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11 Nov 23:24

Football: a sporting barometer of European integration policies (ICSS Journal)

by noreply@blogger.com (James M. Dorsey)

James M Dorsey reports on the successes that football teams have had in helping immigrant communities to integrate with wider society, observing that football can be a useful indicator of how well integration policies are working across Europe

The phones ring continuously at Kurdish football club Dalkurd FF, a hot team for agents and players. In 2009, it signed Bosnian international Nedim Halilovic and upcoming Algerian-Swedish star Nadir Benchenaa. More prominent signings are in the works. Started in 2004 with the support of top Swedish football club IK Brage as a project to create jobs for Kurdish youth, Dalkurd’s meteoric rise has put it on the international football map and turned it into a model of how a Middle Eastern immigrant community can address its social and economic problems and project its identity.

Dalkurd, one of three Swedish clubs that have fielded Europe’s most successful immigrant teams, was founded in Borlänge, a small iron and paper mill workers’ town of some 50,000 predominantly ethnically Swedish residents 220 km north of Stockholm. The club was initially launched as a project to create jobs for the youth. Dalkurd’s Swedish identity is clearly identifiable on maps; its minority Kurdish identity is not. That makes Dalkurd as much a product of the social and economic challenges facing immigrants in Sweden and elsewhere in Europe as it is of the carve-up of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century that turned Kurds into the largest nation without a homeland, and scattered them across the Middle East and the globe. It also highlights Sweden’s relative success in integrating minorities from southern Europe and North Africa who in the 1960s and 70s began immigrating to western and northern Europe, which at the time were encouraging labour migration.

Dalkurd, like other immigrant teams and players, turns football into a prism through which to view how Europe is being shaped by significant Muslim migration and uses the game as a barometer of successes and failures in integration policy. It also spotlights football’s ability to encourage bonding and the development of separate, often multi-layered, identities that help groups to find a common ground and also to differentiate themselves from one another. 

National teams, international squads
On a continental scale, a third of all goals in major European competitions in recent years were scored by either foreign-born players or those from immigrant families. These footballers account for almost half of the players in the continent’s national teams. Of the 2,600 professional players in the five top European leagues – England, Spain, Italy, Germany and France – 800 are expatriates born and recruited in an often Muslim country, and another 500 are immigrants or their descendants.

The three Swedish teams formed by Kurds or Assyrians/Syriacs – two groups that faced off with each other in the early 20th century in rugged eastern Turkey – thrive in a country that is the most welcoming in Europe to non-EU immigrants. Sweden stands out at a time of economic crisis as a nation that has been able to maintain a welfare state and pay for it too.As a result, Sweden hosts more than 25 Assyrian/Syriac clubs alone2 as well as a score of less-prominent Kurdish ones.


Dalkurd’s initial players were Kurdish migrants and refugees, and their descendants. Kurdish immigrants moved to Europe in search of more fertile economic pastures and to escape the suppression of their cultural identity and political rights in Turkey. Elvan Cicen, Dalkurd’s co-founder and sports director, says that, instinctively, the founders thought of naming the club Kurdistan, but on reflection opted for Dalkurd: Dal for Dalarna, the region where Borlänge is located, and Kurd for Kurdistan.3 Dalarna’s famous wooden horses frame the yellow sun on the red, white and green Kurdish flag that the club adopted as its own


“We are both Kurdish and Swedish. Football is our tool to integrate people. We took kids off the streets and away from the gangs. Everybody blamed the kids. But the real problem was the parents, who often were analphabets. The kids lived in different worlds in school and at home. The parents didn’t see what was happening and the kids weren’t integrated. We started involving the parents,” Cicen says.4 Dalkurd players have become role models in local high schools. They have sparked a cultural revolution, inspiring girls to form their own team with the support of Dalkurd managers who seek to overcome the objections put forward by conservative parents.


Dalkurd’s leadership, much like that of other immigrant communities, draws a distinction between integration and assimilation. “Integration is not assimilation. It’s learning a new culture without losing one’s own. Even if we had Kurdistan, I wouldn’t move there. Sure, my parents didn’t come here to be Swedes. They socialise only with the Kurdish part of Dalkurd. I’m trying to learn from both cultures. Having two cultures is being richer. We would lose if we were only a Kurdish team. They call us the Kurdish national team. That is not a problem but we don’t close the door to other people,” Cicen says.

Cicen’s philosophy is backed up by research that shows that sport serves as an integrative tool, or in the words of sports anthropologist Paul Verweel, an enabler of social participation5 through clubs that have an open culture and ideology6 with football being a sport more obsessed with ethnicity than many others.7 That open culture is further encouraged by the fact that both Dalkurd and the Assyrian teams appeal to a fan base that is not purely local but includes a regional, and even global, diaspora. Their self-image as teams that represent a nation rather than just a local community means they are rooted both in the municipality that hosts them and a more geographically diverse community. The internet allows them to maintain bonds across boundaries by broadcasting their matches live on the web and including far-away supporters in their fan networks.


For Kurds, the dream of nationhood is a more realistic one than it is for Assyrians. While Assyrians acknowledge that their hopes for a home state are likely to remain a dream, Kurds can point to an Iraqi Kurdistan as a state-in-waiting with all the building blocks in place. Tumultuous events in Syria are likely to result in Kurds gaining more rights and the government in Turkey has been willing to negotiate with guerrillas who fought a war over almost two decades in which at least 40,000 people died. Nonetheless, Dalkurd is making its mark not in Iraqi Kurdistan, Iran, Turkey or Syria, but in Sweden, where it has won league after league as a Swedish team with a dual identity. Half of its players are the sons and daughters of parents who sought relief from economic under-development and suppression; the remainder are Swedes and other foreigners. Even so, its fans largely include refugees, and their Swedish-born descendants, who fled religious and ethnic discrimination in Turkey and Iran, and Saddam Hussein’s ethnic cleansing of Kurds in northern Iraq. Dalkurd’s sponsors are predominantly Swedish-Kurdish businessmen. 

Kurdish members of Dalkurd’s board do not hide their empathy for the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), the guerrilla group that fought Turkish security forces in south-eastern Turkey. The PKK has, in recent years, dropped its demand for an independent Kurdish state in favour of full cultural and political rights within the framework of the Turkish state. Officials in Iraqi Kurdistan, where the PKK has bases, suggest that the group has helped fund Dalkurd, a claim the club’s executives deny. Nevertheless, Dalkurd chairman Ramazan Kizil, a Kurdish immigrant from Turkey, was sentenced in 2010 in absentia to 10 months in prison in his homeland after giving a speech in his native Kurdish and campaigning on behalf of a pro-Kurdish political party. Kizil’s ambition is to take Dalkurd into the UEFA Europa League, where he dreams of unfurling the Kurdish alongside the Swedish flag. Iraqi Kurdistan has long campaigned unsuccessfully to become a member of FIFA with a status like that of Palestine, the only member without a country, or England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, all of which compete separately rather than as the United Kingdom.

The VIVA World Cup
In doing so, he would put a dent in Kurdistan’s status as a football outcast. Kurdish players are international stars and Kurdish clubs dominate the Iraqi league, but the Kurdish flag flies only at the VIVA World Cup, a tournament that operates by a different set of standards to those of FIFA. VIVA competitors are teams that hail from a tribal area, an agricultural province, an occupied nation, a semi-autonomous region, an ancient city-state, a disenfranchised minority enclave or a nation that is not recognised by football’s international governing body. “The goal is ideological,” says Jean-Luc Kit, vice president of the New Federation Board, VIVA’s organiser. “It’s about allowing peoples to exist through sport.”8 In VIVA, Iraqi Kurds, who are the closest to statehood than Kurds have ever come, and hosted the VIVA tournament in 2012, join fellow aspirant nations, such as Provence, the former Roman province of Raetia in Switzerland, Occitania, the Western Sahara, Darfur, Northern Cyprus, Zanzibar and Greenland – a country that FIFA does not recognise in part because it is too cold to grow adequate grass there.


The goal of integration
If Dalkurd advances into the UEFA Europa League, the club would also achieve another goal: it would symbolise Kurdish integration into Sweden in much the same way that the country’s two other top performing immigrant teams from the industrial town of Södertälje, 35 km south of Stockholm, did for the Assyrian/Syriac community. Ironically, the split among Assyrians in Södertälje, where they account for a quarter of the population, over how to refer to their community in Swedish – depending on whether one emphasises religion and church or the ancient national characteristics of the group – reflects the degree to which they have integrated into their adopted homeland. Assyrians, unlike Kurds, immigrated to Sweden in the knowledge that they were unlikely to ever witness the resurrection of their homeland as a national entity. “We were born here. We don’t know exactly what happened over there. Sweden is good. It is our country. We have no other country. I would never want to live in Turkey. I go there on vacation and come back. Turkey is not for our people. When we play there, they stamp our passports at the border and throw them at us. They don’t like us,” said Syriac football player Robert Massi.

The split within the community has sparked two rival football teams. Each sees itself as the national squad of a disenfranchised nation. There are also two satellite television stations that broadcast in multiple languages, two churches, and a playground for criminal and foreign interests. The differing interpretations of history and identity are highlighted in symbols and chants during Södertälje’s derby.9 Assyriska FF fans boast tattoos of the Assyrian god Ashur while those of Syrianska FC display Christian symbolism or Syriac script on their bare upper bodies. Assyriska fans rolled out a huge flag portraying a medieval patriarch with a sword in commemoration of the mass killing of Assyrians in 1915 and an image of the Ishtar Gate in ancient Babel during the 2009 derby.10 Similarly, fans of both clubs often lace their debates about their teams with historic and religious references designed to prove their differing perceptions on whether the Assyrian kingdom will ever be resurrected and to what degree Assyrians can be distinguished from their church. The differing expressions of support constitute a continuous negotiation of what it means to be an Assyrian or Syriac.11 


The football pitch serves as their platform for becoming part of a new society while at the same time maintaining past cultural identity and resisting efforts to marginalise their national and religious roots. As such, the battles on the pitch are an extension of issues Assyrians and Syriacs confront in their daily lives.

If history and cultural tradition defines the Assyrian/Syriac and Kurdish communities in Södertälje and Borlänge, so does concern about the blood-drenched popular revolt in Syria, intermittent clashes between Turkish security forces and the PKK in predominantly Kurdish south-eastern Turkey, and the spectre of the two meshing with Kurds becoming pawns in the struggle for the survival of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s embattled regime. Those fears are reinforced by: the influx of Christian refugees from Iraq and, more recently, Syria; concerns about the rise of Islamism and the Muslim Brotherhood in Turkey, Syria and post-revolt Middle Eastern and North African nations; links between some Assyrians and Israel; and the grip of pro-Assad elements on the institutions of one significant faction of Assyrians. 

The decision of Ignatius IV Hazim, the late patriarch of Antioch, to back Assad12 highlighted the split in the community and raised concerns that the community might be seen in Sweden as supportive of the Syrian leader’s brutal regime. Football managers fear that such an image could undermine their efforts to project themselves as symbols of integration in a country traditionally sympathetic to their community, which migrated to stay and constitutes an economic success story. The community has produced one former minister and a number of well-known journalists. Yet Assyrians and Syriacs, like the Kurds, feel that no matter how integrated they are and how good their Swedish is they continue to be viewed as outsiders by Swedish society. “I have been here for 40 years but I am still a foreigner. They never make you feel a part of their country. I did my military service here, I play golf and I speak Swedish. But because of my name and hair colour, they treat me differently. I’m still thankful,” says Assyriska executive Aziz Jacob.13 


The perception that there is support for Assad from a significant segment of the community strengthens Swedish suspicions of links between the clubs and organised crime. These were reinforced by the recent trial of 17 people, including two Syrian nationals, on murder, blackmail and other charges involving Assyrian football in Södertälje.14 The fears are most prevalent among officials and supporters of Syrianska FC, the team aligned with the church of Ignatius IV Hazim. Ghayath Moro, a former Syrianska board member who now serves as the unelected head of security, fled Syria in the 1970s and arrived in Sweden aboard a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR) flight from Lebanon. Moro’s unelected position of power in Syrianska serves as evidence for its Assyriska rivals that theirs is a more forward-looking, professionally run club in which officials are held accountable. To Assyriska officials and supporters, professionalism is a code word for ‘better integrated’ in Sweden. Assyriska officials note that their meetings are conducted in Swedish while those of Syrianska are in Aramaic. Swedish football association officials point out that Syrianska is managed by a small core group that has full control while Assyriska has a more professionally constituted board.15 In many ways, the split in the community that has been formalised in rival football teams has become one about the nature and degree of integration, with football as a manifestation of differing perceptions of history and culture. The differing perceptions are also reflected in the Syrian Orthodox Church’s close-knit ties with Syrianska, which are viewed by Assyriska supporters as a dangerous mingling of national and cultural identity.


Lulu Shanku, a Syrianska star who in 2011 stopped playing for the Syrian national team, freely describes the corruption in Syrian football and the intimidation of players by the Assad regime – until Moro joins the conversation. Replying to a question posed to Shanku about the fate of Mosab Balhous, the Syrian national team’s goalkeeper who initially vanished two years ago after reportedly being accused by the Assad regime of being an Islamist, Moro says: “Mosab disappeared because of one of the gangsters against the regime.” According to a senior Syrian football official, now a refugee in Jordan, Balhous resurfaced in Syria in 2013, though he could not explain his two-year disappearance. 

