Admiral Philip Davidson has had a distinguished military career. In May 2018, he was appointed commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command. One of six unified combat commands (UCCs) that together cover the entire globe, Admiral Davidson is responsible for preparing for a potential conflict with China, the country that has come to be seen by many as the main geopolitical rival of the United States. Created by statutory authority, UCCs are there to plan and carry out military operations as directed by the president and secretary of defense — at least in theory.

Few characteristics of democracy are as important as civilian control of the military. Yet commanders of the various UCCs have taken on the role of public advocates for certain policies, putting pressure on and in effect lobbying the civilian leaders that are supposed to be making political decisions. Admiral Davidson’s actions since taking control of the Indo-Pacific Command is a clear example of this, and raises troubling questions about the extent to which the heads of UCCs and others in the national security bureaucracy have come to erode the concept of civilian control of the military and drive public discussion and the policy making process. Media reporting over the last two years also indicates that those who have a bureaucratic or ideological interest in a more belligerent American policy towards China have been leaking information to sympathetic journalists in order to manipulate public opinion.

Admiral Davidson’s actions clearly demonstrate this process. In his confirmation hearing in April of 2018, he stressed the necessity of “expanding the competitive space” to meet a rising China. In June of last year, Admiral Davidson did an interview with hawkish Washington Post reporter Josh Rogin that was published under the headline, “To avoid conflict, the United States must deter Chinese aggression.”

Without any evidence, Admiral Davidson warned about Chinese global ambitions, and a new world order “with Chinese characteristics” that should “send a chill down everybody’s spine across the globe.” Davidson also complained that the United States still was not funding capabilities he had called for two months prior. Six months after the Post article,,he similarly advocated for spending on new technologies to counter China in an interview with Defense One.

Admiral Davidson’s media campaign has had its intended effect. Usually, requests for funding come through the secretary of defense. The 2020 National Defense Authorization Act,  however, called for Admiral Davidson himself to submit a report for what the Indo-Pacific Command needed, in which he asked for $20 billion in additional funds.

With the novel coronavirus hitting the United States, members of Congress took up Admiral Davidson’s cause for a confrontational posture toward China and they found support in a series of anonymous leaks that in one case went to Rogin, who had advanced Admiral Davidson’s campaign for more funding before the coronavirus hit.

On April 14, Rogin reported that the State Department had previously warned about security issues at the Wuhan lab studying coronaviruses. The next day, Fox News, which has often been fed information from the most hawkish members of the national security establishment, reported that sources had come to believe that the Wuhan lab was indeed the source of the novel coronavirus. That same day, in a seemingly unrelated story, The Wall Street Journal told of an upcoming State Department report that China may be violating treaty obligations by testing small-scale nuclear weapons.

There is no evidence that Admiral Davidson knew about or was involved in any of these leaks. Nonetheless, certain members of the national security establishment were clearly working towards the same goals, and collaborating with reporters like Rogin in order to shape public opinion, just as Admiral Davidson has been doing more openly since taking over the Indo-Pacific Command. Almost on cue, less than one week after a series of leaks meant to stir up animosity towards China, Senator Tom Cotton wrote an op-ed published in the Wall Street Journal promoting the theory that the virus escaped from a lab and introduced the FORCE Act, which would give $43 billion to the Indo-Pacific Command, more than double what Admiral Davidson had asked for.

These leaks easily manipulate public opinion. Government officials never leak all the information needed to help the public make an informed decision about the supposed threat coming from a foreign state. Rather, pieces of data and intelligence judgments are provided on a selective basis, clearly for the express purpose of achieving budgetary or ideological goals. Once Congress decides to spend the money, whether the original reporting was factual or not, or whether it looks different in another context, is rarely checked. Scientists almost immediately began expressing skepticism about the Wuhan lab theory, and The New York Times recently reported that intelligence agencies have felt pressure to arrive at that conclusion. According to Australian intelligence officials, American evidence of the Wuhan lab theory consists largely of publicly available news reports. Given that, as we have seen, American national security officials are usually the sources for such reporting, what we see is a self-referential cycle that in effect has created a narrative out of thin air.

