’t stop to co-creation of a brand, and you might not like that co-creation.”

In a strange way, Brewe sees Erin Esurance’s foray into the adult art world as part of a positive feedback loop: “As a brand manager, you’re kind of content when weird things happen,” she admits. “We thought, ‘Wow, we’re making a crazy impact on culture if we’re being embraced by different people,” corroborates Alan Lau, one of her animators. “It was an acknowledgement of our artwork.”

This isn’t to say Erin’s creators don’t have problems with the porn — particularly the gender issues it arouses. “When you’re in a board room designing a corporate mascot, gender is always a part of the conversation,” Brewe says. “And that conversation always goes, ‘Do we make the zebra a woman or a man? Let’s make it a man, because there won’t be as much porn of it.’”

“It’s disheartening that we have to have this conversation,” she adds, “and you don’t want to give in, because then, you’d only see male or genderless figures in advertising.”

For these reasons, Brewe ultimately decided it was best to let the Internet take its course, even if that meant violating her brainchild.

“There were definitely times when the porn bothered me,” admits Brewe. “But it’s like my grandmother used to say: ‘Never mud wrestle with a pig; you get dirty and the pig loves it.’”

Our next post is how the KKK perpetrated a financial scam on its members. To get notified when we post →  join our email list.


This post was written by Zachary Crockett. You can follow him on Twitter at @zzcrockett


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19 Dec 00:02

Cold Medicine

Seriously considering buying some illegal drugs to try to turn them back into cold medicine.
19 Dec 00:02

Eu queria voltar no tempo

by Will Tirando

Will jovem adolescente adulto vagabundo folga mordomia trabalho cansaço máquina do tempo

18 Dec 11:46

Photo



18 Dec 11:44

Let’s Look Inside A Doomsday Global Seed Vault On Spitsbergen, Norway

by dmitry

1

A worker opens the iced entrance door to storeroom 1 at international gene bank Svalbard Global Seed Vault (SGSV) near Longyearbyen on Spitsbergen, Norway, October 20, 2015. Two consignments of crop seeds will be deposited next year in a “doomsday vault” built in an Arctic mountainside to safeguard global supplies. The vault, which opened on the Svalbard archipelago in 2008, is designed to protect crop seeds, such as beans, rice and wheat against the worst cataclysms of nuclear war or disease. (Photo by Anna Filipova/Reuters)

2

Aluminium bags with the seeds inside are seen at the international gene bank Svalbard Global Seed Vault (SGSV) near Longyearbyen on Spitsbergen, Norway, October 20, 2015. (Photo by Anna Filipova/Reuters)

3

An ice covered entrance door to the international gene bank Svalbard Global Seed Vault (SGSV) near Longyearbyen on Spitsbergen, Norway, October 20, 2015. (Photo by Anna Filipova/Reuters)

4

Asmund Asdal Senior Adviser from NordGen inspects seeds in storage at the international gene bank Svalbard Global Seed Vault (SGSV) near Longyearbyen on Spitsbergen, Norway, October 20, 2015. (Photo by Anna Filipova/Reuters)

5

Asmund Asdal, Senior Adviser from NordGen, holds 4 different samples of rice seeds from the Philippines at the International gene bank Svalbard Global Seed Vault (SGSV) near Longyearbyen on Spitsbergen, Norway, October 20, 2015. (Photo by Anna Filipova/Reuters)

6

Empty storage room 2 at the international gene bank Svalbard Global Seed Vault (SGSV) near Longyearbyen on Spitsbergen, Norway, October 20, 2015. There are only 2 storage rooms in the SGSV, the first one is almost full. (Photo by Anna Filipova/Reuters)

7

International gene bank Svalbard Global Seed Vault (SGSV) near Longyearbyen on Spitsbergen, Norway, October 19, 2015. (Photo by Anna Filipova/Reuters)

8

An ice covered entrance door to the international gene bank Svalbard Global Seed Vault (SGSV) near Longyearbyen on Spitsbergen, Norway, October 20, 2015. (Photo by Anna Filipova/Reuters)

9

The entrance tunnel to the international gene bank Svalbard Global Seed Vault (SGSV) near Longyearbyen on Spitsbergen, Norway, October 20, 2015. (Photo by Anna Filipova/Reuters)

10

Seeds are stored on shelves at the international gene bank Svalbard Global Seed Vault (SGSV) near Longyearbyen on Spitsbergen, Norway, October 20, 2015. Each country that sends seeds to the SGSV have to send it in a plastic box with seperate aluminium bags containing different seeds. (Photo by Anna Filipova/Reuters)

11

Plastic boxes on shelves hold seeds from the Icarda in Syria at the international gene bank Svalbard Global Seed Vault (SGSV) near Longyearbyen on Spitsbergen, Norway, October 20, 2015. The empty space are the missing boxes sent back when Syria requested the first-ever withdrawal of seeds from the Svalbard’s Global Seed Vault earlier this year. (Photo by Anna Filipova/Reuters)

18 Dec 11:39

Colorful Tokio

18 Dec 11:38

Photo

Adam Victor Brandizzi

Always share.



18 Dec 11:38

Prohibition and the Penal State - The New Yorker

by brandizzi
The war on alcohol united Progressives and Protestants, federal agents and Klansmen.The war on alcohol united Progressives and Protestants, federal agents and Klansmen. Credit Photograph from New York Daily News / Getty

For much of his life, Gerrit Smith was one of the most prominent abolitionists in America, a distinction he retained until 1865, when the end of the Civil War and the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, which outlawed slavery, made abolitionists obsolete. But Smith had other passions, and four years later he resurfaced in Chicago, insisting that his life’s work was unfinished. The occasion was the founding of a new political party, and Smith delivered the keynote speech. “Slavery is gone,” he announced. “But drunkenness stays.” He suggested that this continuing form of bondage might be more miserable, and more dangerous, than the one recently abolished. “No outward advantages can bring happiness to the victim of alcohol—to him who has killed his own soul,” Smith said. “The literal slave does harm to no one, whilst the self-made slave of whom we speak is a curse to his kindred, a burden upon all, and, in no small share of the cases, a terror to all.” In nineteenth-century America, the temperance speech was a common attraction on the lecture circuit. Decades before the Civil War, Lincoln had made his own contribution to the genre, calling for a “temperance revolution.” But Smith didn’t think that these “self-made” slaves could free themselves. The party’s main plank was its support for a federal law to ban any drink that had “power to intoxicate or madden the drinker.”

The Prohibition Party, as it was called, never became a major electoral force. But in 1919, exactly half a century after the Party’s founding, the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified, banning “the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors.” National prohibition, formerly an eccentric obsession, was now enshrined at the center of America’s legal system. In the fourteen years between its adoption and its repeal, in 1933, many Americans—especially those who had conducted personal research into the compatibility of happiness and intoxication—wondered how Prohibition had come to pass. And, in the decades since, not a few historians have wondered the same thing. In the influential assessment of Richard Hofstadter, Prohibition was a farce, “a means by which the reforming energies of the country were transmuted into mere peevishness.” Indeed, Prohibition is remembered chiefly for its failure to achieve its aims. The Prohibition years were also the roaring twenties, the age of rakish mobsters and glamorous speakeasies, “The Great Gatsby” and “The Untouchables” and Bessie Smith singing, “Any bootlegger sure is a pal of mine.” More often than not, when we think about Prohibition, we think about a time when people seemed to drink—and seemed to enjoy it—more than ever.