Using terminology employed by the regime, Moro denounces Syrian protesters and rebels as “gangsters” and accuses the United States, Israel and Al Qaeda of waging war against Assad. “It is clear that the people want Assad,” Moro says. “The gangsters bombed our church in Khaldiye [an embattled neighbourhood of the city of Homs where Balhous originates and where another national goalkeeper is an opposition leader]. Too many Christians died. Christians are 10 per cent of the population. We have two ministers [in Syria]. Christians and Syrians have always lived in peace and had good relations.” He says the siege of Homs has, since the bombing, enabled Assad to “clean” the city. 

Younger Assyrians and Syriacs raised in Sweden, with its long history of social democratic government, feel uneasy with Moro’s unabashed support for a regime whose ruthlessness has made it a pariah. They too, however, express concerns about the fate of the Christian minority in a post-Assad era. They feel more comfortable with Moro’s expression of frustration with a perceived lack of acceptance by Swedish society. “The Swedes don’t want us to succeed. We’re ambitious, that is what sets us apart. We try all the time to build bridges. It is not easy because we are a foreign team and always will be a foreign team. They don’t see us as Swedes… and the Swedish media do not show our good side,” Moro says, referring to reports on Södertälje football’s links to criminal groups. Describing Syrianiska as a tool to keep youth from drifting into alcohol and drug abuse, Moro blames the city’s criminality on high unemployment and an influx of refugees from Iraq, many of whom are unregistered. He says an increase in police officers had made streets safe again.

The perception that society is failing to embrace the descendents of immigrants as equals is even stronger on German football pitches. Take the case of Nuri Sahin, for example. He was heralded a future star at age 16. He was the youngest player ever to compete in Germany’s Bundesliga, the country’s premier league. A German-born Turk with an infatuating smile, Sahin had secured his place in Germany’s national football team. The German Football Association did everything to persuade him to grab the opportunity, but to no avail. Sahin, like many top German-Turkish footballers, was determined to play for Turkey, asserting that he may have been born in Germany but that at the bottom line he was Turkish.16 In his first international game, he scored the winning goal – against Germany. 


Sahin’s refusal to play for Germany is the product of a country that until recently refused to give citizenship even to those children of immigrants that were born in Germany. Yet, it shocked Germans, who see their national football team as proof that they are successfully integrating their seven million immigrants. With German spoken almost as much in Istanbul clubs as it is in German clubs, Sahin’s decision and the talent drain it represents are a loss and a tell-tale sign of Germany’s struggle with the integration of immigrants.

At the same time, it also tells the story of football’s cross-fertilising effect, not only in Europe but beyond the continent’s borders. The German Turks bring German virtues to Turkey and badly needed talent to European clubs. Football further bridges identities and constitutes a sort of reverse reconciliation, as is the case with France, whose French-born players join teams of their parents’ heritage in Algeria and elsewhere across the Mediterranean. 


The cross-fertilisation effect
The cross fertilisation goes a step further. The ultras – militant, highly organised, highly politicised, street-battle hardened football fans in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa – trace their roots and model themselves on similar groups in Italy and Serbia. It was a German-Tunisian football player, Sami Khedira, who sparked the first crisis in post-revolt Tunisia between the media and the Islamist Ennahda-led government. Staff at Attounissia newspaper were arrested in February 2013 for reprinting a revealing cover of GQ Magazine on which Khedira, dressed in a tuxedo, covers with his hands the breasts of his otherwise naked girlfriend, German model Lena Gercke. 

If Germany’s struggle with immigration is a story of two steps forward, one step back, across the Rhine in France, home to western Europe’s largest Muslim community, it’s one step forward, two steps back. Germans feted their 2010 multi-cultural World Cup squad as proof of the new Germany, a country where integration of Muslim immigrants is succeeding even if it remains cumbersome 10 years after offering, for the first time, citizenship to the German-born offspring of migrants. Germany’s success, moreover, loomed large against the backdrop of the disintegration in South Africa of the French national squad, a damming condemnation of France’s integration policy.

In fact, when the jet carrying the disgraced French team home landed on the tarmac in Paris it resembled an aircraft being sequestered for security or safety reasons. The plane stood there for an hour with its doors closed as the French media, government ministers and politicians denounced the football team as scum, trouble-makers and ‘guys with peas in their heads instead of brains,’ who were led by a captain who refused to sing the Marseillaise. The team made the kind of football history that Frenchmen would prefer to forget about: they were the first team ever to go on strike during a World Cup tournament and turned France into a global laughing stock. 

Right wingers compared the players, many of whom hailed from immigrant suburbs, to hooded youths who set fire to cars on Saturday nights. Centre-right ministers echoed far-right National Front leader Marine Le Pen’s denunciation of the team before the World Cup. She said the squad did not represent France and were more interested in commercial endorsements than national pride. Her comments came in response to Zinedine Zidane, the French-born scion of Algerian immigrants. Zidane is married to a Spaniard whose children have Christian names, and who is widely viewed as one of the best players of his generation. He describes himself as “first a Kabyle [Berber] from La Castellane [a neighborhood of Marseille], then an Algerian from Marseille, and then a Frenchman”.

This was all a far cry from the days of glory in 1998, when a victorious black-white-Arab team united the country. The question is: what went wrong? The answer to some degree is former French president Nicolas Sarkozy’s focus on money and individualism that reinforced social and urban segregation, hardened the religious and cultural divide and fed post-9/11 prejudice against Muslims. Yet football was an indicator of the disintegration that predated Sarkozy and led to the World Cup disgrace. 


The hijab as a cultural symbol
By the same token, Denmark, a country that in recent years has adopted a tougher stance on immigration, emerged as an unlikely catalyst in the acceptance of women who choose to wear the hijab on the football pitch. In 2008 the Danish Football Association backed Zainab al Khatib, a 15-year-old star striker of Palestinian origin who carried the banner in Europe for women demanding the right to play with their heads covered. Its support inspired a campaign to portray the headdress as a cultural rather than a religious symbol. That distinction ultimately persuaded the International Football Association Board, the body that governs the rules of professional football, to rule in 2012 that religiously observant women could wear a headdress that meets their cultural requirements, as well as standards of safety and security. The Danish support for Al Khatib was remarkable as it came at a time that parliaments in France, Belgium and Spain were imposing restrictions on Muslim women’s garb. 

Khatib became the first covered national football player in Europe to be successfully fielded by her team. She wears a black scarf tightly wrapped around her head when she unleashes her lightning fast and nimble skills, and extraordinary her ability to score with a header. The Danish association defended the headscarf of its Under-18 national team’s most promising forward as a cultural rather than a religious commitment and compared it to the headband of Brazilian midfielder Ronaldinho Gaucho, which also violates FIFA’s insistence that all players should be dressed identically. 

The Danish association’s support of Al Khatib set an example for the coalition of female European and Asian football executives and trainers, and Middle Eastern women players led by FIFA vice president Prince Ali Bin Al Hussein of Jordan, which successfully campaigned for FIFA and IFAB’s lifting of the ban on women’s headdress. 

The football pitch has become an important tool for integration and a measure of the success of European integration policies. As such, it constitutes a barometer that local, regional and national policymakers in Europe cannot afford to ignore.

James M Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University, Co-director of the Institute of Fan Culture at the University of Würzburg, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog


  1. Anne Jolis, The Swedish Model for Europe, The Wall Street Journal, 21 May 2012 

  2. Swedish Football Association quoted by Carl Rommel, Real Play, Suryoyo identification in Sweden Through the Performative Space of Football, unpublished MA thesis, 15 September 2009, page 25

  3. Interview with Dalkurd Co-founder and Sports Director Elvan Cicen on 12 May 2012

  4. Idem

  5. Paul Verweel, Respect in en Door Sport, Uitgeverij SWP, Amsterdam, 2007, page 30

  6. M Douglas, Essays with Sociology of Perception, Routledge, London, 1982

  7. Verweel, idem, page 19

  8. Interview with the author on 1 June 2012

  9. Carl Rommel, Real Play, Suryoyo identification in Sweden Through the Performative Space of Football, unpublished MA thesis, 15 September 2009

  10. idem

  11. Carl Rommel, Playing with difference: football as a performative space for division among Suryoye migrants in Sweden, Soccer & Society, 2011, page 850, 12:6

  12. David Gardner, Middle East: Febrile and Fragmented, Financial Times, 19 May, 2012

  13. Interview with the author on 12 May, 2012

  14. 17 Charged in Footballer’s ‘Gang-war’ Slaying, The Local, 16 November 2011

  15. Interview with the author on May 16 2011

  16. Markus Flohr and Maximilian Popp, Turkey Recruits Players ‘Made in Germany’, Der Spiegel, 17 September 2010
07 Nov 19:13

Maybe You Should Think About It

by Sarah Skwire

This post was co-authored with Steve Horwitz.

 

The great thing about being a young adult is that the world is all before you. There are a dizzying multitude of possible paths on which you can set your feet, and an incalculable array of possible futures at the end of each one.

The problem is that you have to listen to people our age tell you which path to take.

There’s a debate currently raging about the value of education, which is filled with people of our generation trying to tell people twenty years younger what they ought to do. The sides in the triangle look, roughly, like this:

Drop Out, Cash In:  The claim is that college is a waste of money and time and that young people would be better off becoming entrepreneurs and creating value in the marketplace and/or alternative institutions.  This is often coupled with a critique of higher education as being about learning to obey authority and conformism rather than creativity and learning.  It also often includes a critique of faculty as being disconnected and self-indulgent and caring little about actually producing critical thinkers and student learning.

Razzle-Dazzle Them: There is a large debate in economics over whether a college education adds to human capital in the form of skills and knowledge or simply signals to employers that you are smart, persistent, and teachable, among other things.  Although this view does not claim that going to college is a bad thing (at least not for most people), it does suggest that one should pick a school, a major, and courses mostly with an eye to their instrumental value as signals.

Grecian Urn: In the rush to protest the hyper-practical exterior of the “Drop Out Cash In” crowd, and what can be the tacky “designer label” feel of the Razzle-Dazzle crowd, the academy often rushes to defend all learning, for all people, for its own sake. No cost can be too high for access to truth and beauty, right?

The problem is that all the sides of the triangle are made up of at least 50% unadulterated hogwash.

The Drop Out, Cash In argument is inspiring. And we like the way it encourages people to follow their dreams and think creatively about how to accomplish their goals. But it ignores, it seems to us, some very important questions about entrepreneurship. First, it ignores the ongoing and heated argument among entrepreneurs and educators about whether entrepreneurship is something that can be taught. Second, it elides the question of whether everyone is suited to entrepreneurial activity. Third, it seems to us to vastly understate the difficulty and challenges of entrepreneurship. We are impressed by successful entrepreneurs (and believe us, we are very impressed) because we know it’s hard to succeed. We’ve seen a lot of failures and been involved with a few ourselves. The implication that “becoming an entrepreneur” is some sort of straight and easy way to success makes us want to rip our hair out (well, Sarah’s anyway). We also have serious questions about the idea of “becoming an entrepreneur” as a goal. Who does that? Don’t most entrepreneurs set out to make a product or provide a service or fill a Kirznerian niche? They have, in other words, a specific thing that they want to do. By doing it and succeeding at it, they become entrepreneurs. Setting out to “become an entrepreneur” without an entrepreneurial idea sounds, to us, a lot like friends who want to “be a writer” but don’t have any story ideas or writing experience. They’re in love with the idea of literary cocktail parties and book tours. How many people who want to “become an entrepreneur” are in love with the idea of seeing themselves quoted in Forbes or giving TED talks about the secret to success?

And we don’t understand why praising entrepreneurship has come, all of a sudden, to go hand in hand with a knee-jerk anti-intellectualism that is the worst version of parodies of the American businessperson.  It’s actually possible to respect and praise entrepreneurship without denigrating the work done by intellectuals and academics.

The Razzle-Dazzle Them approach is persuasive. We can all see how university alumni watch out for one another and help provide opportunities and mentoring, and we can all appreciate the usefulness of a short-hand that says, “Hire me. I finish what I start.” We would never say that education is not a signal. But we are equally unpersuaded that education is only a signal. We have been both teachers and students, and we know that every day we make interesting and productive use of content we dismissed when we acquired it. That education provides a signal and a short-hand does not mean that is all that it does.

The Grecian Urn approach is probably, in today’s climate, the easiest to dismiss. We’re glad that we had the kinds of educations that equipped us to respond to the beauties of poetry and music and painting. But we’re willing to admit that the course Sarah took on Pindaric Odes hasn’t produced any measurable intellectual, spiritual, or material gains for her. (Not yet, anyway.) Nor has Steve’s course on the philosophy of space and time with all of its non-Euclidean geometries and paradoxes of time travel. (But boy he enjoyed writing about the Planet of the Apes movies!) Not all knowledge is useful for all people. And insisting that everyone needs to learn Latin or that the world will fall apart if we are not all conversant with the Great Books is probably not the best way to defend the humanities.

We do believe that there are too many young people going to college today, due to a combination of misguided government subsidies, labor market interventions that make it harder to get work right out of high school, and a mistaken belief that the only path to a successful, financially stable career involves four years of college.  College isn’t for everyone, but neither is anything else.

So are we just going to Statler and Waldorf our way through this debate, throwing peanut shells at all concerned and not making any useful suggestions?

Hell no. We’re as happy as all the rest of the 40-somethings out there to pretend we’ve got all the answers.

Here’s what we think.