While de jure civilian control of the military remains a bedrock principle of the American system of government, the reality is quite different. Hawks within the national security bureaucracy often seem to focus just as much time on manipulating public opinion as they do preparing for war.

The late James McCartney pointed out that, as of 2010, there were only 10 reporters covering the Pentagon full time, compared to thousands of military and civilian personnel in the DOD that worked on managing public opinion. The few journalists that pay attention to military issues rely on good relationships with those in power to provide information to them, some of which they are not legally entitled to. The only thing more concerning than a government that withholds important information from the public is one that provides it selectively. Activist generals and members of the national security apparatus are like all bureaucrats in desiring larger budgets; when collaborating with a media willing and eager to do their bidding, and politicians looking to find scapegoats for problems, it is all too easy for this class to engage in threat inflation and ultimately put us on a path that, at best will lead to more debt and strained relations with another great power, and at worst war.

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The U.S. is removing Patriot anti-missile systems from Saudi Arabia as part of a broader drawdown of its military capacity placed there to counter Iran. While the military characterized the move as part of a planned withdrawal that reflects the view that Iran now poses less of a threat, the news has prompted debate over the timing of the decision.

In general, the Trump administration and especially Secretary of State Mike Pompeo have repeatedly emphasized the danger to regional security posed by Iran. To suddenly acknowledge that the Islamic Republic is less of a threat than it was previously portrayed to be appears to undermine the case that hawks like Pompeo and Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook have made, that the U.S. needs to maintain a posture of heightened vigilance and even pre-emptive aggression in order to deter military actions by Iran. Tensions between Iran and the U.S. remain high, which was why the reduction of U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia prompted speculation among observers. Given Trump’s transactional approach to policymaking and his tendency for showmanship, the assertion that the decision merely reflects the need for maintenance of the Patriot system seems incomplete.

One interpretation reads that the Trump administration feels that Saudi Arabia needs to be reminded that its enjoyment of U.S.-guaranteed security is predicated on its adherence to America’s oil price preferences. Reuters revealed that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman agreed to cut Saudi oil production after Trump called to say that he would otherwise be unable to prevent a bill sanctioning Saudi Arabia from being introduced by representatives of oil producing states, most of whom are Republicans. Although MBS did agree to cut production, Trump may have felt that the Crown Prince would benefit from a reminder of his kingdom’s dependence on the U.S. military umbrella.

Alternatively, Trump just issued the seventh veto of his presidency in order to defeat a bi-partisan bill that would have required him to gain Congressional approval before launching military action against Iran. Although Trump was unwilling to acknowledge any limit to his executive authority, the drawdown of the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia may serve to reassure members of Congress, especially Trump’s GOP allies, that they need not fear his belligerence against Iran.

One final interpretation of the decision to reduce U.S. military capacity in Saudi Arabia takes the opposite view: that it could be intended to tempt the Iranians into a military action that would justify a more robust response from the United States. As explained by officials quoted in the Wall Street Journal article, the build-up of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia was undertaken in response to attacks on Saudi oil facilities in September 2019 that Riyadh and Washington blamed on Iran. However, Iran has generally avoided escalation, even following the killing of Qassem Soleimani in early January, the “unprofessionalism” of Iranian boat captains notwithstanding. Hawks within the Trump White House have maintained that they view the Iranian regime as weak and near collapse and may hope that reducing U.S. forces could tempt Tehran into more aggressive moves that would justify an intimidating U.S. military response.

The drawdown of U.S. military presence in the Middle East, and especially from Saudi Arabia, is a welcome development. However, given this administration’s track record of belligerence towards Iran and its transaction approach towards even its closest security partners, it is hardly surprising that the timing of the move is provoking considerable speculation.

