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13 Feb 06:56

Fromm Frankfurt With Love (Part 1)

by Jack Graham

Let’s be cheeky and try to understand something about the Austrian School using the ideas of the Frankfurt School.  The two are, in any case, now permanently locked-together in a Reichenbachian struggle.  At least, the bastard ideological descendants of the Austrian School seem to imagine this.  For some reason.  So fuck it, let's ignore the fact that this is actually a delusional notion (at least as it is generally meant), and see what happens when they actually fight.

In his 1941 book Fear of Freedom, the Marxist-Freudian Erich Fromm elaborates a dialectical account of human consciousness in late modernity through the prism of a dichotomous conception of the concept of freedom.  For Fromm, freedom can be divided into the very dyad of ‘freedom from’ (negative freedom) and ‘freedom to’ (positive freedom) that we have already raised in connection with Hayek.  Hayek, the Constant Reader will remember, is (ostensibly) concerned for the most part with ‘freedom from’, that is: absence of coercion.  Fromm says that freedom from (hence ‘FF’), while desirable and often fought for, carries dangers within it.  It is not a guarantee of happiness.  Indeed, it can generate unhappiness, and from thence destruction.  (To be clear: Fromm is not offering this view as an apologia for tyranny.)  Essentially, Fromm’s idea boils down to saying that the absence of political or social coercion can be deeply unsatisfying because FF, being essentially negative (one does not, for instance, actively experience the absence of a policeman’s boot in the teeth as a pleasure), leaves us without ‘freedom to’ (hence ‘FT’).  In capitalist society, we remain alienated.  

Fromm goes on, in Marx’s Concept of Man (1961), to describe humanity, alienated in capitalist society, as having a self-orientation which he calls a “marketing orientation”, in which

man experiences himself as a thing to be employed successfully on the market. He does not experience himself as an active agent, as the bearer of human powers. He is alienated from these powers. … His sense of self does not stem from his activity as a loving and thinking individual, but from his socioeconomic role. If things could speak, a typewriter would answer the question “Who are you?” by saying “I am a typewriter,” and an automobile, by saying “I am an automobile,” or more specifically by saying, “I am a Ford,” or “a Buick,” or “a Cadillac.” If you ask a man “Who are you?”, he answers “I am a manufacturer,” “I am a clerk,” “I am a doctor–or “I am a married man,” “I am the father of two kids,” and his answer has pretty much the same meaning as that of the speaking thing would have. That is the way he experiences himself, not as a man, with love, fear, convictions, doubts, but as that abstraction, alienated from his real nature, which fulfills a certain function in the social system. His sense of value depends on his success: on whether he can sell himself favorably, whether he can make more of himself than he started out with, whether he is a success. His body, his mind and his soul are his capital, and his task in life is to invest it favorably, to make a profit of himself. Human qualities like friendliness, courtesy, kindness, are transformed into commodities, into assets of the “personality package,” conducive to a higher price on the personality market. If the individual fails in a profitable investment of himself, he feels that he is a failure; if he succeeds, he is a success. Clearly, his sense of his own value always depends on factors extraneous to himself, on the fickle judgement of the market, which decides about his value as it decides about the value of commodities. He, like all commodities that cannot be sold profitably on the market, is worthless as far as his exchange value is concerned, even though his use value may be considerable.

(I’d like to note in passing that I have some fundamental disagreements with Fromm.  He wrongly sees Marx’s concept of man as metaphysical and religious, and is far too reliant on Freud - himself, like Mises, a fin de siècle Austrian who elaborated a radically subjective, religiose, and pseudo-scientific crackpot theory of human behaviour.  And I have big issues with the Frankfurt School generally… though they’re not the same ones you tend to find vocalised on YouTube.  Even so, like the Frankfurt School, Fromm, while deeply flawed, offers some provocative insights.  And I’d even say the same about Freud.  Quack he may have been... but quacks can have good days, and Freud had a few.)

According to Fromm, even if all coercion from tyrants and institutions is removed, humanity in capitalism remains anxiously trapped in the corrosively hopeless condition of commodification.  Fromm sees humans, thus semi-freed, increasingly afflicted with the malaise of FF, as fleeing to authoritarianism, destructiveness, and conformity.  He sees Nazism as, essentially, a response to the predicament of FF.

For Fromm, this dialectical and circular process repeats through history.  He brings up the rise of Protestant theology during the Reformation – particularly the ideas of Luther and Calvin – as examples of the development of ideas which express and respond to increases in FF.  (We talked a little bit about this last week, if the Constant Reader will recall.)  As the old feudal order crumbled and capital arose, increasingly people felt less constrained by socioeconomic bonds and more aware of themselves as individuals with subjectivity.  “Growing individuation means growing isolation, insecurity, and thereby growing doubt concerning one’s role in the universe, the meaning of one’s life, and with all that a growing feeling of one’s own powerlessness and insignificance as an individual.”  Freedom – that is FF – grew, and security was sought in beliefs which expressed the greater freedoms and also offered an explanation for feelings of anxiety.  As Fromm puts it: “Protestantism and Calvinism, while giving expression to a new feeling of freedom, at the same time constituted an escape from the burden of freedom.”  Lutheranism contextualised anxiety in the doctrine of sin, in Luther’s conviction of the essential evil and powerlessness of humanity, and then offered freedom in individual abasement to the ultimate authority of God, even as it expressed the class interests of the rising middle classes against declining and decadent feudal and Catholic authority, with its rejection of Catholic salvation.  To quote Fromm:

[In] Luther's picture, [m]an is free from all ties binding him to spiritual authorities, but this very freedom leaves him alone and anxious, overwhelms him with a feeling of his own individual insignificance and powerlessness. This free, isolated individual is crushed by the experience of his individual insignificance. Luther's theology gives expression to this feeling of helplessness and doubt. The picture of man which he draws in religious terms describes the situation of the individual as it was brought about by the current social and economic evolution. The member of the middle class was as helpless in face of the new economic forces as Luther described man to be in his relationship to God.
But Luther did more than bring out the feeling of insignificance which already pervaded the social classes to whom he preached--he offered them a solution. By not only accepting his own insignificance but by humiliating himself to the utmost, by giving up every vestige of individual will, by renouncing and denouncing his individual strength, the individual could hope to be acceptable to God. Luther's relationship to God was one of complete submission. In psychological terms his concept of faith means: if you completely submit, if you accept your individual insignificance, then the all-powerful God may be willing to love you and save you. If you get rid of your individual self with all its shortcomings and doubts by utmost self-effacement, you free yourself from the feeling of your own nothingness and can participate in God's glory. Thus, while Luther freed people from the authority of the Church, he made them submit to a much more tyrannical authority, that of a God who insisted on complete submission of man and annihilation of the individual self as the essential condition to his salvation.  Luther's "faith" was the conviction of being loved upon the condition of surrender, a solution which has much in common with the principle of complete submission of the individual to the state and the "leader".
Luther's awe of authority and his love for it appears also in his political convictions. Although he fought against the authority of the Church, although he was filled with indignation against the new moneyed class--part of which was the upper strata of the clerical hierarchy--and although he supported the revolutionary tendencies of the peasants up to a certain point, yet he postulated submission to worldly authorities, the princes, in the most drastic fashion.  Even if those in authority are evil or without faith, nevertheless the authority and its power is good and from God, Therefore, where there is power and where it flourishes, there it is and there it remains because God has ordained it.

Similarly, Calvin’s ‘Doctrine of the Elect’, with its teaching that the salvation of a few is preordained, but that one must also strive, both expresses the ascendant feelings of isolation and anxiety while also allaying them with an extreme form of determinism, which then also permits an expression of individualism within the limits of an authoritarian cosmic schema.  If the damnation or salvation of each individual is pre-decided and unalterable, all that remains is for each individual to labour as hard as they can to discover their own degree of holiness.  An expression of individualism within a comfortingly rigid hierarchy.

These, like Nazism in the C20th, are expressions of Fromm’s thesis that

if the economic, social and political conditions on which the whole process of human individuation depends, do not offer a basis for the realization of individuality … while at the same time people have lost those ties which gave them security, this lag makes freedom an unbearable burden. It becomes identical with doubt, with a kind of life which lacks meaning and direction. Powerful tendencies arise to escape from this kind of freedom into submission or some kind of relationship to man and the world which promises relief from uncertainty, even if it deprives the individual of his freedom.

Now, something rather extraordinary emerges here.  The Austrians, for all their ostensible rejection of statism and authoritarianism, begin to look like a heterodox sect of radical Protestantism.  This outrageous statement clearly requires some justification, as amusing as it would be to simply leave it there.

In his essay ‘Nietzsche’s Marginal Children’, which I directed you to last week, Corey Robin identifies certain profound assumptions on the part of the Austrians (or at least recurrent in the most prominent exemplars of their trend) which relate to their conception of value.  Having reiterated that, being among the originators and extremists of marginalism, the Austrians view (economic) value as radically subjective, Robin goes on to point out the deep ways in which they – most particularly Mises and Hayek – make “the market the very expression of morality”.  To quote Robin:

Moralists traditionally viewed the pursuit of money and goods as negative or neutral; the Austrians claimed it embodies our deepest values and commitments. “The provision of material goods,” declared Mises, “serves not only those ends which are usually termed economic, but also many other ends.” All of us have ends or ultimate purposes in life: the cultivation of friendship, the contemplation of beauty, a lover’s companionship. We enter the market for the sake of those ends. Economic action thus “consists firstly in valuation of ends, and then in the valuation of the means leading to these ends. All economic activity depends, therefore, upon the existence of ends. Ends dominate economy and alone give it meaning.” We simply cannot speak, writes Hayek in The Road to Serfdom, of “purely economic ends separate from the other ends of life.”

It would be hard, by the way, to encounter a more forceful backhanded admission of the truth of Fromm’s view of human alienation mired in commodification, nor of the Marxist view that ideology arises from underlying economic structures and class position.  Indeed, the only such admission more near-suspiciously perfect is the Doctrine of the Elect itself.

Moreover, the development of this viewpoint comes as a result of the Economic Calculation Debate.  (Yes, there was a reason I put you through this.)  This was, as the Constant Reader will recall, an argument between economists between the world wars which ensued from Mises’ contention that planned economies cannot work because, without a market, and therefore without price signals expressing demand, they can’t rationally allocate resources.  Hayek’s contribution was to argue that the sheer number of calculations required of a marketless society makes planned economies prohibitively complex.  When Lange et al developed the response of what was effectively the first idea of ‘market socialism’, they were effectively arguing (wrongly, in my humble opinion) that socialism could, essentially, just be capitalism but completely state managed.  (At least that is how Marx would view their plan, because Marx saw capitalism's essence being the self-expansion of value via competitive accumulation, which would conspicuously be retained in Lange's model.) 

The consequences of such thinking for the liberal capitalist order was what concerned Hayek.  Might Western civilisation be convinced to discard what it had been persuaded to see as a needless, extraneous aspect of the system: personal, private interest?  Hadn’t that dreadful process already begun?

As Duncan Foley puts it in Adam’s Fallacy:

Hayek saw disaster looming for the liberal cause in this episode.  He did not believe that socialist managers could ever mimic capitalist entrepreneurs well enough to make socialist markets function.  Thus he was led to shift the focus of this debate in a profound, fateful, and fruitful direction. It is not, according to Hayek, the market form that is critical to organizing the division of labor; it is the content of the market as a clash of personal interests that actually drives things forward. … The antagonistic relations of the market are no longer a necessary evil to be tolerated for the sake of getting our dinner (and a better one) out of the butcher and the baker, nor even an ingenious game we might play to squeeze out potential economic surpluses. In Hayek’s vision the antagonistic relations of the market are the existential core of human existence, the ground from which everything else emerges.
Hayek did not put his point in quite this way. He argued that the real metabolism of the market rests on its ability to force everyone to reveal their private information about needs, technology, and resources, whether they want to or not, and whether they participate in the market enthusiastically, seeking profit, or grudgingly, to defend their conditions of existence. …  Hayek puts this informational aspect of the market in the central position. The capitalist market now appears as a critical component of a complex system of information revelation and exchange. The division of labor itself becomes a by-product and side effect of this play of information. The reason the socialist managers cannot mimic the capitalist market is that they have no direct existential interest to defend and assert in making market exchanges. Socialism imagines that economic life is a means to an end, a method of supplying the material needs without which human life and social life cannot function. The conceit of socialism is that supplying this material basis is just a matter of getting necessary productive work done. In fact, according to Hayek’s way of thinking, the central problem is to know what the necessary productive work actually is. Even the best-intentioned and most self-disciplined socialist worker-citizens would find themselves helpless to know where to expend their labor effort, or even to know whether what looks like an obvious social need (building a steel mill) may not be doing more harm than good.

[My emphasis.]  (Pardon all these long quotes, by the way.)

Hayek has some points to make about command economies.  They're not great.  For instance, the managers have no personal interest in efficiently allocating resources, if we take ‘efficient’ to mean ‘best fulfilling the common good’.  But, contra Hayek, it is the absence of democracy in a command economy which causes this problem, just as it is the absence of democracy in, say, a corporation, which causes essentially the same problem.  The absence of democracy is the most fundamental thing negating the possibility of socialist co-ordination.  In a corporation, the undemocratic manager already has self-interest as his goal.  In a command economy, self-interest soon appears where the absence of democracy leaves the state manager without orientation.  Hence the endemic corruption and inefficiency of such systems.  The fact that the Right endlessly go on about this doesn’t make it untrue, and socialism won’t get anywhere sticking its fingers in its ears and pretending.  Socialism cannot be about authoritarian statism, not just because authoritarian statism isn't nice, but because it doesn't work - at least not for any purposes which can meaningfully be called socialist.  (Social-democratic or reformist, perhaps.)

Robin notes in passing that sentiments such as Mises’ view of wider human needs being satisfied by efficient market provision (see above) can be adapted to Left arguments.  As he also notes, it’s worth remembering that several early marginalists viewed their theory as bolstering some left-wing ideas, and that marginalism was put into the theoretical service of welfarism, liberalism, and social democracy in the C20th.  Even today there are left-libertarians, and most economists who are liberals or leftists embrace some form or other of marginalism (Keynesianism is marginalist).  Similarly, bits of Hayek’s occasionally very pertinent critique of command economies can actually be adapted by anti-authoritarian variants of socialism.  (Remember, there were even lefty(ish) currents within the early Austrian School.)

But we’re straying into another subject.  Here I want to emphasize the way Hayek’s insights lead him deeper and deeper into an escalating fetishism of private property relations and thus, whatever his protestations (and he does protest), of the market form.

Marginalism’s rejection of any real element to value is taken to an extreme by Hayek, and is part of a wider semi-mystical belief in what Corey Robin calls, in The Reactionary Mind, “an almost hyperactive subjectivity - comparable to Freud’s anarchic id”.  (Oh, hello again Sigmund.)  It’s true that this is Robin’s description of John Gray’s picture of Hayek, but that picture was endorsed by Hayek himself in glowing terms.

Mises and Hayek are fundamentalist in their rejection of reason and rationality. Hayek sees rational, conscious understanding as being a mere thin layer on top of a vast, submerged well of tacit knowledge. His belief in the free market’s ability to express such mysterious gnosis is religiose. And at the center of it are his chosen caste of divine sensitives, the ‘entrepreneurs’, who he fetishizes as having special qualities, special style and timing and creativity, special abilities to express themselves and thereby remake the world. The horror of state planning is that it will, like repression or oppression, cramp the style of these artistic creatives. In its peculiar way, it’s a deeply Romantic vision. (Rooted in fin de siècle Europe, it might even be possible to describe it as a form of last-minute counter-modernist mechanically-recovered-Romanticism... another respect in which it has some similarities with fascism.)  For Hayek, the entrepreneurs, if set free, create the world anew as they express their unique visions.  They are capitalists as artists-as-heroes.

According to Robin, the Austrians – with, as I've said, their avowedly and a priori anti-socialist intent – push to the extreme of arguing that, since all decisions about ends and means are value-judgements, and since the essence of economic judgements is deciding on ends and means in the context of finite resources, then economic choices are revelatory of our highest and most fundamental moral values.  (They, of course, take it as read that resources will always be scarce because they silently take it for granted that class will always endure, because no society can achieve generalised abundance – a self-fulfilling prophecy that is key to their project.)

The economics of the marketplace – the battleground in which we work out our desires and methods against ourselves, unforgiving nature, and others – is thus where morality comes from.  It is where we make our economic choices, which are based on values, which are how we separate our higher and lower ends.  The essence of morality, then, is the market.  It is not that we achieve our highest ends via our market behaviour, but rather that we separate higher from lower ends via the market’s provision of the lower.  Moreover, for Hayek, it is our very freedom to make the lower, economic choices which forces us to make them, and thus which forces value and values into our lives in the first place.  As Robin puts it: “While the economic is, in one sense readily acknowledged by Hayek, the sphere of our lower needs, it is in another and altogether more important sense the anvil upon which we forge our notion of what is lower and higher in this world, our morality.”  It is the hardscrabble, the suffering, the husbandry, that makes us capable of good.  A profoundly (if fragmentarily) Protestant, even Puritan view of human life. 

 

Part 2 Next Week.  (You can't wait, can you?)