  1. Life is full of unexpected surprises. Very few of us take a straight line through life where the plans we have at 18 are the plans we are living at 40. You should probably pack carefully for that trip—with as broad a set of experiences and tools as possible, and a mind that is as flexible and capable of improvisation as you can make it. You aren’t one thing. And whatever things you are, you’ll be different things later down the road. Fill your mental and physical toolbox with a wealth of tools and you’ll be more prepared to address those surprises.  A good liberal education is as much about this flexibility and about the ability to learn how to learn as it is about the particular content you acquire.
  2. Knowledge is always useful. Heinlein said that “A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects.” Some of those are things best learned in an academic atmosphere. Some are not. The point is to take this intellectual and mechanical and spiritual curiosity as your motto. As Kipling said, “Run and find out.” Because you cannot predict when the stuff that you know will bump up against the stuff someone else knows and produce one of those great ideas, enduring friendships, or moments of happiness that we all live for.
  3. School is expensive. If you go, go hard. Go with a sense of the possible risks and potential rewards.
  4. Entrepreneurship is expensive. If you go, go hard. Go with a sense of the possible risks and potential rewards.
  5. Everyone is trying to sell you something. We’re educators. (Well, Sarah is sort of complicated, but she’s more like an educator than anything else.) We’ve chosen to do this with our lives because we believe education is important and valuable and useful and beautiful and fun, and because we are lucky enough to be able to make money from doing something we believe is important and valuable and useful and beautiful and fun. So of course we want you to think that as well—not just so we can make money, but so we can share the things we love. The same thing is true of the people who are pushing students to drop out and be entrepreneurs. They’re doing something they believe in, and they’re trying to make money from it. There’s no shame in any of us making money from what we do. Just know that this is what’s happening. 

That’s what we think.

Oh. You wanted to know what we think you should do? You wanted to know if you should drop out? Razzle-dazzle ‘em? Study truth and beauty? You, in particular?

We’re libertarians. We don’t know what’s best for you. And we’re very suspicious of people who claim they do.

We think you ought to decide. And because the decision you make today may not be the decision you stick with in 5 or 10 or even 20 years, we think you ought to keep deciding as your life twists and turns and changes. We just wanted to give you a few more things to think about while you do.

Now get off our lawn.

23 Oct 13:42

Extreme Austrian Apriorism as the No True Scotsman Fallacy

by Jason Brennan

UPDATE: Tom “There’s an Anti-Rothbard Cult”* Woods claims to have refuted my criticism here. Judge for yourself.

I was at a conference a few years ago on Austrian vs. Chicago-school economics. Here’s a conversation I had with an Austrian economist, whom I won’t name here. I’ll just call my interlocutor “Austrian Dude”.

Brennan: “What do you think of behavioral economics that purports to show people often act irrationally in the market?”

Austrian Dude: “That doesn’t pose a problem for economics. Economics is a priori.”

Brennan: “But doesn’t it show that people don’t often act in the way your theory describes?”

Austrian Dude: “No. You see, there’s a difference between behavior and action. Action is defined as….[insert a summary of Mises's Human Action here]. But what Frank and others are describing is behavior, not action. Economics tells us how human beings act, but behavioral economics is just describing behavior.”

Brennan: “That creates a big problem for you. You intend to defend markets in the real world, with real human beings. You can decide to distinguish action from behavior, and say that action by definition is rational, etc. But this doesn’t save you from behavioral econ. Instead, it leaves open, as an empirical question, whether actual human beings in the real world are better described by your a priori theory of human action or by behavioral economics. If your theory doesn’t account for actual human behavior very well, then it’s impotent to defend real life markets, and you shouldn’t advocate libertarianism in the real world on the basis of your Austrian economics.”

In short, extreme apriorism ends up being a version of the No True Scotsman Fallacy.

Not all Austrian economists make this mistake. In particular, the ones who publish in real journals know better, but the ones who are confined to publishing in fake journals (i.e., journals that, say, Georgetown wouldn’t count towards tenure) do make this mistake.

P.S.: N.B., I’m not here defending behavioral economics, nor am I taking a stance on what follows from behavioral economics. (In fact, I think behavioral economists tend to jump to policy implications in an intellectually lazy way. See Frank’s embarrassingly bad book The Darwin Economy for a collection of non sequiturs.)

*For what it’s worth, I think Rothbard was more or less a hack. But no one indoctrinated me into that. I came to that conclusion by reading his work, as much as I could stomach, after it was recommended to me. So, my joining the cult came not through brainwashing but through Satanic inspiration.

23 Oct 13:40

A Knock-Down Argument against the Free Market

by Jason Brennan

I have to announce today my apostasy from bleeding heart libertarianism. As of now, I am a bleeding heart socialist instead. You see, I recently became aware of a knock-down argument against free markets. I call this argument the “Positive Duties Exist Argument against Free Markets”. It goes as follows.

The Positive Duties Exist Argument against Free Markets:

  1. We have general duties of beneficence towards one another, and in some cases, we have specific obligations to help strangers.
  2. If we have general duties of beneficence towards one another, and in some cases, we have specific obligations to help strangers, then free markets are morally wrong.
  3. Therefore, free markets are morally wrong.

On behalf of premise 1, consider, for example Singer’s Drowning Child thought experiment: You are walking along one day, when you see a toddler drowning in a pool of water nearby. You could easily save the child at no risk to yourself, but in doing so, you would damage your $500 blue suede shoes. (You don’t need these shoes–they are just a luxury good.) Now, most people, including me, think you have a moral duty to save the kid–it’s not merely a nice thing to do, but something you must do.

Premise 2 is just painfully obvious, so I won’t argue for it here.

Thanks, Amia Srinivasan, for showing me the light! It’s amazing that you managed to take down all of free market thinking, despite, as far as I can tell, having never read any free market thinkers, including Nozick! The Positive Duties Exist Argument is so powerful one can just ignore all that. One can destroy free market thinking despite being ignorant and misinformed about what free market people think and why they think it.

 

 

16 Oct 23:38

Taxation Is Not Slavery

by Matt Zwolinski

Today in the mail I received a copy of the movie, Amazing Grace, courtesy of the Foundation for Economic Education. The film tells the story of William Wilberforce and his struggle to end the British slave trade in the late 18th century. FEE is distributing the film as part of their “Blinking Lights Project,” a new effort designed, in their words, “to highlight and emphasize the vital link between personal character and a free society.”

I haven’t watched the film yet. But it looks good, and Wilberforce is certainly a heroic figure. I’m glad that FEE is distributing it. And I am favorably inclined to the effort to link considerations of virtue to the case for a free society.

But still…

Included with the movie are a set of “suggested discussion questions” for educators who choose to show it. One of those questions read as follows:

Slavery deprives the slave of the right of private property in his own person, as well as the right to sell his labor in a  free marketplace. In effect, it is taxation at the rate of 100%. America’s Founders objected to British rule in part because they thought “taxation without representation” was a form of slavery, but British taxes on the colonies then were nowhere near as high as taxes in America today. Is there a point below 100% where taxes could be high enough to say that taxpayers are effectively enslaved?

Of course, the claim that “taxation is slavery” is pretty much a commonplace among libertarians. And I’ve expressed my doubts about it, and its variants, before. But what struck me about this particular passage was the way in which it drew out that common idea to its logical conclusion. If (partial) taxation is (partial) slavery, then 100% taxation ought to be 100% slavery. In other words, 100% taxation would be morally or “effectively” identical to slavery.

Except that it isn’t. It just clearly isn’t. Even with a rate of taxation of 100%, no one would be forcing you to labor, they would merely (“merely”) be forcibly extracting 100% of the proceeds of your labor. If you chose not to work at all (and why wouldn’t you choose this?), no one would be stopping you. A taxation rate of 100% does not give anyone else the right to physically beat you just because you aren’t working hard enough, or because they didn’t like the tone in your voice, or because you looked at a white woman the wrong way. A taxation rate of 100% doesn’t give anybody the right to forcibly separate you from your family. It doesn’t give anyone the right to buy you or sell you, or tell you where you have to live, or prevent you from learning how to read or from speaking your mind, etc., etc., etc…

None of this is to say, obviously, that taxing people at a rate of 100% wouldn’t be a gross moral wrong. I wouldn’t even deny that it would be wrong for many of the same reasons that slavery is wrong. But it’s not the same thing. And it’s not anywhere close to the same magnitude of wrong.

Libertarians have a genuinely valuable insight, I think, when they claim that the power to tax the proceeds of another person’s labor gives the holder of that right a partial property right in the other person. But a property right is a bundle. And even a right to tax all of the proceeds of another person’s labor still falls well short of the kind of property right that masters had in their slaves in the context of the African salve trade.

All of this is obvious to most people. Even if taxation and slavery are both bad, and both bad for many of the same reasons, there are obviously morally significant differences between them. And so when libertarians act like those differences aren’t there, or that they don’t matter, other people don’t think – “Wow, what a principled and radical idea!” They just think we’re kind of thick.

So please, let’s stop talking this way.

16 Oct 17:13

Political Philosophy vs. Political Theory Explained in a Flowchart

by Jason Brennan

For those confused about the difference, a while back I created this handy flowchart.

411604_1706671922273_248532358_o

15 Oct 13:39

The Adventures of Flatman

a_romance_in_n_dimensions
01 Oct 12:30

On shutting down

by Andrew Cohen

Agent A makes a contract with agent B, agreeing to pay B $X. A overspends and has difficulty paying B. A decides not to pay B. In many cases, we would say this is unacceptable and that A must pay B what is owed. At least, we think, A must go through the proper channels to declare bankruptcy if A is to not pay B what A owes B. This would be unfortunate, we are told, but bankruptcy law is needed to allow for the proper running of the economy.

Today, the U.S. government is agent A. Many libertarians seem happy with the idea of a government shut down. The government, I imagine some think, is not an ordinary agent–it is a big evil entity that had no right to make the contracts at issue and could only afford to pay what it is thought to owe B because it planned to steal the money to do so from the rest of us innocent individuals who it aggresses against. I think as much of this as I do the idea that all taxation is theft. If we are to have a government, we must have taxation in some form. Anarchists could consistently hold that all taxation is theft. For my part, though I am very sympathetic to anarchism–and sometimes find myself almost embracing it–I think there is a role for government: harm prevention and rectification. That costs money; in my view, taxation to pay for that is acceptable. But this is at least partly beside the point.

Our government does not confine itself to harm prevention and rectification. It engages in many activities no libertarian of any stripe would endorse or think permissible. So, I agree that our government taxes us wrongly. Yet I am not gleeful at the prospect of a government shut down. Perhaps you think I should be. After all, police, military, prisons, and courts will all continue to operate–the shutdown is partial, not complete–and that, some will say, means the government will, under the “shutdown,” do the things I want it to do and less of what I don’t want it to do.

But there’s the first point: its not true that the government will “do the things I want it to do and less of what I don’t want it to do.” So-called “essential” services will remain and so-called “non-essential” services will not. NASA will (mostly) be shut down, OK. But our soldiers will stay in all of the places they find themselves, regardless of whether their presence there is a matter of harm prevention or not (and police will continue to arrest people for smoking marijuana; the DEA, I think, will also remain active). The NSA will continue to record or monitor our phone calls, emails, etc. Judges will continue to hear cases about which there should be no laws. Import tariffs will still be collected. I’ll leave it to others to go make a longer list, noting merely that I do not trust that the essential/non-essential distinction will be used appropriately. And lets be honest: our so-called “representatives” in Congress know the score. They know how the essential/non-essential distinction will be used. That means that even if the programs they want cut are exactly the programs that should be cut, they are only engaging in political showmanship. And it has costs. And that takes us to the second point.

People who were promised paychecks will not get them. Some will get them late. Some will get smaller paychecks (due to furlough time). Some of these people will face tremendous difficulty. I think it fair to say they will be harmed–having planned their lives given the promise of a regular paycheck, they have legitimate expectations that are being set back. Perhaps the government should not have hired those people in the first place (after all, they are “non-essential” personnel!). But the fact is they were hired and treating them this way is wrong and makes a mockery of contract.

Put the point this way: a mobster might be wrong to extract protection money from a business, but that does not make it any less wrong for the mobster to fail to protect that business in time of need. We don’t say “wait, the mobster doesn’t have to live up to its agreement because it was wrong to make the agreement in the first place.” I think most of us think 2 things: (a) the mobster should not have extracted the protection money in the first place and (b) the mobster owes the business protection. Similarly, I think the government should not have hired people to do non-essential jobs (by which I mean any jobs not needed for harm prevention and rectification) in the first place but that because it did, the government* owes those people their salaries on the regular pay days. This does not mean we should not seek to limit government or that we are stuck forever with all of the “non-essential” personnel. It means we must work to have the government limited in scope, but limited through moral means. This may be harder, but its not impossible. (I’d start with a simple rule: No replacement hires of any personnel who do not do any work needed for harm prevention or rectification unless failure to fill the position in question would result in a direct harm to another. I realize that needs unpacking.)

I’ll add one final point. At least some of us here at BHL.com (maybe all of us) believe that the government “is significantly responsible for causing and perpetuating poverty” (I borrow that way of putting it) and that if this is the case, it would be wrong to suddenly and immediately cut programs aimed at alleviating that poverty–at least before cutting elsewhere. This is really the same point as the one made in the last paragraph: it was wrong for the government* to undertake programs that lead anyone into poverty, but since it did, it has obligations to those so lead. This does not mean we are stuck forever with helping those people (as a matter of rectification). It means that if we want limited government, we must work to have the government limited in scope through moral means.

*NOTE, meant to prevent a certain sort of objection: The government is a corporate entity. It was people in the government that acted in ways that lead other people in the government to have legitimate expectations regarding paychecks (and that lead to the policies that lead to poverty). To some extent, perhaps, we are all complicit in this. I won’t defend that claim here.