Lisa McGirr believes that this is a mistake. She is a historian who studies grassroots political movements in twentieth-century America, and she has concluded that our fascination with the boozy, semi-clandestine world that Prohibition created has led us to ignore its more lasting effects. In her view, Prohibition was not a farce but a tragedy, and one that has made a substantial contribution to our current miseries. In “The War on Alcohol” (Norton), she urges us to put aside our interest in the many ways involuntarily temperate citizens sought relief, so that we can consider the federal government’s strenuous attempts to stop them. Her book’s subtitle is “Prohibition and the Rise of the American State,” and by “state” she means in particular what she calls the “penal state”: the Prohibition Bureau and its many enforcers, some of them drawn from the ranks of the Ku Klux Klan; the laws and prisons required by a federal government newly alarmed about crime; the reality of a country in which addicts were treated not as victims but as perpetrators. Prohibition was patchily enforced, and certain groups were more likely to find themselves tossed into the rough patches: “Mexicans, poor European immigrants, African-Americans, poor whites in the South.” Nearly a century later, she argues, the legacy of Prohibition can be seen in our prisons, teeming with people convicted of violating neo-Prohibitionary drug laws. Many at the time viewed Prohibition as an outrage, and, in McGirr’s view, we are missing its true meaning if we are not outraged, too—and ready to resist its equally oppressive descendants.

People have known since the Stone Age that sugary liquids, given time, have a salutary tendency to ferment, transforming themselves into something like beer or wine. Distillation, a more sophisticated process, was perfected only in the past few hundred years, and wherever it went it upended social customs. In “Deliver Us from Evil,” a crisp history published in 1976, Norman H. Clark explained that nineteenth-century temperance movements in the U.S. distinguished gin, whiskey, and other distillates from milder beverages, which were considered part of the common diet. “Many Americans of the New Republic simply did not regard beers and wines as ‘intoxicating,’ ” he writes. By contrast, hard liquor was prohibited in some American territory even before the country formed: in 1733, James Oglethorpe, the founding governor of the British province of Georgia, banned “the importation of ardent spirits.”

In the early nineteenth century, though, the country had a vibrant distilling industry, to supply a demand that scholars have struggled to quantify, though they agree that it was enormous. By one estimate, in 1810 the average American consumed the equivalent of seven gallons of pure alcohol, three times the current level. Nineteenth-century temperance campaigners deployed a familiar cast of stock figures: starving children, battered wives, drunks staggering and dying in the streets. (Researchers were just figuring out the science of liver failure, which bloated and killed so many heavy drinkers.) During a visit to Philadelphia, Alexis de Tocqueville was informed that, although the “lower classes” were drinking too much cheap liquor, politicians didn’t dare offend their constituents by imposing heavy taxes. Tocqueville inferred, wryly, “that the drinking population constitutes the majority in your country, and that temperance is somewhat unpopular.” In fact, by the time his account was published, in 1835, temperance was growing less unpopular. In Portland, Maine, a temperance activist named Neal Dow was elected mayor, and, in 1851, helped pass the so-called Maine Law, which made it illegal to make or sell intoxicating drink. Although it was repealed within a decade, it became a model for other states.

The most surprising thing about the nineteenth-century temperance movement is that it seems to have worked: in the course of the century, hard-liquor consumption plummeted. But at the same time the older, weaker stuff was making a comeback: new waves of European immigrants were turning up in saloons, where the supposed harmlessness of beer was strenuously tested. The new drinking culture inspired a radical Prohibitionism, personified by Carrie Nation, who became a national celebrity for barging into saloons and destroying them, often with a hatchet, while singing hymns. She published a vivid and dreamlike autobiography in which she fondly recalled her first saloonicide:

There was quite a young man behind the bar. I said to him: “Young man, come from behind that bar, your mother did not raise you for such a place.” I threw a brick at the mirror, which was a very heavy one, and it did not break, but the brick fell and broke everything in its way. I began to look around for something that would break it. I was standing by a billiard table on which there was one ball. I said: “Thank God,” and picked it up, threw it, and it made a hole in the mirror. By this time, the streets were crowded with people; most of them seemed to look puzzled. There was one boy about fifteen years old who seemed perfectly wild with joy, and he jumped, skipped and yelled with delight. I have since thought of that as being a significant sign. For to smash saloons will save the boy.

This was a risky strategy; angry proprietors and customers sometimes returned fire. But it was based on a shrewd political calculation. The inaugural smashing took place in Kiowa, Kansas, in 1900, twenty years after the state had adopted a constitutional amendment banning “intoxicating liquors.” The saloon in Kiowa, like all the saloons in Kansas, was violating the law, and Carrie Nation realized that the police couldn’t arrest her without acknowledging their own negligence. She was angry at the saloons that were, she held, filling up the jails and the morgues, but her real target was a government that was failing to do what it had promised.

Who were the Prohibitionists? Many of the leaders were, as McGirr acknowledges, Progressives, engaged in a broad and idealistic project of reform. The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, founded in 1873, fought for both Prohibition and women’s suffrage. (One early volunteer was Carrie Nation.) Its president, Frances Willard, said that she wanted to help women protect themselves, and their homes, against drunkenness and vice. Many supporters of the Eighteenth Amendment also supported, a year later, the Nineteenth Amendment, an equally controversial measure, which established women’s right to vote. The Prohibition movement was also partly a good-government movement, and the saloons it targeted were associated not only with disorderly drunkenness but with big-city corruption—saloons were where the local political bosses held court, doing private favors with public money. McGirr has some sympathy for the Progressives, and she imagines an alternate history in which these enlightened Prohibitionists devised “liquor-control laws more in line with the measures introduced by other industrializing nations.” In Sweden, the government rationed alcohol for decades; Australia ordered bars to close by six o’clock.

In the event, Progressives were joined and sometimes upstaged by a complicated cast of allies, all with different reasons to believe that banning alcohol would restore the country. Prohibition was a profoundly Christian movement, delivering its message in the language of revivalism. But there were Christians on both sides: where many Baptists and Methodists saw Prohibition as a strike against depravity, Catholics perceived it as an attack on their communities, not to mention their Communion wine. Southern states were drier than Northeastern ones, middle classes were drier than working classes, and Americans with deep roots were drier than recent arrivals. These disparate factions were held together by a relentless lobbyist named Wayne Wheeler, the leader of the Anti-Saloon League, who realized that politicians’ fear of Prohibitionist anger might outweigh their disinclination to act decisively on an issue that divided both parties.

Prohibitionism, with its focus on the saloons and the immigrants who populated them, was propelled by no small amount of ethnic nationalism. (McGirr notes that in 1910 more than four in ten residents of New York City were foreign-born—slightly higher even than today.) McGirr is unsparing in her analysis of the preoccupations that underlay the resistance to alcohol. She quotes Charles Eliot, the president of Harvard, who was convinced that “alcoholism threatens the destruction of the white race.” Elizabeth Tilton, a wellborn and influential suffragist and Prohibitionist, was particularly concerned about the price that alcoholism exacted from poor immigrants, who “thought little but acted rashly.” In Tilton, McGirr diagnoses a barely disguised and mean-spirited status anxiety. She writes that Tilton, and others like her, “sought to buttress their previous easy dominance against an ever more pluralist, urban, and proletarian nation.” And it is true that most Prohibitionists supported the 1924 Immigration Act, which set national quotas designed to limit the number of new arrivals judged undesirable—but then so did nearly everybody else. In the meantime, many of the Prohibitionist leaders expressed an earnest—and characteristically Progressive—desire to help those who seemed, to them, insufficiently progressed. William Allen White, a paragon of Progressivism, stated the movement’s credo memorably, and revealingly: “We believed faithfully that if we could only change the environment of the under dog, give him a decent kennel, wholesome food, regular baths, properly directed exercise, cure his mange and abolish his fleas, and put him in the blue-ribbon class, all would be well.”

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At times, the Prohibitionists permitted themselves to express their frustration in less conciliatory terms. McGirr quotes Frances Willard, the W.C.T.U. president, who sometimes described her political opponents as crude invaders. “Alien illiterates rule our cities today,” she wrote. “The saloon is their place; the toddy stick their scepter.” McGirr cites this, persuasively, as proof that Prohibition was “imbued with a deeply antidemocratic impulse.” In the Presidential campaign of 1928, Al Smith, the anti-Prohibition governor of New York, lost in a landslide to Herbert Hoover, in an election that functioned partly as a referendum on Smith’s Catholic faith—opponents accused him of supporting “rum and Romanism.” In many cases, the high-minded Progressives and anti-“alien” sloganeers weren’t merely awkward allies but the same people.

