After watching a two hour debate on the feasibility of the Mars One mission last night, I think I finally understand its problem. It’s not that the company is broke. It’s that we don’t yet have the technology to sustain human life on Mars, and Mars One still won’t admit it.
Robert Jones's Die Antwoord/Teletubbies mashup turns a troubling childhood memory into an even more troubling one. This makes Teletubbies getting spattered with pink goo seem even more freeky.
When the CIA got caught spying on its Senate overseers, John Brennan, its director, at first defended the scandal-prone agency, dismissing the possibility of an act so unthinkable. Later, the CIA admitted breaking into computers being used by Senate intelligence committee staffers as they studied the agency’s brutal torture of prisoners. Two senators called on Brennan to resign. Others demanded a formal apology.
Now, newly released documents reveal that Brennan drafted a formal apology to Senators Dianne Feinstein and Saxby Chambliss, co-chairs of the intelligence committee.
“I apologize for the actions of CIA officers,” he wrote.
But Brennan never sent that letter. Instead, he sent a different draft with no apology. Jason Leopold of Vice News reports:
The draft apology letter Brennan wrote to Feinstein and Chambliss are two of more than 300 pages of documents VICE News obtained in response to a joint Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed against the CIA with Ryan Shapiro, a historian and doctoral candidate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. We sued the CIA seeking a wide range of documents related to the allegations that the agency had spied on the Intelligence Committee and hacked into their computer network. While the CIA turned over some records, it also withheld thousands of pages, citing nearly every exemption under FOIA.
Here’s the best part:
After VICE News received the documents, the CIA contacted us and said Brennan's draft letter had been released by mistake. The agency asked that we refrain from posting it.
Notice the letter that the CIA meant to exclude didn’t contain any classified material or compromise any national-security secrets whatsoever. The public wasn’t going to be allowed to see it because the draft was embarrassing to people in power, even though it is plainly of interest to the press and to citizens engaged in self-governance. Meanwhile, as Feinstein told Leopold, “the CIA still has held no one responsible” for spying on the Senate, which ought to be reason enough for President Obama to fire its director. Perhaps Obama feels constrained by the fact that Brennan knows where the bodies aren’t buried by virtue of being intimately involved with virtually every drone strike of questionable legality that Obama has authorized. (It isn’t beyond the realm of possibility that a future Senate intelligence committee will attempt a 6,000 page report on crimes committed during the course of America’s drone war in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.)
The newly released documents also raise questions about the competence of Brennan and the CIA. For those keeping score at home, the following incidents have all taken place during Obama’s tenure in office:
In 2011, Leon Panetta––the previous director of the CIA––“revealed the name of the Navy SEAL unit that carried out the Osama bin Laden raid and named the unit’s ground commander” in the presence of an uncleared Hollywood filmmaker.
In 2012, John Brennan inadvertently “helped lead to disclosure of the secret at the heart of a joint U.S.-British-Saudi undercover counter-terrorism operation.”
During the Senate intelligence committee’s torture investigation, the CIA, which desperately wanted to conceal Leon Panetta’s torture review from the Senate, incompetently made it available to them through a Google search function.
And now they’ve accidentally released a draft letter that they intended to suppress.
As salutary as I believe the last two of those errors to be, the overall pattern suggests a national security establishment that is terrible at guarding legitimate and illegitimate secrets alike, even as it vigorously prosecutes breaches of the classification system in order to punish whistleblowers. Perhaps Brennan sent the wrong letter when he apologized, too.
"Another clue to the importance of carbohydrates, Dr. Thomas said, can be found in our DNA. Chimpanzees, our closest living relatives, have two copies of the amylase gene in their DNA. But humans have many extra copies — some people have as many as 18. More copies of the amylase gene means we make more of the enzyme and are able to derive more nutrients from starches, said Dr. Thomas."
A new report suggests that our ancestors were able to fuel the evolution of our oversize brains by incorporating cooked starches into their diet.
You can own a D20 die carved from a 10,000-year-old wooly mammoth tusk for just $249. From Artisan Dice:
Mammoth Ivory has some very unique characteristics hiding within its aged and flaky bark. The inner layers polish to an brilliant luster that showcase a wonderful grain in the form of a subtle cross hatch pattern, and distinctively heavy weight along with a crisp sound when rolled as a die. On top of all that, it produces one hell of a stink when worked. It’s by far one of the worst smells in the shop. Enduring that pungent aroma is well worth the results though as Mammoth Ivory makes some of the best dice on the planet.