30 Sep 15:53

God's Wounded Ego

by Tim Urban



















































































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19 Sep 12:51

Debunko Squad

9_11_was_an_inside_job_cuz_aliens
14 Sep 23:27

Jane Jacobs, carros e transporte coletivo

by Anthony
Em entrevista à Reason, onde o jornalista pergunta sobre os subúrbios americanos (altamente incentivados pelo planejamento "carrocêntrico") ela fala:
Reason: Estou a 5 minutos de carro de todo tipo de comércio que eu preciso, mas eu não conseguiria fazer isso a pé.
Jacobs: Claro, você quer defender o carro nesses casos. É uma linha de vida. É tão importante quanto sua água.
Reason: Você não é anti-carro, certo?
Jacobs: Não. Mas eu acho que precisamos de muito mais transporte público. Mas você não pode ter transporte público na situação que você está falando.
Reason: Você não quer dizer literalmente transporte público estatal?
Jacobs: Não, todas as formas de transporte coletivo. Podem ser táxis, vans gerenciadas privadamente, qualquer coisa. Transporte onde as pessoas não precisam ser donas e possam pagar uma tarifa.
Reason: Você não é uma inimiga de um livre mercado de transportes.
Jacobs: Não. Eu gostaria que tivéssemos mais dele. Eu gostaria que não tivéssemos a noção de que precisamos de um monopólio de transporte coletivo. Eu gostaria que fosse mais competitivo -- nos tipos de veículos que se usa, nas tarifas que se cobra, nas rotas que se faz, nos horários do dia que funciona. Eu já vi isso em ilhas pobres do Caribe. Eles tem um bom serviço de peruas porque é ditado pelos usuários.
Eu gostaria que pudéssemos fazer mais disso. Mas temos tanta história contra isso, e tantas coisas institucionais estabelecidas contra isso. A ideia de que você deve usar grandes veículos monstruosos, quando o serviço na verdade funcionaria melhor se fosse no tamanho de uma perua. Isso mostra o quão artificial e tolo os monopólios são. A única coisa que salva a situação é quando coisas ilegais começam a quebrar o monopólio.
Pelo jeito não é só eu que defendo a desregulamentação do transporte: estou sentado no ombro de uma gigante.
14 Sep 05:45

Dumpster Diving and Libertarianism

by Moorfield Storey Institute

The Left-of-center website, Demos, has a somewhat dishonest attack on libertarianism by a Mr. Matt Bruenig. Bruenig is happy to announce that a libertarian from the Cato Institute has agreed to discuss the nature of libertarianism with him. He then pulls one of the more dishonest stunts that one can pull in a debate or discussion—he set up an extreme, minority position as if it is the mainstream and then demanded his opponent justify it.

This is similar to conflating left progressives with the Communist Party USA. It was a shameful stunt when pulled by McCarthyites, Birchers and others on the extreme Right and it is just as shameful when pulled by left progressives, such as Mr. Bruenig.

Bruenig demands that his Cato discussant defend the antics of Han-Hermann Hoppe, who is absurdly described as “a very prominent libertarian academic.” In truth, Mr. Hoppe is hardly “prominent,” though he and his small band of followers would rush to agree with Bruenig—which makes Bruenig the one keeping odd company.

Bruenig notes Hoppe’s affiliation with the paleolibertarian Ludwig von Mises Institute—formed by a former staffer from the Conservative Book Club, well after Mises died. Now, if you were to take the budgets of the various libertarian-oriented think tanks and combine them together, you would probably find that this organization represents less than 1% of libertarian funding of ideas in any one year.
If you were to look at the archives of Reason magazine, the premier magazine of a libertarian nature for decades, I don’t think you will find one magazine article that even references Hoppe. I have long followed the academic conferences that are sponsored by libertarians groups such as the Atlas Foundation, the Institute for Humane Studies and Liberty Fund, and I don’t remember one such event sponsoring Hoppe as a speaker or one where his ideas were taken seriously.

In fact, one reason Hoppe founded his Property & Freedom Society, mentioned by Bruenig, was because the libertarian-leaning international group of academics, the Mont Pelerin Society, wasn’t keen on him. Hoppe’s “alternative” is a hodge-podge of fringe Right-wing conservatives, racists and so-called paleolibertarians—precisely the kind of people that Mont Pelerin would generally shun. That Hoppe founded this organization is not evidence he is a mainstream libertarian figure—it proves the very opposite.

I should point out that even many of the people associated with the Mises Institute have little affinity with Hoppe’s views, especially the ones singled out by Bruenig, and some have been publicly critical. For instance, Walter Block wrote a critical analysis of Hoppe in the Reason Papers, though many libertarians would think his criticisms didn’t go far enough. Block has not been alone—especially in regard to Hoppe’s perceived racism and anti-gay bigotry, perceptions I think are wholly justified.



Hoppe’s influence on modern libertarianism is extremely minor. Mr. Bruenig ignored the Mount Olympus of libertarianism and went searching in the gutter instead. The reality is that the vast majority of libertarians, if asked about Hoppe, would respond: “Who?”

Bruenig, however, pretends that no libertarian has spoken out against Hoppe and his views. “Is anyone in the libertarian community willing to denounce Hans-Hermann Hoppe as not one of them, and call him the lunatic he clearly is? Or is he still going to get an invite to the next convention?”

This is on par with: “Have you stopped beating your wife?” Both questions are dishonest because they are meant to imply something as true, which is not.

Bruenig discovers that, “Hoppe is a huge fan of discrimination of basically all sorts: racist, sexist, classist, and all the others. In fact, if there is any overarching theme in Hoppe's work, it is that the problem with our status quo society is that, because it is democratic, the majoritarian tendency reigns, and that majoritarian tendency is to protect people from discrimination.”

This is like someone taking a 747 to Boston and pretending they have “discovered” North America. Many libertarians have noted Hoppe’s prejudicial, extremist views long before progressives like Bruenig had any idea who he was. Libertarians were concerned that Hoppe was cloaking his bigotry in libertarian terms. Bruenig reveals NOTHING about Hoppe that libertarians didn’t expose first, and condemn.

If Bruenig did any research for his article he should have known this. That leaves the uncomfortable assumption that he either did very little research or he ignored the context of the libertarian movement in order to make it appear that libertarians are in lockstep—or goose-step if you prefer—with Mr. Hoppe.

Hoppe has tried to justify his petty bigotries by the claim, in twists of bizarre logic, that a property-based, free society would discriminate—coincidentally against all the very groups that Hoppe himself dislikes: non-white immigrants, blacks and gays.

Bruenig accidentally gives away the flaw in his own argument that Hoppe is the "Libertarian Extraordinaire.” He notes that Hoppe thinks some “libertarians are hopelessly confused” because “they believe that in this world of free markets and private property, gays will be super-free to love who they want to love, live how they want to live.” Actually, in my experience, that pretty much encapsulates the view of most libertarians.

Bruenig claims:

Hoppe realizes that in a world of a true lock down on private property, with no regulation on how such property might be used, there would be unbelievable amounts of social coercion to prevent people from living the lives they'd like. If you don't get on board with the dominant culture, you literally will find yourself with nowhere to live, work, eat, and will summarily die. Also, notice how old school he is even in 2001 comparing LGBTQ people to pedophiles. Bold move, Hoppe, bold move.

Bruenig says Hoppe “realizes” this because this is precisely the sort of bizarre claim that Bruenig himself wants to be true, albeit for very different reasons. Hoppe imagines this to be the case because there are people he hates and he wants to argue this hatred would be sanctioned in a property-based, depoliticized market. Hoppe does this to give approval for his own prejudices against these people. Mr. Bruenig does it because he wants to give sanction to his prejudices against markets and libertarians.

But, is this the case? Hoppe’s argumentation is wrong and Bruenig applauding his logic doesn’t make it correct. In fact we have countless examples of how markets and property have done the very opposite of what Hoppe and Bruenig seem to wish were the case.

Police harassing Stonewall customers
Gay establishments existed long before anti-discrimination laws. In fact, they existed in the face of anti-gay laws of the worse kind. The fact that individuals owned private property allowed them to set up gay establishments. Yes, those clubs were harassed and often shut down—by the government. Police harassment of gay clubs was, and to some extent still is, a problem. Private property and market-incentives created gay establishment and government closed them.

Apartheid, and its little brother, Jim Crow, were not examples of markets. Blacks didn’t ride in the front of the bus because the states passed laws making it illegal to do so. In South Africa, the laws forbade the hiring of blacks for certain professions—without the law people were hiring blacks for those very professions. The government prosecuted employers for the crime of hiring black workers.

And, as the Civil Rights struggle showed, when white business owners did try to treat customers equally they were often violently attacked by hate groups like the Klan, who were usually in cahoots with the local police department. It wasn’t the protection of private property that was the problem here, but the systematic violation of those rights by bigots who had government power behind them.

Immigrants are another favored target of Mr. Hoppe—particularly those from non-European cultures, by which Hoppe seems to mean non-Whites.

During recent waves of “illegal” immigration we had property owners and markets acting very differently from policy-makers and government. Politicians passed laws making it a crime to rent property to someone without verifying they were a citizen first. Why? This was “necessary” because without the force of government, private-property owners were quite happy to rent apartments and homes to them.


Politicians passed laws making it a criminal offense to hire these people unless they provided government papers certifying they had a “right” to work in the United States. If employers wished to discriminate they could have easily done so. Even the anti-discrimination laws would not have required them to hire “illegal immigrants” in most cases. But, employers were hiring these people and the political process had to step in forcibly to prevent it. Even with these extraordinary state interventions employers are still hiring “illegals” to this very day.

In other words, private property and depoliticized markets have been sanctuaries for victims of discrimination and bigots knew it. If this were not true there would be no need for these laws.

Bruenig ends his piece by claiming “I didn’t pull this man out of some backwater obscurity.” I would argue the lady doth protest too much. That is precisely what he did.

Beyond his blanket condemnations of libertarianism there is nothing in Bruenig’s article that is critical of Hoppe that wasn’t said first by libertarians—and said better.

Resources: Various libertarian sites have been critical of Hoppe. For instance, the Rightwatch blog had multiple exposes of Hoppe during the years it was in operation, 2005-2008. Libertarian activist and intellectual, Tom Palmer, publisheddozens of critiques of Hoppe on his personal blog. For that he was rewarded with an anti-Palmer website from Hoppe acolytes, along with numerous anti-gay slurs from Hoppe and his small band of followers. In 2005 the World Freedom Conference hosted libertarian policy analyst Oliver Marc Hartwich who gave a presentation on “The Errors of Hans-Hermann Hoppe.” What is noteworthy, but ignored by Mr. Bruenig, is that outside the limited circles of the Mises Institute, there is a shortage of academic libertarian organizations and/or publications that bother to take Mr. Hoppe seriously at all.

For a discussion of why depoliticized markets actually undermine conservative values—the opposite of what Hoppe and Bruenig believe—see “Conservatism versus Liberal Capitalism."
14 Sep 05:43

The Rime of the Data Scientist

by Gary Ernest Davis

The Rime of the Data Scientist (with apologies to Samuel Taylor Coleridge)

Part I

It is a Data Scientist,

And he stoppeth one of three.

`By thy Python code and glittering eye,

Now wherefore stopp’st thou me?

 

The classroom doors are opened wide,

And I am next one in;

The others are met, the test is set:

Mayst hear the noisy din.’

 

He holds him with his skinny hand,

“There was a cluster,” quoth he.

`Hold off! unhand me, open-source loon!’

Eftsoons his hand dropped he.

 

He holds him with his glittering eye –

The student stood quite still,

And listens like a three years’ child:

The Scientist hath his will.

 

The student sat upon a stone:

He cannot sort his list;

And thus spake on the young person,

The Data Scientist.

 

“The code was cleared, the whole team cheered,

Merrily did we drop

Unto the pub, and there to drink,

Without a thought to stop.

 

The variables were writ upon the left,

Transferred from R to C;

The code shone bright, and on the right

The data a, b, c.

 

More and more code every day,

It was a wondrous thing –

The student here did beat his breast,

For he heard the exam bell ring.

 

The examiner hath paced into the hall,

Red of face is he;

Nodding his head from side to side –

A fan of Scotch whisky.

 

The student he did beat his breast,

He forgets to sort his list;

And thus spake on the young man,

The Data Scientist.

 

“And now the data surge came, and it

Was tyrannous and strong:

It struck with massive overload,

And analysis took so long.

 

With high performance really stretched,

As who pursued with yell and blow

Still treads the shadow of his foe,

And foward bends his head,

The cluster was fast, it was a blast,

And onward aye we sped.

 

And now there were missing values and outliers,

And it grew wondrous confused:

And deleted columns, as if floating by,

Their data could not be used.

 

And through the drifts the snowy clifts

Did send a dismal sheen:

Nor shapes of men nor beasts we ken –

The grep was all between.

 

The grep was here, the grep was there,

The grep was all around:

It cracked and growled, and roared and howled,

Regular expressions could not be found!

 

At length did cross a statistician,

Thorough the fog she came;

As she had been a blessed soul,

We hailed her in Tukey’s name.

 

She saw the data we ne’er had seen,

And all around she went.

The data did split with a thunder-fit;

The programmers steered us through!

 

And a good data stream sprung up behind;

The statistician did follow,

And every day, for data or play,

Came to the programmer’s hollo!

 

In hard-drive or cloud, whatever’s allowed,

She analyzed the data mine;

Whiles all the night, with code writ right,

The programmers drank moonshine.”

 

`God save thee, Data Scientisit,

From the fiends that plague thee thus! –

Why look’st thou perchance?’ – “With a wicked glance,

I fired the statistician.”