When federal Prohibition finally arrived, it was disguised as a program of wartime austerity. In 1917, as the country entered the First World War, Congress banned distillation, in order to conserve food, and restricted the grain available to brewers, eventually limiting their beer to no more than 2.75 per cent alcohol. These measures helped make Prohibition seem both feasible and patriotic, especially since the brewers who supplied the saloons were largely German-American. No less important, the Sixteenth Amendment, adopted in 1913, established a national income tax; until then, as much as thirty per cent of federal revenue had come from excise taxes on alcohol.

Woodrow Wilson, the President, was a Democrat, and his party was divided on Prohibition, so he was not eager to divide it further by taking a firm stand. Not that it mattered: modifying the Constitution does not require the President’s approval, and in some histories the passage of Prohibition can seem slightly anticlimactic. The Eighteenth Amendment passed easily in the Senate and the House, and was soon approved by every state except Rhode Island. This quick success came as a shock even to the Prohibitionists, who were just settling in for a struggle that might, they thought, consume the rest of their lives.

Prohibition took effect in January, 1920, and, all at once, people really did stop drinking, at least for a time. In “Last Call,” a witty popular history of the Prohibition era, published in 2010, Daniel Okrent chronicled the country’s six-month infatuation with nonalcoholic beer, and its longer relationships with other substitutes. Sales of Coca-Cola increased, and some Protestants took dry Communion with the aid of a new product called Dr. Welch’s Unfermented Wine, which would be familiar to any modern toddler. Understandably, though, Okrent spent much of his book chronicling the manifold and ingenious ways that Americans warded off sobriety. In New York, attendance soared at synagogues offering “Kosher Wine for Sacramental Purposes”—the predecessors, perhaps, of the California medical-marijuana clinics currently treating a suspiciously hale group of patients. Small boats raced across the Detroit River from Canada; big ships hosted revelry offshore from East Coast cities, beyond the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard. Enterprising vintners sold grapes directly to customers and also provided them with grape-crushing services, to facilitate home fermentation. Rural bootleggers and urban speakeasies helped the country adapt, too; the change of circumstance helped convert American drinkers to gin, because it was easy to produce, and it also made them more brand-conscious, in the hope of avoiding liquor that was weak or poisonous or, in the worst case, both.

McGirr wants us to remember that these new patterns of consumption emerged only among those who could afford them; according to one study she cites, “drinking among workers was cut by half,” and research suggests that Prohibition did indeed cause a meaningful decline in alcohol-related deaths and illnesses. Many Negro leaders supported temperance and, to a lesser extent, Prohibition, although most of them renounced it as they discovered what it would entail. The speakeasies of Harlem helped spark a cultural renaissance, but they were viewed more skeptically by many locals, who resented the way the police allowed their neighborhood to become a locus of lawless fun. An editorial in a black newspaper complained that Harlem was now “a modern-day plantation for white thrill-seekers.” McGirr argues that Prohibition showed that the police would allow “vice” to flourish in “areas of the city without weighty protectors”—the same process by which, in the decades that followed, drug dealers were allowed to operate in many of the same vulnerable neighborhoods. In the South, raids often targeted Negroes and poor whites. Using records from Virginia, McGirr finds some evidence that race played a role in who was arrested; she also concludes that the government’s heavy-handed tactics alienated many white citizens who weren’t wealthy or lucky enough to be left alone. The Richmond Planet, a black newspaper in Virginia, noted with some satisfaction that “the same treatment that has been accorded to black citizens for more than a decade in the matter of Constitutional rights and privileges is now being meted to white citizens.”

The paradox of Prohibition was that it required intrusive enforcement from a government equipped to deliver only sporadic interventions; the results could be both ineffective and brutal. The Prohibition Unit, a new agency within the U.S. Treasury, was given only three thousand employees, which was a small number relative to the size of the country but a big one relative to the size of the federal government—at the time, the agency that became the Federal Bureau of Investigation had only six hundred employees. Federal Prohibition agents sometimes increased their ranks by deputizing volunteers, including members of the Ku Klux Klan, who found the battle to enforce Prohibition consistent with their broader mission to purify the nation. In 1923, in Williamson County, Illinois, hundreds of enforcers, many of them Klansmen, began a series of violent raids on distilleries, bars, and private homes, in which several hundred people were arrested and more than a dozen were killed.

Three Republican Presidents—Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Hoover—held office during Prohibition, and all of them were willing, if not eager, to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment. (During the 1928 Presidential campaign, Hoover issued an exquisitely equivocal pronouncement: “Our country has deliberately undertaken a great social and economic experiment, noble in motive and far-reaching in purpose. It must be worked out constructively.”) As bootleggers and smugglers took control of the alcohol industry, crime increased, or seemed to—breathless news reports about brazen gangsters left an exaggerated impression of the uptick in violence. McGirr notes that Hoover was the first President to mention crime in his Inaugural Address, which helped establish the idea, now commonplace, that law enforcement was a matter of urgent federal concern. The response was the construction of a bigger, more sophisticated, more intrusive federal criminal-justice system. J. Edgar Hoover got the money and the impunity to build his F.B.I.; the government established a national archive of criminals’ fingerprints; overwhelmed prosecutors learned to use plea bargaining to avoid trials; the Supreme Court ruled that government agents didn’t need a warrant to conduct wiretaps. McGirr views these and other developments as reactions to the “extreme stress” caused by Prohibition, a big task that made the federal government suddenly seem small.

This is a provocative thesis, especially in the light of what happened next. In 1932, Hoover, the reluctant Prohibitionist, was defeated by Franklin D. Roosevelt, a reluctant anti-Prohibitionist; a year later, the country repealed the Eighteenth Amendment. Conventional accounts trace the metastasis of the federal government not to what came before Roosevelt’s election but to what came after. Roosevelt’s New Deal sought to modernize and enlarge all of government, including the F.B.I., which he promised to make “as effective an instrumentality of crime detection and punishment as any of the similar agencies in the world.” McGirr wants us to see Prohibition as a prelude, “helping to shape the New Deal order.” This is indisputable, in that any era helps shape the one that follows, but it is also indisputable that Roosevelt was elected by a public that had grown to despise mandatory temperance. Some Prohibition-era innovations surely endured in spite of their pedigree, not because of it. Government programs, once established, do not tend to disestablish themselves, but the growth and modernization of the federal government was probably inevitable. If “extreme stress” was the necessary precondition, the twentieth century provided no shortage of it.

In 1933, the country’s Prohibitionists had to grapple with a political fate worse than failure: oblivion. Their solution had been tried and rejected, which meant that it could never be tried again. McGirr gleefully reproduces Elizabeth Tilton’s pronouncement, from her diary: “Civilization is undone.” Some of the old warriors kept the faith. (The Prohibition Party never disbanded, and held its most recent convention in July, by conference call; Gerrit Smith doubtless would have been more impressed by the technology than by the turnout, which was eleven.) Others found new outlets for their old passions. McGirr tells the story of Richmond Hobson, an anti-saloon activist who reinvented himself, during the Prohibition years, as an anti-drug activist. In 1922, Congress passed a law that banned various narcotics, a prohibition that endured when the other one ended. For McGirr, the war on drugs is Prohibition’s true legacy. Its toll and its continuing persistence help explain the urgency of her tone: she wants to make us see not just what we once did but what we are doing still, in a misguided effort to prohibit substances no more eradicable—and not necessarily more harmful—than alcohol. Even now, rethinking the war on drugs typically means rethinking marijuana, rather than rethinking the general concept of banning mood-altering substances. In New York, Mayor Bill de Blasio pledged to stop arresting people for possessing small amounts of marijuana, but he also signed a new law to criminalize a class of synthetic drugs known as K2.