 

11 Feb 19:14

DARIUS – “Colourblind”

by Tom

#932, 10th August 2002

9107BD35-B240-405A-9FD3-5D696EB34B86 Such was the grip of Pop Idol on the singles-buying imagination that two winners weren’t enough – bronze medalist Darius Danesh got a career too. But “Colourblind” is not just a participation medal. In Darius we see not one but two of the classic reality pop tropes make their appearance. First of all – in his note-strangling debut on the Popstars series, wrestling “Baby One More Time” to the ground like prehistoric man tackling an aurochs, there’s the Freak: the terrible performer armoured in their own self-confidence who we indulge because we want to see what on earth they’ll do next.

There’s little question that if the public had been given any say in things we’d have seen more from Darius in Popstars. But by the time they got a chance to vote for him and carry him to third place in Pop Idol, he’d reinvented himself to fit the second trope, the Artist: the figure who is Actually Talented but who must yet put themselves through the circus of a singing competition to gain recognition. “Colourblind”, fittingly, was a self-penned composition he’d been ‘working on’ before Pop Idol. (Actually this is entirely believable – its procession-of-colours lyric certainly feels like the kind of solid but banal structure a beginning songwriter might try.)

In general the Freak and the Artist are separate reality-show characters, and compared to the real maestros of each form – Jedward on the one hand, James Arthurs on the other – Darius is far milder. But his trope-switching shows the basic linkage between the two ideas – in the sense that both need unusual reserves of self-belief, but also in the role both play in the keyfabe of reality TV. “Colourblind” became a hit partly because it was rejected by Simon Cowell, who decided Darius’ self-penned material didn’t cut it. The Freak and the Artist are both presented as rejections of Cowellism, one via excess, one via authenticity – they are useful parts of the reality show narrative because they preserve the illusion of autonomy, the idea that the story can be disrupted. We’ll come back to this bit of theatrical play again and again in 00s Popular.

All of this is a lot more interesting to me than the actual song. “Colourblind” shoots its creative bolt quickly – you get the basic lyrical conceit immediately, and in any case whatever promise and momentum the verses build is frittered by the chorus. The emotional core of the song – D has lots of ambiguous negative feelings about his relationship but can’t sustain them in the face of her smile – just doesn’t fit the treatment he gives it. The sense of the lyric suggests something dark, helpless and conflicted, but Darius, eager to please his crowd now he’s finally got one, belts out a big jolly chorus. (It’s also not clear he knows what colourblindness is.) The arrangers do a creditable job gussying up slim ideas into something listenable, but not for the last time Simon Cowell is right: willpower and good intentions aren’t enough, and even next to “Anyone Of Us” or “Light My Fire”, this is muddled and thin.

11 Feb 14:41

Steve

by evanier

I write a lot of obits on this site. Some are about people I didn't know very well.  Ten years ago today, I had to write one about someone I knew well and liked a lot.  I still miss Steve Gerber and so does the comic book industry even if some who work in the field don't know it…or him.

I don't think I ever told you how I met Steve.  I knew him first through his published stories which I thought were some of the best coming out of Marvel at the time.  From a writer's standpoint, there are two kinds of comics you find yourself writing for a company like DC or Marvel.  One is the kind where you're handling characters created by others, working in a mythology established by others.  Some writers do some wonderful work in this arena but when I think about my favorite comic book writers, I'm more impressed with their work in the other kind of comic book.

That would be the kind that you either create the comic or co-create the comic…or you take over a book about which very little has been established.  Generally speaking, you have to be the only person writing those characters at the time.  That gives you more freedom to shape the environment of that book and to add new characters or reshape existing ones such that you can tell the kinds of stories you have to tell.  You make it your own, at least for the time you do that book, which generally has to be a long period.  It never happens when you're doing an issue or three.  You have to stay on a book for a while before you can form-fit it to your strengths.

Steve did that when he took over a comic called Man-Thing, making it distinctly his own for a while.  He did it of course with Howard the Duck and a few other comics he launched.  He wrote some good stories for ongoing comics handled by many like The Defenders and  Sub-Mariner but he found his voice in the more personal books.  In them, he wrote more about human beings even if those human beings were monsters or ducks.

Anyway, I liked his writing but before I met him, when I mentioned his name to anyone at Marvel, I was told he was crazy…and I don't mean brilliantly, eccentrically crazy.  I mean "crazy" the way Charles Manson was crazy.  Several people, including a writer or two who I guess thought of him as competition, told me that any day, Steve Gerber would be hauled off to the looney bin.

I didn't necessarily believe them.  I've had too many people in my life turn out to be exact opposite of the way they were described.  But I also didn't not believe what I was being told about this Steve Gerber person.

Now then: For several years in a row, my partner Sergio Aragonés would host an annual post-con party right after what we then called the San Diego Comic-Con and now call Comic-Con International.  The con ended on Sunday afternoon and a lot of us would caravan (or drive home) to Los Angeles and by 8 PM, there'd be a big crowd at Sergio's old home in the Hollywood Hills, sitting around the pool and eating pizza.  Just talking and unwinding.

At one of these parties, I found myself talking to a guy with glasses.  We were discussing comics, the world, life, movies, the pizza we were consuming, everything…and the guy was bright, funny, perceptive and I had no idea who the hell he was.  He somehow knew who I was but if I'd been introduced to him, I hadn't caught the name.  And after 40 minutes or so of great, enjoyable conversation, I didn't feel like I could say, "By the way, who are you?"  I was trying to figure it out without doing that.

I forget which comics he mentioned he'd worked on but let's say one of them was Daredevil.  He'd say, "You know, when I was writing Daredevil…" and I'd start thinking, "Okay, who wrote Daredevil besides all the people I know who wrote Daredevil?"  And then I'd think, "Well, I believe Steve Gerber wrote a few issues but this person is way too sane to be Steve Gerber."  He'd mention some other comic that several people had written and I'd think, "Gee, the only person I can think of who wrote that comic and who I don't know is Steve Gerber.  Could this possibly be Steve Gerber?  Naw…"

Finally, he mentioned writing Howard the Duck and I thought, "This is Steve Gerber!"  And I instantly realized that not only was he not demented or insane but he was saner and smarter than any of the people who'd told me Steve Gerber was out of his mind.  He was also a better writer than any of them.

We spent a lot of time together.  When I was running the Hanna-Barbera comic division, I brought Steve in as my assistant and he also wrote a lot of the comics, most of which were published overseas.  Later, I recommended him for animation writing for the Ruby-Spears studio and he quickly became one of their most valuable writers and story editors.  He wrote for many of their shows and developed Thundarr the Barbarian.

Often, you bond with people by charging into battle alongside them.  Steve had his infamous legal battle against Marvel over Howard the Duck and a lot of folks (not just me) joined that battle in whatever way we could.  But Steve also fought a lot of fights to better working conditions and compensation for all writers, not just himself.  If and when an accurate history is ever written of how life in comics got better for creative people in the eighties, Steve's name will be mentioned a lot.  That's what I meant about how the industry misses him.

I do, too.   He was a clever, creative guy and we all out missed out on the wonderful things he might have written if he'd been around the last ten years.   A great, great loss.

When Steve died, I seized control of his blog and it's still up and running at www.stevegerber.com.  Not a lot has been posted since and as I write this, the most recent post and comments are from October of '16.  But every message Steve posted is still there, followed by many posted since we lost him.  You might want to drop by and read and maybe even write something.

The post Steve appeared first on News From ME.

10 Feb 19:24

The Grandma story

by Fred Clark
Throughout her life, my grandmother insisted that she, as a woman, must never "usurp authority" by teaching men in the church. But a lot of men in the church could learn a lot from my grandmother.
10 Feb 10:10

Briefly Noted…

by evanier

This news story has my favorite headline of the week…

The post Briefly Noted… appeared first on News From ME.

09 Feb 22:16

Patrick Troughton: The Biography of the Second Doctor Who, by Michael Troughton

Second paragraph of third chapter:
Finally in December [1945] he managed to persuade the owner of a large dilapidated building on the Finchley Road in London to rent him two rooms. A friend of my mother describes it well, ‘After the war they rented a flat in Swiss Cottage on a stretch of the Finchley Road opposite the old Odeon and close to the famous pub. In those days there was a row of substantial detached houses, each with what had been stables, but then converted into garages with flats above. I remember a very rickety staircase inside the garage up to the flat, and the intriguing fact that the bath was in the kitchen, with a large wooden cover serving perfectly as a table during the day. I envied them living there so close to the bright lights, and the fact that they had such a relaxed ‘bohemian lifestyle’ which included going out for breakfast when they felt like it!’
Slowly working through the published biographies of Doctor Who crew and cast, and it's time to look at Patrick Troughton, possibly the most versatile actor to take on the role as a regular, and certainly the only one to appear in a Oscar-winning film (as the Player King in Olivier's 1948 Hamlet, which also features Peter Cushing as Osric; John Hurt is in A Man for All Seasons which won the Oscar for Best Film in 1966, and of course Peter Capaldi shared the Oscar for Best Live Action Short Film in 1994). The author is one of Troughton's many acting descendants, his third child Michael, who actually appeared in the 2014 Christmas special Last Christmas as Dr Albert Smithe.

It must be very difficult to write about a father like Patrick Troughton, who was loving but physically distant. Troughton's own life was full of much human drama, which we must largely infer from Michael's childhood memories and his father's preserved correspondence. Soon after Michael was born in 1955, Patrick left his first wife, Margaret, for another partner with whom he had another three children; at the point that he decided to take on the Doctor Who role, he was in the middle of a brief and ultimately unsuccessful reconciliation with Margaret, played out to a certain extent in front of the children. At the same time there was a third partner in the mix. He married someone else entirely in the mid-1970s. He said to Michael, years after the final split with Margaret,
‘I needed change. Things have to change all the time for me I’m afraid, that’s the way I am made. I am sorry if I hurt you.’
Reminiscent of one of his first lines as the Doctor: "Life depends on change and renewal."

He seems to have been a man who broke many hearts, but continued to take his emotional commitments to all his lovers and children very seriously, but always suffered from the pressure of generating enough income to meet his financial obligations to his two families, which eventually ground him down; he had his first heart attack at 58, and died of another at a convention eight years later. (Incidentally the circumstances of his death are clarified here, and are much less exciting than we had been led to believe.)

There is quite a lot here about Troughton's approach to acting, including his early education ain London and New York. He is on record (sometimes contradictory) about his philosophy of theatre, particularly on how it defined his own sense of personhood:
My father was a complex man but one thing was very clear – he had to act. He once confessed to me, whilst working together on an episode of the seventies TV nursing drama Angels, that acting was part of his being, something he had to do rather than had chosen. He likened the process of inhabiting another character in performance to ‘a drug-like craving that seemed to keep my whole self in order. I can’t imagine my world without it. It sparks me with life.’
This craving for multiple identities perhaps played out in his complex private life, and even his approach to being an ex-Doctor Who, where he embraced the American convention circuit once he had discovered it, but was much less visible in the UK, where he wanted to avoid typecasting for the sake of future acting work. He would no doubt be pleased that IMDB ranks The Omen as his most notable performance. There's not much on politics here (Troughton fought in the second world war, where he became noted for wearing a tea-cosy; he was contrarian for the sake of it in argument). Interestingly, there is more on religion: Troughton was deeply hostile to organised Christianity, boycotted one son's wedding service and was dismayed when another decided to get ordained.

It's a more lively book than Jessica Carney's biography of her grandfather, William Hartnell, because Troughton had a more lively life, and Doctor Who came in the middle of his career rather than at the end (chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10 out of fifteen total). It scratches one's itch of curiosity about its subject, while inevitably leaving you wishing you knew more. Well worth getting.

(Next up, if I can find it, is Directed by Douglas Camfield by Michael Seely; if I can't find it, I'll turn to Robert Holmes: a Life in Words by Richard Molesworth.)
09 Feb 17:41

Technology, power & ideology

by chris

One of Marx’s many great insights was the theory of commodity fetishism – the idea that in capitalism relations between people assume “the fantastic form of a relation between things.” For example, the labour market – “a very Eden of the innate rights of man” – serves to depersonalize the relation between boss and worker and disguise the fact that the former exploits the latter.

Some things I’ve seen recently remind me that this phenomenon is still very much with us.

Alex says:

So many problems that are spoken of as “computer systems” problems are systems problems, that just happen to be implemented using computers rather than paper or giant rocks or whatever.

In this way, management tries to pass off blame for failure onto inanimate things. He’s surely right. We’ve all heard somebody say “our systems are down” as if this were an act of God rather than what it is – bad management.

A lot of talk of this week’s stock market fall fits this pattern. We’re told that the drop was amplified by algorithmic trading, and invited to believe that if only humans were in charge the market would be more stable. This is, of course, pish: who wrote and implemented those algorithms?

Sarah O’Connor describes how a similar thing is happening in workplaces, as workers are increasingly monitored not by humans but by algorithms, with the result that “human managers [are] hiding behind the veneer of ‘data science’ to offload responsibility for their decisions.”

Technology, then, serves an ideological function. It permits bosses to shift their own responsibility onto impersonal things, and to disguise their own power by attributing it to machines. Commodity fetishism lives.

This is on top of the fact that it also provides means for capitalists to better exploit labour. Peter Skott and Frederick Guy show how technologies (pdf) such as CCTV, containerization and bar codes have allowed bosses to screw down wages; the algorithmic management discussed by Sarah is an extension of this.

There is, of course, nothing new here. Supporters of worker oppression in the 19th century claimed that workers needed to be closely supervised because it would be too expensive for thousands of pounds worth of machinery to lie idle even for a short while. James Carey describes (pdf) how the telegraph “turned colonialism into imperialism: a system in which the centre of an empire could dictate rather than merely respond to the margin.” And more recently, containerization facilitated globalization and hence the entry (pdf) into the global workforce of millions of low-paid workers.

But might there be a backlash here? Rene Chun describes how self-checkouts encourage shoplifting because people feel anonymous. Partial gift exchange – which is the foundation of many economic transactions – is something that happens between humans, not between people and a machine.

My point here should be an old and trivial one, but I fear is under-appreciated. It’s that technology is not merely a neutral set of possibilities for improving the human condition. It plays a central role in shaping both the reality of class relations and our perceptions of those relations – often in ways which we cannot foresee at the time.   

09 Feb 17:01

Sarah’s Brexit Policy

by Sarah

I came up with this while thinking about what an awful job the government is doing at negotiating Brexit, and the tragedy of how a marginal victory by one side in a dubious referendum is taken as a sign that instead of trying to bring the country together, you should just ignore one half completely.

 

So this is my fantasy Brexit policy. It’s not the policy of any political party at the moment. I do wish it would be. If you’re a politician reading this, feel free to steal it.

 

Sarah’s Brexit Policy

The referendum revealed a profound split in our country. Since the result, politics has pandered exclusively to one side while completely ignoring the other. This is not a way to heal the fracture in our society, and will only lead to escalation and further division. A 52/48 split should have been a time to reflect on ways to bring both halves together. Nobody has tried to do that.

If elected we would revoke Article 50 and then start the process the government SHOULD have embarked upon after the referendum vote. We will hold a national conversation respecting both sides of the debate and seek to find a consensus position. If two halves of society want contradictory things, the only fair thing to do is find a position that both can, at least, live with. Only then will we go forward with a change to our international position.

09 Feb 14:02

Theresa’s Tories take a 4 point lead with YouGov – their best position in any poll since GE2017

by Mike Smithson


Times

Maybe Corbyn’s LAB is paying the price for its Brexit ambivalence

Threre’s a new YouGov poll in today’s Times that sees a dramatic move to the Tories. The figures are with comparisons on last week:

CON 43%+1
LAB 39-3
LD 8+2

As can be seen this has been driven by LAB losing vote share – three points – with the Tories up 1 and Cable’s LDs up 2.

Also in the poll TMay extended her lead over Corbyn to 8 points as “best PM”. Last week the margin was 6 points.

The pattern of a drop for LAB, a move to CON and an increase in the LD share has been seen in the last three polls from ICM, Survation, and now YouGov.

On Brexit it is not all good news for TMay. A total of 59% think she is doing a bad job negotiating with Brussels compared with 22% saying she is doing well. This is a net minus 37 which equals the worst ever rating since the referendum. At the end of January this was a net minus 32.

Quite why this is happening is hard to say except that Brexit dominates just about everything and on this Team Corbyn has very little to say. The red team’s leadership is very much out of line with the party supporters.

Without a Brexit stance that resonates with party supporters then Corbyn’s party could face an uphill battle and it is hard to see JC achieving his “PM by Christmas” goal.

Mike Smithson

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09 Feb 01:27

Brexiters' blind-spot

by chris

Tony Yates and Andrew Neil were debating gravity models on Twitter this morning. Tony was right. The gravity model isn’t some hi-falutin theory without much factual backing. It is in fact (pdf) “one of the most empirically successful in economics”.

Even so, talk of “models” is a bit fancy. Let’s instead look at some facts. According to the World Bank Germany exported $118.6bn of goods to the US in 2016. That’s $1434 per person. The UK exported $61.6bn, which is $939 per person. That's one-third less. Germany exported $85.4bn to China, or $1032 per person, whereas the UK exported only $18.1bn or £277. To Russia, Germany exported 5.4 times as much per person as the UK. To Japan it exported 2.5 times as much, and to India twice as much. Even to Canada Germany exported one-third more per person.

These facts tell us something important. They tell us that membership of the single market/customs union is NOT a great obstacle to trade with other nations. It is not the lack of good trade deals with China, the US, or Japan that is restraining exports. Germany has exactly the same deals with them as us and is exporting far more.

What is stopping us exporting? There are countless possibilities: poor management; lack of animal spirits; insufficiently skilled workers; lack of investment; financing constraints; exchange rate volatility; a lack of price competitiveness; and so on. Many of these are, unsurprisingly, the same factors that lie behind our poor productivity.