03 Sep 16:18

If science tells you you can’t predict something, is it no longer science?

by James Fearon

The NYT ran an op-ed last week by philosophers of Science Alex Rosenberg and Tyler Curtain that said that (1) economics is not a capital-S Science because it has no “record of improvement in predictive success” and (2) therefore the next Fed chair should be someone who understands that economics is not a capital-S Science and instead has “wisdom” and “a feeling for the economy.”  (Interestingly, experience was not mentioned, which you’d think would be more important the more the job is a matter of craft, as R and C say, than of book learning, which is mainly what Ben Bernanke had.  R and C applaud Bernanke for his craft.)

Harvard Econ theorist Eric Maskin wrote a letter in reply and then NYT did a “Room for Debate” exchange between Maskin and other readers.  Maskin made the point that explanation can be valuable and scientific independent of whether it leads to sharp predictions in some particular domain.  But most of the readers the Times printed were not buying this at all—for them, sufficient evidence that Economics is not a capital-S Science is that it can’t predict stock market movements and crashes reliably.  Rosenberg and Curtain also seem to have this in mind as the key example.

But what you could reasonably call a scientific thought experiment is enough to show that you can’t have a Scientific Theory that reliably predicts stock market movements and crashes:  If such a theory existed that predicted a giant market collapse on date T, the collapse wouldn’t happen on date T.  Ditto for forecasting market movements from publicly available data.  In the long run, or “in equilibrium” in the sense of the developed formal models of this kind of thing, market movements and crashes should be random or unpredictable based on public information.  Yes, that’s an “idealization,” and an idealization that R and C obliquely criticize at the end of their op-ed.  But it’s an idealization that provides an important and valid insight into the kind of system an asset market is.

The reply by reader David Berman raises this issue indirectly, but he concludes that it means that Economics can’t be a “proper” capital-S Science (“if only we could [predict market crashes] without the prediction’s entirely changing the behavior of the markets! That’s the other critical difference between economics and meteorology, or physics, or any of the disciplines we properly call scientific”).  I read what R and C are saying the same way, although it’s less spelled out there.  But can that be right?  I would have thought the argument should be that scientific inquiry has clarified the reasons for why a theory that predicts specific market movements or crashes is difficult, or impossible in the long run, in contrast to theories of simple physical systems.  In other words it’s not so much a case of inappropriate hubris of Economics in trying to be like Physics, but of a scientific effort producing a better and deeper understanding of why this sort of system (an asset market, here) is different from a physical system that doesn’t have agents that condition what they do on expectations about what others will do.

Of course, not all markets—or economic, political, or social interactions—have this specific dynamic that asset markets have, so the difficulties in predicting the stock market from public information do not imply that you can’t develop theory that makes reasonably good predictions in other areas (eg., basic supply and demand analysis for prices and quantities).  R and C were making a reasonable point about choosing Fed chairs.  Sure, I’d like someone who is wise and not rigidly attached to some particular mathematical idealization.  But the broader line of argument seems wrong.

31 Aug 19:23

A inimaginável cidade em 2025

by Anthony

Tente imaginar uma cidade em 2025. Carros autônomos, limpos e silenciosos rondam constantemente as ruas atrás de passageiros. Utilizando um sistema descentralizado como o Waze que conhecemos hoje, os carros procuram as rotas com menor trânsito, distribuindo-os perfeitamente na infraestrutura. Taxas pela infraestrutura também são cobradas eletronicamente de acordo com a distância que eles transitam, o horário que estão nas ruas e o espaço que ocupam, impedindo a superlotação. Os carros tem gestão descentralizada e fácil acesso dos usuários, como Car2Go e Zipcar. Para chamar um deles é simples: identifique o tamanho e o modelo que você precisa através de uma listagem online, acessado pelo seu Google Glass. A qualidade do serviço pode ser avaliada através das críticas dos usuários anteriores. O preço é baixo: após a desregulamentação do trânsito em 2020 a concorrência "predatória" eliminou as empresas ineficientes, deixando apenas os melhores serviços no mercado. Além disso, seus motores elétricos são extremamente eficientes e são carregados na própria rede pública, abastecida pelas fachadas fotovoltaicas dos prédios ao invés de grandes e distantes usinas hidrelétricas que tem enorme perda na distribuição. Para serem carregados, lembrando o pequeno Roomba do início do século, os carros autônomos se direcionam à garagens na periferia da cidade, onde o custo da terra é mais baixo. As garagens atuais foram convertidas em escritórios e também em hortas hidropônicas, possibilitando comida fresca diariamente.

Este é um cenário possível para a cidade de 2025, mas muito improvável. Improvável porque é impossível prever se essas tecnologias, todas existentes hoje, realmente vão ter esse tipo de uso, ou até mesmo se vão ser legalmente permitidas - maioria delas hoje não são. Também é improvável porque até 2025 teremos muitas outras tecnologias, inovações que ainda não foram inventadas, além de possivelmente passarmos por crises econômicas, ambientais, sociais, imprevisíveis para qualquer planejador atual. A cidade de 2025 é inimaginável.

Minha última postagem tangenciou o tema de tecnologia nas cidades e como a regulação atual não permite que a cidade se adapte às transformações e aos imprevistos ao longo do tempo. Quando planejamos demais a cidade ela perde a capacidade de absorver positivamente às transformações, criando um ambiente suscetível a desastres ainda maiores. Como explica Nassib Taleb no seu último livro Antifragile, um sistema complexo e orgânico se torna cada vez mais frágil à mudanças se você tentar tirá-lo do seu caminho natural e protegê-lo demais. Se deixarmos um ser humano deitado na mesma cama durante anos, quando ele se levantar estará fraco e sensível à qualquer mudança no ambiente e no seu corpo: o mesmo se aplica para cidades.

Se você achou o cenário tecnológico que eu elaborei muito sonhador, esta postagem serve para atualizar você, leitor, mostrando o que já existe hoje e provando a necessidade de permitir dinamismo para a cidade do futuro, pois tecnologias além dessas surgem a cada semana, a cada dia. Escolhi, assim, algumas das principais tecnologias que interferem diretamente na cidade atual. Não pretendo explicar a fundo cada uma delas, mas passar um resumo de como funcionam e como podem impactar nas nossas cidades.

Carsharing
Empresas: Zipcar/Car2go
Como funciona: Empresas disponibilizam carros espalhados pela cidade inteira que podem ser facilmente desbloqueados e acessados pelos usuários. O serviço ideal para quem não quer ter um carro mas eventualmente ter acesso à um veículo individual quando necessário.
Benefícios: Com carros compartilhados por várias pessoas o aproveitamento do espaço ocupado por ele na cidade é menor.

Bikesharing
Empresas: Citibike/Mobilicidade
Como funciona: Empresas disponibilizam racks de bicicletas pela cidade para aluguel, que podem ser desbloqueadas através de cartões especiais ou aplicativos de celular. A grande fonte de receita é através do marketing das empresas, fornecendo o serviço a um custo muito baixo para o usuário.
Benefícios para a cidade: Parte da dificuldade de andar de bicicleta na cidade é o medo de comprar uma e acabar não usando-a, além de ter um lugar para guardá-la. Os racks permitem que usuários não precisem comprar sua bicicleta, oferecendo um espaço para guardá-las após o uso.

Ridesharing
Empresas: Lyft/Uber/Sidecar
Como funciona: Uma rede de motoristas individuais é organizada através de um aplicativo para smartphone, permitindo que usuários facilmente encontrem e avaliem seus "caroneiros".
Benefícios para a cidade: É uma forma de gerar segurança para que cidadãos dêem caronas, contribuindo para o sistema de transporte coletivo já que não precisam mais andar sozinhos nos seus carros. Este sistema poderia ser facilmente extendido para vans: a insegurança que usuários normalmente sentem em relação à qualidade do motorista

Roomsharing
Empresas: Airbnb/Liquidspace
Como funciona: Usuários podem locar salas vazias, seja um quarto no seu apartamento, uma sala ou até mesmo uma mesa do seu escritório através de uma plataforma online. Assim como os demais serviços de compartilhamento, os sites permitem um sistema de avaliação dos usuários e dos espaços sendo alugados.
Benefícios para a cidade: O espaço construído privado é melhor utilizado, utilizando melhor os recursos existentes e contribuindo para diminuir distâncias de deslocamento dos cidadãos, que encontram espaços mais próximos de onde precisam.

Crowdfunding urbano
Empresas: Citizinvestor
Como funciona: A plataforma permite que cidadãos invistam diretamente nos projetos elaborados pela Prefeitura ao invés de através da decisão usual de um grupo de técnicos ou políticos. Cidadãos também podem, através da plataforma, submeter novos projetos para a Prefeitura que ainda não foram pensados ou aprovados.
Benefícios para a cidade: Torna os gastos com projetos públicos mais de acordo com a vontade dos cidadãos ao invés de depender de decisões políticas ou autocráticas.

GPS corrigido pelo trânsito
Empresas: Waze
Como funciona: Ao invés de simplesmente mostrar a sua rota de acordo com a menor distância, o aplicativo para smartphone corrige sua rota de acordo com o trânsito. O trânsito é calculado de forma descentralizada, já que cada usuário que estiver com o Waze ligado no trânsito envia um sinal para a central. Apenas 5% dos motoristas usando Waze são necessários para um cálculo preciso do trânsito na cidade.
Benefícios: Além de simplesmente diminuir o tempo de cada motorista no trânsito, o aplicativo permite que a infraestrutura da cidade seja melhor utilizada já que os motoristas buscam rotas alternativas para fugir do trânsito, tendendo a equalizar a quantidade de carros pela cidade.

Fachadas fotovoltaicas
Empresas: Rukki/Onyx
Como funciona: Sensores fotovoltaicos (que transformam energia do sol em energia elétrica) são embutidos na fachada dos prédios. Estes, que normalmente recebem incidência solar o dia inteiro com enormes gastos de energia, podem converter a energia gerada pela fachada para o uso interno, e inclusive devolver o restante para a rede pública.
Benefícios para a cidade: Descentralização da geração de energia, com redução nos custos de energia e de infraestrutura, além de ser não poluente para a cidade onde é instalada.

Taxa de congestão
Empresas: IBM
Como funciona: Através de câmeras e/ou sensores espalhados pela cidade, é possível monitorar e cobrar pelo trânsito dos veículos. A taxa de congestão pode ser estabelecida em faixas fixas ao longo do dia ou variar de forma dinâmica de acordo com a demanda da infraestrutura.
Benefícios para a cidade: O custo da infraestrutura não precisa mais ser socializado, beneficiando aqueles que usam as ruas de forma mais intensiva. A infraestrutura também é melhor utilizada já que distribui o trânsito nos horários ao longo do dia. A taxa pode ser gerenciada de forma dinâmica para gerar fluxo de tráfego durante o dia inteiro, eliminando a necessidade de corredores especiais para ônibus.

Smart Parking
Empresas: Streetline/SFPark
Como funciona: Sensores são instalados nas vagas de estacionamento da cidade, podendo identificar se há ou não um carro estacionado. Esta informação é enviada para uma central que processa os dados, possibilitando saber em quais horários as vagas são mais demandadas, variando o preço da vaga de acordo. Através de um aplicativo de celular o motorista também pode visualizar onde estão as vagas livres, qual o seu preço no momento e traçar sua rota diretamente para a vaga onde vai estacionar o carro.
Benefícios para a cidade: Estudos pelo economista americano Donald Shoup mostram que em cidades grandes cerca de 20min são perdidos por motorista apenas procurando uma vaga para estacionar. Shoup estima que nos centros cerca de 30% do trânsito é gerado por motoristas circulando procurando vagas. A tecnologia age a favor da mobilidade ao facilitar o estacionamento, levar o motorista diretamente à uma vaga livre e cobrar um valor mais justo de quem usa o valioso espaço público.



Carros autônomos
Empresas: Google
Como funciona: Uma câmera giratória instalada em cima de um carro escaneia toda a informação ao redor do veículo. Estes dados são processados pelo equipamento instalado no carro, possibilitando que ele faça uma rota segura sem precisar de um motorista humano.
Benefícios para a cidade: Há uma série de previsões sobre como os carros autônomos vão transformar nossas cidades, mas muito ainda é incerto já que a tecnologia ainda não foi utilizada em escala. Algumas previsões dizem que carros autônomos funcionarão como salas móveis, já que sem motorista as poltronas podem ser viradas para o centro. Usuários também poderão guardar seus carros em lugares distantes ou edifícios garagem, chamando-os quando necessário. Isso possibilita que a área valorizada nos centros não precise ser ocupada por carros, e provavelmente veremos uma futura adaptação das garagens existentes. Caso possuam energia limpa e barata serviços podem surgir que deixem estes carros constantemente circulando as vias atrás de passageiros, onde o usuário simplesmente pára um carro que está próximo dele quando necessário. Com um tempo de resposta automático em relação ao ambiente externo, carros autônomos também prometem diminuir congestionamentos e diminuir o número de acidentes, muitas vezes causados por falhas humanas como motoristas bêbados.

Carros elétricos
Empresas: Tesla
Como funciona: Com motores 100% elétricos, estes carros podem ser carregados por qualquer fonte de energia elétrica comum.
Benefícios para a cidade: A externalidade negativa da poluição e do ruído gerado pelo trânsito termina, já que elimina-se o motor de combustão. Estes carros também têm se mostrado mais seguros, já que sem o enorme motor em frente ao motorista sobra bastante espaço frontal para o efeito "sanfona" na hora do acidente.
31 Aug 03:00

Do risco de só se ver canalhas do outro lado

by Carlos Orsi
Enquanto pesquisava para a reportagem sobre teorias da conspiração que saiu na edição de julho da revista Galileu, encontrei alguns artigos de psicólogos e cientistas políticos que mencionavam o fenômeno da polarização: em linhas gerais, quando um grupo de pessoas que têm uma opinião comum, ainda que moderada -- digamos, que o Lula não foi um presidente assim lá tão bom quanto se diz, ou que o capitalismo é um sistema que tem lá seus problemas -- se reúne para conversar, existe uma tendência muito forte de que, ao fim do papo, todos saiam do encontro um pouco mais radicalizados do que entraram.