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Each night many of us are transfixed to our television screens, watching in fear and dismay as politicians and epidemiologists recite the latest statistics on COVID-19. With our daily lives upended by stay-at-home orders, sickness, and job loss, it is easy to turn inward and ignore what’s happening far from our shores. But the crisis presents numerous opportunities to build a better, safer world – and to avoid actions that will compound the dangers. Here are just five of them:

1. Seize the day for diplomacy. Out of the pain and suffering comes a rare opportunity for world leaders to join together against a common, mortal foe. Coronavirus sees no geographic boundaries; it favors no political systems; it exempts no race, religion, gender, or creed. To save lives, nations must share data, resources, knowledge, and equipment. If calls for ceasefires in Yemen, Colombia, the Philippines, and globally are heeded, they could break long-running cycles of violence and pave the way for negotiated settlements. Now is the moment to recommit to multilateralism, building the foundation of treaties and international agreements that reduce the chances of war, and enable broader cooperation on transnational challenges.

2. Remember we’re all in this together – but we’re not all at equal risk. This is not the time for xenophobia, finger-pointing and blame. It is not an either-or choice for the United States, helping ourselves or helping others. No one country can flourish at another’s expense. Most of the world will suffer a greater toll from COVID-19 than the United States, given their limited access to clean water, food, sanitation, housing, medicine, and health care. Failing to mobilize a robust international response will only come back to haunt us as hundreds of millions, perhaps billions, face the loss of lives and livelihoods.

3. Look beyond the health emergency. The coronavirus is causing far more than a disease pandemic – it could also set off a violence epidemic. Domestic violence has surged as women and children are trapped at home with their abusers. Authoritarian regimes are using the crisis as an excuse to crack down on free speech and human rights. The sickness and death of leaders – particularly in states without strong democratic institutions – will almost certainly result in power struggles and civil strife. Pre-existing conflicts over rights and resources could flare into genocide and mass atrocities as COVID-19 exacerbates communal division and weakens command and control over armed forces. This is the time to invest in long-term, comprehensive peacebuilding and conflict mitigation networks.

4. First, do no harm. At a time of such intense and universal suffering, it is immoral as well as self-defeating for the United States to continue policies that were designed to pummel other countries into submission. Economic sanctions intended to isolate and weaken “rogue” states are compounding the suffering of innocent civilians. They must be lifted as a purely humanitarian matter, especially in Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea. At the same time, drone wars and militarized counterterrorism operations – which have aided the growth of terror networks – should be terminated and replaced by civilian efforts to address underlying grievances and strengthen systems of justice.

5. Shift the paradigm. At the very least, the COVID-19 pandemic should make it obvious that our “defense” spending is utterly out of sync with the real challenges to the health and safety of Americans. Already more than twenty times as many Americans have died from COVID-19 as in the 9/11 attacks, and even the best-case scenarios show more dying than in all the wars since World War II combined. A new report from the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons calculates that the amount we spend in one year on nuclear weapons would be enough to cover 300,000 Intensive Care Unit beds, 35,000 ventilators, and 75,000 doctors’ salaries. Even the most sophisticated weapons on the planet can’t protect our armed forces – or anyone else – from this virus.

In some ways the COVID-19 pandemic is but a dress rehearsal for climate change, and the world has been granted a golden opportunity to change its ways before the worst is upon us. Before Congress sleepwalks into another $750 billion or more in Pentagon spending, the American public should give it a wake-up call about the investments that are truly needed to keep everyone safe for the long haul.

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Zaclys

C’est une association loi 1901 qui, à l’image de Framasoft, propose de nombreux services en ligne. Le service mail utilise l’interface Roundcube. A partir de 5 € par an. Belle initiative du monde associatif qui propose également de nombreux services numériques (du nuage à la française).

Whereas the entire world seems to have turned in on itself trying desperately to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, interestingly Turkey’s foreign policy is displaying signs of an outward dynamism.

In Libya, for example, in early April, the Turkish-backed, and the United Nations-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) struck a serious blow against the rebel warlord Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA). The GNA captured strategic cities of Surman, Sabratha and al-Ajaylat in West Libya.

The GNA victory came at a time when Haftar had become the most likely winner of the now 6-year old Libyan civil war since his forces captured the strategic coastal town of Sirte in January, a vital outlet to the Mediterranean Sea for Libya’s oil export.

Turkey’s deep involvement in the Libyan civil war is closely related to Ankara’s perception that Greece and the Greek Cypriots are trying to divide up the Eastern Mediterranean, rendering Turkish maritime navigation difficult without Greek consent.