And these will be the same after Brexit as before. They will continue to hold back exports even if we do sign free trade agreements with non-EU nations. Monique Ebell (pdf) and Silvia Nenci have shown that such deals do little to boost trade. Even if you cut legal barriers to trade, real ones remain. I am free to do a park run on Saturday, but I’ll not – and certainly not in a good time.

Why do Brexiters find it so hard to grasp this?

In part, it’s because some of them do “violence to basic facts of economic life.” Monkey

But I suspect two other things are going on. One is that many support Brexit for non-economic reasons and – motivated reasoning being so powerful – they then invent reasons why it will be a good economic thing, like a man putting lipstick on a monkey and pretending it’s Rachel Riley. They forget that there are trade-offs – not least between sovereignty and the regulatory harmony that facilitates trade.

Also, support for Brexit is a way of avoiding unpleasant realities.

Since the 80s, the right has got pretty much want it wanted: weaker unions, more power for bosses, lower top taxes, less regulation and so on. And yet the UK’s macroeconomic performance has remained unimpressive, not least because many structural weaknesses in British capitalism remain – weaknesses that contribute to our lack of exports.

Brexit allows the right to avoid having to acknowledge these weaknesses, however, because they can pretend instead that we can become a great trading nation if only we are free from the shackles of the EU. This prolongs the right’s longstanding belief that British capitalism is fundamentally dynamic if only the right legal framework can be imposed. This, however, is a fantasy.

07 Feb 18:01

What the proposed new boundaries would mean if Britain voted as in latest ICM poll

by Mike Smithson

The Electoral Calculus projection based on proposed boundaries

And the Electoral Calculus projection on current boundaries

Over the next couple of years the boundaries review is going to become a major issue. The final proposals are almost there and to show the effect of them I have taken a projection, based on yesterday’s ICM poll, from Martin Baxter’s Electoral Calculus based on the old boundaries and compared them with the new.

As can be seen the Conservatives do better with the new boundaries and will be closer to an overall majority. The big question is whether the House of Commons will approve the changes which come to it later on in the year.

A big issue is what was originally the Cameron plan to cut the number of seats by 50. This results in more potential losers amongst those sitting MPs who might worry about having to fight for a seat against neighbouring MP in areas where the number of seats are being cut back.

For many MPs this may be that their livelihoods could be at stake.

In the meantime the existing boundaries, the ones on which the 2010 General Election was fought, are increasingly becoming out of date.

What is interesting is that under both the new boundaries and old boundaries the Tories do better in terms of seats and on the same percentage vote than Labour.

As I have repeatedly highlighted here of late we have moved on from a situation where the boundaries favoured the red team to one where they favour the blue – something that is accentuated by the changes. The issue with Northern Ireland looks as though it has been resolved and the DUP remains the top party in the province.

Mike Smithson

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07 Feb 14:26

Why I barely read SF these days

by Charlie Stross

Being a guy who writes science fiction, people expect me to be well-informed about the current state of the field—as if I'm a book reviewer who reads everything published in my own approximate area.

(This is a little like expecting a bus driver to have an informed opinion on every other form of four-wheeled road-going transport.)

Similarly, marketing folks keep sending me SF novels in the hope I'll read them and volunteer a cover quote. But over the past decade I've found myself increasingly reluctant to read the stuff they send me: I have a vague sense of dyspepsia, as if I've just eaten a seven course banquet and the waiter is approaching me with a wafer-thin mint.

This isn't to say that I haven't read a lot of SF over the past several decades. While I'm an autodidact—there are holes in my background—I've read most of the classics of the field, at least prior to the 1990s. But about a decade ago I stopped reading SF short stories, and this past decade I've found very few SF novels that I didn't feel the urge to bail on within pages (or a chapter or two at most). Including works that I knew were going to be huge runaway successes, both popular and commercially successful—but that I simply couldn't stomach.

It's not you, science fiction, it's me.

Like everyone else, I'm a work in progress. I've changed over the years as I've lived through changing times, and what I focus on in a work of fiction has gradually shifted. Meanwhile, the world in which I interpret a work of fiction has changed. And in the here and now, I find it really difficult to suspend my disbelief in the sorts of worlds other science fiction writers are depicting.

About a decade ago, M. John Harrison (whose stories and novels you should totally read, if you haven't already) wrote on his blog:

Every moment of a science fiction story must represent the triumph of writing over worldbuilding.

Worldbuilding is dull. Worldbuilding literalises the urge to invent. Worldbuilding gives an unnecessary permission for acts of writing (indeed, for acts of reading). Worldbuilding numbs the reader's ability to fulfil their part of the bargain, because it believes that it has to do everything around here if anything is going to get done.

Above all, worldbuilding is not technically necessary. It is the great clomping foot of nerdism. It is the attempt to exhaustively survey a place that isn't there. A good writer would never try to do that, even with a place that is there.

I recognize the point he's putting in play here: but I (conditionally) disagree. The implicit construction of an artificial but plausible world is what distinguishes a work of science fiction from any other form of literature. It's an alternative type of underpinning to actually-existing reality, which is generally more substantial (and less plausible—reality is under no compulsion to make sense). Note the emphasis on implicit, though. Worldbuilding is like underwear: it needs to be there, but it shouldn't be on display, unless you're performing burlesque. Worldbuilding is the scaffolding that supports the costume to which our attention is directed. Without worldbuilding, the galactic emperor has no underpants to wear with his new suit, and runs the risk of leaving skidmarks on his story.

Storytelling is about humanity and its endless introspective quest to understand its own existence and meaning. But humans are social animals. We exist in a context provided by our culture and history and relationships, and if we're going to write a fiction about people who live in circumstances other than our own, we need to understand our protagonists' social context—otherwise, we're looking at perspective-free cardboard cut-outs. And technology and environment inextricably dictate large parts of that context.

You can't write a novel of contemporary life in the UK today without acknowledging that almost everybody is clutching a softly-glowing fondleslab that grants instant access to the sum total of human knowledge, provides an easy avenue for school bullies to get at their victims out-of-hours, tracks and quantifies their relationships (badly), and taunts them constantly with the prospect of the abolition of privacy in return for endless emotionally inappropriate cat videos. We're living in a world where invisible flying killer robots murder wedding parties in Kandahar, a billionaire is about to send a sports car out past Mars, and loneliness is a contagious epidemic. We live with constant low-level anxiety and trauma induced by our current media climate, tracking bizarre manufactured crises that distract and dismay us and keep us constantly emotionally off-balance. These things are the worms in the heart of the mainstream novel of the 21st century. You don't have to extract them and put them on public display, but if they aren't lurking in the implied spaces of your story your protagonists will strike a false note, alienated from the very society they are supposed to illuminate.

Now for a personal perspective. I don't find other peoples' motivations intuitively obvious: I have to apply conscious reasoning to put myself in a different head-space. I am quite frequently alienated by my fellow humans' attitudes and outlook. (I strongly suspect I have mild ASD.) For me, world-building provides a set of behavioural constraints that make it easier to understand the character of my fictional protagonists. (For example, if writing a 2018 story: new media channels lead to a constant barrage of false news generated by state actors trying to produce political change, delivered via advertising networks? And this is why my characters constantly feel uneasy and defensive, dominated by a low-level sense of alienation and angst.) The purpose of world-building is to provide the social context within which our characters feel, think, and act. I don't think you can write fiction without it.

Now, what's my problem with contemporary science fiction?

Simply put, plausible world-building in the twenty-first century is incredibly hard work. (One synonym for "plausible" in this sense is "internally consistent".) A lot of authors seem to have responded to this by jetisoning consistency and abandoning any pretense at plausibility: it's just too hard, and they want to focus on the characters or the exciting plot elements and get to the explosions without bothering to nerdishly wonder if the explosives are survivable by their protagonists at this particular range. To a generation raised on movie and TV special effects, plausible internal consistency is generally less of a priority than spectacle.

When George Lucas was choreographing the dogfights in "Star Wars", he took his visual references from film of first world war dogfights over the trenches in western Europe. With aircraft flying at 100-200 km/h in large formations, the cinema screen could frame multiple aircraft maneuvering in proximity, close enough to be visually distinguishable. The second world war wasn't cinematic: with aircraft engaging at speeds of 400-800 km/h, the cinematographer would have had a choice between framing dots dancing in the distance, or zooming in on one or two aircraft. (While some movies depict second world war air engagements, they're not visually captivating: either you see multiple aircraft cruising in close formation, or a sudden flash of disruptive motion—see for example the bomber formation in Memphis Belle, or the final attack on the U-boat pen in Das Boot.) Trying to accurately depict an engagement between modern jet fighters, with missiles launched from beyond visual range and a knife-fight with guns takes place in a fraction of a second at a range of multiple kilometres, is cinematically futile: the required visual context of a battle between massed forces evaporates in front of the camera ... which is why in Independence Day we see vast formations of F/A-18s (a supersonic jet) maneuvering as if they're Sopwith Camels. (You can take that movie as a perfect example of the triumph of spectacle over plausibility at just about every level.)

... So for a couple of generations now, the generic vision of a space battle is modelled on an air battle, and not just any air battle, but one plucked from a very specific period that was compatible with a film director's desire to show massed fighter-on-fighter action at close enough range that the audience could identify the good guys and bad guys by eye.

Let me have another go at George Lucas (I'm sure if he feels picked on he can sob himself to sleep on a mattress stuffed with $500 bills). Take the asteroid field scene from The Empire Strikes Back: here in the real world, we know that the average distance between asteroids over 1km in diameter in the asteroid belt is on the order of 3 million kilometers, or about eight times the distance between the Earth and the Moon. This is of course utterly useless to a storyteller who wants an exciting game of hide-and-seek: so Lucas ignored it to give us an exciting game of ...

Unfortunately, we get this regurgitated in one goddamned space opera after another: spectacle in place of insight, decolorized and pixellated by authors who haven't bothered to re-think their assumptions and instead simply cut and paste Lucas's cinematic vision. Let me say it here: when you fuck with the underlying consistency of your universe, you are cheating your readers. You may think that this isn't actually central to your work: you're trying to tell a story about human relationships, why get worked up about the average spacing of asteroids when the real purpose of the asteroid belt is to give your protagonists a tense situation to survive and a shared experience to bond over? But the effects of internal inconsistency are insidious. If you play fast and loose with distance and time scale factors, then you undermine travel times. If your travel times are rubberized, you implicitly kneecapped the economics of trade in your futurescape. Which in turn affects your protagonist's lifestyle, caste, trade, job, and social context. And, thereby, their human, emotional relationships. The people you're writing the story of live in a (metaphorical) house the size of a galaxy. Undermine part of the foundations and the rest of the house of cards is liable to crumble, crushing your characters under a burden of inconsistencies. (And if you wanted that goddamn Lucasian asteroid belt experience why not set your story aboard a sailing ship trying to avoid running aground in a storm? Where the scale factor fits.)

Similar to the sad baggage surrounding space battles and asteroid belts, we carry real world baggage with us into SF. It happens whenever we fail to question our assumptions. Next time you read a a work of SF ask yourself whether the protagonists have a healthy work/life balance. No, really: what is this thing called a job, and what is it doing in my post-scarcity interplanetary future? Why is this side-effect of carbon energy economics clogging up my post-climate-change world? Where does the concept of a paid occupation whereby individuals auction some portion of their lifespan to third parties as labour in return for money come from historically? What is the social structure of a posthuman lifespan? What are the medical and demographic constraints upon what we do at different ages if our average life expectancy is 200? Why is gender? Where is the world of childhood?

Some of these things may feel like constants, but they're really not. Humans are social organisms, our technologies are part of our cultures, and the way we live is largely determined by this stuff. Alienated labour as we know it today, distinct from identity, didn't exist in its current form before the industrial revolution. Look back two centuries, to before the germ theory of disease brought vaccination and medical hygeine: about 50% of children died before reaching maturity and up to 10% of pregnancies ended in maternal death—childbearing killed a significant minority of women and consumed huge amounts of labour, just to maintain a stable population, at gigantic and horrible social cost. Energy economics depended on static power sources (windmills and water wheels: sails on boats), or on muscle power. To an English writer of the 18th century, these must have looked like inevitable constraints on the shape of any conceivable future—but they weren't.

Similarly, if I was to choose a candidate for the great clomping foot of nerdism afflicting fiction today, I'd pick late-period capitalism, the piss-polluted sea we fish are doomed to swim in. It seems inevitable but it's a relatively recent development in historic terms, and it's clearly not sustainable in the long term. However, trying to visualize a world without it is surprisingly difficult. Take a random grab-bag of concepts and try to imagine the following without capitalism: "advertising", "trophy wife", "health insurance", "jaywalking", "passport", "police", "teen-ager", "television".

SF should—in my view—be draining the ocean and trying to see at a glance which of the gasping, flopping creatures on the sea bed might be lungfish. But too much SF shrugs at the state of our seas and settles for draining the local acquarium, or even just the bathtub, instead. In pathological cases it settles for gazing into the depths of a brightly coloured computer-generated fishtank screensaver. If you're writing a story that posits giant all-embracing interstellar space corporations, or a space mafia, or space battleships, never mind universalizing contemporary norms of gender, race, and power hierarchies, let alone fashions in clothing as social class signifiers, or religions ... then you need to think long and hard about whether you've mistaken your screensaver for the ocean.

And I'm sick and tired of watching the goldfish.

06 Feb 13:23

New poll highlights the danger for Corbyn if LAB is perceived as being pro-Brexit

by Mike Smithson

It also suggests a way back for the LDs

The Stop Brexit pressure group Our Future Our Choice has published a YouGov poll it commissioned which suggests that LAB’s poll rating could drop from 39% to 30% if it goes into the next election backing or having backed Brexit.

The big dangers comes from the very same group of voters who were behind the party’s better than expected performance at GE2017 – those under 40.

It finds that 73% of Remain voters in this group would back LAB if it opposed Brexit, compared to just 39% if it supports going ahead.

    I should say that I’m not convinced by polls that seek to test opinion in such a way. By its very nature such questioning is leading because you have to link the voting intention to a theoretical proposition.

Also the polling has been funded by a group which has a very clear agenda. Having said that it does highlight a huge risk in Corbyn’s ambivalent approach. He is going very much against a large bulk of the voters who helped save Labour’s bacon on June 8th last year.

As long as Seamus Mline, John McDonnell and Corbyn, all with long histories of being opposed to the EU, are the main drivers of LAB’s position then the party is probably not going to be moved.

The big question is how Brexit will be perceived at the time of the next election which almost certainly will be after it has happened.

Mike Smithson

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06 Feb 13:07

My Fellow White People, Here’s One Simple Trick You Can Do About Racism TODAY!

by JenniferP

So, you said something racist. Or, someone told you that you said something racist.

Or, someone you really like & admire said or did something racist, or is getting told on for saying something racist.

And now you feel uncomfortable. You feel guilty, maybe, or ashamed. Whatever it is, it’s weird and you don’t like it.

What I need you to do when this happens is stop, drop, and be quiet for a minute. You are not Racism Columbo, your job is not to interrogate the situation for whether it is actually, “objectively” racist. Your job is not to find the motive, to drill down to whether it was intended to be racist. Your job is not to revert to High School Debate Club mode and split hairs looking for plausible deniability. Your job is not to defend your fave from the racist stuff they said!

Your first job is to shut the fuck up for a second. If you have to say something, say “I’m sorry.” Then stop talking. Definitely stop typing in that little social media window. Stop. Don’t. Make. It. Worse. Honestly, if most people just stopped there, the world would start becoming a marginally better place almost instantly.

Important: Engaging with white people about race is an incredibly high-stakes and potentially exhausting activity for a person of color to take on. (Women, think of the last time you tried to sincerely engage with a sexist dude who mansplained your world to you. Did you need a drink/seventeen naps afterward? Did you feel like you’d been trapped in a horrible alternate reality with no way out? Yeah.) So if someone is willing to actually talk with you about this, chances are it is an investment having a better relationship with you, not a drive-by insult-fest or attack designed to tear you down and make you feel terrible and hate yourself. They are talking to you about it because they want you to get it and to stop doing the hurtful thing so that they can keep working with/hanging out with you. The people who hate your guts or think you’re a lost cause will just avoid you. There are worse things you could do than just listen without interrupting. 

Step 2, after that initial encounter, instead of trying to justify or excavate why whatever it is isn’t racist or isn’t “really” racist or wasn’t meant to be racist or isn’t usually racist or is racist only on Tuesdays, think about why it is or could plausibly be racist. (Think about this quietly, inside your head.) Why might someone see it that way? What context or history are you missing? How might your action look to someone who doesn’t know about your pure heart and good intentions, somebody who experiences the same “mistakes” and “slip-ups” over and over again from white people? And what are the relative stakes & consequences here if you’re wrong? The saying about misogyny goes: “Men are afraid that women will laugh at them, women are afraid that men will kill them.” Welp, white people are worried about being unfairly called racist and feeling weird about it. People of color are worried about dying (in medical situations, at the hands of police, from environmental racism, etc. etc. etc.)

The history of racism is complex enough and insidious enough that chances are:

  1. Yep, race is a factor affecting that “fun” or “simple” thing you’re discussing. That one, too.
  2.  It’s just possible that we white folks have some rill big knowledge gaps about it.
  3. Automatically discounting someone’s lived experience or point of view just because we’re momentarily uncomfortable is a crappy thing to do and we should stop it.