No caso do exemplo acima, seria, numa caricatura exagerada, como se os críticos moderados de Lula saíssem declarando-o o pior presidente da história, ou os defensores da reforma sutil do capitalismo saíssem berrando por la revolución. O problema com esse efeito de polarização é que ele raramente se baseia em evidências ou argumentos: trata-se apenas de um efeito de manada, da tendência que temos em reforçar o que nos liga ao grupo com que nos identificamos e "aparar" diferenças. 

Como cada peixe de um cardume corrige sua rota a partir da observação da posição relativa dos que estão mais próximos, assim os seres humanos tendemos a administrar nossas emoções e, por tabela, nossas ideologias.

A polarização, ao mesmo tempo em que aumenta a solidariedade interna do grupo (mesmo que, muitas vezes, ao preço de sacrificar uma visão mais sóbria da realidade) tende a excitar a desconfiança e a hostilidade aos de fora. 

Nessas horas, é fácil citar casos claramente patológicos, como o da Família Manson, ou trágicos, como o de David Koresh, mas é importante notar que isso acontece com todo mundo, o tempo todo: se eu acredito em X, e a esmagadora maioria das pessoas cuja companhia valorizo e cuja inteligência e bom-senso respeito também acreditam em X, então quem não acredita em X é ou idiota ou está de má-fé. O raciocínio é tão límpido, tão inescapável, que mobiliza as paixões mais intensas. Mesmo sendo inválido.

Como qualquer neurocientista -- ou publicitário -- terá prazer em lhe explicar, o cérebro humano é construído de forma que associações fortes e frequentes entre eventos tendem a se tornar automáticas e quase que permanentes no espaço mental. Assim, depois de algum tempo, você não conclui mais que quem diz não-X possivelmente é idiota ou talvez esteja de má-fé. Você sente, nas entranhas, de modo automático, que a pessoa na sua frente é um imbecil indigno de respeito. Daí à desumanização, é um pulo. E da desumanização à crença de que os fins justificam os meios -- de que "nada é ruim demais" para "essa corja" -- é outro, razoavelmente menor.

Some-se a isso fato de que mensagens simples e diretas são mais facilmente assimiladas que discursos complexos e cheios de nuances, e o caldo está feito. 

Toda a peroração acima foi motivada pelo estágio atual do debate sobre a questão dos médicos cubanos, em particular, e pelo estado do Fla-Flu ideológico brasileiro, em geral, que cada vez menos parece uma disputa entre times e, cada vez mais, uma briga de torcidas, e das feias, com lança-foguetes e cadeiradas pra todo lado. 

Quem acompanha o blog há algum tempo sabe que não tenho nada contra o uso tático de retórica forte, mas há linhas a traçar entre discurso, incitação e ação, traçadas séculos atrás por Stuart Mill, que é sempre bom ter em mente. Como é sempre bom ter em mente a diferença entre fato e metáfora, e entre verdade incômoda e mentira conveniente (para ficar num caso só, que vem se mostrando especialmente virulento no ambiente maniqueísta das redes sociais, as doações do Criança Esperança vão para a Unesco, não para a Rede Globo). 

Polarização, solidariedade para com os colegas de grupo, desconfiança para com os de fora são fenômenos humanos, naturais. Mas ciúme também é, e quando as pessoas começam a apedrejar jornalistas, ou médicos falam em deixar pacientes à própria sorte, parece que estamos chegando perigosamente perto do equivalente ideológico de uma onda de crimes passionais. 

Há quem diga que as redes sociais agravam a polarização, criando espaços onde as pessoas conseguem filtrar as verdades inconvenientes que poderiam desmontar seus maniqueísmos particulares, interagindo apenas com quem já concorda, ou tende a concordar, com elas. E o resto flui daí, em cascata.

Mas não precisa ser assim: a capacidade de se pôr no lugar do outro é, à exceção dos psicopatas, tão inata quanto o impulso de seguir a manada. Assim como a de refletir antes de repetir, de respirar antes de se exaltar. E com um pouco de curiosidade honesta, sempre dá para dar uma olhada na posição do adversário e ver se não há algo de razoável ali ou, pelo menos, procurar os verdadeiros erros de raciocínio e de conceito, além das -- supostas ou reais -- falhas de caráter.

O pior efeito da polarização, no espírito humano, é a certeza arrogante de que, fora da nossa posição, seja ela qual for, só existem cretinos e canalhas. 
19 Aug 14:08

Misunderstanding

by Doug
17 Aug 11:08

Places Actually Discovered by Europeans

by joberholtzer
16 Aug 19:49

Linguistic Diversity and Traffic Accidents

by Mark Liberman

An important new paper (Sean Roberts & James Winters, "Linguistic Diversity and Traffic Accidents: Lessons from Statistical Studies of Cultural Traits", PLOS ONE 2013, is explained clearly in a blog post by one of the authors, "Uncovering spurious correlations between language and culture", a replicated typo 8/15/2013:

James and I have a new paper out in PLOS ONE where we demonstrate a whole host of unexpected correlations between cultural features. These include acacia trees and linguistic tone, morphology and siestas, and traffic accidents and linguistic diversity.

We hope it will be a touchstone for discussing the problems with analysing cross-cultural statistics, and a warning not to take all correlations at face value.  It’s becoming increasingly important to understand these issues, both for researchers as more data becomes available, and for the general public as they read more about these kinds of study in the media (e.g. recent coverage in National Geographic, the BBC and TED).

One of my favorite bits is the following  (and not only, or even mainly, because they link to one of my posts!):

Everyone knows that correlation does not imply causation, but there are other problems inherent in studies of cultural features.  One problem that is often discounted in these kinds of study is the historical relationship between cultures.  Cultural features tend to diffuse in bundles, inflating the apparent links between causally unrelated features.  This means that it’s not a good idea to count cultures or languages as independent from each other. [...]

Our paper tries to demonstrate the importance of controlling for this problem by pointing out a chain of statistically significant links, some of which are unlikely to be causal.  The diagram below shows the links, those marked with ‘Results’ are links that we’ve discovered and demonstrate in the paper.

For instance, linguistic diversity is correlated with the number of traffic accidents in a country, even controlling for population size, population density, GDP and latitude.  While there may be hidden causes, such as state cohesion, it would be a mistake to take this as evidence that linguistic diversity caused traffic accidents.

Read the whole blog post (and also the paper), if you're interested in things of this sort.

 

14 Aug 23:29

A Softer World

01 Aug 17:04

What Should You Read on Cyber Security?

by Daniel Nexon

http://www.duckwranglers.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/duck_pc.jpgEditor’s Note: This is a guest post by Brandon Valeriano of the University of Glasgow and Ryan C. Manes of the University of Chicago, Illinois. Brandon asked if we could run a bibliography on Cyber Security, and we happily agreed. If anyone else is interested in submitting bibliographies to be archived at the Duck of Minerva, drop us an email.

It is that time of the year again – that time when everyone considers updating their syllabus. So you have an interest in cyber security but have not taken the time to develop a reading list. Well here it is, I have, unfortunately, dived into the topic. The following includes a one day-version and then a more detailed list to can be used to develop a class, graduate seminar day, or to prep for a debate.

(Thanks to Hans-Inge Langø for asking the original question that promoted this post and suggesting a few things I was missing)

Of course I may have left some things out. This is a developing literature so we will update as time goes on. Feel free to  tweet suggestions to @drbvaler. We attach many of our own writings here, mainly because we are a glutton like that but also because our book on Cyber Conflict is not out yet. The premium here, at least for us, is on social-scientific and peer-reviewed articles and books rather than popular speculation. Our goal is to present the entire range of the field, from the cyber threat hype folks, to the more measured reactions, to the cyber skeptics.

Short Version (The Essentials)

Cyber Pearl Harbor,”New York Times
War in the Fifth Domain,” Economist

(The book on cyber hype and fear) Clarke, Richard A. and Robert K. Knake. 2010. Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What to Do About It.  New York: Harper Collins.

(A more measured evaluation) Hersh, Seymour. 2010. “The Online Threat: Should We Be Worried About Cyber War?” New Yorker.

My Perspective

Media and Cyber

Valeriano, Brandon. “Cyberwar and Skyfall: Bond Enters the Digital Age,” Duck of Minerva, 11.10.2012

Public Opinion and Cyber

Valeriano, Brandon and Ryan Maness. “Perceptions of the Cyber Threat,” Duck of Minerva, 1/30/2013

Countering Hype with Evidence

Valeriano, Brandon and Ryan Maness.  2012. “The Fog of Cyberwar: Why the Threat Does not Live up to the Hype,” Foreign Affairs. (11.21.2012) Snapspot

Foreign Policy and Cyber Events

Maness, Ryan and Brandon Valeriano. “Cyber Events Data and Foreign Policy Reactions,” Duck of Minerva, 7/24/2013.

Norms and Cyber

Valeriano, Brandon. “The Cyber House Rules: Justice and Ethics in the Fifth Domain” The Conversation, 7/26/2013

Long Version

Key Books

Nye, Joseph. 2011. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs. (quick summary)

Schmitt, Michael. 2013. The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center for Excellence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (online version)

Choucri, Nazli.  2012. Cyberpolitics in International RelationsCambridge, Mass.: MIT Press (summary of book)

Reveron, Derek, ed. 2012. Cyberspace and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual WorldWashington D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Rid, Thomas. 2013. Cyber War Will Not Take Place. London, UK: Hurst & Company. (summary with links to)

First Cyber Article

Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. 1993. “Cyberwar is Coming!” Comparative Strategy. 12 (2): 141–165.

Cyber Hype

Farwell, James P. and Rafal Rohozinski.  2011.  “Stuxnet and the Future of Cyber War.” Survival. 53 (1): 23-40.

“Cool” War

Rothkopf, David. 2013. “The Cool War.” Foreign Policy. 2/20/2013.

Types of Cyber Strategies

Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt, eds. 1997. In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

Andres, Richard. 2012. “The Emerging Structure of Strategic Cyber Offense, Cyber Defense, and Cyber Deterrence.” In Cyberspace and National Security: Threats, Opportunities, and Power in a Virtual WorldDerek Reveron, ed.  Washington D.C., Georgetown University Press.

Libicki, Martin C. 2009. Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009.

Cyber Weapons

Rid, Thomas and Peter McBurney. 2012. “Cyber Weapons.” The RUSI Journal 157 (1): 6-13.

Best Take on Stuxnet

Sanger, David E. 2012. Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American PowerNew York: Random House. (New York Times summary with links)

Cyber War Will not Happen

Rid, Thomas. 2011. “Cyberwar Will Not Take Place.” Journal of Strategic Studies. 35(1): 5-311-28.

Rid, Thomas. 2013 “Cyber Sabotage is Easy” Foreign Policy

Gartzke, Erik. 2013. “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War on the Internet Back Down to Earth.”  Forthcoming, International Security. (working paperMonkey Cage blub)

Valeriano, Brandon and Ryan Maness. 2013.  “The Dynamics of Cyber Conflict between Rival Antagonists, 2001-2011” (working paper version;  Monkey Cage blub)

Yes it will, but…

Stone, John. 2013. “Cyber War Will Take Place!” Journal of Strategic Studies  36(1): 101-108

McGraw, Gary. 2013. “Cyber War is Inevitable (Unless We Build Security In).” Journal of Security Studies 36 (1): 109-119.

Government Strategy and Reactions

White House.  2011. International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World.  May 2011.

Shactman, Noah. 2012. “Darpa Looks to Make Cyberwar Routine with Secret ‘Plan X’” Wired.

Markoff, John and Thom Shanker. 2009. “Halted ’03 Iraq Plan Illustrates U.S. Fear of Cyberwar Risk.“ New York Times Online 8/1/2009,

Brenner, Joel. 2013. “Grey Matter: How to Fight Chinese Cyber Attacks without starting a Cold War.“ Foreign Policy.  March 8, 2013.

Guitton, Clement. 2013. Cyber insecurity as a national threat: overreaction from Germany, France, and the UK?“ European Security 22 (1): 21-35.

China

Inkster, Nigel. (2013) “Chinese Intelligence in the Cyber Age.“ Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 55 (1): 45-66.

Case Study- pre data Chapter

Valeriano, Brandon and Ryan Maness. 2012.  ”Persistent Enemies and Cybersecurity: The Future of Rivalry in an Age of Information Warfare“ in Cyber Challenges and National Security, edited by Derek Reveron, Georgetown University Press.  Pgs. 139-158.

Data chapter will all Cyber Disputes and Incidents Listed

Valeriano, Brandon and Ryan Maness. “The Dynamics of Cyber Conflict between Rival Antagonists, 2001-2011“ (Under Review)

Securitization

Hansen, Lene and Helen Nissenbaum. 2009. “Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the  Copenhagen School.“ International Studies Quarterly. 53(1155-1175).

Ethics

Dipert, Randall. 2010. “The Ethics of Cyberwarfare.“ Journal of Military Ethics. 9(4): 384-410.

Eberle, Christopher. 2013. “Just War and Cyberwar.“ Journal of Military Ethics.  Forthcoming.