Furthermore, the lucrative hydrocarbon deposits around the island of Cyprus, Ankara posits, would be exploited ignoring the island’s Turkish population. France, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have also thrown their political and material support behind Haftar. By propping up a pro-Turkish government in Libya, Ankara hopes to save the maritime deal it signed with GNA prime minister Fayez al-Sarraj , and spoil any plan in which it is not included.

Turkey’s recent critical gains in Libya are the direct result of the anti-Turkey coalition being rendered debilitated by a variety of factors closely associated with COVID-19. Simply put, Turkey, which has fared the pandemic relatively unharmed, used this opportunity to advance its interests in Libya.

The UAE, Haftar’s main financial backer, has been hit hard by the all-time low oil prices due to plummeting demand because of COVID-19, which has made its involvement in Libya even more costly. Abu Dhabi announced on April 20 that it had borrowed $7 billion to counter slumping oil prices.

Moreover, for Russia, as if having to fund its costly involvements in Syria and Ukraine as well as the constricting U.S. sanctions were not enough, the plummeting oil prices and the ruble’s simultaneous nosedive has had Moscow reevaluate the purpose of its Libya commitment.

The withdrawal from Libya of the majority of forces from the Russian paramilitary group Wagner corresponded with the beginning of the declining oil prices in late February. “Syria has become Putin’s headache” says Alexander Shumilin, a former Russian diplomat who runs the state-financed Europe-Middle East Center in Moscow.  Finally, Putin’s abrupt decision to pull the Russian oil giant Rosneft from Venezuela in March is a clear sign of Russia being overstretched.

French President Emmanuel Macron has thrown his support behind Haftar with the conviction that a pro-French authoritarian regime in Libya would facilitate Paris’s policies towards its former colonies in North and West Africa.

However, a series of predicaments have forced Paris to recalibrate its Africa policies. The signs of France getting bogged down in West Africa abound. The French military’s mounting casualties in Operation Barkhane, which it started in the Sahel in 2014 with some 5,000 troops, is obstructing Paris’s ability to fully commit in Libya.

In November 2019, two French helicopters in pursuit of militants in Mali collided, killing all 13 French soldiers aboard. To make things worse for France, its only nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle, which it has used as a deterrent against Turkey’s naval and air advances in Libya, is currently out of commission as more than 1,000 French sailors are believed to be infected with COVID-19. Having been hit hard by the pandemic at home, coupled with the ever increasing mission creep in the Sahel, France has shifted its priority away from Libya.

Turkey has seemingly seen this as a window of opportunity. Last week, in an unprecedented show of resolve, it sent 11 F-16s accompanied by refueling, early warning radar, and other support aircraft to Haftar controlled airspace in a clear message that Turkey is ready to escalate its involvement in Libya.

Turkey has over the past year already shipped a multitude of weapons including drones, armored vehicles, electronic warfare tools, laser weapons, and other arms and ammunition to the GNA. Of these, the low cost but extremely effective armed drones are rapidly changing the face of the Libyan battlefield. With the help of Turkey’s proven armed drone supremacy, Sarraj’s militia inflicted serious damage on Haftar, turning the tide in Libya.

Turkey has further scored points in its foreign policy by sending, in early April, medical supplies to Italy and Spain, two of the most important Mediterranean countries, of which Ankara would very much want to see on its side against the France-Greece block. Ankara’s gesture came at a time when Italy and Spain had been imploring the European Union for supplies, only to get a cold shoulder from Brussels. The situation further eroded when France confiscated much-needed masks, some six million, destined for Italy and Spain.

Even before the pandemic outbreak, Italy had moved closer to Turkey’s Libya policies, expressing its support for Sarraj and voiced concern with Macron’s support for Haftar.

It appears the COVID-19 pandemic has bestowed Turkey with favorable foreign policy opportunities by reducing the ability of its rivals to meaningfully sway Ankara’s advancements in the East Mediterranean, particularly in Libya and reinforce its position vis-a-vis the European Union. One should expect a more active foreign policy of Ankara in the post-COVID19 era.