There are steps after that. Reading. Listening. Self-reflection. Finding ways to do the work of dismantling racism. Here is one organization that is doing work. Here is another. This one, too. (Don’t take my word for it or get distracted by whether any of these are the Perfect One. Do research and find something that works for you.)

For today, here are your steps if you should make a mistake and say or do something racist:

  1. AT MINIMUM, DON’T MAKE IT WORSE. This almost certainly means saying “I’m sorry” followed by a period of listening and quiet reflection.
  2. During that quiet time, think about what it would mean to accept, at face value, someone else’s insight on what is or might be racist. What do you lose when you say to yourself hey, wait a second, I’m the one who screwed up, so maybe I’m not the expert here?

Baby steps, friends.

 

05 Feb 14:15

I Might Be In The Swamp

by Andrew Rilstone
"What are your politics?"
"Well, I am afraid really I have none. I am a Liberal."
"Oh, they count as Tories. They dine with us. Or come in the evening, at any rate."
The Importance of Being Earnest


An American once asked me if Tony Benn was a liberal.

“On the contrary," I replied  "He was on the left of the Labour party.”

To which the American riposted  “Oh, I thought he supported high taxation, socialized medicine, trade unions and fairly generous welfare spending and opposed the death penalty and nuclear weapons.”

“Yes,” said I “That’s what I mean by ‘on the the left of the Labour Party’”.

“Oh,” the fictitious American retorted “But that’s what I mean by ‘liberal.”



On November 18th, the Guardian published a short essay by the former leader of the British Liberal Democrats, under the headline “Liberalism has eaten itself — it isn’t very liberal any more.” 


Any fool can type “Christ was not a Christian” or “Marx was no Marxist”. It’s just a smart-arse way of saying “I don’t think that Jesus would have agreed with some of the doctrines which the Christian church now subscribes to” or “Present day leftists haven’t properly understood Karl Marx’s political ideas.” If Tim Farron had said that the Green party was no longer green, the Conservative Party was not interested in conserving things or that the Worker’s Revolutionary Party was neither Holy, Roman nor an Empire, we would all have understood perfectly well what he meant. 

But when Tim Farron types that liberalism is no longer “very” liberal he doesn’t mean that his party, the Liberal Democrats, has drifted away from the political ideas which it was founded to promote. What he appears to be saying is that there is a thing called liberalism, which is distinct from the liberal party. When this thing called liberalism exists in conjunction with Christianity it has a desirable quality which he calls…liberalism. But when Christianity is removed from that thing called liberalism, that quality called liberalism is lost. However, Christianity and liberalism are not the same thing.

The Athanasian Creed seems positively straightforward by comparison. 

Let us try to unpack the argument as best we can.



I: The Liberal party was founded by Christians - it grew out of the eighteenth and nineteenth century Protestant Non-Conformist movement

"British liberalism is founded in the battle for religious liberty. The nonconformist, evangelical Christian groups that were persecuted by a society that favoured adherence only to the established church built a liberal movement that championed much wider liberty, for women, for other religious minorities, nonreligious minorities, for cultural and regional minorities, for the poor and vulnerable."

A lot of the great liberals of the past were definitely Church of Wales, Unitarian or Methodist. And so were a lot of the great socialists and the great Tories. Tony Benn was fond of saying that the Labour Party owed more to Methodism than to Marx; Mrs Thatcher’s dad was a Methodist local preacher. Was there a special link between the liberals and the Non-Conformists? Or would it be more accurate to say that the Non-Conformists were more inclined than the Established Church to think it their Christian duty to change the world through secular, political action?

Tim is trying to make the point that there is no necessary contradiction between being an evangelical Christian and being a liberal. I am not sure how far claiming that the movement's origins were Christian (even if that is true) supports his case. Most people have a perception that evangelical Christians want laws against blasphemy and obscenity, whereas liberals are against censorship. They think that evangelicals want abortion and euthanasia to be against the law, but that liberals think that people should be free to make their own choices. They think that evangelicals believe that God gave men and women different roles whereas the liberals support the equality of the sexes. This is why they are “surprised and confused” when a liberal such as Tim Farron says that he is also an evangelical Christian. If this is a misconception, Tim could very easily have typed “That may have been true at one time, but evangelicalism has moved on: most of us are much more progressive on those kinds of issues than we used to be.”

But he doesn’t

II: Although the Liberal Party has lost the election, a separate thing called liberalism has “comprehensively triumphed” everywhere else. 

"Liberalism has apparently won. Even members of the Conservative and Labour parties call themselves liberals today. Let’s be honest, you can’t work in the media without being a liberal. Even most of the journalists who write for the rightwing press are in truth liberals."

"Despite my best efforts, the Liberal Democrats have not won. But irrespective of my efforts, liberalism has." 

Is it true that we are all liberals now? Many people would agree with Tim that you can’t work in the media without being a liberal. Many people would agree that liberals run even the so-called right-wing press. And many people do indeed believe in something they call the Liberal Elite.

But the people who talk about the liberal elite aren’t talking about an elite made up of members of the Liberal Democrats. They certainly aren’t saying that in order to work at the Daily Telegraph you have to believe in 200% council tax surcharges on second homes. Liberal, in this sense, simply means “of the left”. And it is almost always used in a pejorative sense. Indeed, most people who think that you have to be a liberal to work in the media (hello, Richard Littlejohn! can you hear me, Kathy Hopkins?) subscribe to a conspiracy theory in which the media is controlled by a secret society known as the SJW or the Cultural Marxists.

Liberal, in this pejorative, American sense doesn’t imply beliefs which are particularly left-wing by British standards. A liberal, in this sense, believes that women should be paid the same as men, that evolution and climate change are real things, and that everyone should be allowed to go to the doctor if they get sick. The far right call this “leftie” or “PC” or “liberal” or “SJW”. The rest of us call it "what everyone believes in nowadays."

If Tim wants to adopt this usage, then he is free to do so. If we define “liberalism” as “views which are not on the extreme right” then it is certainly true that everyone except the extreme right is now a liberal. 

3: However, there is some analogy between this triumph of liberalism and the conversion of Rome to Christianity in 313 AD, which Tim takes for granted was a Bad Thing.

“Yet its triumph is hollow, just as Christianity’s apparent triumph was hollow when it became the state religion of the Roman empire.”

“My experience is that although liberalism has won, it is now behaving like the established church of the empire in the fourth and fifth centuries. It has gained ascendancy and lost itself in the process.”

This is a very odd thing for a self-proclaimed Bible believing Christian to say. I understand why a conspiracy theorist like Dan Brown might think that Jesus was just a new age hippy mystic until Nasty Constantine deified him in order to sell his new faith to the pagans. I understand why a, er, liberal theologian like Giles Fraser would think that the historical Jesus was basically a Corbynite social reformer and that the doctrines of the Atonement and the Resurrection are part of a vicious death-cult invented by Wicked Constantine in 325. But why should an evangelical think that the conversion of Rome was a disaster? Surely it was the post 313 Church that established the text and canon of the Bible they hold so dear? And surely it was the post 313 church that formalized the doctrines and creeds that they are so committed to?

Would Tim Farron rather we were all Arians?

I fear that there is a very dodgy sectarian undercurrent to this. I am very much afraid that evangelicals identify the ancient Roman church with the present day Roman Catholic church, and believe that Roman Catholics are “not Christian” or at any rate “not very Christian”. I fear that they believe that the Protestant Reformation — specifically, whatever sect they happen to belong to — restored the primitive apostolic faith. And I suppose that Tim Farron wants to wrest primitive liberalism back from these nasty fake liberals with their newspapers and their temples and their idolatry. 

IV: Because many liberals are not Christians, liberalism has lost a quality which it once had. This quality Tim calls "liberalism". 

"In discarding Christianity, we kick away the foundations of liberalism and democracy and so we cannot then be surprised when what we call liberalism stops being liberal."


"My experience is that although liberalism has won, it is now behaving like the established church of the empire in the fourth and fifth centuries. It has gained ascendancy and lost itself in the process. It isn’t very liberal any more."


I am pretty sure what Tim Farron is not saying here. He is not saying that the liberals (in the first sense, the Liberal Democrat Party) have ceased to believe in raising income tax by 1p to pay for the health service. He is not even saying that liberalism (in the second sense, the near universal progressive consensus) has ceased to believe in progressive values. He is claiming that liberalism has lost one specific defining liberal characteristic. The salt has lost its savour and Tim Farron knoweth wherewith it can be salted. 


I will accept for the sake of argument that liberalism emerged from the eighteenth and nineteenth century Non-Conformist movement; I will allow him to conflate Non-Conformism with evangelicalism, and I will even swallow the implication that the fourth century Roman Church and the nineteenth century Church of England are "establishment" Churches in a somehow analogous way. 


What I will not accept is that because liberalism was originally Christian, it follows that liberalism is irreducibly Christian. It certainly doesn’t follow that if you “discard” Christianity -- if some liberals are also catholics or atheists -- that you “kick away the foundations” of liberalism. You might as well say that because the Freemasons were originally a guild who built Cathedrals then building Cathedrals is what Freemasonry is all about and your local lodge is no longer very masonic. 


I think that what is happening here is simple metaphor-abuse. I am reminded of the pundits who argued that since marriage is the foundation of our society, allowing lesbians to get married will cause society to fall down. 


It might be that liberalism has some hidden premise that only works if you believe in sola scripture and baptism by total immersion. But Tim would need to demonstrate this. He isn't allowed to take it for granted.


So what is this quality called liberalism which is present when Christianity is present, but absent when Christianity is absent?

Ladies and gentlemen, the true definition of liberalism is…

(loud fanfare and drum roll) 

….freedom of speech. 

“What is at the heart of a liberal society? It is to uphold that we have a right to offend and a duty to tolerate offense. George Orwell said: “If liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear.””

Is that truly what he believes? Is that the one quality which makes liberalism liberal, which modern liberalism has lost? Is that the quality which disappears from liberalism when the majority of liberals stop being Methodists? And indeed, is there the slightest evidence that evangelical Christians are any more inclined than anyone else to say that they don’t agree with Jerry Springer the Opera or Monty Python’s Life of Brian but they will defend to the death those works right to be heard?

Oh, and did you spot the way that when George Orwell said "liberty" Tim Farron heard "liberalism"?

I don’t know if freedom of speech is at the heart of a liberal society, because I don’t really know what “at the heart of...” means. It is a classic preacher’s cliche. Clergymen are always telling us that improved street lighting on the Putney High Street should be right at the heart of our Christmas celebrations and that the problem of drug misuse in the under twelves is at the very heart of our Christian witness.

If free speech is at the heart of a liberal society, does that mean that it is the most important thing: that we should be prepared to sacrifice other things in order to secure it? Or does it mean that free speech is the good thing on which all other good things depend — that unless you secure free speech you will never secure any other reform?

I think that freedom of speech is one of a number of Good Things which need to be balanced against each other. I don’t think that freedom of speech is more important than universal enfranchisement. I would never have said “Well, it’s a shame that women are still not allowed to vote, but at least they are allowed to say offensively nasty things about men.” I don’t think that freedom of speech is the freedom from which all other freedoms derive. I don’t think that you have to fight for the right of offensively bigoted people to say offensively bigoted things before you can start to work towards racial equality.

Both ideas sound like nonsense to me. But perhaps they don’t sound like nonsense to Tim Farron. Perhaps that is why I am a Corbyn-supporting reformist and he is a Liberal Democrat. Perhaps the Liberal Democrats are and always have been the Freedom Of Speech Party.


In what way has this freedom to be offensive, this right to tell people things they do not want to hear, been withdrawn?

Tim cites two pieces of evidence.

First, social media. "Liberalism has eaten itself" turns out to mean “some people on Twitter can sometimes be a bit awful.”

“Five minutes on social media will give you a window into a society that condemns and judges, that leaps to take offence and pounces to cause it – liberals condemning those who don’t conform as nasty and hateful, the right condemning liberals as fragile snowflakes.”

I invite the reader to examine this claim very closely indeed. Note that Tim again adopts the American usage where liberal is the opposite of the right and the right is the opposite of liberal. Even granted this usage, you would expect him to say "the right condemns liberals and liberals condemn the right”. Instead, while we are all looking the other way, he performs his rhetorical masterstroke.  “The right condemns liberals and liberals condemn those who don’t conform.

Those who don’t conform.

It isn’t that liberals say that white supremacists and rape apologists and people who think that wheelchair users should be barred from going to school are nasty and hateful because nasty and hateful is what they in fact are. Liberals are calling them bad names because liberals don’t like people who won’t conform.

Note the subtle way he brings everything back to non-conformism, which is where we started. The true liberals, refusing to conform to the liberal consensus on the internet, are like the Anabaptists, refusing to conform to the protestant consensus in the Church of England. The liberals on the internet, shocked when someone says that secondary modern students are little different from cavemen, are like the fake Christians who made a pact with Caesar. Any one who deviates from received opinion is a non-conformist, and every non-conformist is a liberal. So the brave soul who is prepared to come right out and call a spade a nigg-nogg is the true liberal and the person who tells him that we don’t want that kind of language round here is not a liberal at all.

(There is also a sort of a pun going on around the dual meaning of "non-conformist". Non-Conformist has a specific religious meaning; but it can also just mean "anyone who won't fit in".  Not all non-conformists are Non-Conformists. And most Non-Conformists were rather conventional folk.)

Then we get an odd digression on “shared values”. 

“People talk about shared values today – I’ve done it myself. But when they do, what they mean is: “These are my values – and I am going to act as though they are also yours, and will demonstrate contempt for you if you depart from them"…..The cultural leaders of our day have made the arrogant and fatal assumption that we have these shared liberal values, and have sought to enforce them via John Stuart Mill’s hated tyranny of opinion.”

Is this true? Is this what people mean when they say “shared values”? Is this what Tim meant? Did he truthfully declare some idiosyncratic private belief of his own  to be a value that everyone shared and then try to enforce it? Are consensus progressive values merely the personal whims of a handful of individuals which have been forced on the majority by the minority? Is it really so arrogant of me to assume that everyone round the table agrees that black people and white people should have the same civil rights? Wouldn’t showing my contempt be the very mildest possible reaction if it turned out that someone at the table supported slavery or didn't think that Muslims should have freedom of worship?

But this is the claim. The people in charge -- the Establishment, the Emperor, Twitter -- have a set of rules, and if you deviate from those rules you risk of.....being disapproved of and called bad names.

And the people at risk from this terrible fate are....people who aren’t sufficiently liberal.

Don’t believe anything you may have read about Gamergate and the Puppies issuing rape and death threats to what-they-call SJWs and what-they-call feminazis. What we need to fear is the baying mob of consensus progressives.



And that, of course, is what this is all about.

There was once a  politician -- let's call him "Tim" -- who was also, confusingly and surprisingly, an evangelical Christian. And he dissented from the consensus by saying that he thought that it was a sin to be gay. And everyone in the liberal media judged the poor politician. They condemned him and demonstrated contempt for him. He was despised and rejected of Twitter, a man of sorrow and acquainted with John Humphries.

So he went home, and tried to come up with a way of defining the word liberal such that the people who said that gay sex was forbidden by God were the liberal ones, and the people who said that it was fine to be gay were not true liberals.

So he decided that judge not lest thee be judged was the whole of the law. And so it turned out if the liberals had really been liberals they would have tolerated his intolerance and not said that he was hateful and nasty for thinking that a whole section of the population were going to hell.

Because if liberalism doesn’t mean the right to call one lot of people sinners without another lot of people looking down on you then it doesn’t mean anything at all.




05 Feb 01:18

Tomorrow, 5 February 2018, the Berlin Wall will have been down for as long as it was up.

The Berlin wall was erected on 13 August 1961. It was breached on 9 November 1989, after 28 years, 2 months and 27 days (10315 days, to be exact). Counting forward another 28 years, 2 months and 27 days (or just 10315 days, you get the same answer) takes us to tomorrow, 5 February 2018.

Below is the blog entry I posted on the twentieth anniversary of the Fall of the Wall, in 2009. Since then, I have continued to enjoy visiting Berlin; and I always pay my respects to the Wall and its memories, for me and for many others.

Originally posted by nwhyte at The Fall of the Wall, twenty years on
The day the Wall fell, I split up with my girlfriend. She had moved to a different city, and the long-distance thing wasn't working; I went to visit her that Thursday evening, and we had an intense conversation over drinks and pizza, vaguely aware that people were staring at the television screens but assuming it was some sports event. By the time we had worked out that we had both reached the same conclusion about the future of the relationship, I had missed the last train; we went back to her place, I slept on the couch and got up early to go home. And then I bought a newspaper and discovered that while one (short and mostly sweet) chapter of my life was ending, the world had changed forever.

I first went to Berlin in 1986, over the long weekend of German Unity Day which was then on June 17, hitch-hiking there with a friend who I was working with in Heilbronn way off in the southeast. In those days Berlin was a slightly hippyish enclave (the hostel we stayed in was very hippyish and slightly threatening) on the front line of the Cold War. The inner German border remains the most vigorously fortified frontier I have ever seen. We went east as well as west (by tram to Frieedrichstraße), and took pictures of the Brandenburg Gate from both sides which I guess I must still have somewhere; I went to an eastern bookshop and made the mistake of referring to "Ost-Berlin" (rather than "Berlin, Hauptstadt der DDR"). At that point the Wall had been up for almost 25 years and looked like it would remain a lot longer.