Cyber Arms Races and Military Spending

TBD – Nothing decent I am aware of

Other Cyber Articles and Appearances by Valeriano and Maness can be found here.

Image Source

22 Jul 09:16

Defensive political science responds defensively to an attack on social science

by Andrew Gelman

Nicholas Christakis, a medical scientist perhaps best known for his controversial claim (see also here), based on joint work with James Fowler, that obesity is contagious, writes:

The social sciences have stagnated. They offer essentially the same set of academic departments and disciplines that they have for nearly 100 years: sociology, economics, anthropology, psychology and political science. This is not only boring but also counterproductive, constraining engagement with the scientific cutting edge and stifling the creation of new and useful knowledge. . . .

I’m not suggesting that social scientists stop teaching and investigating classic topics like monopoly power, racial profiling and health inequality. But everyone knows that monopoly power is bad for markets, that people are racially biased and that illness is unequally distributed by social class. There are diminishing returns from the continuing study of many such topics. And repeatedly observing these phenomena does not help us fix them.

I have just a couple comments here. I’m no economist so I can let others discuss the bit about “monopoly power is bad for markets.” I assume that the study by economists of monopoly power is a bit more sophisticated than that!

I have studied racial profiling, and I can assure you that this work is not about the claim “that people are racially biased.” I can also assure you that, whatever it is we have learned, it’s not true that “everyone knows” it.

As Duncan Watts has written so memorably, it’s easy to say that everything is obvious (once you know the answer).

Regarding the question of illness being distributed by social class: Is it really true that “everybody knows,” for example, that Finland has higher suicide rates than Sweden, or that foreign-born Latinos have lower rates of psychiatric disorders. These findings are based on public data so everybody should know them, but in any case the goal of social science is not (just) to educate people on what should be known to them, but also to understand why. Why why why. And also to model the effects of potential interventions.

The study of the contagion of obesity is just fine. In fact, I was once part of an NIH panel where where we recommended funding some of this research. But to say that this is the real stuff, and then to dismiss studies of monopoly power, racial attitudes, and variation in disease rates—that’s just silly.

Resources are limited, and I think it’s good to have open discussion about scientific priorities. So I applaud Christakis for sticking out his neck to participate in this debate. Even though I don’t agree with his particular recommendations.

20 Jul 13:27

A Softer World

20 Jul 13:24

Ideologically Convenient Beliefs about Worker Productivity

by Jason Brennan

Consider this a Robin Hanson-style post.

Basic textbook economics says that workers’ wages are determined by marginal productivity. (Here’s a quick explanation from Mankiw intended for a popular audience. Deep in this column you can see Krugman saying the same thing.) Now, one of the major issues in labor economics is to what degree this basic model holds. We know there are all sorts of distortions and strange things going on in the real world. I won’t get into the debate at great length in this post, but, just to get started, I’d recommend you Google and read debates about, e.g,, A) sticky wages, B) whether the output recovery without employment recovery following the great recession showed that many workers had zero marginal product, C) how immigration restrictions are massively inefficient and keep third world wages incredibly low. (I’m not taking a stand here on A or B, though I have endorse C in print and continue to do so.) And of course there’s Frank’s famous paper here and the hundreds of reactions to it.

Many of the responses to my previous post (which purposefully kept the economics simple in order to ask a moral question) have been rather obviously ideological. I discussed a case where I stipulated that a particular worker’s marginal product was extremely low, lower than whatever someone might reasonably consider a living wage, in order to ask whether employers still owe that worker a living wage, even at a net loss to themselves. Many libertarians took that to mean I decisively refuted the Walmart living wage argument, even though I warned them I had not, while many left-wingers had various fits and tantrums.

If you’re on the Left, you might be tempted to believe something like the following: “With the exception of a few disabled people, perhaps, all adult workers are productive enough that their potential employers can hire them at a living wage [however you might define that] and still make a profit.” If you find yourself thinking something like that, ask, did you come to this conclusion after studying labor economics closely, or did you come to it because it would be convenient for your ideology? Unless you define the “living wage” as very low, it would be pretty surprising if this were true. So, for instance, this website defines a living wage for a single adult living alone in the District of Columbia as $13.68/hr, a single adult with one child living as $26.37/hr, and one adult with 2 children as $32.97/hr. Do you think many low-income workers in DC are producing $32.97/hr?* Even in DC, that doesn’t seem very plausible. Is it even plausible to think that all potential employees will produce $13.68/hr? Many low-income workers are dysfunctional, badly behaved, or just not very skilled. Sorry.

If you’re a libertarian or a conservative, on the other hand, you might be tempted to believe that whenever someone gets a low wage, this is because she has low productivity. This is probably often the case. But you don’t have to accept Marxian whack-a-doodle-nomics–you can look at real social science–to see arguments that some workers are getting paid low wages because they have a bad bargaining position or because there is a market or government failure. (C above is just such an example. Sweatshops would be far less sweaty with open borders.) It’s awfully convenient, ideologically, if it turns out that all poorly paid people are just doing low productivity work. But, if you’re going to argue that, you’d better be prepared to answer a string of objections from labor economists who claim that econ 101 marginal productivity theory frequently doesn’t hold in the real world. Libertarians will have an easier time ideologically with this than conservatives, though, since many of them already hold that corporate rent seeking causes market distortions that bias wages down.

Relatedly, Will Wilkinson responds here, in the Economist, making a further case for social insurance over the living wage. Sam Freeman says Rawls rejected the minimum wage:

He [Rawls] thought we ought to get rid of a minimum wage and let the labor market just go as low as it would and let employers just pay two, three dollars an hour if they could and let the government come in and supplement that.

…So he supported – he would support wage subsidies…

So, for all the unfortunate angry mood affiliation and team signaling that’s taking place here, Rawls appears to be on my side on this.

UPDATE: Skoble has a winning comment: “Of course, in DC, many high-income workers don’t produce $32.97/hr either.”

28 Jun 14:24

What if Marriage Equality Is Loving Instead of Roe?

by John Sides

We welcome this guest post from NYU political scientist Patrick Egan.

*****

“Half a loaf is better than none,” goes the saying.  So let’s call the Supreme Court’s pair of rulings yesterday on same-sex marriage what they really amount to: half a loaf for the marriage equality movement.  Yes, U.S. v. Windsor allows the federal government to recognize state-sanctioned same-sex marriages, and it appears that the upshot of Hollingsworth v. Perry will be that gay couples again have the right to marry in California.  But full marriage rights will now exist in only a baker’s dozen of the states; most of the remainder explicitly ban same-sex marriages altogether.   The federal government is no longer forbidden from recognizing same-sex marriages, but is it required to do so?  And what happens to gay couples who marry in one state and move to another?

The fact that Windsor and Perry leave a two-tiered legal regime in place for most gay couples begs an even bigger question: why didn’t the Court simply establish marriage equality as the law of the land?  The five justices making up the Court’s majority in Windsor clearly empathize with gay people and attest that gays and lesbians are entitled to Constitutional protection.  But when given not just one, but two chances to vastly improve the circumstances of gay couples in states that could take decades to extend marriage rights on their own, why did they punt?

The most likely explanation is that the justices who support marriage equality are haunted by the aftermath of decisions like Roe v. Wade, which struck down abortion laws in 46 states when it was decided in 1973.   As shown in the figure below, as the Court deliberated Roe, public opinion trends on abortion (plotted in red) looked awfully similar to recent shifts in attitudes on gay marriage (plotted in blue).  Support for legalizing elective abortion (here measured with a question from the National Opinion Research Center about whether abortion should be legal for a pregnant woman who is “married and does not want any more children”) was rising rapidly, particularly among the youngest generations.  It was not unreasonable to think at the time that Americans were moving toward a national consensus on an issue framed as a matter of personal liberty and gender equality.

scotus_egan


Of course, that didn’t happen.  Roe helped catalyze the pro-life movement and moved the abortion debate to the front-and-center of the American political stage.  As shown on the graph, support for legal abortion plateaued at exactly where it was in the Roe era, and  Americans have been deeply divided on the issue for four decades since.  (For more on Roe and opinion trends on abortion, see the excellent chapter contributed by Samantha Luks and Michael Salamone to Public Opinion and Constitutional Controversy, a book I co-edited with Nathaniel Persily and Jack Citrin.)

There is hard evidence that at least one of the five justices in the Windsor majority—Justice  Ruth Bader Ginsburg—feels exactly this way about Roe.  A proponent of abortion rights, Ginsburg recently stated publicly that Roe “seemed to have stopped the momentum that was on the side of change.”  A narrower decision—perhaps applying only to the Texas law before the Court—would have preserved this momentum, said Ginsburg.  Narrow decisions are exactly what the Supreme Court delivered yesterday, even though legal experts said it had many options at its disposal, including a sweeping ruling striking down all state marriage bans on equal protection grounds.

But might abortion rights and Roe be the wrong analogy to the controversy over gay marriage?   What if instead the proper parallel is interracial marriage—and Loving v. Virginia, the landmark 1967 Supreme Court ruling this right throughout the nation?   Stanford Law School’s Jane Schacter has noted several similarities between the trajectories of the two issues, including the fact that bans on interracial marriage were being struck down by state high courts in the decades before the issue reached the Court.

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Loving was anything but narrow: it struck down miscegenation laws still on the books in 17 states in 1967.  And as shown in the figure, interracial marriage was anything but popular: only a minority of Americans supported legalizing interracial marriage when Loving was issued—and an even smaller share  “approved” of such marriages.  Nevertheless, public opinion continued to march steadily upward after Loving toward the near-universal levels of acceptance where it stands today.  (In fact, the consensus is so strong that the biennial General Social Survey ceased asking its question about interracial marriage in 2002.)

If interracial marriage is the correct analogy to gay marriage, then justices who favor marriage equality have little to fear from issuing a sweeping ruling.  By contrast, if abortion is the proper parallel, then the careful path pursued by the Windsor majority is the right one.  In my next post, I’ll argue why the former is much more likely than the latter—and thus why in future rulings on gay rights and marriage equality, the Supreme Court can afford to be more bold than it has thus far.

22 Jun 12:19

The Whole of Government Needs a Game Changer

by Josh Busby

Here are some recent phrases that entered the policy lexicon in the last few years that I absolutely hate – “whole of government” and “game changer.” There is a faddishness to tropes in the policy arena that proliferate, that capture a certain sentiment of the moment that soon become over-used. Earlier, it was “tipping point.” I kind of hated that one too.

These words are useful short-hand. Ah yes, a game-changer, that which changes the game, a dramatic development that upends our understanding of what will transpire. Yet, strung together with other stock phrases, you end up with policy pablum. 2013 was a game changer, and now we are at a critical crossroads. We need a whole of government response to the events of recent months, which represent a tipping point in the events (in Syria, North Korea, Iran, Brazil, Turkey). Gag. We should be offended by such writing, as it demeans the craft of writing, turns policy language in to rote speech.

We do need a common vocabulary. Why do I hate game-changer when words like anarchy and civil society are also bandied about as short-hand? Here is use of the phrase in an otherwise exemplary 2012 study for the National Academies Press on climate change and national security. These references take place within a couple of pages:

We agree with the need for a whole-of-government approach and note that the effort should include improved knowledge and monitoring of changing vulnerabilities as well as of climate trends.

A whole-of-government approach to understanding adaptation and vulnerability to climate change can advance the objectives of multiple agencies, avoid duplication of effort, and make better use of scarce resources.

The intelligence community should participate in a whole-of-government effort to inform choices about adapting to and reducing vulnerability to climate change.

The U.S. government should begin immediately to develop a systematic and enduring whole-of-government strategy for monitoring threats connected to climate change. This strategy should be developed along with the development of priorities and support for research.

What the hell does “whole of government” mean beyond greater inter-agency coordination? Do we need a new phrase for something that is already supposed to be happening? Something about the use of whole of government always seems to imply that it is an inherent good, that there are never downsides of bringing more agencies in to coordinate (as if there are not collective action problems associated with actors with heterogeneous preferences). Maybe asking for all the agencies to work together isn’t always a solution.

Perhaps I’m developing my slow, steady descent into grumpy old man-dom, but I tell my students that when I see these kinds of phrases in their work that they inspire an extremely negative reaction. Why? The point of higher education is to foster critical thinking, the ability of our students to develop a set of concepts and tools to understand the world. The boilerplate, the catch-phrases du jour seem to me the opposite of that. You reach for such words as filler and fluff. Words like anarchy have a richer conceptual underpinning that mean something.

What are the phrases and fad words that infuriate you? Is my reasoning off?

20 Jun 06:03

Rawls for Libertarians

by Kevin Vallier

My last two posts have explained what I take to be Rawls’s philosophical project and the main errors in that project. Now I can state in a relatively straightforward fashion why I think libertarians should take Rawls seriously. I’ve explained why in earlier posts, but I weave them together here.

(1)   Historical Accomplishments – libertarians should appreciate Rawls’s great historical accomplishments. He played a major role in reviving political philosophy as a legitimate discipline in the 1960s and 1970s. Second, he saw the need for a systematic alternative to utilitarian politics. Finally, Rawls convinced a great many academics that Marxism was wrong to assert that social order was inevitably a story of conflict until the completion of revolution. One of Rawls’s great insights was that society is a cooperative venture for mutual gain.

(2)   Consequence-Sensitive Deontology – I have repeatedly stressed in my posts the importance of developing a non-utilitarian approach to justice that is nonetheless sensitive to consequences. Rawls helped contemporary moral philosophers see the need for such a theory.

(3)   Contractualism – contractualism is an attractive moral and political theory. And it provides an attractive foundation for liberalism based on the recognition that the norms of political life should be acceptable to all. Rawls was one of the first proponents of the view.