One quality that McGirr shares with some of the historians she criticizes is a tendency to downplay the threat posed by alcohol. At times, her book makes it easy to forget that the Prohibitionists had good reason to associate alcohol with violence and misery and death; one needn’t have been a saloon smasher or a xenophobe to conclude that the country would have been a lot better off if it had been a little drier. A hundred years later, news outlets regularly raise the alarm about the K2 craze, or opioid abuse, or the latest resurgence of crystal methamphetamine—drugs that cause a small fraction of the mayhem that alcohol caused, and continues to cause. The Centers for Disease Control estimate that excessive drinking is implicated in ten per cent of deaths among working-age people. Alcohol is a factor in about a third of all violent crimes. And, despite decades of public-awareness campaigns and enforcement efforts, drunk driving still kills dozens of Americans every day.

Part of the problem with thinking about Prohibition is that the fact of its evident unsustainability tends to overwhelm everything else about it; even McGirr sometimes struggles to make her characters seem sensible enough to be taken seriously. The temptation is to compare Prohibition to whatever new movement seems silly or futile. Seven years ago, the Los Angeles City Council engaged in its own effort to provide “wholesome food” to “the under dog,” banning most new fast-food restaurants from opening in South Los Angeles, a largely Latino and African-American area that was judged to have poor eating habits. (A recent study found that obesity rates kept rising anyway.) More recently, New York tried to ban big cups of soda, a law that became such a punch line that it seemed almost mean-spirited when an appeals court struck it down.

But, of course, Prohibition didn’t seem frivolous at the time—if the comparison to abolitionism seems bizarre today, that should tell us something about how difficult it is to make accurate historical judgments when we are engulfed in debate. Campaigners who talked about death and destruction weren’t being hyperbolic: alcohol kills and destroys. To find a contemporary analogue, we should look at our most bitter and divisive political disagreements: the abortion wars, or—especially recently—the ongoing arguments over gun regulation. The country seems to be living through a gun-violence epidemic, even if the statistics are more complicated than the headlines suggest. (There are about thirty thousand gun-related deaths per year in America—and about ninety thousand alcohol-related deaths.) Now, as then, people are accused of defending the indefensible—after all, there is no good rationale for the consumption of whiskey, although there are plenty of good occasions—and people on the other side are accused of misjudging what government can and should do. The lesson of Prohibition is not that every grand crusade is a mistake; it’s that, from zero feet away, it can be difficult to tell the difference between an idea as bad as the Eighteenth Amendment and one as good as the Nineteenth Amendment—or, as the example of Gerrit Smith illustrates, the Thirteenth. We can be sure that there are neo-Prohibitionists among us today, intent on making things better by making them worse. But we can’t be sure who they are. ♦

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17 Dec 07:53

Visitei uma escola ocupada

by Marco Aurélio
Toda hora notícia de escola ocupada em São Paulo, que não sei quê de reorganização, que a polícia isso e aquilo, que governador suspendeu não sei quê, me enchi o saco de notícia. Na quarta-feira, dia 9, estava passeando com o cachorro e descobri que a escola aqui perto de casa, a Escola Estadual Barão […]
17 Dec 07:45

PETA, Ferguson, jihad, Doctor Who, rape, and kitten pics: the toxoplasma of online rage

by brandizzi
Adam Victor Brandizzi

I am not the same after reading this.

Last year, PETA offered to pay the water bills for needy Detroit families if (and only if) those families agree to stop eating meat.

Predictably, the move provoked a negative reaction. The International Business Times, in what I can only assume is an attempted pun, described them as "drowning in backlash". Groundswell thought it was a "big blunder". Daily Banter said it was "exactly why everyone hates PETA". Jezebel called them "assholes".

This is par for the course for PETA, which has previously engaged in campaigns like throwing red paint on fashion models who wear fur, juxtaposing pictures of animals with Holocaust victims, juxtaposing pictures of animals with African-American slaves, and ads featuring naked people that cross the line into pornography.

People call these things "blunders", but consider the alternative. Vegan Outreach is an extremely responsible charity doing excellent and unimpeachable work in the same area PETA is. Nobody has heard of it. Everybody has heard of PETA, precisely because of the interminable stupid debates about "did this publicity stunt cross the line?"

While not everyone is a vegan, many people who hear about the conditions on factory farms are upset by them. Even meat-eaters become uncomfortable when they hear stories of chickens crammed in, dozens to a tiny cage, unable to move, just squawking and scratching at each other their whole lives. There's not much room for PETA to convert people from pro-factory-farming to anti-factory-farming, because there aren't any radical grassroot pro-factory-farming activists to be found. Its problem isn't lack of agreement. It's lack of publicity.

PETA creates publicity, but at a cost. Everybody's talking about PETA, which is sort of like everybody talking about ethical treatment of animals, which is sort of a victory. But most of the talk is, "I hate them and they make me really angry." Some of the talk is even, "I am going to eat a lot more animals just to make PETA mad."


So there's a tradeoff here, with Vegan Outreach on one side and PETA on the other.

Vegan Outreach can get people to agree in principle that factory-farming is bad, but no one will pay any attention to it.

And PETA can get people to pay attention to factory farming, but a lot of them who would otherwise oppose it will switch to supporting it just because they're so mad at the way it's being publicised.

But at least they're paying attention!

PETA doesn't shoot itself in the foot because it is stupid. It shoots itself in the foot because it is traveling up an incentive gradient that rewards it for doing so, even if it destroys its credibility.

***

The University of Virginia rape case recently profiled in Rolling Stone has fallen apart. In doing so, it joins a long and distinguished line of highly-publicised rape cases that have fallen apart. Some studies show that only 2 to 8 per cent of rape allegations are false. Yet the rate for allegations that go ultra-viral in the media must be an order of magnitude higher than this. As the old saying goes, once is happenstance, twice is coincidence, three times is enemy action.

The enigma is complicated by the observation that it's usually feminist journalists and bloggers who are most instrumental in taking these stories viral. It's not some conspiracy of pro-rape journalists choosing the most dubious accusations in order to discredit public trust. It's people specifically selecting these incidents as flagship cases for their campaign that rape victims need to be believed and trusted. So why are the most publicised cases so much more likely to be false than the almost-always-true average case?

Several people have remarked that false accusers have more leeway to make their stories as outrageous and spectacular as possible. But there are two less frequently mentioned possibilities.

"Signalling" is when people take an action so that it can reveal something about them. When signalling, the more expensive and useless the action, the more effective it is as a signal. Although buying eyeglasses can be expensive, it's a poor way to signal wealth because they're very useful; a person might get them not because they are very rich but because they really need glasses. On the other hand, buying a large diamond is an excellent signal; no one needs a large diamond, so anybody who gets one anyway must have money to burn.

Holding certain moral positions can also send signals. For example, a Catholic man who opposes the use of condoms demonstrates to others (and to himself!) how faithful and pious a Catholic he is, thus gaining social credibility. Like the diamond example, this signaling is more effective if it centres upon something otherwise unlikely. If the Catholic had merely chosen not to murder, then even though this is in accord with Catholic doctrine, it would make a poor signal because he might be doing it for other good reasons besides being Catholic – just as he might buy eyeglasses for reasons beside being rich. It is precisely because opposing condoms is such a poor decision for non-Catholics that it makes such a believable signal of Catholicism.

But in the more general case, people can use moral decisions to signal how moral they are. In this case, they choose a disastrous decision based on some moral principle. The more suffering and destruction they support, and the more obscure a principle it is, the more obviously it shows their commitment to following their moral principles absolutely. For example, Immanuel Kant claims that if an axe murderer asks you where your best friend is, obviously intending to murder her when he finds her, you should tell the axe murderer the full truth, because lying is wrong. This is effective at showing how moral a person you are – no one would ever doubt your commitment to honesty after that – but it's sure not a very good result for your friend.

In the same way, publicising how strongly you believe an accusation that is obviously true signals nothing. Even hardcore anti-feminists would believe a rape accusation that was caught on video. A moral action that can be taken just as well by an outgroup member as an ingroup member is crappy signaling and crappy identity politics. If you want to signal how strongly you believe in taking victims seriously, you talk about it in the context of the least credible case you can find.

But aside from that, there's the PETA Principle. The more controversial something is, the more it gets talked about.

A rape that obviously happened? Shove it in people's face and they'll admit it's an outrage, just as they'll admit factory farming is an outrage. But they're not going to talk about it much. There are a zillion outrages every day, you're going to need something like that to draw people out of their shells.