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Arab leaders have long evinced an ability to reinvigorate their ruling institutions when confronted with tough challenges. While state collapse or civil war have wreaked havoc in Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen (with the exception of Tunisia and the partial exception of Iraq and Lebanon), it is authoritarian survival—and the unceasing struggle against it—that define the political contours of much of the Arab world today.

Will COVID-19 change these realities? Like their cohorts in powerful positions around the world, Arab leaders are using the coronavirus pandemic to increase political control. This crisis, however, has unique features that could complicate efforts to defend autocracy, creating both headaches and opportunities. What is at stake now is not only regimes but myriad state institutions whose mission should be to ensure a basic level of economic, personal, and human security for their citizens. The nightmare facing many Arab leaders is that the rapid spread of COVID-19 might outpace their capacity to adapt state institutions to an unprecedented and dangerous threat.

Algeria provides a telling example of the challenges posed by the coronavirus where, as of April 21, 2,811 cases of infection and 392 deaths have been reported. The virus arrived just as Algeria was about to mark a full year of weekly street protests; as the anniversary of the Hirak movement, the protesting group’s political future was unclear. That uncertainty had much to do with the regime’s shrewd decision to tolerate rather than repress the protesters. But COVID-19 seemed to remove any uncertainty about the regime’s calculations. Seizing on the undeniable—if useful—imperative of enforcing social isolation, and gradually imposing lockdowns on different sectors and areas of the country, Algeria finally declared a national lockdown on April 5. This gave authorities a range of powers, including the right to ban all streets protests. As for the Hirak movement, its forced retreat into the uncertain sanctuary of home and family will weaken an already weak hand. Nevertheless, some Algerian activists also see in this crisis a chance to create the kind of wider political strategy and capacity that Hirak has thus far failed to forge.

The military’s (flattening) learning curve

Algeria’s military and political power is rooted in far more than its capacity to repress: it also derives from the imposing fact that the military controls the state and the distribution of the goods and benefits provided by the state-owned oil sector. Because revenues from oil and gas resources are channeled through an array of formal state institutions and informal networks that are controlled by allies of the military, the generals assume that the weakening of any part of this sprawling infrastructure will lead to a collapse of the entire system. This intertwining or “pillaring” of Algeria’s vertical division of state power inclines the military and its allies in state institutions to view even modest political reform as threatening. Moreover, during moments of crisis or menace the generals have ample incentive to put aside clan or personal divisions and close ranks. As a result, opposition groups—including the Hirak movement—have no reliable interlocutors within the military, no soft-line faction that might negotiate the terms of political reform. At the end of the day, the Algerian military is a hard-line united front that will not abide any serious talk of political change.

Why, then, did a military that is deeply allergic to any hint of real opposition tolerate a year of massive street protests that were centered in Algiers but echoed throughout the country? While it is impossible to answer this question precisely, the most likely explanation is that the generals calculated it was better to tolerate the protests than try to repress them. Waiting out the demonstrators was preferable to taking measures that might only provoke a violent response that would, in turn, require greater force to suppress successfully. Going down this slippery slope risked provoking the kind of civil strife that engulfed Algeria following the military’s decision to shut down democratic elections in 1991.

Moreover, the Hirak lacked an authoritative leadership that could draw on the protests to create negotiating leverage with the regime. The one thing on which the protesters agreed was demanding the fall of the regime; beyond that, there was no consensus as to what kind of government—or democracy—should follow, or the demands that would advance a democratic bargain the opposition could envision. Last but not least, the demonstrations did not translate into wider public support for democratic change. Indeed, in 2019 only 41 percent of Algerians who were polled indicated that they believed that democracy was always superior to other forms of government. In short, however inspirational, the Hirak did not pose the kind of threat that would have justified a decision to favor confrontation over regime caution and patience.