Some anti-Planned Parenthood demonstrators were captured performing this little playlet in front of the White House recently, and it is the most amazing dramatic performance we’ve seen in quite some time, and that’s including Kid Zoom’s explanation of what happened to that slice of cake I was saving. It’s a masterpiece of economy, with all the subtlety of a political cartoon where everything has a clear label but the thing as a whole makes no goddamn sense. Puts us in mind of that time when Jesus Camp put on a production of Sweeney Todd. This classic sample of Theater of the Obamasurd has already gotten rave reviews after being posted to Twitter Tuesday by a guy named “Calvin,” who gives it an enthusiastic blurb: “Oh my god. Republican protests are NEXT LEVEL. I can’t stop laughing.”
Holy shit. Definitely looks more like fuel than a high explosive, so, probably an accident. But it's dwarfing those buildings in the foreground...
Around 11:30 p.m. on Wednesday, a massive explosion shook the Chinese port city of Tianjin — home to 15 million people — killing at least 50 people, including 12 firefighters. Chinese state media said about 700 people are injured, with 71 in critical condition. Dozens are unaccounted for, and the death ... More »
http://www.twitter.com/davidoreilly soundtrack: http://cathead.bandcamp.com/album/the-external-world-ost http://www.theexternalworld.com A boy learns to play...
Oracle undoes the problems created by their CSO’s rant by deleting her blog post. Done. PS: http://t.co/EyvsPngufQ pic.twitter.com/Tckm33b91H — Mikko Hypponen (@mikko) August 11, 2015 If you take apart Oracle’s software and find a hackable vulnerability, don’t tell the company. Or at least not its chief security officer. “If you are trying to get […]
Yesterday, Marco Rubio went on national television to reaffirm his awful anti-abortion beliefs to the public. And of course, to confirm that humans are not, in fact, cats.
"The Oath Keepers told reporters on the scene that they were there to protect journalists from InfoWars, a conservative-media website run by noted conspiracy theorist Alex Jones."
On Monday night, as a smattering of protesters continued to remember the anniversary of Michael Brown's death, a group of four white men carrying assault weapons walked onto the streets of Ferguson. They might have looked familiar to veterans from last year's protests in Missouri. The heavily armed people in ... More »
As numbers-based arms control wanes, norms become even more important. Norms can be clarified in Codes of Conduct or established by customary practice. The most important norm in our field is the non-use of nuclear weapons in combat.
Few expected this norm to exist after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki – let alone to last for 70 years. As Nina Tannenwald has written in The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (2007) “It is rare for a weapon found to be useful on one occasion to remain unused in the next.” And yet, this was the case during the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as during the Korean, Vietnam, and Kargil wars. So far, the Bomb’s vast destructive powers have been confined by popular demand, wise decision-making, and divine intervention. Some would argue that deterrence also deserves credit for non-use, even though it has failed often enough. There’s some truth to this assertion, but nuclear weapons are more of a hindrance than a help in severe confrontations.
To my way of thinking, we’ve made it to the 70th anniversary of battlefield non-use in large measure because of the mental image we humans collectively hold of the mushroom cloud. Everything in the body of work that we call arms control is built on this collective fear — and the foundational norm that national leaders have adopted because of it.
The image of the mushroom cloud is so evocative that testing as well as battlefield use has been stigmatized, first in the atmosphere and later, after three decades of diplomatic effort, in all environments. The norm against testing, as with the norm against battlefield use, grows stronger with every passing year, even without the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s entry into force. Only one state in the 21st century disregards this norm, and even North Korea doesn’t dare test in the atmosphere. Still, as long as the Bomb exists, in numbers that defy logic other than the open-ended extrapolation of deterrence theory, the specter of the mushroom cloud hangs over us.
Everything we seek as well as everything that has been accomplished in nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament hinges on this foundational norm. We might call this norm “No Third Use,” or “No Next Use,” or “No First Use.” They all amount to the same thing. The Humanitarian Pledge movement and getting to zero nuclear weapons both depend on No Third, No Next, and No First Use. Phased, time-bound reductions in strategic arsenals can be stopped in their tracks by the reappearance of a mushroom cloud. Regional security, the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime, and escalation control depend, above all, on No Third, No Next, and No First Use. So why isn’t there more focus on extending this norm in the most probable locales for norm-breaking? Why do we instead place so much effort on end states rather than on near-term circumstances that could trigger third, next, and first use?