On the other hand, the controversy over dubious rape allegations is exactly that – a controversy. People start screaming at each other about how they're misogynist or misandrist or whatever, and Facebook feeds get filled up with hundreds of comments in all capital letters about how my ingroup is being persecuted by your ingroup. At each step, more and more people get triggered and upset. Some of those triggered people do emergency ego defence by reblogging articles about how the group that triggered them are terrible, triggering further people in a snowball effect that spreads the issue further with every iteration.


Source here

Only controversial things spread. A rape allegation will only be spread if it's dubious enough to split people in half along lines corresponding to identity politics. An obviously true rape allegation will only be spread if the response is controversial enough to split people in half along lines corresponding to identity politics – which is why so much coverage focuses on the proposal that all accused rapists should be treated as guilty until proven innocent.

Everybody hates rape just like everybody hates factory farming. "Rape culture" doesn't necessarily mean most people like rape, it can also mean most people ignore it. That means feminists face the same double-bind that PETA does.

First, they can respond to rape in a restrained and responsible way, in which case everyone will be against it and nobody will talk about it.

Second, they can respond to rape in an outrageous and highly controversial way, in which case everybody will talk about it but it will autocatalyse an opposition of people who hate feminists and obsessively try to prove that as many rape allegations as possible are false.

The other day I saw this on Twitter:

So as I understand it, Atticus Finch is now the bad guy in "To Kill A Mockingbird," because he doubted a story about rape.

— Instapundit.com (@instapundit) December 2, 2014

My first thought was that it was witty and hilarious. My second thought was, "But when people are competing to see who can come up with the wittiest and most hilarious quip about why we should disbelieve rape victims, something has gone horribly wrong." My third thought was the same as my second thought, but in ALL CAPS, because at that point I had read the replies at the bottom.

I have yet to see anyone holding a cardboard sign talking about how they are going to rape people just to make feminists mad, but it's only a matter of time. Like PETA, their incentive gradient dooms them to shoot themselves in the foot again and again.

***

 

Slate recently published an article about white people's contrasting reactions to the Michael Brown shooting in Ferguson versus the Eric Garner choking in NYC. And man, it is some contrast.

A Pew poll found that, of white people who expressed an opinion about the Ferguson case, 73 per cent sided with the officer. Of white people who expressed an opinion about the Eric Garner case, 63 per cent sided with the black victim.

Media opinion follows much the same pattern. Arch-conservative Bill O'Reilly said he was "absolutely furious" about the way "the liberal media" and "race hustlers" had "twisted the story" about Ferguson in the service of "lynch mob justice" and "insulting the American police community, men and women risking their lives to protect us".

But when it came to Garner, O'Reilly said he was "extremely troubled" and that "there was a police overreaction that should have been adjudicated in a court of law". His guest on FOX News, conservative commentator and fellow Ferguson-detractor Charles Krauthammer added that, "From looking at the video, the grand jury's decision [not to indict] is totally incomprehensible." Saturday Night Live did a skit about Al Sharpton talking about the Garner case and getting increasingly upset because, "For the first time in my life, everyone agrees with me."

This follows about three months of most of America being at one another's throats pretty much full-time about Ferguson. We got treated to a daily diet of articles like Ferguson Protester On White People: "Y'all The Devil" or Black People Had The Power To Fix The Problems In Ferguson Before The Brown Shooting - They Failed or Most White People In America Are Completely Oblivious and a whole bunch of people sending angry racist editorials and counter-editorials to each other for months. The damage done to race relations is difficult to overestimate – CBS reports that they dropped ten percentage points to the lowest point in 20 years, with over half of black people now describing race relations as "bad".

And people say it was all worth it, because it raised awareness of police brutality against black people, and if that rustles some people's jimmies, well, all the worse for them.

But the Eric Garner case also would have raised awareness of police brutality against black people, and everybody would have agreed about it. It has become increasingly clear that, given sufficiently indisputable evidence of police being brutal to a black person, pretty much everyone in the world condemns it equally strongly.

And it's not just that the Eric Garner case came around too late so we had to make do with the Mike Brown case. Garner was choked a month before Brown was shot, but the story was ignored, then dug back up later as a tie-in to the ballooning Ferguson narrative.

More important, unarmed black people are killed by police or other security officers about twice a week according to official statistics, and probably much more often than that. You're saying none of these shootings, hundreds each year, made as good a flagship case as Brown? In all this gigantic pile of bodies, you couldn't find one of them who hadn't just robbed a convenience store? Not a single one who didn't have ten eyewitnesses and the forensic evidence all saying he started it?

What if the Brown case went viral – rather than the Eric Garner case or any of the hundreds of others – because of the PETA Principle? It was controversial. A bunch of people said it was an outrage. A bunch of other people said Brown totally started it, and the officer involved was a victim of a liberal media that was hungry to paint his desperate self-defence as racist, and so the people calling it an outrage were themselves an outrage. Everyone got a great opportunity to signal allegiance to their own political tribe and discuss how the opposing political tribe were vile racists/evil race-hustlers. There was a steady stream of potentially triggering articles to share on Facebook to provoke your friends and enemies to counter-share articles that would trigger you.

The Ferguson protesters say they have a concrete policy proposal – they want cameras on police officers. There's only spotty polling on public views of police body cameras before the Ferguson story took off, but what there is seems pretty unaninimous. A UK poll showed that 90 per cent of the population of that country wanted police to have body cameras in February. US polls are more of the form "crappy poll widget on a news site" (1, 2, 3) but they all hovered around 80 per cent approval for the past few years. I also found a poll by Police Magazine in which a plurality of the police officers they surveyed wanted to wear body cameras, probably because of evidence that they cut down on false accusations. Even before Ferguson happened, you would have a really hard time finding anybody in or out of uniform who thought police cameras were a bad idea.

And now, after all is said and done, 90 per cent of people are still in favor – given methodology issues, the extra ten percent may or may not represent a real increase. The difference between whites and blacks is a rounding error. The difference between Democrats and Republicans is barely worth talking about – 79 per cent of Republicans are still in support. The people who think Officer Darren Wilson is completely innocent and the grand jury was right to release him, the people muttering under their breath about race hustlers and looters – 80 per cent of those people still want cameras on their cops.

If the Ferguson protests didn't do much to the public's views on police body cameras, they sure changed its views on some other things. Polls show that the controversy around Ferguson increased white people's confidence in the way the police treat race:


 

Source here

White people's confidence in the police being racially unbiased increased from 35 per cent before the story took off to 52 per cent on 17 December. Could even a deliberate PR campaign by the nation's police forces have done better? Doubt it.

It's possible that this is a symptom of the question's wording – after all, it asks people about their local department, and maybe after seeing what happened in Ferguson, people's local police forces look pretty good by comparison. But then why do black people show the opposite trend?

I think this is exactly what it looks like. Just as PETA's outrageous controversial campaign to spread veganism make people want to eat more animals in order to spite them, so the controversial nature of this particular campaign against police brutality and racism made white people like their local police department even more to spite the people talking about how all whites were racist.

Once again, the tradeoff.

If campaigners against police brutality and racism were extremely responsible, and stuck to perfectly settled cases like Eric Garner, everybody would agree with them, but nobody would talk about it.

If instead they bring up a very controversial case like Michael Brown, everybody will talk about it, but they will catalyse their own opposition and make people start supporting the police more just to spite them. More foot-shooting.

***

 

Here is a graph of some of the tags I commonly use for my posts on the blog Slate Star Codex, with the average number of hits per post in each tag:

(Click on chart to enlarge)

I blog about charity only rarely, but it must be the most important thing I can write about. Convincing even a few more people to donate to charity, or to redirect their existing donations to a more effective program, can literally save dozens or even hundreds of lives even with the limited reach that a private blog has. It probably does more good for the world than all of the other categories on here combined. But it's completely uncontroversial – everyone agrees it's a good thing – and it is the least-viewed type of post.