In addition to waiting the opposition out, by emulating many of the tactical reforms that other Arab leaders had taken to contain opposition, the regime displayed its resiliency. For example, it initiated a national dialogue while insisting on maintaining its control during negotiations with protesters. At the same time, the military maneuvered to defend its long-term interests. Thus Lt. General Ahmed Gaid Saleh—who was widely viewed as the country’s most powerful military leader—forced Bouteflika to resign in April 2019 and then purged the former president’s allies. Having neutralized his potential internal rivals, Salah presided over the election of a new president. Elected on December 12, 2019 in a low turnout election (40 percent of eligible voters participated), Abdelmajid Tebboune (who had briefly served as prime minister in 2017) provided a paper thin veneer of civilian legitimacy for the military’s institutional primacy.

Saleh’s sudden passing on December 23 did not change one basic fact, namely that the new president could make no move that threatened the generals. Thus while Tebboune pledged to pursue radical political reforms, he in fact had little room for maneuver. Similarly, the release of 76 protest detainees—along with Tebboune’s creation, in January 2020, of a new committee to reform the constitution—inspired little confidence, especially in the formal opposition, whose leaders pushed for what turned out to be a widespread boycott of the December election. But the Hirak was not well positioned to leverage the potential opportunity presented by a newly elected president who was struggling to gain popular support. Lacking allies in the military and an authoritative leadership, the Hirak’s only alternative was to continue relying on Friday protests. When the coronavirus crisis eliminated this option, it seemed only a matter of time before the regime would begin a comprehensive clampdown on all forms of political and social dissent.

COVID-19 creates dangers and possible opportunities for the regime

The arrests of several social and political activists in February and March seemed to signal the beginning of just such a campaign. Not surprisingly, these activists were charged with an array of vague alleged crimes, not least of which was making statements that endangered the reputation of the military. But the onset of the COVID-19 crisis in Algeria generated a number of challenges that complicated any bid by the regime to widen the net of repression. While enforcing social isolation also worked in favor of political isolation, the regime had ample justification to advance these measures as necessary for protecting the general welfare. But COVID-19 is an equal opportunity virus whose rapid spread could literally weaken the human and institutional infrastructure that is at the heart of a repressive apparatus. Such a prospect was hardly on the radar screens of Algeria’s leaders in early February, when only a handful of coronavirus-related cases were officially reported.

The ability of the regime to address this growing threat has been hampered by a national health system that lacked the resources to fight the spreading disease, by widespread distrust of the regime, and—last but not least—by a steep decline in oil revenues. What could worsen this situation is the collapse in oil prices, which would result in serious cuts in spending because of the country’s dependence on the hydrocarbon sector. Algeria has been suffering from 12.35 percent unemployment in 2019 (26.9 percent among the youth). Its regime’s capacity to channel subsidies and other support to the vast urban middle class and to state employed workers had already been weakened. The country is now facing an even deeper social crisis.

The military’s fate will depend in part on how well it manages the current challenges. The regime has tried to relieve the burden on the state’s overcrowded prison system by releasing 10,000 prisoners in February and more than 5,000 others in April. This has left some 43,000 prisoners in 150 prisons, 30 of which are now being used to produce face masks for a health system that is unprepared for the COVID-19 onslaught. But political prisoners are not among those who have been released, a fact that has prompted demands from the official political parties that the government release “all prisoners of conscience” and to take measures to create a genuine state of law and real democracy. Of course, the military and its allies in the police and intelligence services will dismiss or ignore these demands, not only because they clash with the security sector’s interests but also because Algeria’s escalating health crisis might just give military leaders the opportunity to prove that they are the most effective institution in the country. Given the widespread perception that economic and social problems, rather than democracy, should be the first order priority of the regime, Algeria’s actual rulers might be well poised to regain public trust, which only a few short years ago remained strongly behind the military.

Whatever its intentions, the fact of the matter is that the security apparatus is vulnerable to COVID-19. While it is hard to secure a definitive estimate of the size of this sector, in 2019 the defense budget stood at $9.6 billion, far higher than any other ministry. With a security sector that, according to a 2016 NATO report, employs over half a million troops and a vast intelligence apparatus, the generals will have their hands full containing a virus that could sap the capacity and will of the military to address myriad domestic challenges, not to mention abiding security threats along its border with Libya, Morocco, as well as the Sahel region.

The Hirak: reassessing, retreating, or both?