I went back with Anne in 1992. It was utterly transformed, of course. I cried as we walked through the Brandenburg Gate, which had appeared so utterly blocked by historical circumstance and concrete fortification only a few years before. The west of the city had found a new security and confidence, a strong sense of liberation; the east was still shell-shocked by defeat. The transport system, now unified, charged considerably less to former easterners buying tickets. The frenzy of new build was just getting going but the momentum wasn't yet there. Since then I've been back perhaps half a dozen times. Earlier this year I took an afternoon to retrace the Wall, helpfully marked out by bricks in the road. It remains a fascinating city for me, and every time I go I find something new.

The BBC has a handy list of walls that remain, including two of which I have direct experience (Belfast and the Green Line in Nicosia) and another which I work on (the Moroccan berm closing off the illegally occupied part of the Western Sahara). Just as the Berlin Wall disturbed me in 1986, any restriction like this disturbs me now. Robert Frost wrote "Something there is that doesn't love a wall"; his New Hampshire boundary markers were threatened by natural forces, perhaps elves, built by old stone savages. The conflict-built walls of the world are also perpetually under threat from the erosive force of history. And a good thing too.
05 Feb 01:17

Civil Service, Racism, and Cost Control

I ran a Patreon poll about theory-oriented posts, and this option won over the concepts of skin in the game and of cities and assimilation. It came to me when I tried understanding why on several distinct measures of good governance related to urbanism and public transportation, the US is unusually weak by developed-country standards. I was reminded of something regular commenter Max Wyss once said: in French and in German, there’s a word that means “the state” and has positive connotation, whereas in native English use it usually refers to a sinister external imposition.

My main theory is that the US has problems with governance that ultimately stem from its racist history, and these have unrelated implications today that lead to poor urban governance and low transit usage. This is not a straightforward claim about white flight leading to high car use, or even a general claim about racism-poor transit correlation. (I don’t think the US is currently more racist than the average Western European country, and the costs in Europe don’t seem to correlate with my perception of racism levels.) In particular, fixing racism is not by itself going to lead to better transit or better urbanism, only to improvements in quality of government that in the future could prevent similar problems with other aspects of public policy that are yet unforeseen today.

This is a three-step argument. First, I am going to go over the weakness of US civil service and its consequences. Second, I am going to step back and describe the political mentality that leads to weak civil service, which centers the local community at the expense of the state. And third, I am going to relate this and similar examples of excessive localism in the US to the country’s unique history of racism. In effect, I am going to go backward, describing the effect and then looking at its causes.

Effect: Weak State Capacity

The argument is as follows: the US has a weak civil service. There’s relatively little in-house expertise, and weak planning departments. The rapid transit extensions of London and Paris are driven mostly by professional planning departments (Transport for London is especially powerful), with the budgets debated within their respective national parliaments. In contrast, in New York, while Second Avenue Subway was similarly driven by an internal process, other rail extensions were not: the 7 extension is Bloomberg’s project, the ongoing plans for BQX and the LaGuardia AirTrain are de Blasio and Cuomo’s projects respectively, and Gateway in its various incarnations is political football among several agencies and governments. Similarly, while the TGV was developed internally at SNCF with political approval of the overall budget, American plans for high-speed rail involve a melange of players, including consultants.

The more obvious effect of the weakness of the American civil service is that, with political control of planning and not just of the budget, it’s easy to build low-performance infrastructure such as the 7 extension. However, there are three ways in which this problem can increase costs, rather than just lead to poor priorities.

First, it is easier to have agency turf battles. The US has no transport association coordinating planning like STIF in Ile-de-France or any number of German-speaking Verkehrsverbünde (Berlin’s VBB, Zurich’s ZVV, etc.). Even when one agency controls all transit in an area, like SEPTA in Philadelphia or the MBTA in Boston, powerful internal cultures inhibit reforms aiming at treating mainline rail like regular public transit. An instructive example of better civil service is Canada: while Canadian civil service is also weak by Continental European or Japanese standards, it is strong enough that Metrolinx plans to raise off-peak frequency and at least in theory aims at fare integration, over the objections of the traditional railroaders who, like their American counterparts, like the situation as it is today.

Without any structure that gets different agencies to coordinate plans, overbuilding is routine. I blogged about it a few months ago, giving the examples of Gateway and East Side Access in New York and San Jose Diridon Station. A second Bay Area example, not mentioned in the post, concerns Millbrae, where BART holds on to turf it does not need, leading California High-Speed Rail to propose a gratuitous $1.9 billion tunnel: see posts on Caltrain-HSR Compatibility here and here.

Second, there is less in-house supervision of contracting. Brian Rosenthal’s article about Second Avenue Subway’s construction costs talks, among other things, about the lack of internal expertise at the MTA about running large projects. This is consistent with Manuel Melis Maynar’s admonition that project management should be done in-house rather than by consultants; Melis managed to build subways in Madrid for around $60 million per km. It’s also consistent with what I’ve heard from MBTA insiders as an explanation for the cost blowout for Boston’s Green Line Extension, an open-cut light rail so expensive it was misclassified as a subway in a Spanish comparison; as I mention in CityLab, once the MBTA found a good project manager it managed to substantially reduce costs.

Weaker in-house supervision has knock-on effects on procurement practices. An agency that can’t easily oversee the work it pays for has difficulty weeding out dishonest or incompetent contractors. One way around it is strict lowest-bid rules, but these offer dishonest contractors an opportunity to lowball costs; California has a particular problem with change orders. In New York, I’ve heard from several second-hand sources that to prevent contractors from doing shoddy work, the specs micromanage the contractors, leading to more expensive work and discouraging good builders, who can get private-sector work, from bidding. If fewer contractors bid, then there is less competition, increasing cost further. In contrast, Melis Maynar’s prescription is to offer contracts based primarily on the technical score and only secondarily on cost, to ensure quality work. But this requires objective judgment of technical merit, which American bureaucrats are not good at.

And third, the US’s weaker state capacity leads to problems with NIMBY opposition to infrastructure. This does not means the US can’t engage in eminent domain (on the contrary, its eminent domain laws favor the state). But it means that agencies feel like they’re politically at the mercy of powerful local interests, and can’t propose projects with high community impact that they can negotiate with local landowners. The impetus for the SECoast’s hiring me to analyze high-speed rail in Fairfield County is that the NEC Future plan was vague about that area; an insider at one of the NEC Future consultants told me that this was specifically because the consultant was worried about NIMBYism in that part of the state, so an “unspoken assumption” was that the area should not be disturbed.

This kind of preemptive surrender to NIMBYism leads to inferior projects, like agency turf battles: cost-effective solutions are not pursued if consultants are worried about political pushback. But, like agency turf battles, it also leads to higher costs, if the reports propose expensive remediation such as tunnels.

Cause: Localism

Any attempt to build a strong bureaucracy in the United States runs into entrenched interests, most of which are local. These interests are empowered politically rather than legally. The NIMBYism example is the cleanest case study. The United States does not have a legal regime that empowers NIMBY opposition in eminent domain cases. On the contrary, the state can condemn property with relative ease, and the arguments are over price. Under Kelo, the state can even expropriate land and to give to a private developer.

In contrast, in Japan the process is more difficult: in a 1994 Transportation Research Board paper, Walter Hook says that urban landowners in Japan enjoy strong legal protections, which requires the state to pay a high price for property takings. About 75-80% of the cost of urban highway construction in Japan is land acquisition, versus only 25% in the US (both figures are lower for rail, which is more space-efficient; the paper argues that Japan’s difficult land acquisition led it to favor the more space-efficient mode for its urban transportation network).

Moreover, in Japan as well as in France, property owners have extralegal means of fighting infrastructure: they can take to the streets. The construction of Narita Airport faced riots by landowners, encouraged by leftists who opposed the airport’s use by the US military; and in France, blocking roads is a standard way of protesting, and there is little the state can do against it. SNCF resolves this issue in building high-speed lines for TGVs by spending years negotiating with landowners and coming up with win-wins in which it pays extra to make the owners go away quietly.

With a legally stronger state, the US needs to come up with different ways to protect powerful property owners from arbitrary expropriation. The mechanism the country settled on is political empowerment of local interests. If rich individuals in Fairfield County or on the San Francisco Peninsula can interfere with the construction process, then they can rest assured the state will not be able to build a rail alignment that wrecks their real or imagined quality of life. The point I made repeatedly in my writeup about high-speed rail in Fairfield County (funded by those rich individuals) is that there is some real visual and noise impact, but it’s possible to mitigate it in most cities using noise barriers and trees, and as compensation use the faster tracks to offer faster commuter rail service; only Darien has unmitigable impact.

The same localism encourages agency turf battles. The LIRR, Metro-North, and New Jersey Transit could provide much better rail service in their respective service areas by integrating planning, but this would compel local interests to give up control. Long Islanders would have to interact directly with the Tri-State Area’s transport association, in which they’d be only 12% of the population and 5% of transit ridership; today they interact with planning via their powerful elected representatives, who can block any change that is unfavorable to incumbent riders.

The main losers here are potential riders. It is possible to come up with a win-win (there’s so much schedule padding a local train could be as fast as today’s super-express trains), but it is not possible for any coordinated planning department to credibly promise that the suburbs would retain the priority they have today. For the same reason, even vertically integrated SEPTA and the MBTA find it difficult to engage in integration – the suburbs would lose their special status.

In contrast, planning in France and Britain is more centralized, and the local communities were never so empowered. The two main players in STIF are RATP and SNCF. RATP serves Paris, and SNCF is the national railroad and does not view itself as catering to the suburbs even if those suburbs are the overwhelming majority of SNCF’s ridership. The rich can exercise direct political influence: thus, the state just committed to building the entire Grand Paris Express, despite cost overruns, without pruning the unnecessary airport connector that is Line 17 or the low-ridership favored-quarter suburban circumferential that is Line 18. But they can’t block projects as easily as in the US.

The US achieves democratic checks and balances by having many veto points on every law. In Congress, a law needs majorities in both houses and a presidential signature, or supermajorities in both houses. Moreover, achieving a majority in each house requires not only the support of the majority of legislators, but also the support of the majority of legislators in the majority party (the Hastert Rule). In each state legislature, the process is largely similar. In nonpartisan or effectively single-party legislatures, such as the New York City Council, votes on such local issues as rezoning informally require the approval of the legislator representing the district in question; David Schleicher, who has elsewhere investigated high US subway construction costs, has a paper on this local representative privilege explaining why upzoning is difficult in large cities.

This localism is absent from other democracies. Westminster systems just don’t have checks and balances, only traditions, occasionally supplemented by narrow civil liberties-oriented constitutions like the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As a result, Ontario could pass a rent control law overnight; with this regulatory uncertainty, it’s no wonder that for years, even before the law, fearful developers built mostly condos rather than rental units.

In most other democracies, checks and balances instead rely on proportional representation and a multiparty system: laws in Germany or Scandinavia require a parliamentary majority, and restrictions on the government’s ability to pass big changes overnight with no debate come from the ability of class-based and ideological interests to activate entire political parties. Coalition agreements still specify the agenda, roughly equivalent to the Hastert Rule, but parties can freely campaign for changes in elections, reducing the ability of a minority to block change. In some systems, most notably Switzerland, it’s also possible to use referendums to direct spending. This way, local magnates opposed to the expansion of civil service are disempowered, while at the same time the civil service cannot easily use its powers to create internal slush funds, because it is still overseen by a political majority that cares little for corruption.

Ultimate Cause: Democratic Deficit and Racism

The superficial reason why the US prefers localism to civil service is that it is historically localist. New England had powerful town halls from early white settlement, and Americans like to tell themselves that they have a lively tradition of self-government and individualism. But this is incorrect. Israelis in the United States often comment that far from individualist or self-governing, Americans are unusually rule-bound and obedient, compared with not just Israelis but also Europeans.

More to the point, traditions of localism exist in much of Europe. Switzerland is famous for this, and yet it’s managed to develop civil service planning transportation; referendums exert a powerful check on the ability of the state to spend money, but do not micromanage planning, and as a result the state makes cost-effective plans rather than retreating and letting local suburbs decide what to build.

Moreover, most European countries have undergone rounds of municipal consolidation, converting formerly independent suburbs or villages into parts of larger cities or townships. France has uniquely not done so, and is therefore extremely fractionalized, with 30,000 communes, about the same as the number of municipalities in five times more populous America; but in France the communes are for the most part weak, and most subnational government is done by departments and regions. The US, in contrast, maintained its suburbs’ autonomy.

The answer to the question of why the US has done so is simple: racism. Suburban consolidation came to a hard stop once the cities became more diverse than the suburbs. Relying on prior town lines could offer suburban whites something they craved: protection from integration, especially school integration.

It would be difficult to consolidate education policy, even at the state level, and maintain the white middle and working classes’ desired segregation levels. Thus, the US prefers the second-best policy of maintaining localism. The same principle also underlies much election disenfranchisement (giving white poll workers authority to reject black voters’ credentials), today and even more so before the Voting Rights Act.

Transit faces the same issue. The traditional American transit cities’ suburbs have fast expensive trains for middle-class, mostly white suburban commuters to city center, and slow, cheap suburban buses for poor minorities working service jobs in the suburbs. Stephen Smith, who spent some time on the NICE buses on Long Island and compared their demographics with those of the LIRR, calls this “separate and unequal.” This segregation would not survive any coordinated planning; even ignoring racial equality, it’s inefficient.

The underlying cause is that it is very difficult to have a clean herrenvolk democracy. Neither of the two main examples of herrenvolk democracies, the American South in the eras of slavery and Jim Crow and South Africa in the apartheid era, had good government. On the contrary, the antebellum South opposed public infrastructure investment (“internal improvements” in the era’s language), and the Jim Crow South was a single-party state ruled by corrupt political machines. Apartheid South Africa, too, was effectively a single-party state with totalitarian characteristics trying to stamp out communism. The ability of the state to respond to even the white population’s economic and social needs was constrained by the overwhelming need to credibly promise to maintain apartheid. Ta-Nehisi Coates notes this of George Wallace:

I frequently reference the story of George Wallace’s evolution. Wallace was once a sensible politician who generally was seen as fair-minded by black leaders in Alabama. But he lost the gubernatorial election after being tarred by John Patterson as too friendly to black people. Wallace subsequently vowed to never be “out-niggered” again and thus began his long dark march into history.

You know, I tried to talk about good roads and good schools and all these things that have been part of my career, and nobody listened. And then I began talking about niggers, and they stomped the floor.

The only way to maintain racism is to weaken institutions. It’s hard to have a clean system of apartheid justice, because then the oppressed minority can simply demand the state treat it the way it treats the herrenvolk. A state that attempted to impose apartheid with clean government would not be able to credibly promise to the racists that the system would stay as is. Instead, it would need to engage in arbitrary justice, giving individual cops, judges, and juries broad latitude to make decisions, which could survive the end of formal apartheid to some extent.

The Impact of Racism on Property Rights

The US built roads in the 1950s and 60s by running them through low-income black urban neighborhoods. The book The Big Roads says that road planners figured that those areas were already declining and had low property values, so it was cheap to build there; in one tone-deaf example, planners in Washington tried surveying roads after a race riot, figuring that it was the best time to demolish buildings, until outraged civil rights groups put a stop to the process. The problem is that black neighborhoods were cheap because of redlining. The federal government spent 30 years wrecking the property values of black neighborhoods and then acquired property for cheap to build infrastructure for then-white suburban drivers.

For the same reason, there is much less tolerance toward protest in the US than in other democracies. If Americans tried reacting to adverse changes the way the French react, the police would shoot them. If the US engaged in a process to reduce its police brutality rates to levels that Europeans tolerate, black people would be able to free to roam the streets and make racist whites uncomfortable.

Thus, the US refrains from giving property owners any formal legal or extralegal protections from expropriation. Instead, it promises security of property to the middle class by underinvesting in institutions that could come up with bureaucratic rules for expropriation. Legally excluding minorities is difficult; politically excluding them is easy. The natural end of this system is to ensure the locus of protection from expropriation is political rather than legal.

When the US protects individuals from the predations of the state, it does so by letting people sue the government; this contrasts with regulatory protections, such as the Nordic ombudsman system. While suing the government is in theory a legal protection, in practice it depends on familiarity with the court system, which privileges people with connections and legal knowledge. When the state does spend political capital on getting what it wants, some rich individuals can sue indefinitely to delay projects; the poor have no such recourse. While this is partly a legacy of the common law system, indefinite delay by lawsuit is rare in the rest of the common law world, leading to British stereotypes that Americans are overly litigious.

The US is not uniquely racist. Its levels of economic discrimination against minorities seem fairly average to me by developed-country standards. Moreover, the extent of political exclusion of black Americans is arguably the smallest among all large groups of nonwhite minorities in white-majority countries. Barack Obama faced considerably racism as president, but he did win by a fair margin, and for years beforehand the media normalized the idea of a black president (as in the TV show 24 or the film Deep Impact). In contrast, a Muslim French president would be unthinkable. Even the Trump cabinet is more diverse than the Macron cabinet, which has one black member (the minister of sport) and one part-Algerian member (the minister of public accounts); the Clinton, Bush, and Obama cabinets all had minorities in far more senior positions.

However, the US is unique in that it was racially diverse early, requiring its political system to adapt to a state of slavery and subsequently apartheid. Europe, in contrast, formally applies the rules of liberal democratic participation, developed when there were few minorities, to an increasingly diverse electorate. To the extent that European racists are dissatisfied with this arrangement, they try to push for localism as well: British xenophobia borrows rhetoric from American local racism, substituting neo-Confederate dislike for the US federal government for anti-EU sentiments. Similarly, Swiss racists push for rules putting every naturalization to a referendum, ensuring that long-settled white Germans and Italians could naturalize while nonwhites could not.