Compare this to the three most-viewed category of post. Politics is self-explanatory. Race and gender are a type of politics even more controversial and outrage-inducing than regular politics. And that "regret" all the way on the right is my "things i will regret writing" tag, for posts that I know are going to start huge fights and probably get me in lots of trouble. They're usually race and gender as well, but digging deep into the really, really controversial race and gender-related issues.

The less useful, and more controversial, a blog post is, the more likely it is to get lots of page views.

For people who agree with them, angry rants on identity politics are a form of ego defence, saying, "You're OK, your ingroup was in the right the whole time." Linking to it both raises their status as ingroup members, and acts as a potential assault on outgroup members who are now faced with strong arguments telling them they're wrong.

As for the people who disagree, they'll sometimes write angry rebuttals on their own blogs, and those rebuttals will link back to the original post. Or they'll talk about it with their disagreeing friends, and their friends will get mad and want visit the original blog post to get more ammunition for their counterarguments.

If someone's making money off a blog, which do you think they will want to write more of? Posts about charity which get 2,000 paying customers? Or posts that turn their readers against one another like a pack of rabid dogs, and get 16,000?

I don't have a fancy bar graph for them, but I bet this same hierarchy of interestingness applies to the great information currents and media outlets that shape society as a whole.

So if it's in activists' interests to destroy their own causes by focusing on the most controversial cases and principles, the ones that muddy the waters and make people oppose them out of spite, it's certainly in the media's interest to help them.

***

 

And now, for something completely different.

Before "meme" meant doge and all your base, it was a semi-serious attempt to ground cultural evolution in parasitology. The idea was to replace a model of humans choosing whichever ideas they liked with a model of ideas as parasites that evolved in ways that favored their own transmission. This never really caught on, because most people's response was: "That's neat. So what?"

But let's talk about toxoplasma.

Toxoplasma is a neat little parasite that is implicated in a couple of human diseases including schizophrenia. Its life cycle goes like this: it starts in a cat. The cat poops it out. The poop and the toxoplasma get in the water supply, where they are consumed by some other animal, often a rat. The toxoplasma morphs into a rat-compatible form and starts reproducing. Once it has strength in numbers, it hijacks the rat's brain, convincing the rat to hang out conspicuously in areas where cats can eat it. After a cat eats the rat, the toxoplasma morphs back into its cat compatible form and reproduces some more. Finally, it gets pooped back out by the cat, completing the cycle.

What would it mean for a meme to have a life cycle as complicated as toxoplasma?

Consider the war on terror. It's a truism that each time the United States bombs Pakistan or Afghanistan or somewhere, all we're doing is radicalising the young people there and making more terrorists. Those terrorists then go on to kill Americans, which makes Americans get very angry and call for more bombing of Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Taken as a meme, it is a single parasite with two hosts and two forms. In an Afghan host, it appears in a form called "jihad", and hijacks its host into killing himself in order to spread it to its second, American host. In the American host it morphs in a form called "the war on terror", and it hijacks the Americans into giving their own lives (and several bajillion of their tax dollars) to spread it back to its Afghan host in the form of bombs.

From the human point of view, jihad and the War on Terror are opposing forces. From the memetic point of view, they're as complementary as caterpillars and butterflies. Instead of judging, we just note that somehow we accidentally created a replicator, and replicators are going to replicate until something makes them stop.

Replicators are also going to evolve. Some Afghan who thinks up a particularly effective terrorist strategy helps the meme spread to more Americans as the resulting outrage fuels the War on Terror. When the American bombing heats up, all of the Afghan villagers radicalised by the attack will remember the really effective new tactic that Khalid thought up and do that one instead of the boring old tactic that barely killed any Americans at all.

Some American TV commentator who comes up with a particularly stirring call to retaliation will find her words adopted into party platforms and repeated by pro-war newspapers. While pacifists on both sides work to defuse the tension, the meme is engaging in a counter-effort to become as virulent as possible, until people start suggesting putting pork fat in American bombs just to make Muslims even madder.

So let's talk about Tumblr.

Tumblr's interface doesn't allow you to comment on other people's posts, per se. Instead, it lets you reblog them with your own commentary added. So if you want to tell someone they're an idiot, your only option is to reblog their entire post to all your friends with the message "you are an idiot" below it.

Whoever invented this system either didn't understand memetics, or understood memetics much too well.

What happens is – someone makes a statement which is controversial by Tumblr standards, like, "Protect Doctor Who fans from kitten pic sharers at all costs." A kitten pic sharer sees the statement, sees red, and reblogs it to her followers with a series of invectives against Doctor Who fans. Since kitten pic sharers cluster together in the social network, soon every kitten pic sharer has seen the insult against kitten pic sharer – as they all feel the need to add their defensive commentary to it, soon all of them are seeing it from ten different directions. The angry invectives get back to the Doctor Who fans, and now they feel deeply offended, so they reblog it among themselves with even more condemnations of the kitten pic sharers, who now not only did whatever inspired the enmity in the first place, but have inspired extra hostility because their hateful invectives are right there on the post for everyone to see. So about half the stuff on your dashboard is something you actually want to see, and the other half is towers of alternate insults that look like this:

Click to zoom. Actually, pretty much this happened to the PETA story I started off with

And then you sigh and scroll down to the next one. Unless of course you are a Doctor Who fan, in which case you sigh and then immediately reblog with the comment, "It's obvious you guys started ganging up against us first, don't try to accuse **US** now" because you can't just let that accusation stand.

People make fun of Tumblr social justice a lot, but the problem isn't with Tumblr social justice, it's structural. Every community on Tumblr somehow gets enmeshed with the people most devoted to making that community miserable. The tiny Tumblr rationalist community I participate in somehow attracts, concentrates, and constantly reblogs stuff from the even tinier Tumblr community of people who hate rationalists and want them to be miserable. It's like one of those rainforest ecosystems where every variety of rare endangered nocturnal spider hosts a parasite who has evolved for millions of years solely to parasitise that one spider species, and the parasites host parasites who have evolved for millions of years solely to parasitise them. If Tumblr social justice is worse than anything else, it's mostly because everyone has a race and a gender so it's easier to fire broad cannonades and just hit everybody.

Tumblr's reblog policy makes it a hothouse for toxoplasma-style memes that spread via outrage. Following the ancient imperative of evolution, if memes spread by outrage they adapt to become as outrage-inducing as possible.

Or rather, that is just one of their many adaptations. I realise this toxoplasma metaphor sort of strains credibility, so I want to anchor this idea of outrage-memes in pretty much the only piece of memetics everyone can agree upon.

The textbook example of a meme - indeed, almost the only example ever discussed - is the chain letter. "Send this letter to ten people and you will prosper. Fail to pass it on, and you will die tomorrow." And so the letter replicates.

It might be useful evidence that we were on the right track here, with our toxoplasma memes and everything, if we could find evidence that they reproduced in the same way.

If you're not on Tumblr, you might have missed the "everyone who does not reblog the issue du jour is trash" wars. For a few weeks around the height of the Ferguson discussion, people constantly called out one another for not reblogging enough Ferguson-related material, or (Heavens forbid) saying they were sick of the amount of Ferguson material they were seeing. It got so bad that various art blogs that just posted pretty paintings, or kitten picture blogs that just reblogged pictures of kittens were feeling the heat (you thought I was joking about the hate for kitten picture bloggers. I never joke.) Now the issue du jour seems to be Pakistan. Just to give a few examples:

"friends if you are reblogging things that are not about ferguson right now please queue them instead. please pay attention to things that are more important. it’s not the time to talk about fandoms or jokes it’s time to talk about injustices."

"can yall maybe take some time away from reblogging fandom or humor crap and read up and reblog pakistan because the privilege you have of a safe bubble is not one shared by others"

"If you’re uneducated, do not use that as an excuse. Do not say, “I’m not picking sides because I don’t know the full story,” because not picking a side is supporting Wilson. And by supporting him, you are on a racist side...Ignoring this situation will put you in deep shit, and it makes you racist. If you’re not racist, do not just say “but I’m not racist!!” just get educated and reblog anything you can."