My hunch is that the answer lies in part on an understandable human impulse to find mental refuge from the daunting list of problems that besiege us. We can find more refuge in thinking about end states than in working on hard problems of the here and now. Current events are unrelievedly troubling, with the exception of an Iran deal that the Republican Party is up in arms against. The perils of nuclear proliferation, safety, and security remain great. Vladimir Putin is a hard case. China is flexing its muscles at sea and in space. The brash, untested young leader of North Korea is a wild card. We focus on the possibility that Iran could have enough fissile material for one bomb fifteen years from now rather than the 20 warheads or so that Pakistan is producing annually. Then there’s an Indian government that will not engage Pakistan except on its own terms, ISIS, Ukraine, and a hard-right government in Israel that has embraced dead-end policies.
Faced with these real world messes, many resort to an excess of “shoulds,” freely advising those in the trenches on what “must” be done, immediately. Do this; do that. Sign up. Adhere to a timetable. Demonstrate leadership and political will. We all do this from time to time; some do it more than others. There is mental relief in dealing with complex problems by proposing neat and simple “shoulds.” These policy prescriptions amount to an effortless exercise in abstraction.
Almost everybody who works on reducing nuclear dangers or deterring nuclear war finds refuge in abstract reasoning. The nuclear deterrence business is built atop constructs that are as otherworldly as a world without nuclear weapons accomplished on a fixed timetable. Most of us cannot deal with the horrors of nuclear war except through mental abstraction.
There are notable exceptions. The hibakusha — survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki — reject abstract reasoning. So, too, do those in the trenches who are too busy for “shoulds,” including the unsung heroes who safeguarded massive stockpiles of warheads and fissile material after the Soviet Union dissolved and the IAEA inspectors who will be monitoring Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
Abstract reasoning and war planning go out the window if the foundational norm of non-use is broken and a third mushroom cloud appears on a battlefield. Then everyone will become mired in detail, scrambling, if there is time, to prevent a fourth. All it takes is one mushroom cloud to defeat abstract reasoning.
Let’s assume the appearance of just one more mushroom cloud. This might conceivably be a chastening experience, hastening reconciliation, non-proliferation, arms control, reduced stockpiles and improved nuclear safety and security. But think of the conditions that are required for any of these positive outcomes. A singular mushroom cloud would have to be the result on an accident, inadvertence, or unauthorized use. Or possibly a singular detonation would be purposeful, intended to signal an adversary to stop advancing. The singular mushroom cloud would have to have limited yield. It would need to be detonated on one’s own territory or at sea. Forensics and clarification would have to be accomplished quickly. Third parties would try to intervene, but likely at a distance, fearing prospective nuclear exchanges. And above all, escalation would have to be controlled.
These highly constrained and unique circumstances might possibly generate positive results. Positive outcomes would have to be quite significant to compensate for the breaking of the foundational norm upon which all arms control and nuclear threat reduction efforts rest. Now contemplate how many “ifs” are involved in realizing positive outcomes. Then multiply these “ifs” by the number of mushroom clouds. The Cuban Missile Crisis led to a positive outcome — the ban on atmospheric nuclear testing — because by the grace of God and wise decision-making, this crisis did not produce a mushroom cloud.
The most consequential norm of the Atomic Age is now 70 years old. Everything rides on its continuation.
Yep, I got about 20% of that. What's not to love about the British fascination with cants?
Brian and Karl remember a form of English that's all arsey-varsey: "slang used in Britain by actors, circus and fairground showmen, merchant navy sailors, criminals, prostitutes, and the gay subculture."
I'd hazard that it's possible to follow the gist of things for native English speakers—but Amelia Bee explains the plot in YouTube Comments:
Here's a basic summary for those who don't understand the slang: The setting is London in the 60's, when being gay was still illegal. Two gay men are on a bench. One comments that he doesn't like the book Clockwork Orange. Using coded language they check to see that one another is gay before letting their guard down and speaking frankly, ogling other men as they pass by, etc.
They gossip about a promiscuous mutual acquaintance that got thrown in prison after getting caught having sex with men. The one on the left then laments that he nearly got locked up himself once, after the cops came knocking right as he finished going down on a guy, but narrowly escaped by telling them there was a "poof" inside and ran as they arrested his lover. The one on the right is rightfully disgusted by this revelation and leaves.