Conclusion: the Origins and Future of Poor Governance

With the need to maintain apartheid embedded into the American legal and political systems, it had to underinvest in state capacity. A uniform civil service with clear rules would have to treat everyone equally, and if it didn’t, it would be so obvious that civil rights advocates would be able to easily push for change.

For the same reason, the US didn’t design rules that would guarantee security of property to all citizens while allowing the government to function in those cases where expropriation was required. Such rules would equally protect whites and blacks, and allow the black middle class to build wealth on the same terms as whites. Instead, its legal system empowers the state in eminent domain cases and requires individuals to either use their political pull to protect themselves or to attempt to sue the government for just compensation, neither of which option protects unorganized or disempowered communities.

With planning done by ad hoc arrangements and excessive empowerment of local interests, it is difficult to engage in any regional coordination. Even when none of the actors is a racist, or when all relevant communities are white, parochial local interests are stronger than the civil service and have many levers with which they can block change. With a change-averse political system, planning is run by autopilot, keeping traditional arrangements as they are.

Aversion to change, poor coordination, and ad hoc planning all lead to bad government, but are especially deleterious for public transit. Two road agencies that work independently in neighboring jurisdiction could build a single continuous road. Two public transit agencies in the same situation could build a railroad but not operate it. Moreover, with the bulk of spending on roads coming from individual consumers buying cars and fuel, a car-based transportation system is more resilient to bad government than a transit-based one, in which all spending is directed by a transit agency.

It’s hard to have an organization-before-electronics-before-concrete mentality when organization is stymied by the overarching need to maintain white middle-class local autocephaly. The end result is that transit planning departments are too weak to prioritize projects the right way and even to control costs of spending that benefits the white middle class.

None of this was intentional. Racism was of course intentional, but the political compromises between racist and nonracist whites that created American governance as it is today were not intended to wreck American state capacity. They just did so as a side product of guaranteeing the desired levels of political and economic exclusion.

The importance of intent is that reducing the extent of racism in the US in the future, while obviously desirable, is independent of fixing public transit. Some individual bad decisions today, such as Larry Hogan’s cancellation of the Red Line in Baltimore, are directly racist, but a lot of agency turf (such as between different commuter rail agencies) is not, and neither are high construction costs. Fixing the problems of US transit planning requires improving the relevant planning departments, but this is so narrowly-focused as to neither require nor be a natural consequence of fighting racism.

However, there is an entire world out there beyond public transit. When the US built its current racist system, during the midcentury transition period from apartheid to more-or-less equal democracy, probably the most obvious racially charged issue was school integration; the effect on transportation policy was a byproduct. Likewise, if the US makes a concerted effort to move toward racial equality, or if any European country with high immigration rates makes a concerted effort to avoid falling into an American racist trap, the improvements in governance will have far-reaching unforeseen benefits in the future.

03 Feb 02:48

Not only will there not be an EURef2, there can’t be

by David Herdson

Both the timetable and the politics make it all but impossible

It’s the Remainer dream that won’t go away. Indeed, it’s as if they’ve never woken up to the strong coffee the electorate served on the fateful night in June 2016. They want to believe that the fight is still on and continue to make the case that they should have made better before EURef1. It isn’t still on and the dream is just that: an hallucination in the dark.

    There can be no EURef2 both because the politics don’t allow it and because the timetable doesn’t realistically allow it, even though Brexit Day remains nearly 14 months into the future.

In truth, there are two referendums that opponents of Brexit are touting for – which is itself a reason why it won’t happen: only groups which have a very clear aim and can mobilise great force behind it can overturn the political establishment. With no agreement as to what their detailed objective is, such energy as the Continuity Remainers have is dissipated. Do they want a re-run of the original vote or a confirmatory ballot on the Article 50 agreement? The tactics are as yet unclear.

Let’s pause that question for the moment and look at the logistics, which are similar for either route. Although 14 months might seem a long time, in truth, it isn’t. If the vote is on the same question, the latest it can realistically be held is in the late autumn of this year. To go into December would clash with Christmas, as would a January ballot, and any later than that wouldn’t leave sufficient time to either reverse the A50 notification (if that is indeed possible), or to confirm an exit deal – depending on how the vote went.

So, if the vote was no later than November, that means that all the campaign registrations would need to be in place for September, which in turn means that the legislation would need to be signed off before the summer recess. It’s true that where there is consensus, legislation can be rushed through parliament very quickly – in days or even hours (the Abdication Act of 1936 received royal assent the same day it was introduced) – but a second EU Referendum Act would not be like that for two reasons.

The first reason, which is obvious, is that there would be a great deal of opposition from MPs who believed that the vote has already taken place and that the mandate should be respected (most, but not all, of whom supported the winning Leave side). Let’s also put aside the party politics here for the moment.

The other reason is that even if Leave MPs were minded to let such a bill through, there would still be a mighty battle over the details. In Tim Shipman’s outstanding All Out War, he identified five crucial procedural or legislative victories that Leave MPs (led by Steve Baker, of recent controversy), won that was almost certainly critical to their winning the vote, given the closeness of the final result. The point here is not the specifics as such (which are in chapter 6 for those interested), but that the specifics have a very real effect and that there would therefore be battles over them. The 2015 Act didn’t receive royal assent until a little under 7 months after it was introduced. Even if we accept that a sense of urgency could condense that process, we’d still be surely looking at a minimum of 3 months for the legislation to pass Commons and Lords – so publication would have to be no later than early April.

That’s the true deadline for a re-run of the EURef: two months for the government (or a government) to commit to a new vote and for it to draft and publish legislation to enable it.

And yet where is such a government going to come from? No Conservative PM could possibly introduce such legislation in the current climate and apart from anything else, May is far too weak and even if she were deposed next week, it’d still take the best part of the two months just mentioned to election a new Conservative leader – who would have to be either an original Brexiteer or someone who was utterly signed up to making Leave work. Either way, it’s no new referendum.

Might a Labour government take a different course? Possibly, even under Corbyn, it would – but how does a Labour government come about? They don’t have the votes in the current parliament and even if the DUP were to find some reason to withdraw support from the Tories in the next few days, an election wouldn’t occur until our identified deadline of early April (although possibly a Labour majority government could push the Bill through faster) – but this is loading profound improbability upon profound improbability. In truth, the door has already closed.

What then about the possibility of a ratification vote on the A50 deal? That would presumably have to occur early in 2019, in which case there’s still time to put the arrangements in place – though again, not by much: we’d still probably need a Bill introduced no later than May. That again makes the domestic politics extremely difficult to square with the outcome.

And then there’s the international politics: the diplomacy. This is the angle simply not being considered by those whose advocacy of an EURef2 is driven by a determination to stop Brexit so strong that it’s blinded them to all other outcomes.

If Britain was to go down the road of initiating a second referendum – a process which, as mentioned, would take several months – the withdrawal talks would inevitably become even more difficult for Britain as the EU waited to see what the UK electorate did second time round. How could a British government negotiate withdrawal during that period, when the rug could so easily be pulled form under their feet by the voters?

Even more importantly, what happens if the public do not play ball, as they may well not? It’s true that most recent polls have suggested that a slim majority now would have preferred the UK to have stayed in the EU but it is slim, with low single-figure leads being the norm. Given the scale of Remain’s lead before EURef1 that’s not anything like comfortable, particularly as very few have been making the case for Brexit in principle of late, rather than the case for honouring the referendum mandate – and in any second vote, it’s unlikely that the Conservatives would remain neutral as before.

What happens if the public vote to Leave again in a late November vote? At best, it would require an extension to the A50 period; at worst, it’d mean almost certainly either crashing out with no deal or accepting more or less whatever the EU put on the table before the December summit.

Even worse, what happens if the public voted down a ratifying referendum after a deal had been reached? This point also applies to parliament who theoretically could vote down the deal – though if they do, they at least will do so far more quickly, giving a little time to sort it out. In fact, probably the biggest risk to the whole process is that the European Parliament votes the deal down – but that’s a scenario for another day. At least if Westminster says No, it would probably do so in December, giving a little time for May or her successor to sort something out. Were a referendum to go down in late February or March, there’d be no time for a repeat. Some seem to hope that without a deal, the default would be to remain. They are wrong: the default still be to leave.

But it doesn’t matter. These political-diplomatic tangles are simply additional reasons why MPs will not go down the road of offering a second referendum, on top of the straightforward one that enough of them don’t want to anyway and the boring but very real one that even if they did want to, time has essentially run out.

None of that will stop campaigners from demanding that the political world stop turning and conform to their own preferred laws of physics but their appeals will go unheeded. It’s all a Westminster show now.

David Herdson

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02 Feb 21:12

Latest local by elections see a LAB loss to LDs on swing of 35% in strong Leave area

by Harry Hayfield

Falmouth, Smithick on Cornwall (Lab defence)
Result: Lab 643 (60% +20% on last time), Con 184 (17% -7% on last time), Lib Dem 184 (17% -2% on last time), Green 57 (5% -11% on last time)
Labour HOLD with a majority of 459 (43%) on a swing of 13.5% from Con to Lab

Pallion on Sunderland (Lab defence)
Result: Lib Dem 1,251 (54% +50% on last time), Lab 807 (35% -16% on last time), Con 126 (5% -8% on last time), UKIP 97 (4% -25% on last time), Green 39 (2% -1% on last time)
Liberal Democrat GAIN from Labour with a majority of 444 (19%) on a swing of 35% from Lab to Lib Dem

Harry Hayfield

02 Feb 20:58

Brexit: an unending dream

by chris

Simon says Brexit is a fantasy:

There is nothing about the case for Brexit that is based in reality. This is why everything Brexiters say is either nonsense or untrue.

This poses the question: will they ever acknowledge reality? I’m not sure they will.

Let’s say, for the sake of argument, that Brexit proceeds without massive glitches such as hold-ups at ports but otherwise much as Remainers expect (pdf)– that is, we get slower growth in trade and productivity than we otherwise would. This implies weaker trend growth than otherwise. If we are to be five per cent worse of in the mid-30s than we would had we remained, we’d get average growth of (say) 1.6 per cent rather than (say) two per cent per year. Jimbowen

But the thing about counterfactuals is that nobody sees them. In 2035 there’ll be no Jim Bowen saying “here’s what you could have won”. There’ll be no “a-ha” moment of proof that Brexiters were wrong, even if (arguendo) they are.

And this will bring a host of cognitive biases into play. Once we have bought something, we invent reasons to justify our choice. This is especially true for things we’ve strived hard for. As Dan Ariely put it in Predictably Irrational, “the more work you put into something, the more ownership you begin to feel for it.” This is the Ikea effect (pdf). And it’s amplified further by the fact that if a belief is part of our identity, we are especially loath to ditch it.

Brexiters, then, are likely to play up the benefits of being an “independent people”. And they can easily attribute slowish growth to other causes: inadequate infrastructure or training, a lack of entrepreneurship and so on. Such blame will not be wholly wrong.

As Leon Festinger and colleagues showed, even the clear failure of a prophecy does not necessarily cause its believers to recant. This is likely to be especially true of Brexit, as the failure might not be glaringly, irrefutably obvious.

Asymmetric Bayesianism, choice-supportive bias, the endowment effect, ego involvement and dissonance reduction might combine powerfully to stop Brexiters recanting.

There’s more: adaptive preferences. We’ll get used to mediocre growth and resign ourselves to it. As John Band tweeted:

In 30 years time British people will just plain have forgotten that the country used to be about as rich as France, rather than benchmarking itself against Poland and Portugal.

Facts rarely settle political debates. This might be especially the case with Brexit.

02 Feb 01:50

Arc Weld

by Peter Watts

“Language is a virus from outer space”
—William S. Borroughs

 

bsfoty3

.

Chest-thump to start off the year: Last year’s “ZeroS”, appearing in Jonathan Strahan’s Infinity Wars, made it into a couple of (late-breaking update: into three!) Year’s Best collections: Neil Clarke’s Best Science Fiction of the Year (Vol. 3), and another couple I hesitate to name because they don’t seem to have been announced yet. So that’s cool.

*

But this is way cooler:

There’s this gene, Arc, active in our neurons. It’s essential for cognition and longterm memory in mammals; knockout mice who lack it can’t remember from one day to the next where they left the cheese. It looks and acts an awful lot like something called a gag— a “group-specific antigen”, something which codes for the core structural proteins of retroviruses. Like a gag, Arc codes for a protein that assembles into  capsids (basically, shuttles containing messenger RNA). These accumulate in the dendrites, cross the synaptic junction in little vesicles: a payload from one neuron to another.

Pastuzyn et al, of the University of Utah, have just shown that Arc is literally an infection: a tamed, repurposed virus that infected us a few hundred million years ago. Apparently it looks an awful lot like HIV. Pastuzyn et al speculate that Arc “may mediate intercellular signaling to control synaptic function”.

Memory is a virus. Or at least, memory depends on one.

Thoughtcrime.

Thoughtcrime.

Of course, everyone’s all over this. U of Utah trumpeted the accomplishment with a press release notable for, among other things, describing the most-junior contributor to this 13-author paper as the “senior” author. Newsweek picked up both the torch and the mistake, leading me to wonder if Kastalio Medrano is simply at the sloppy end of the scale or if it’s normal for “Science Writers” in popular magazines to not bother reading the paper they’re reporting on. (I mean, seriously, guys; the author list is right there under the title.) As far as I know I’m the first to quote Burroughs in this context (or to mention that Greg Bear played around a very similar premise in Darwin’s Radio), but when your work gets noticed by The Atlantic you know you’ve arrived.

Me, though, I can’t stop thinking about the fact that something which was once an infection is now such an integral part of our cognitive architecture. I can’t stop wondering what would happen if someone decided to reweaponise it.

The parts are still there, after all.  Arc builds its own capsid, loads it up with genetic material, hops from one cell to another. The genes being transported don’t even have to come from Arc:

“If viral RNA is not present, Gag encapsulates host RNA, and any single-stranded nucleic acid longer than 20-­30 nt can support capsid assembly … indicating a general propensity to bind abundant RNA.”

The delivery platform’s intact; indeed, the delivery platform is just as essential to its good role as it once was to its evil one. So what happens if you add a payload to that platform that, I dunno, fries intraneuronal machinery somehow?

I’ll tell you. You get a disease that spreads through the very act of thinking. The more you think, the more memories you lay down, the more the disease ravages you. The only way to slow its spread is to think as little as possible; the only way to save your intelligence is not to use it. Your only chance is to become willfully stupid.

Call it Ignorance is Bliss. Call it Donald’s Syndrome. Even call it a metaphor of some kind.

Me, I’m calling it a promising premise. The only real question is whether I’ll squander it now on a short story, or save it up for a few years and stick it into Omniscience.

 

(Thanks to Bahumat, btw, for showing me the link.)
29 Jan 18:24

The Outsider

by chris

It is fitting that the pre-publicity for Afua Hirsch’s book Brit(ish) should have coincided with the death of Mark E Smith. What they have in common are stories of exclusion and isolation.

Ms Hirsch writes:

This country of mine had never allowed me to feel that it is where I belong. If I were to single out the most persistent reminder of that sense of not belonging, it would be The Question: “Where are you from?”

Not belonging, though, is also the experience of many clever working class people. Obituaries of Mark E Smith call him an outsider: The Fall were named after a novel by Albert Camus who also wrote The Outsider. As Mark Brown has written in a wonderful essay, “cleverness meant loneliness.”

And this has been my experience too. My grammar school was on the other side of town and it played rugby, the function of which was not so much to produce rugby players as to signal to people like me that we didn’t belong. And then I went to Oxford which was chocka with charmless dullards from “nice” middle-class backgrounds*. All along there were cues that I didn’t fit in.

Of course, the ruling class rarely gave overt outright messages of class hatred, just as Ms Hirsch rarely encountered crude racism. It likes to think of itself as open and tolerant. But this is self-regarding bullshit which rests upon a denial of the real lived experience of the tens of thousands of black, mixed-race or working-class people: Michael Henderson’s “review” in the Times is a wonderful example of this.

But the undertow is there. And it has real, material consequences. Black people earn less than whites with similar qualifications and are under-represented in influential jobs. Likewise, people who “rise” from working class backgrounds earn less for the same credentials, are more likely to live alone, and are even more likely to die early than those from posh families.

Even if we try to fit in, we never wholly do.

What I’m trying to do here is to lean against a regrettable tendency in identity politics. It is the case that everybody’s particular experience of isolation or oppression is different: Ms Hirsch’s experience is not mine, and mine is not that of a woman or a gay man. But these are different facets of a similar thing: the barriers we face from the beneficiaries of the existing order. Sure, capitalism, patriarchy or heteronormativity are different things. But they have something in common.

Yes, we should rail against the injustices here. But we should also – for the good of our health – remember our comforts.

One of these is the potential for a greater understanding of each other. It’s difficult (though not impossible) for insiders to understand outsiders because fish don’t know they are wet.; this of course was the message of that song. Many of us with experience of both sides, however, might be capable – should we choose to be so – of more empathy. One recent study has found that people from lower social classes are better able to think well about inter-personal conflicts. The divisions in the Tory party – drowning men fighting for a brick - are perhaps consistent with this.

Secondly, when you realize that there’s no point trying to impress some people you lose ambition and the need to work hard. That can be liberating.