"why are you so disappointing? I used to really like you. you've kept totally silent about peshawar, not acknowledging anything but fucking zutara or bellarke or whatever. there are other posts you've reblogged too that I wouldn't expect you to- but those are another topic. I get that you're 19 but maybe consider becoming a better fucking person?"

"if you’re white, before you reblog one of those posts that’s like “just because i’m not blogging about ferguson doesn’t mean i don’t care!!!” take a few seconds to: consider the privilege you have that allows you not to pay attention if you don’t want to. consider those who do not have the privilege to focus on other things. ask yourself why you think it’s more important that people know you “care” than it is to spread information and show support. then consider that you are a fucking shitbaby."

"For everyone reblogging Ferguson, Ayotzinapa, North Korea etc and not reblogging Peshawar, you should seriously be ashamed of yourselves."

"This is going to be an unpopular opinion but I see stuff about ppl not wanting to reblog ferguson things and awareness around the world because they do not want negativity in their life plus it will cause them to have anxiety. They come to tumblr to escape n feel happy which think is a load of bull. There r literally ppl dying who live with the fear of going outside their homes to be shot and u cant post a fucking picture because it makes u a little upset?? I could give two fucks about internet shitlings."

You may also want to check the Tumblr tag "the trash is taking itself out", in which hundreds of people make the same joke ("I think some people have stopped reading my blog because I'm talking too much about [the issue du jour]. I guess the trash is taking itself out now.")

This is pretty impressive. It's the first time outside of a chain letter that I have seen our memetic overlords throw off all pretense and just go around shouting "SPREAD ME OR YOU ARE GARBAGE AND EVERYONE WILL HATE YOU."

But it only works because it's tapped into the most delicious food source an ecology of epistemic parasites could possibly want – controversy.

I would like to be able to blog about charity more often. Feminists would probably like to start supercharging the true rape accusations for a change. Protesters against police brutality would probably like to be able to focus on clear-cut cases that won't make white people support the police even harder. Even PETA would probably prefer being the good guys for once. But the odds aren't good. Not because the people involved are bad people who want to fail. Not even because the media-viewing public are stupid. Just because information ecologies are not your friend.

Thus the Litany of Jai: "Almost no one is evil; almost everything is broken." We pretty much never wrestle with flesh and blood; it's powers and principalities all the way down.

***

 

I would support instating a National Conversation Topic Czar if that allowed us to get rid of celebrities.

— Steven Kaas (@stevenkaas) August 26, 2010

Steven in his wisdom reminds us that there is no National Conversation Topic Czar. The rise of some topics to national prominence and the relegation of others to tiny print on the eighth page of the newspapers occurs by an emergent uncoordinated process. When we say "the media decided to cover Ferguson instead of Eric Garner", we reify and anthropomorphise an entity incapable of making goal-directed decisions.

A while back there was a minor scandal over JournoList, a private group where left-leaning journalists met and exchanged ideas. I think the conservative spin was "the secret conspiracy running the liberal media – revealed!" I wish they had been right. If there were a secret conspiracy running the liberal media, they could all decide they wanted to raise awareness of racist police brutality, pick the most clear-cut and sympathetic case, and make it non-stop news headlines for the next two months. Then everyone would agree it was indeed very brutal and racist, and something would get done.

But as it is, even if many journalists are interested in raising awareness of police brutality, given their total lack of coordination there's not much they can do. An editor can publish a story on Eric Garner, but in the absence of a divisive hook, the only reason people will care about it is that caring about it is the right thing and helps people. But that's "charity", and we already know from my blog tags that charity doesn't sell. A few people mumble something something deeply distressed, but neither black people nor white people get interested, in the "keep tuning to their local news channel to get the latest developments on the case" sense.

The idea of liberal strategists sitting down and choosing "a flagship case for the campaign against police brutality" is poppycock. They – and their conservative colleagues – are not led by sober strategists holding meetings. They are led by discoordinated flailing responses to incentives. If they want views and ad money, they'll eventually flail into publicising whatever's controversial enough to get it.

Which means that it's not a coincidence that the worst possible flagship case for fighting police brutality and racism is the flagship case that we in fact got. It's not a coincidence that the worst possible flagship cases for believing rape victims are the ones that end up going viral. It's not a coincidence that the only time we ever hear about factory farming is when somebody's doing something that makes us almost sympathetic to it. It's not coincidence, it's not even happenstance, it's enemy action. Activists are irresistably incentivised to dig their own graves. And the media is irresistably incentivised to help them.

Lost is the ability to agree on simple things like fighting factory farming or rape. Lost is the ability to even talk about the things we all want. Ending corporate welfare. Ungerrymandering political districts. Defrocking paedophile priests. Stopping prison abuse. Punishing government corruption and waste. Feeding starving children. Simplifying the tax code.

But also lost is our ability to treat each other with solidarity and respect.

Everyone is irresistably incentivised to ignore the things that unite us in favor of forever picking at the things that divide us in exactly the way that is most likely to make them more divisive. Race relations are at historic lows not because white people and black people disagree on very much, but because the media absolutely worked its tuchus off to find the single issue that white people and black people disagreed over the most and ensure that it was the only issue anybody would talk about. Men's rights activists and feminists hate each other not because there's a huge divide in how people of different genders think, but because only the most extreme examples of either side will ever gain traction, and those only when they are framed as attacks on the other side.

People talk about the shift from old print-based journalism to the new world of social media and the sites adapted to serve it. These are fast, responsive, and only just beginning to discover the power of controversy. They are memetic evolution shot into hyperdrive, and the omega point is a well-tuned machine optimised to search the world for the most controversial and counterproductive issues, then make sure no one can talk about anything else. An engine that creates money by burning the few remaining shreds of cooperation, bipartisanship and social trust.

This article first appeared on slatestarcodex.com and is crossposted here with permission

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17 Dec 07:45

The Poor Child’s Friend | History Today

by brandizzi
Adam Victor Brandizzi

Impressionante que essa história tenha se perdido.

Joseph Lancaster, a man of modest background and education, was responsible for transforming education for the poor in the early 19th century. His ebullience, generosity and vision helped change the lives of millions of children and, ultimately, ruin his own.  

Today he is largely forgotten; historian Roy Porter attributed this to an ingrained Anglo-Saxon distrust of educational theorisings. But at the time, his nonconformist views brought him into conflict with the Church of England, which did its best to erase his significance. His 1803 book Improvements in Education was treated as a dangerously subversive tract by those who feared teaching the poor would lead to a French-style revolution and also by Anglican moralisers and reformers such as Sarah Trimmer, who described him as ‘that Goliath of Schismatics’ and was horrified by his assertion that ‘above all things education ought not to be subservient to the propagation of the particular tenets of any sect’.  

Aged 20, he started teaching the working-class children of Southwark in a room in his father’s house. His dedication and charisma brought him more pupils than he could teach. He could not afford a teaching assistant and so developed the monitorial method, teaching trusted student ‘monitors’ to deliver simple, well-defined lessons. His economical methods included using sand for them to form their ABCs and standing around the enlarged pages of a single book to practise reading.  

Today we would call it ‘peer-to-peer’ teaching; 200 years ago it combined two innovations: the teaching of poor children, generally left to Sunday schools, with the idea that teachers should be trained, raising their social status and improving the education they were giving the children in their care. His other innovations included the arrangement of classes so that all children faced the front and, strange as it may seem to us today, a conviction that writing was just as important as reading and that the two reinforced one another. He challenged the common belief that the poor should be taught literacy only so that they could read the Bible and other morally improving works. He also recognised that small children had a limited attention span (‘variety is ever productive of agreeable sensation’, he argued). As a Quaker, he refused to beat the children in his care, although some punishments (including suspending naughty children in a cage from the ceiling) were elaborate and he was later accused of beating boys for his own amusement.   