(4)   Institutionalism – Rawls saw that institutional conflicts raise a unique problem above and beyond questions of individual conduct. While Rawls used this point to motivate applying principles of justice primarily to society’s basic structure, allowing him to develop an account of social justice, libertarians also appreciate that moral and economic problems arise at higher levels of social organization. What libertarians can learn from Rawls is that one of these problems is a problem of justice, or so I (controversially) argued here.

(5)   Reasonable Pluralism – Rawls recognized that the free exercise of practical reason leads to systematic disagreement about matters of ultimate importance and that political theory must begin by recognizing this social predicament. Many libertarian theories fail to recognize this critical fact (I have called these mistaken views Enlightenment libertarianisms).

(6)   Public Justification – Respect for persons requires that all instances of coercion be subject to public justification. Rawls brought this idea into clearer focus than anyone in history up to that point. He also made possible Jerry Gaus’s classical liberal account of public reason in The Order of Public Reason, which one prominent review described as “the most complete and rigorous defense of classical liberalism” to date (Kindle version now only $16.50!).

(7)   Liberal Neutrality – Rawlsian political liberalism provides an attractive account of liberal neutrality. Libertarians have always stressed the importance of a non-perfectionist politics (even if they buy into a perfectionist political theory): it is not the business of the state to promote a particular conception of the good. Rawls provides us with a method of justifying such restraints on state power.

(8)   Respect for Religion – Rawls’s last work “The Ideal of Public Reason Revisited” (pdf here) reveals his most mature thoughts on the place of religion in liberal institutions. His view is far more tolerant and thoughtful than views of religion held by many libertarians, who cannot see religious belief and practice as a rational phenomenon. I think Rawls’s view can be marshaled to defend religious liberty, or so I argued here. I argue the same in more detail in my forthcoming book.

(9)   Liberalism – Rawls defended liberalism against all comers. He placed an enormous amount of weight on the importance of liberal liberties, arguing that they could not be sacrificed for any reason save to protect some from the others. Even if this is too strong, libertarians should be able to appreciate Rawls’s emphasis.

(10)  Neo-Rawlsian Libertarianism – Rawls’s work made possible classical liberal interpretations of his theory, some of which are philosophically persuasive. I have outlined my own preferred version here. John Tomasi has the most well-known account.

It won’t do to simply ignore or trash Rawls. Libertarians have a lot to learn from him.

18 Jun 08:02

Lima e a descentralização do transporte coletivo

by Anthony
Passageiros entram em ônibus privado na Av. Javier Prado.
O NextCity, que já havia defendido a desregulamentação do transporte coletivo no ano passado, acaba de postar uma história bastante completa sobre o sistema de Lima, que desregulamentou o transporte em 1991, removendo barreiras de entrada para competidores privados assim como controle de preços das passagens.

O texto cita várias situações interessantes que não devem surpreender os leitores frequentes deste blog. Na minha tradução:
"...o sistema, com todo seu caos, também fornece transporte barato e de sobra para a classe trabalhadora da cidade, indo para lugares (e mantendo tarifas mais baixas) que os sistemas formais de muitas outras cidades." 
E continua:
"...como se contrói um desenvolvimento voltado para o transporte coletivo em uma cidade onde o desenvolvimento parece naturalmente predisposto à informalidade, crescendo nas periferias e mudando a cada dia? Assim é como Lima tem crescido nas últimas décadas - e como o sistema privado de ônibus, com todos os problemas que ele causa para a cidade como um todo, tem tido sucesso por sua adaptabilidade e agilidade.
"Tem um motivo pelo qual o transporte funciona da maneira que é em Lima", diz McConville. "A flexibilidade do sistema, sua cobertura - muita gente que precisa do serviço são as comunidades pobres na periferia da cidade. Estas comunidades estão mudando o tempo todo. É muito difícil de atendê-las com um sistema formalizado." Um grande motivo pelo qual o número de usuários de transporte coletivo aumentou drasticamente foi precisamente pelo modo como o sistema funciona. Ônibus privados vão diretamente onde estão as pessoas, e cobram o que elas conseguem pagar. Formalizar o sistema pode ser um risco que vale a pena tomar, mas não deixa de ser um risco. 
"O desafio que Lima tem é de [reformar o sistema e ainda] manter os 80% de moradores que usam transporte coletivo," diz Tapia. Parte de o que fez a rede de ônibus privado tão atraente foi sua capacidade de se adaptar para a população expansiva de Lima. Antes da entrada dos ônibus privados, os moradores da cidade -  especialmente aqueles nas periferias - tinham acesso inadequado ao transporte."
E para concluir (e vamos comparar isso com a situação brasileira):
"Este sistema serviu a cidade nos últimos 20 anos, e manteve preços estáveis por mais de uma década. Por outro lado, no ano passado o Metropolitano [nova linha pública de Lima] aumentou suas tarifas no BRT para tornar a linha lucrativa. O aumento de 1,50 para 2,00 soles (R$ 1,50) na tarifa única da linha principal torna o Metropolitano quase o dobro do preço dos ônibus privados."
O artigo, por outro lado, cita alguns problemas que surgem com este sistema, e cito-os abaixo com maneiras muito simples de mitigá-los:

1) Acidentes causados por "corridas a passageiros": Uma solução já citada neste blog é a de "direitos de calçada", pois o problema surge pelo fato de a rua ser pública. Se determinadas linhas, principalmente as que trabalharem com veículos grandes, tiverem suas próprias paradas, mesmo que uma ao lado da outra, elimina-se os problemas gerados por esse tipo de concorrência. Além disso, empresas deveriam ser severamente penalizadas se forem identificadas como responsáveis por terem causado um acidente de trânsito, criando um sistema de incentivos para a boa condução.

2) Ameaças de "máfias" do transporte: Não vejo este problema como uma falha de um mercado competitivo per se, mas uma falha de segurança pública ao permitir ameaças sociais por grupos terroristas. É uma assunto que surge quando falamos sobre perueiros no Brasil, mas que aqui está relacionado ao fato de que o transporte coletivo privado é crime, atraindo para este mercado grupos que já se envolvem com outras atividades ilícitas.

3) Poluição: Quando desregulamentaram o transporte em Lima o número de ônibus multiplicou por quatro. De início vejo este aumento como positivo: mais pessoas tendo acesso à transporte coletivo e, principalmente, menos pessoas optando pelo transporte individual, o que resulta em menos poluentes. Mas poluição que surge, principalmente com as vans antigas, certamente é uma externalidade que poderia ser mitigada. Uma forma simples de resolver isso seria apenas exigir revisões periódicas nos veículos, assim como são feitos com todos os carros que circulam na cidade, garantindo segurança e níveis toleráveis de poluentes.

O histórico da desregulamentação na capital peruana mostrou alguns problemas, mas tem correções fáceis e cria uma dinâmica impossível de ser replicada por qualquer sistema formalizado. Lima é uma grande metrópole, com políticas e problemas urbanos que se assemelham às brasileiras, e em um momento de revisão de conceitos de transporte coletivo por todo nosso país, sem dúvida é um modelo a ser considerado.
14 Jun 05:15

Protestos pela passagem: criando antipatia lutando por uma boa causa [2]

by Anthony
Manifestantes oferecem flores aos policiais durante o protesto na
Av. Paulista [O Globo]
Esta é a continuação da minha própria postagem, uma mensagem para o outro lado dessa bizarra sociedade polarizada. Infelizmente quem leu a primeira e gostou provavelmente não vai gostar dessa, e vice versa.

Assim, ao Estado que está reprimindo os manifestantes pela redução da passagem pelo Brasil inteiro: o que poderia ser uma forma de atender às demandas de grande parte da população está polarizando a sociedade. Muitos de nós solidarizamos pela causa global: transformar cidades em espaços mais fáceis de se locomover, mais seguros, com um transporte coletivo eficiente.

O Prefeito Haddad fala que não vai dialogar em uma situação de violência, explica que é para manter o controle. Se fosse assim, não vai dialogar em momento algum, já que a própria existência do estado pressupõe o uso da força para coagir o povo. Veja as fotos na imprensa, todas elas. Quem mais faz uso da violência? Manifestantes com flores, bombinhas e cartazes ou policiais militares com fuzis, cacetetes e bombas de gás lacrimogênio? Haddad utiliza uma retórica falha, ainda mais para um grupo de pessoas que provavelmente foi sua maior base aliada durante as últimas eleições.

O uso da força é uma tentativa deliberada para manter o status quo, obviamente falhado. Haddad abriu uma nova licitação para renovar os contratos, mas muda alguma coisa? Do meu ponto de vista, nada. Continua sendo um sistema que privilegia um determinado grupo de empresas, proibindo empreendedores a entrar no mercado de transporte coletivo. Criminaliza perueiros, vans e caronas compartilhadas dos pobres da periferia, quando o sistema atual é totalmente deficitário no atendimento dessas pessoas. Manter as concessões é manter a autoridade estatal sobre o transporte coletivo, que conseguiu, através séculos de monopólio sobre o sistema, iludir a população de que transporte é algo que deve ser centralizado, com custos socializados. A descentralização e desregulamentação do sistema não entra em pauta nem na mídia e nem pelos manifestantes, que esqueceram que podem reivindicar o direito de eles mesmos transportarem passageiros de forma mais barata e eficiente, hoje proibido.

O uso da força no nível que o Haddad lidou com a situação vem pelo medo de aceitar a derrota. Medo de aceitar que o Estado é um incompetente na gestão do transporte público e que o sistema de concessões não funciona. Medo de aceitar que os próprios cidadãos teriam capacidade de fazer o sistema funcionar sem a sua autoridade ao invés de com ela.

E assim usam equipamentos militares contra jovens desarmados, generalizando-os como vagabundos e vândalos. Conheço muita gente que foi nessas passeatas. Na maioria são apenas jovens sonhadores, cansados com o fracasso do sistema atual, que não vêem outra alternativa senão uma manifestação para chamar atenção. Esse cenário deve ser compreendido para procurar diálogo e convergência, ao invés de espancá-los e prendê-los assim como fazemos com delinquentes e verdadeiros criminosos. Um político influente poderia facilmente se colocar à disposição dos organizadores, reunindo todas as pessoas que fossem necessárias para conversar e resolver o problema, antes mesmo das pessoas saírem às ruas. Mas Haddad decide pela repressão, uma briga que nunca trará respeito, muito menos consenso.
13 Jun 18:18

Protestos pela passagem: criando antipatia lutando por uma boa causa

by Anthony
Funcionários do Metrô removem vidro quebrado por manifestantes
durante protesto na avenida Paulista [Folhapress]
Aos revolucionários que estão manifestando pela redução da passagem do ônibus pelo Brasil inteiro: o que poderia ser uma forte mensagem de conscientização está polarizando a sociedade. Muitos de nós solidarizamos pela causa global: transformar cidades em espaços menos direcionados para o automóvel individual, mais verdes, com mais opções de transporte coletivo, de maior qualidade e preços mais justos.

Mas o trabalhador que está preso no ônibus por causa da manifestação - que muitas vezes tem sua passagem paga pelo empregador e se importa mais com seu emprego do que pelo preço da passagem - não está feliz. O paciente (ou o médico) que está tentando chegar no hospital muito menos. E nem vou falar da ala direitista que simplesmente acha que vocês são o demônio. Onde a primeira ideia era melhorar o trânsito e lutar por uma causa comunitária, em primeira instância piora o trânsito e deixa a comunidade triste. Suas reivindicações provavelmente tem apoio de todos, mas não os meios que vocês estão usando para atingi-las.

Em primeiro lugar, seria interessante um primeiro entendimento de porque o preço das passagens aumentou, evitando reações imediatistas de simplesmente gritar pela sua redução. Entendam que governo municipal proíbe qualquer tipo de inovação e concorrência em transporte coletivo, favorecendo e subsidiando um grupo fechado de empresas. Vans, perueiros e redes colaborativas de caronas compartilhadas são vistas como crime, não como solução. Além disso, planeja as cidades incentivando transporte individual (o que mais ocupa espaço nas vias) ao limitar densidades demográficas, zonear atividades de bairros e focar suas obras infraestruturais em viadutos e largas avenidas, todas oferecidas gratuitamente aos usuários com custos socializados. Na questão financeira, para realizar estas grandes obras infraestruturais o Governo Federal simplesmente imprime mais dinheiro, diminuindo o valor de cada nota que você possui e, assim, contribuindo ainda mais para que todos os preços (não só do ônibus como o do tomate) aumentem.

Por que não conscientizar a população destas distorções, mudando o sistema para que gere benefícios de longo prazo para a cidade e a população? Onde vocês estão quando os perueiros lutam pelo seu direito de trabalhar? Quando os moradores das regiões centrais barram novos empreendimentos que poderiam ajudar a adensar seus bairros, evitando o alastramento da periferia? Quando são sugeridas políticas para taxamento de congestão? Ou quando Guido Mantega se colocou no comando de uma política inflacionária irresponsável? Não podemos agir com o coração antes de parar para estudar o sistema atual, suas consequências e possíveis soluções. Atacar os problemas que afetam nossos interesses diretos sem um entendimento dos interesses alheios é irresponsável e improdutivo (e a mensagem também vale para quem vê vocês como malucos que só querem destruir a cidade). Garanto que não teremos mudanças de longo prazo enquanto houver provocações pessoais daqueles que tem opiniões diferentes ao invés de buscar uma convergência, e enquanto soluções práticas e economicamente sustentáveis não entrem no debate para que as ideias sejam respeitadas.