And then, there’s art. There’s lots that we outsiders can feel more strongly about than the privileged – from Dostoyevsky** and Camus through to Bowie and Holland. We might have a material disadvantage, but not, necessarily, a cultural one.

* It’s insufficiently appreciated that the more typical product of Oxford is Theresa May rather than Boris Johnson.

** Fyodor Karamazov was just like my dad.

Another thing: there’s a link between this post and my last one. Both are about the need to hear the voices of the excluded.  

29 Jan 18:22

Meet Keith Johnson

by John Scalzi

A picture of Keith Johnson, teacher, and his 1980 sixth grade class.

Over on Twitter, some foolish person posted the following question, which I will replicate here with all grammatical confabulation intact, because it’s necessary for context:

As a straight male, how would u feel about your child having a homosexual school teacher?! Who their around 8hours a day !

This was my response:

As a straight male, the best teacher I ever had was a gay man. Among many other things, he taught me the difference between “there,” “their” and “they’re.” His name was Keith Johnson. I would have been absolutely delighted for my daughter to have known him. I sang at his funeral.

This tweet, boosted by folks like Neil Gaiman, JK Rowling and Nick Offerman, has now been seen by over three million people. So now I would like to tell you a little bit about Keith Johnson, the best teacher I ever had.

To begin, in 1980, when he was my sixth grade teacher, I had no idea he was gay. It was 1980, when bluntly it wasn’t safe for a teacher to be out (he may have been out to colleagues but I wasn’t aware of it if he was). Also I was eleven years old, and in that time and place, I wouldn’t really have known what it meant to be gay. Not that I hadn’t heard the word or ones like it, which we flung around as slurs — “that’s gay,” “don’t be a fag,” and the game we rather obliviously called “smear the queer,” in which someone caught a ball and then everyone else in the game tried to drive them into the ground. But I didn’t have a very good idea of why those were slurs, nor how those slurs would have been applied to Keith.

No, in that time and place, Keith was simply “Mr. Johnson” — not Keith Johnson, mind you, as the idea of calling a teacher by their first name elicited the sort of holy terror that convinced you that if you were to do so you would promptly burst into retributive flame. “Mr. Johnson” would do. It wasn’t until years later that I could even say “Keith” without feeling I stepped over some still-glowing, forbidden line.

Keith’s reputation preceded him. At Ben Lomond elementary’s “MGM” (“mentally gifted minors”) program, the upper grades went through Mrs. Fox, Mrs. Swirsky and Mr. Johnson, for fourth, fifth and sixth grades. Even in fourth grade you heard about what a hardass Mr. Johnson was, how he didn’t suffer fools, and how if you got out of line, you were in for it. He was legendary in a way that elementary school teachers could be: Here was this fearsome leonine visage, and he was coming for you. Well, not coming for you exactly, but one day you would be in his class, and then you would feel his wrath. Sure, you get away with some things in Mrs. Swirsky’s class. But if you tried that in Mr. Johnson’s class? Principal’s office. Or worse.

Which, when you was finally ended up in Keith’s class, turned out to be only about 30% true. Certainly, Keith wanted you to pay attention, and if you weren’t, he had a boomy baritone voice which would snap you back into line. And if the entire class was lazy or inattentive, then Keith had a phrase that let us know we disappointed him on a fundamental level. “Boy, I’m telling you, some people,” he would say, loudly and with a slathering of reproach, and then would detail what some people would do, and it was clear that some people were foolish and silly and would eventually lead lives of regret and disappointment, and the genesis of those regretful lives would be now, in this moment, when we weren’t getting our history projects done in a timely way. And it would work, because obviously we didn’t want regretful, disappointing lives, but also because we didn’t want to disappoint Keith.

Because here was the thing about Keith. Fundamentally, he wasn’t frightening, or mean, or an indiscriminate hardass on eleven year old kids. He was in fact kind and attentive, and more to the point, he saw each of his students in the way teachers are supposed to, and the way the best of teachers do, seemingly by reflex. He saw us, and saw our quirks and flaws, where we needed encouragement and also what kind of encouragement we would need. He saw us as individuals and as a group, and while he always had the same educational goals year in and year out, it became clear he would get us to those goals in ways that we could get there.

Being seen by one’s teacher, as it turned out, was especially important to me in the sixth grade. My mother was having a bad divorce that left me, my mother and my sister briefly homeless and then shuttling around between houses for the rest of the year. There was little stability, emotionally or physically, in my home life, and it would have been easy — and understandable — for me to fall down a hole and not come out of it for a long time. I didn’t because as it happened a number of people stepped up to help save me. One of those was Keith, who in seeing me saw some of the possible paths of my future, and gently but with just the right amount of push, set me on those paths.

I’ll give you two examples. The first happened when Keith asked me to write a letter. Every year Keith had his class perform a play (my year it would be “Oliver!” in which I would play the Artful Dodger; I can still sing most of the songs from that play by heart). To pay for it, he would have the class run a small business selling doo-dads to other students and parents. We would do the whole nine yards, including registering the business with the city and issuing stock (and at the end of the year, paying off the stock with dividends, if any), and by naming officers of the corporation.

Among the things Keith had us do was publicity, and one day while explaining the concept of publicity to us, he said one of the things he wanted us to do was contact a local TV station and try to get them to do a segment on us for the five o’clock news — and as he was saying this, he turned to me directly, pointed at me, and said “and I want you to write the letter.” Why me? He told me later and privately it was because I wrote differently than everyone else in class and he thought I could make the argument in a way that would interest the news crew. Keith was the first person aside from my mother to see that writing was a thing I did — and the first person to say to me that it was a thing I could do well, in a way that set me apart. It would be a few years until I decided for myself to become a writer, but I never forgot that Keith saw it first in me.

(Also, he was right: I wrote the letter with his editorial guidance, sent it in to Channel 7 News, and then a couple of months later they called and wanted to do a segment on us. We did an extra run of doo-dads so they could see us in production, and then sold those for a nice profit. And that’s how we paid dividends on our stock that year.)

Another example I’ve detailed elsewhere, when Keith gave me a copy of Ray Bradbury’s The Martian Chronicles, said to me I would enjoy it, and said to me it was one of his favorite books. For me, this wasn’t just a teacher suggesting a book, it was my teacher sharing a confidence that was for me alone. And again he was right — The Martian Chronicles is in many ways foundational to my understanding of a field that I would eventually come to write in. I can’t say I became a science fiction writer because Keith gave me Bradbury’s book. But I can say I believe he understood me well enough to believe that it was the right book at the right time for me. And it was.

When I left Keith’s class to middle school, I would still drop by after class to chat with him and catch up; he always seemed pleased that I would come to say hello. I wasn’t the only former student who would do that — others told me they did it as well — but perhaps I was the most persistent, keeping in touch through high school and then college and then in the early parts of my professional career. Somewhere in there I directly asked him if he were gay, because by that time, several years on, some rumors had begun to circulate among his former students. Keith by this time had retired from teaching and told me it was true, named his partner and seemed perfectly at peace with it, and with me knowing.

By this time Keith was also sick. He was one of the many gay men who contracted HIV in the early days, before it was well understood and before there was a good treatment regimen for the virus. It developed into AIDS and he died of it, as did hundreds of thousands of gay and other Americans (and as do thousands still do, even today). I went to his memorial service, as did a few other of his former students, and at his funeral, with the permission of his family and partner, I sang a song I wrote for him.

Keith Johnson was a teacher and I can’t claim that I was more special to him than the hundreds of other students who passed through his classroom over the couple of decades he taught. But I think that’s the point of him being one of the best teachers I’ve known: His skills and talents as a teacher were for everyone, and were there for every student who came through his class. I don’t think I’m alone in saying he was the best teacher I’ve had, and I’ve had some magnificent ones over the years. But he stands alone.

To go back to the original question of how I as a straight male would feel about a homosexual teacher with my child eight hours a day, the answer is: A homosexual teacher was my best teacher, was the right teacher for me at a critical time, and saw me when I could have been lost. It’s even possible that in his way Keith Johnson saved me at a time when I most needed saving, simply by being the teacher he was with each of his students. I would have loved to have been able to introduce my daughter, born after he died, to Keith, my teacher and my friend. And I would want my daughter, and for every child, to have a teacher like Keith — one who saw her, one who taught her, and one who helped make her more herself, as Keith did with me. How could one not wish that for one’s child?

And now you know a little more about Keith Johnson, at least from my perspective. He was my best teacher. His memory is a blessing.

29 Jan 15:40

Choosing choice: why I would vote to #RepealThe8th

Some time this year, Irish voters will have a chance to repeal Article 40.3.3° of the Irish Constitution, inserted by referendum in 1983. It reads:
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.
This embedded a ban on abortion into the Irish constitution. Many on both sides of the debate, including the Catholic Church, assert that this ban is in line with traditional Christian teaching, particularly in Ireland. The word “medieval” is sometimes used on the pro-choice side.

This is very unfair to the medieval Irish.

A brilliant 2012 article by Maeve Callan of Simpson College, Indiana, “Of Vanishing Fetuses and Maidens Made-Again: Abortion, Restored Virginity, and Similar Scenarios in Medieval Irish Hagiography and Penitentials.” (Journal of the History of Sexuality vol 21 pages 282-96 - summarised here, but the whole thing is worth a read) recounts the records of four medieval Irish saints who miraculously “cured” unwanted pregnancies, one of them being no less than St Brigid of Kildare. Prof. Callan also transcribes the medieval Irish recommendations of what penance to impose on a woman who confesses to abortion - in one text, less than half the penance for carrying a child to full term and giving birth; for another, it is half the penance imposed on a man who has extramarital sex. Basically, for the medieval Irish church, God might well be on the side of a woman who wanted to terminate her unwanted pregnancy.

I have come on a significant personal journey on this issue. I was educated in the Catholic system in Belfast, and accepted the doctrine which we were taught (and had to regurgitate for our compulsory O-level in R.E.): that human life begins at conception and abortion is therefore always wrong. It seemed logically coherent on its own terms. As an undergraduate I campaigned for David Alton’s bill which would have reduced the term limits for abortion in England, Scotland and Wales, to the extent of visiting Parliament as part of a mass (unsuccessful) lobby. I actually had to withdraw from a spot in a national Lib Dem student slate in 1989 when it became clear that my record on the issue would be a problem. (My replacement, ironically enough, was a younger chap called Tim Farron; I wonder what happened to him?)

But despite my public commitment, I became troubled by two things. The first was that although back then (and until not all that many years ago) I counted myself as a practicing Catholic, my research into the history of the Church’s position on the issue revealed some serious inconsistencies. The logical coherence that I had valued was not there. Maeve Callan’s research was not yet available, but it was perfectly clear that, for instance, St Augustine condemned early-stage abortion as equally (but no more) sinful than sex outside marriage, or marital sex using contraception, both of those being activities which he strongly opposed but that I have enjoyed without, I like to think, any lasting moral harm. The Catholic Church’s dogmatic firmness that full human life begins at conception dates only from 1869, and to assert now (as many pro-lifers do) that it goes back to the earliest times of Christianity is simple dishonesty about theological history. The early picture is murky, as is the picture from Classical times. I don’t go all the way with those who see Numbers 5:11-31 as a text allowing the local priest to terminate an embarrassing pregnancy by magic ritual, but I can see their point. (Going a lot further back, the origin of pregnancy itself is murkier still.)

The second thing that troubled me, frankly, was that although some of my closest friends were also pro-life, many of the other pro-life activists who I dealt with were simply on a completely different political wavelength to me in many other respects, and in addition some of them were not very nice people at all; meanwhile most of the people who I generally had more in common with politically and personally were also pro-choice. (The National Union of Students had a joke: “How many pro-lifers does I take to change a lightbulb?” “The lightbulb may not be working, but I’m going to ignore that and tell you about a much more important issue.”) I have never minded being a maverick, but I started looking around and wondering if it was them or if it was me, and I came to the conclusion that it was quite probably me. I strongly relate to this moving account by an evangelical American former pro-lifer of her growing awareness that the supposedly "pro-life" movement was in reality anything but. (See also U.S. Congressman Tim Ryan.)

So I underwent a quiet change of mind, with no particular need to speak out on it one way or the other. Since the proposition that full human life begins at conception is not tenable, all we are left with is the question of where and when to draw the line, which is obviously a matter for legislation and not the constitution. The issue was not raised once as an issue when I last stood for public election, in 1996, and I doubt that I will ever stand for election again. On the other hand it became increasingly clear to me that a healthy society is a society where everyone is able to make free choices about how they shall live: most fundamentally, whether and how to have children. The State should in general stay out of people’s decisions about fertility, except in so far as it prevents abuse and maximises the available options. Talking to people who have directly made the decision themselves one way or the other reinforced my change of mind.

Many years on, becoming a parent has confirmed my scepticism of the pro-life agenda. I love both of my daughters very dearly. But life with them has not always been easy. I would not condemn any prospective parent who had the opportunity to avoid such an experience of parenthood, and took it. (See also this piece on the Eighth Amendment debate by the father of a girl with Down Syndrome.) This is a very different issue from fatal fetal abnormality, of course, an issue which in my view unhelpfully restricts the discussion even though it is the least defensible aspect of the Irish situation. We need to emphasise the right to choose parenthood positively, a point made quietly but well by Rachel.

Even more so when I consider the awful prospect that either of my daughters might become pregnant, which could only come about as a result of molestation; both are physically mature, but neither is remotely capable of consent. I have no doubt at all that we would exercise our legal authority to have such a pregnancy terminated. A consistent pro-lifer would have to argue that our potential grandchild should not have to pay the penalty of its father's crime or its mother's incapacity. Such arguments frankly do not interest me in the slightest.

Coming back to Ireland, it’s clear that on its own terms the Eighth Amendment has failed. (And I could write a lot more about the crazy times of the 1983 referendum, the Kerry Babies and Ann Lovett, but that will have to wait.) Thousands of Irish women every year still go to England, or to other countries, or get pills mailed to them, to terminate their pregnancies. The defenders of the Eighth Amendment seem to have little to say about that. If the intention was truly to stop abortions from happening, the effect has been to ensure that unwanted pregnancies are restricted to women without the necessary resources to end them. (A similar point is made in this piece by a Texas woman who found Texas had placed so many obstacles in the way of getting a legal and necessary abortion that she had to go to another state.) And, of course, another effect of the Eighth Amendment is that medical care for women fails them because necessary abortions are banned, most notoriously and fatally in the case of Savita Halappanavar.

In four Irish referendums since 1983, two attempts to strengthen the ban by excluding the threat of suicide have been rejected by voters (in 1992 and 2002) while two proposals to recognise reality by formally permitting women to travel abroad for abortions and to access relevant information have been approved (both in 1992). Really it is ridiculous, in any field of policy, for this level of fine detail of women’s rights to be regulated by the blunt instruments of constitutional amendment and referendum.

Ireland now faces another vote on abortion. The new Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar, has committed to holding another referendum. A specially convened Citizens’ Assembly recommended last June that Article 40.3.3° be replaced by a new text explicitly allowing for legislation on abortion. The parliamentary committee charged with the subject last month recommended the straight repeal of Article 40.3.3° without any new text (rightly so; any new text will quickly become a traumatic litigation playground). High profile politicians including opposition leader Micheal Martin and government MEP Brian Hayes have endorsed the straight repeal option. The tide appears to be turning.

And who knows, maybe it will even reach Northern Ireland next?
28 Jan 16:12

Winning where? The Lib Dem targets for 2022

by Mike Smithson


Alastair Meeks looks at the challenges facing Cable’s party

Three years ago, the Lib Dems were still in government. Danny Alexander and Nick Clegg comprised half of the quad, the inner circle that fixed the government’s direction. It feels like a lifetime ago now. The Lib Dems were reduced to 8 MPs in 2015 and recovered only to 12 MPs last year (with a slight decline in vote share nationally), despite being the only party to advocate remaining in the EU. Replacing Tim Farron with Vince Cable has not given them any more airtime or sense of relevance.

The Lib Dems are urgently in need of a strategy. That strategy needs to be founded on a basis that can produce an electoral recovery for them. In turn, that means understanding what they need to defend and where they are best placed to gain ground.

Defence first. Here’s the list of Lib Dem seats. It’s a short list, obviously. There are two points of interest. First, the Lib Dems are not immediately challenged by Labour in any seat that they hold. They have now lost every last Lib Dem / Labour marginal. Secondly, they aren’t particularly safe anywhere – a uniform 5% swing against them would see them lose all but four seats and a uniform 10% swing across these seats would see every last Lib Dem seat fall.

Oh, so you think a 10% swing is big? Let me introduce you to my next list, the list of Lib Dem prospects, organised by swing required. As you can see, a uniform 5% swing to the Lib Dems would increase their tally by just 9 seats. A 10% swing gathers a further 10 new seats for them. A 15% swing brings in just 18 more. And by this stage, the table is actively unhelpful in understanding what’s going on: many of the seats feature simply as a function of a distributed vote – the Lib Dems finished fourth and lost their deposit in Edinburgh North & Leith, for example. Anyone fancy the Lib Dems’ chances in Kensington? I have asterisked where the Lib Dems finished third (and added additional asterisks for each additional drop in the voting order). As you can see, even on this shortish list, asterisks proliferate.

For targeting, I suggest the Lib Dems would do better to concentrate on seats where they already have a substantial vote share, which to my mind gives a truer reflection of where the Lib Dems have potential strength and chances of real progress. Here are the 52 seats where the Lib Dems have more than 20% of the vote.