The Hirak’s anniversary provided a moment of introspection. Scholars and activists would do well to reevaluate their position within the body politic. What it needed, first and foremost, is the creation of the institutional basis for an enduring presence in the political terrain. For this purpose, it appears that the Hirak not only has to secure closer ties with formal political parties, but also more enduring linkages to civil society organizations and to organized labor, whose unions have often depended on state support for their very survival.

This could be a tall order, one that would require considerable imagination from a community of activists who are now more physically isolated or fragmented than ever before. Anticipating or reflecting these challenges, Hirak activists issued calls for the people to remain at home, thus suggesting that the real authority behind the campaign for social distancing emanated from the people rather than the regime. Thus the Hirak-linked Student Rally for Change (REC) proclaimed¹ that in light of the regime’s failures and “the weakness of our health system,” the REC was announcing the temporary suspension of its participation in the popular protests.

Amplifying this theme, Hirak-linked activists have mounted online campaigns to underscore their determination to frame popular concerns about the health crisis into a wider message of social activism and political solidarity. Not surprisingly, the government-linked media has responded with reports clearly designed to discredit these new initiatives. But the regime must be careful what it wishes for. Given the scope of the escalating health crisis, the claim that these social activists have been “infiltrated by certain political currents” who are trying to “make it divert from its civic, patriotic, democratic and plural vocation” could boomerang. After all, the regime will not be able to fight the coronavirus without some partnership with the wider society. It thus faces a conundrum: how to secure the trust and cooperation of society without inadvertently empowering a beleaguered opposition. At the same time, social activists face the tricky task of seizing the social and ideological terrain without giving credence to claims that they are merely advancing their own narrow interests, and without provoking a backlash from the security apparatus. In Algeria, as in the wider Middle East, the dance of state power and social resistance continues, but now under conditions that are creating multiple dilemmas for all the key forces and leaders.

Where next?

Given the global challenges posed by COVID-19, Algeria’s leaders will have a tough time mobilizing international assistance. For the United States and for the European Union as well, any failure by Algeria to meet this challenge could have serious security implications for North Africa and the Sahel. But given the troubles the EU faced following Brexit and COVID-19—and in light of the multiple challenges that the Trump Administration is now confronting—Algeria will probably have to fend for itself as it struggles with threats to all aspects of what we might broadly call human security.

This article was republished with permission from the Arab Center Washington DC.

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The exodus of Afghan immigrants fleeing Iran in the recent weeks because of the novel coronavirus outbreak in the Islamic Republic has largely gone off the radar of global media, but is actually a tragedy that has the potential of spawning broad, devastating consequences.

Iran has been hosting between 3 and 4 million Afghans, of whom only 1 million are registered refugees with legal status and entitlement to government support. Afghans in Iran have faced discrimination on different levels, and unequal access to healthcare services is one of them.

For decades, international organizations have been offering financial assistance to Iran to subsidize its support for the Afghan refugees.

However, the brunt of the debilitating international sanctions, coupled with the Iranian government’s lack of attention and proper policymaking have rendered the Afghans living in Iran a highly vulnerable group deprived of equal opportunities, situated at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

Around  200,000 Afghans have reportedly fled the coronavirus crisis submerging Iran, mostly on account of being denied medical care and also because their low-paid jobs have vanished by the pandemic induced global economic collapse.

The global humanitarian community is now concerned the massive cross-border movement may result in widespread infections across Afghanistan, as those who have decamped from Iran and dispersed throughout Afghanistan can potentially spread the virus.

The Afghan Ministry of Public Health has issued a stern warning, cautioning that some 16 million people could become infected, and tens of thousands could die. Afghanistan’s Herat province, bordering Iran, has the most confirmed cases of COVID-19.

Many Afghan citizens with symptoms of coronavirus who fled Iran say the overburdened health system there and the overstretched, under-equipped hospitals explicitly refused to admit them, because all of them are facing an unprecedented flooding of Iranian patients and caring for suffering Afghans doesn’t appear to be a priority.