Lancaster established his first school in Southwark. Its busy, methodical and successful atmosphere attracted august visitors, including William Wilberforce and the Duke of Kent, who became subscribers, and Tsar Alexander I, who took Lancaster’s methods to establish schools for his army. Lancaster presented a copy of his Improvement in Education to George III, who was so impressed that he subscribed £100 per annum. The monitorial system was picked up in the Americas; by the time of Lancaster’s death it was estimated that there were upwards of 1,200 schools using his methods in Britain, Venezuela, Mexico, Switzerland, Ecuador, Columbia, Peru, Canada and the United States. Lancaster worked tirelessly in travelling, lecturing and – it has to be said – self-aggrandisement. A typical visit, in 1808 to Hitchin in Hertfordshire, so inspired a local lawyer and landowner, William Wilshere, that he opened his own Lancasterian school in a malthouse he owned and, in 1837, built a monitorial schoolroom with clerestory windows and pillared side aisles, to Lancaster’s specifications.

Lancaster was zealous, generous, but expensive in his tastes. His grasp of economics was not up to his own standards of teaching arithmetic and he fell more and more into debt. He suffered from what is now known as bipolar disorder: at one moment driven by a euphoric belief that he was doing God’s work; at another cast into paranoid despair. He lambasted friends and benefactors, believing they were trying to steal his glory or betray the cause. He was frequently in conflict with the committee set up to relieve him of the financial responsibility for what became the British and Foreign Schools Society; he became bankrupt and was imprisoned in a sponging house for debt. Eventually, he took himself to the US and in 1838 he was knocked down by a cab in New York and died the next day. He was buried in an unmarked grave.

Lancaster’s legacy far outweighed his fame. He showed that educating the poor was possible, beneficial and cost-effective. His success galvanised the established Church out of its lethargic opposition to proper schooling for working-class children. 

In the words of Robert Southey:

What we are obliged to Lancaster for is, for having been the means of frightening the Bishops who, except for the Bishop of Durham, would never have exerted themselves if they had not been compelled to it.

He is still remembered in Hitchin, Hertfordshire. The Lancasterian school opened by Wilshere taught children up to 1969 and is now the British Schools Museum, where visiting children (and adults) can take Victorian lessons in the monitorial schoolroom and visit other historic classrooms, including one built on the advice of Matthew Arnold, and the Victorian Headmaster’s House. It is a fitting tribute to the man dubbed the ‘Poor Child’s Friend’. 

Pen Vogler is a trustee of the British Schools Museum

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17 Dec 07:45

How to Use the Feynman Technique to Identify Pseudoscience | Big Think

by brandizzi

by Simon Oxenham

Last week a new study made headlines worldwide by bluntly demonstrating the human capacity to be misled by “pseudo-profound bullshit” from the likes of Deepak Chopra, infamous for making profound sounding yet entirely meaningless statements by abusing scientific language.

This is all well and good, but how are we supposed to know that we are being misled when we read a quote about quantum theory from someone like Chopra, if we don’t know the first thing about quantum mechanics?

In a lecture given by Richard Feynman in 1966, the influential theoretical physicist told a story about the difference between knowing the name for something and truly understanding it:

“This boy said to me, 'See that bird standing on the stump there? What's the name of it?' I said, 'I haven't got the slightest idea.' He said, 'It’s a brown-throated thrush. Your father doesn't teach you much about science.' 

 I smiled to myself, because my father had already taught me that [the name] doesn't tell me anything about the bird. He taught me 'See that bird? It's a brown-throated thrush, but in Germany it's called a halsenflugel, and in Chinese they call it a chung ling and even if you know all those names for it, you still know nothing about the bird — you only know something about people; what they call that bird. Now that thrush sings, and teaches its young to fly, and flies so many miles away during the summer across the country, and nobody knows how it finds its way,' and so forth. There is a difference between the name of the thing and what goes on.

The result of this is that I cannot remember anybody's name, and when people discuss physics with me they often are exasperated when they say, 'the Fitz-Cronin effect,' and I ask, 'What is the effect?' and I can't remember the name."

Feynman went on: “There is a first grade science book which, in the first lesson of the first grade, begins in an unfortunate manner to teach science, because it starts off on the wrong idea of what science is. There is a picture of a dog — a windable toy dog — and a hand comes to the winder, and then the dog is able to move. Under the last picture, it says, 'What makes it move?' Later on, there is a picture of a real dog and the question, 'What makes it move?' Then there is a picture of a motorbike and the question, 'What makes it move?' and so on.

I thought at first they were getting ready to tell what science was going to be about — physics, biology, chemistry — but that wasn't it. The answer was in the teacher's edition of the book: The answer I was trying to learn is that 'energy makes it move.'

Now, energy is a very subtle concept. It is very, very difficult to get right. What I meant is that it is not easy to understand energy well enough to use it right, so that you can deduce something correctly using the energy idea — it is beyond the first grade. It would be equally well to say that 'God makes it move,' or, 'Spirit makes it move,' or, 'Movability makes it move.' (In fact, one could equally well say, 'Energy makes it stop.')

Look at it this way: That’s only the definition of energy; it should be reversed. We might say when something can move that it has energy in it, but not what makes it move is energy. This is a very subtle difference. It's the same with this inertia proposition.

Perhaps I can make the difference a little clearer this way: If you ask a child what makes the toy dog move, you should think about what an ordinary human being would answer. The answer is that you wound up the spring; it tries to unwind and pushes the gear around.

What a good way to begin a science course! Take apart the toy; see how it works. See the cleverness of the gears; see the ratchets. Learn something about the toy, the way the toy is put together, the ingenuity of people devising the ratchets and other things. That's good. The question is fine. The answer is a little unfortunate, because what they were trying to do is teach a definition of what is energy. But nothing whatever is learned.

Suppose a student would say, 'I don't think energy makes it move.' Where does the discussion go from there?

I finally figured out a way to test whether you have taught an idea or you have only taught a definition. Test it this way: You say, 'Without using the new word which you have just learned, try to rephrase what you have just learned in your own language. Without using the word "energy," tell me what you know now about the dog's motion.' You cannot. So you learned nothing about science. That may be all right. You may not want to learn something about science right away. You have to learn definitions. But for the very first lesson, is that not possibly destructive? 

I think for lesson number one, to learn a mystic formula for answering questions is very bad. The book has some others: 'gravity makes it fall;' 'the soles of your shoes wear out because of friction.' Shoe leather wears out because it rubs against the sidewalk and the little notches and bumps on the sidewalk grab pieces and pull them off. To simply say it is because of friction, is sad, because it's not science.”

Feynman’s parable about the meaning of science is a valuable way of testing ourselves on whether we have really learned something, or whether we just think we have learned something, but it is equally useful for testing the claims of others. If someone cannot explain something in plain English, then we should question whether they really do themselves understand what they profess. If the person in question is communicating ostensibly to a non-specialist audience using specialist terms out of context, the first question on our lips should be: "Why?" In the words of Feyman, “It is possible to follow form and call it science, but that is pseudoscience.”

Follow Simon Oxenham @Neurobonkers on TwitterFacebookRSS or join the mailing list. Image Credit: Adapted from Wikimedia Commons.

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17 Dec 07:30

humanoidhistory: The Hypostyle Hall of the Temple of Amon,...



humanoidhistory:

The Hypostyle Hall of the Temple of Amon, Karnak at Thebes, Egypt, 1867, photo by Gustave Le Gray. (Getty Museum)

17 Dec 07:17

Advent Calendar

by boulet

















16 Dec 11:59

Comic for 2015.12.15

by Rob DenBleyker

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16 Dec 11:58

Hitting a Wall

by Grant
 


Posters are available at my shop.
16 Dec 11:54

Comic for December 16, 2015

by Scott Adams
Nod At Preset Intervals - Dilbert by Scott Adams

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13 Dec 02:29

Spare Time

by Doug
13 Dec 02:27

Heroes

by Reza

heroes_

13 Dec 02:26

Sinha Merchan

by Will Tirando

merchandising novela TV televisão dinheiro propaganda anúncio época sinha moça

– Isso explica

08 Dec 18:07

1588 – Jesus era humilde, menos quando…

by Carlos Ruas
Adam Victor Brandizzi

Não posso culpá-lo.

2750