This to me is a particularly interesting table. First, there are only 52 seats on the list. The Lib Dems held more seats than this up to 2015. If you wanted an indication of just how badly the Lib Dems have been smashed, there’s as good a measure as any.

Secondly, the colour that dominates is blue. There are just five Labour-held seats on the list – the days of Lib Dem / Labour marginals are well and truly over. This is perhaps exemplified by Bristol West. Stephen Williams won this seat in 2010 with 48% of the vote – it was the Lib Dems’ 11th safest seat. He lost it in 2015. He fought it again last year and tallied just over 7% of the vote. The battle on the left of centre has been fought and the Lib Dems have been routed for now.

Thirdly, it shows that the vote has polarised in each constituency – the same effect that has harmed the Lib Dems nationally is making life harder for them in their target seats too. Outside Scotland the Lib Dems hold no seat with less than 40% of the vote. There are three seats in England where they beat that mark and failed to take the seat. This is in part a function of the Lib Dems losing the battle of the left. The English seats they once held on lower vote shares (like Norwich South and Bradford East) were usually Lib Dem / Labour marginals where a fair chunk of the Conservative support refused to vote tactically. Now those have gone, the Lib Dems’ chances of coming through the middle have correspondingly declined.

Fourthly, the seats cluster strongly geographically. The Lib Dems have husbanded their strength well in Scotland. The Lib Dems have considerable residual strength in south west England and in quite a few seats south and west of London. Conversely, they are almost non-existent in the Midlands (a longstanding weak area for them) – there’s a hole bounded by Cambridge, Witney, Montgomeryshire, Hazel Grove and Sheffield Hallam where not a single seat can be found where 1 in 5 voters plumped for the yellow team last time round.

The Lib Dems will need to fight the next election exclusively in target seats – anything else will be a waste. I strongly suggest that if the seat isn’t on this list of 52, it should essentially be ignored next time around. Candidly, 52 right now looks far too high a number to be aiming at.

Next, the Lib Dems need to build policies to help themselves in their target seats. That means taking on the Conservatives. There is no point in taking on Labour because there are next to no Labour seats that they can take. Fortunately, there’s a nice big space between a Labour party that has taken the next left turning after radical socialism and a Conservative party that has decided to major on implementing a nationalistic Brexit, where the Lib Dems could hunker down and turn their guns on the Conservatives. So the opportunity is potentially there. They just need to take it.

Alastair Meeks

28 Jan 16:10

Why Tories are wrong to fear that Corbyn could become Prime Minister in the foreseeable future – part 1

by Mike Smithson

There isn’t going to be an early general election

Labour came out of the last election 56 seats short of the Tories and the MP totals of other parties barely make up the gap particularly as Sinn Fein don’t take up their seats. This situation eas exacerbated by the Conservative-DUP no confidence vote agreement.

As the law stands at the moment there are only two ways that an election can take place before 2022. The first would require the Conservatives to do like Theresa May in last April and seek to secure the support of two thirds of all MPs. Given how badly wrong that went for the PM it’s hard to envisage her or her successor doing it again for a very long time indeed.

The other way of an early election can be triggered is if there are consecutive no confidence votes in the government within a period of a fortnight. The deal with the DUP is the first hurdle and the second one is that the SNP, with 35 MPs the third biggest party, surely won’t back any move that could trigger an early election. Their position in quite a large number of Scottish seats is quite precarious and the largest SNP vote share is just 46%.

The election system is now biased in favour of the Tories

Even with the current boundaries the Conservatives could expect to have a double digit lead on seats over Labour if both parties achieve the same national voucher.

This will be even more so if the new boundaries are brought in when the theoretical margin of victory for equal vote shares with Labour increases 20-30 seats

LAB has failed to establish election winning poll leads

Even though by any standards TMay’s Tories have been all over the place what is currently TMay’s party has managed to keep within a percentage point of Labour in almost all recent polls.

On current boundaries Corbyn’s party public needs a national vote lead of about 7% for a majority. On top of that the regional variation in Labour’s support has to be factored in. The party has not been doing anything like as well in the towns of midlands and the north as it had in the big conurbations. The former are places where there are the most marginal seats.

Part 2 of this analysis will be published tomorrow.

Mike Smithson

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28 Jan 03:28

Mort Walker, R.I.P.

by evanier

One of the world's most-read cartoonists, Mort Walker died early this morning at the age of 94.  He was a professional cartoonist for eighty years.

That's right.  I said he was a professional cartoonist for eighty years.  He was selling 'em from the age of 14 and drawing them years before then.  In September of 1950, he launched his first of his many syndicated newspaper strips, Beetle Bailey.  Originally set at a college, the feature didn't really take off until a few months later when he shifted it to an army setting, drawing on his own military experiences.

It soon became one of the most popular comic strips of all time and Mort could have had a very fine, lucrative life just producing it until he could draw no longer. Instead, he began expanding.  He and his friend Dik Browne began Hi and Lois in 1954 and then he and Frank Roberge started Mrs. Fitz's Flats in 1957.  In 1961, Mort and Jerry Dumas gave us Sam's Strip, which only lasted two years but which was revived (somewhat changed) as Sam & Silo in 1977.

There was also Boner's Ark, which Walker started in 1968, signing it with his real first name, Addison.  There was also The Evermores, which he started in 1982 with Johnny Sajem.  There was also Gamin & Patches which "Addison" launched in 1987.  Some of these strips didn't last long but Mort still had an amazing track record…and Beetle Bailey, Hi and Lois and Sam & Silo still persist to this day.

They will not suffer the loss of Mort because for years, they were produced by a squadron of Walker friends and relatives, with Mort writing and drawing as his health allowed.  King Features Syndicate distributed all but Gamin & Patches, and Mort's output was so much a part of King's offerings that the New York office referred to his Connecticut studio as "King Features North."

Mort himself was a cheery, affable fellow who was also very involved in the National Cartoonists Society (serving as an officer and winning many awards from it) and in 1974, he opened the Museum of Cartoon Art, said to be the first museum devoted to the art of comics.  The times I encountered him, he was delightful to be around and always willing to draw Beetle or Sarge for any of his fans.  He sure had a lot of them.

If you'd like to know more about this extraordinary fellow, I would recommend a book he wrote in 1974 called Backstage at the Strips.  It's kind of an autobiography up to that point, and a look at how he and others produced their strips back then.  Here's an Amazon link to a paperback version that's still in print.  It's also a love letter to the cartooning profession — a profession that served him well (and vice-versa) for, like I said, eighty years. That's right: Eighty years!

The post Mort Walker, R.I.P. appeared first on News From ME.

27 Jan 16:58

Why economists should look at horses

by chris

“If economists wished to study the horse, they wouldn’t go and look at horses. They’d sit in their studies and say to themselves, ‘What would I do if I were a horse?” Two things I’ve seen recently remind me of that line of Ely Devons.

When I approvingly tweeted Stephen Marglin’s account of the rise of the factory system, Pseudoerasmus referred me to Greg Clark’s paper (pdf). He argues that factory discipline emerged because when workers had freedom to choose their hours they short-sightedly worked too little and earned too little:

Whatever the workers themselves thought, they effectively hired the capitalists to discipline and coerce them. Even in the factories of the Industrial Revolution they were the ultimate masters of their fate, but weakness of the will meant they delegated that mastery to the capitalists… Though factory discipline was coercive, forcing the worker to do what he or she would otherwise not have done, the worker was in no sense exploited by the introduction of discipline. The workers voluntarily entered into the temporary servitude of the factory…Had they been able to exercise more self-control, factory discipline could have been avoided for most technologies in the 19th century.

There is, though, a massive hole here. Clark gives us no direct empirical evidence that this actually happens. He points to no real worker who freely chose factory discipline as a commitment device; to no evidence as to how workers actually chose among different capitalists; and to no worker who was with hindsight grateful to capitalists for saving him from himself. The voice of actual workers is wholly absent*. Clark is not studying horses, but asking: what would I do if I were a horse?

He is not atypical. This is an example of something common in economics – “as if” modelling. Clark describes the rise of factories as if workers chose them as a commitment device, just as (say) Murphy and Becker describe smackheads as if they were rational maximizers. But this is insufficient. You can describe a woman’s black eye as if she had walked into a door. But if in fact her husband had beaten her, you are missing the truth and overlooking genuine oppression and injustice.

My second example was an exchange on Twitter about Cobb-Douglas production functions. Nobody saw fit to point out that if you want to know how useful they are, you should look at how actual firms produce actual stuff: do Cobb-Douglas functions describe the real world or not? Again, nobody’s looking at the horses.

What happens when they do? One nice example is a study (pdf) of a steel mill by Igal Hendel and Yossi Spiegel. They showed that it doubled production over 12 years with the same plant and workforce. Every time the mill seemed to be at “full capacity”, its managers found ways of tweaking production methods to eke out more output. “Capacity is not well defined” they conclude. If this is true of an old economy steel mill, how much more true might it be of intangibles-intensive firms which are more scalable?

To the extent that this is the case, it has an important implication. It means that growth in demand and a zero output gap will lead not to capacity constraints and rising inflation, but to productivity improvements. Hendel and Spiegel give us micro-empirical evidence for a claim by Joan Robinson:

When entrepreneurs find themselves in a situation where potential markets are expanding but labour hard to find, they have every motive to increase productivity.

Recent data is consistent with this. The UK and US have both recently seen unemployment fall to multi-year lows. And both saw productivity jump in Q3 after years of stagnation.

 If all this is the case, then Unlearning Economics is right: long-run growth can indeed be influenced by aggregate demand. Trend and cycle might not be so cleanly distinguished. A zero output gap is to be welcomed as a spur to productivity growth, not feared as a portent of inflation.

Now, I stress the “ifs” here. I’m not saying the evidence for this is overwhelming. All I’m doing in endorsing Sarah O’Connor’s point – that the best economists are those with dirty shoes.

* You might reply that we have few first-hand accounts of the lives of workers: history is written by the winners, or at least the literate. We must not, however, let our thinking be distorted by the availability heuristic.

27 Jan 16:55

Now isn’t the time to push May, whatever the temptation

by David Herdson

But there’s a good chance Con MPs will do it anyway

Only one of the three traditional British parties currently has a leader – and that one by happenstance. To lead is by definition a dynamic thing. It is to set oneself at the head of something and take it somewhere in such a way that others follow. It is not a quality granted simply by virtue of holding a given office.

On those terms, Vince Cable is not a leader: he and his party are simply invisible. A leader of the Lib Dems would be going and grabbing publicity. Certainly, the losses sustained over the last two general elections left his party make that far harder than it was before 2015 but capable leaders of smaller parties – Caroline Lucas and Nigel Farage spring to mind – have managed it in the past. The Lib Dems’ impressively large membership has been garnered despite their leader, not because of him.

But Cable’s failings pale beside those of the prime minister. It was telling that she devoted her speech at Davos to the subjects of internet security and regulating artificial intelligence: important matters no doubt but not ones to grab the attention of either the national media or her international peers. She was in effect running back to the ground on which she felt comfortable as Home Secretary – a post that she’s never truly psychologically left. Even more importantly, she didn’t propose anything so there was nowhere for her to lead anyone nor for them to follow.

Her failure to become the leader she was elected to be is, inevitably, what’s at the heart of the renewed speculation over her future at the head of the Conservative Party. The newspaper stories this week might have been based on the alleged comments of the Chairman of the 1922 Committee, asking Tory MPs to be careful in submitting any more letters (a comment which by definition should always apply and which might be as likely to encourage some MPs to act as to put them off), but if more letters have been dropping into Graham Brady’s inbox recently, it’s because of the extent to which her standing has been damaged as much by the actions of others as by anything she’s done. But that in itself is only possible because the vacuum at the centre.

Politically, that’s a recipe for instability. Sooner or later, something will happen that will prompt MPs to act – possibly after a minister does so – or for May to quit of her own accord, though that’s much less likely: prime ministers are rarely short of self-confidence. If Tory MPs are thinking straight, it should be later.

There are all sorts of reasons not to call a Vote of No Confidence now. For one thing, while she’s not much of a leader, she’s not a bad head of government. There’s no great innovation and the intentions she spelt out on entering Number Ten will forever be unfulfilled by her, but as far as anyone else’s ambitions go, that failure to establish a direction is no bad thing: they have no need to engage in premature action to stave off an irreversible decision. In terms of the economy and public services, she’s doing a reasonable job of minding the shop. Sure, there are issues in the NHS at the moment and there are other challenges ranging from Universal Credit to Stormont but none that can’t be rectified with application and perhaps more cash.

Except of course for Brexit: that cannot be deferred. (Let’s leave aside unrealistic legal loopholes here – Britain will leave in Spring next year, probably on March 29, because that’s what nearly all Conservative MPs, plus a large enough number from other parties, are committed to). However, that very fact should of itself be a deterrent to action. To take another two months out of the timetable to indulge in a leadership election would not only be grossly irresponsible and look ridiculous to the public and to the EU27, it could only result in one of two possibilities: a new leader with much the same policy, in which case why bother, or one that wants to rip up 18 months’ work and replace it in a third of the time with something that the other EU members will almost certainly find harder to agree to (on the assumption that any change in policy would be to a harder Brexit) – which is probably not deliverable.

Either way, whatever the outcome, those who don’t like it will blame the leadership contest, certainly for it being a distraction and, depending on their view, because of the outcome.

Besides, if the last three years have taught us anything, it’s that elections are inherently unpredictable, both in themselves and in what the person or party elected turns out to be like. An attempted coup from the Ultras could end up with the membership being given a choice of Amber Rudd and Jeremy Hunt if, say, Boris knocked out the other Leavers and then imploded in a badly misjudged remark. Is it worth the risk?

And of course, there’s the even bigger risk that the leadership election messes up the Conservatives’ relationship with the DUP – not at all impossible given the interrelated issues of Brexit and the N Irish border – and the country is plunged into another general election, taking a further six weeks or more out, riling the public and risking the very real possibility of a Labour win.

We should note, while we’re at it, that there is the risk that the MPs having called a Vote of No Confidence, May then wins. I doubt that she would – the disillusionment seems too deep and the very act of calling a vote would undermine her position further – but the possibility must be faced. In that case, if she won narrowly, it would do nothing to resolve the situation and would probably bring discontent further out into the open; if she won comfortably, with MPs taking the view that now is not the time, then May’s position could be strengthened sufficiently that it becomes hard to challenge her again later in the parliament. On that basis, my own view is that whatever damage a leadership contest would do, calling a vote is of itself the point of no return.

But this is a betting site. The question of what MPs should do (from their own perspective) is a rather different one from what they will do. Muddling through is not an attractive option when there is an alternative, even if that alternative is a leap in the dark.

Will May be forced out this year? Until this last week, I’d have said no based on the power of the logic (though that was also the reason why I didn’t think May would reshuffle this year either). But now? I think there’s a good chance and if it happens, it’ll probably be in response to some incident we cannot yet predict in detail. Everyone has a limit to their patience.

David Herdson

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26 Jan 20:46

Oscar: The Grouchy Post

by evanier

The Academy Awards nominations came out earlier this week and there is probably no one in my area code who cares about them less than I do. I don't get to a lot of movies the same year they come out. I generally get to them a year or three later.

That's the great thing about movies: They never disappear and they never change. When I take Amber out for entertainment, we mostly go to plays, concerts and other live events since those do go away. Next year or the year after, we'll probably watch the screener I received of The Post or the one here for Three Billboards Outside Ebbing, Missouri or the one for The Shape of Water. They'll be just as good then.

That explains why I can't muster a whole lot of rooting interest in the Oscars. What does interest me is how people try to predict who'll win in this game for which we don't have any idea who votes or why. Analysis of political elections involves knowing how blacks between the ages of 18 and 40 voted or the past voting trends of people who make $200,000 a year or more and what they thought was the Number One Issue. Data like that. With the Oscars, all we know who's won in the past — and we don't even know whether they got 51% of the vote or 99%.

We also don't know who voted or how many. Did 90% of eligible Academy members vote or did 10%? It's probably somewhere in-between but where in-between? There are indications that the key to winning our political elections is turnout. It's not how many people are on your side. It's how many of them went to the polls. So what was the turnout for last year's Oscars? How many people returned their ballots? Answer: You have no friggin' idea.

And here's the thing I'd really love to know: What is the criteria for a category like Best Actor? I mean, I assume it's different with everyone but how different?

Some years, it seems to me — and remember, I'm basing this on no data whatsoever — that a lot of voters are voting for the actor who most successfully tackled a controversial, non-glamorous role in a film that didn't seem like a shoo-in at the box office. The Oscar, it seemed to me, was about taking big risks…which is why you see so few nominations for raunchy comedies or movies with a lot of CGI. (General rule of thumb: If the movie's up for Best Visual Effects, it'll get zero acting nominations.)

But maybe some people are voting for the actor they think is overdue to win for past work. And some are voting for the actor they just plain like more than the others. And maybe some are voting for the actor they think will give the most exciting acceptance speech. And maybe a lot of 'em are voting for the only nominated performance they saw last year.

And maybe — and I have a hunch this is true in more cases than one might imagine — they vote for the performance that "the buzz" (industry chatter) says is the most outstanding. Since we have zero data, my hunch can never be proven right or wrong but there are folks out there who do a pretty good job of predicting the Oscars and most of them seem to basing their predictions on "the buzz." I think that may be it.

Then again, maybe they're all voting for the movie star they last saw in a fast food restaurant…and Meryl Streep wins so often because she eats every meal at a Burger King. Yeah, that could be it.

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