Afghanistan’s own healthcare system is in a state of near total despair, thrashed by decades of war and conflict. According to official figures, the death toll in the war-wrecked country stands at 36, and a total of 1036 cases have been reported thus far. However, considering the scarcity of testing kits and related equipment, the actual numbers are likely far higher.

In a press briefing on April 14, U.N. Refugee Agency spokesperson Babar Baloch called for support to Iran and Pakistan as the two countries are hosting the largest populations of Afghan refugees.

“Leaving Afghans and their host communities behind will have a far-reaching and negative impact on global efforts to fight the virus,” he said.

Afghanistan’s Minister for Refugees and Repatriation Sayed Hussain Alemi Balkhi has said at least 10 Afghans have died in Iran from coronavirus. But here again, the actual figures are likely much higher, as there is a shortage of testing kids and Iran hasn’t provided accurate statistics.

In an interview with BBC Persian, the Afghan ambassador to Iran Abdul Ghafoor Lewal complained of the Iranian authorities refusing to provide the embassy with precise or estimated numbers of Afghan citizens inflicted with the coronavirus.

Afghans in Iran

Discrimination against Afghans in Iran is not a novelty, and unavailability or scarcity of healthcare services is only one instance of the travails they endure. More than 99 percent of Afghan employees across different economic pursuits, including in construction sector, which exposes them to serious health hazards, do not have any type of work-related insurance. When doing the same jobs, Iranian workers “benefit from 10-23% higher wages compared to Afghans.”

International human rights organizations have been repeatedly warning against the abuse and discrimination targeted at Afghans living in Iran. According to Human Rights Watch, the Iranian government deports thousands of Afghans indiscriminately, without giving them the chance to legally defend their right to stay or lodge asylum applications.

In November 2012, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s government issued a regulation, allowing for the expulsion of “1.6 million foreigners ‘illegally residing in Iran’ by the end of 2015.” The decision also mandated the Interior Ministry with facilitating the voluntary repatriation of an additional 200,000 Afghans bearing legal status as refugees and terminating the refugee status of 700,000 other Afghans.

There are also barriers to the social integration of Afghans and their development. For example, Afghans cannot enter or reside in 16 of Iran’s 31 provinces, they cannot enroll in certain university programs, and many mixed Iranian/Afghan couples find it difficult to get married as a result of government restrictions. Afghan husbands of Iranian women and children of such couples are denied citizenship and there are a limited number of professions Afghans in Iran can practice, which mostly include manual labor with extremely low wages.

The economic sanctions against Iran, which have woefully shrunk Tehran’s revenues, and impaired its ability to maintain international banking relations, are often cited by the Iranian authorities as the reasons why the Islamic Republic is not able to cater to the needs of the Afghans living in the country.

This, however, can never justify the abuse and indignity that Afghan migrants in Iran, especially children, live through. International organizations have reported police violence against Afghan youths, bullying against them in public sphere and racist assaults aimed at them, which are often left unaddressed.

In May 2019, the Iranian owner of a retail store in the city of Nazarabad received a suspended jail term after putting a racist sign on the window of his shop, reading, “The entry of Afghan residents into this store is forbidden.” The move was met with fury and frustration among both Iranians and Afghans.

In July 2019, an Afghan boy was severely pummeled and hurled on the pavement by a member of the board of trustees of a holy shrine near the city of Bushehr in southern Iran after he was caught tampering with a locked donation box outside the shrine. The man later on offered an apology to the boy’s family, and no litigation was brought against him.

The life of Afghans in Iran over the past three decades has been saturated with hardships. Although some of them have been able to thrive, find prestigious jobs, and set up families, many of them have constantly found themselves in dire straits, defenseless in a battle with government policies that overtly discriminate against them, and a poor public image that centers on linkages to crime, illiteracy, poverty, and addiction.

The departure of thousands of Afghans from Iran to their homeland to enjoy protection from the coronavirus pandemic that has battered Iran more than any other nation in the Middle East and West Asia is only a reminder that a sizeable population of immigrants and refugees are living in a country ruined by an international economic blockade while suffering from corruption and mismanagement, and they need meaningful and efficient help.

The post COVID-19 has forced Afghan refugees in Iran to flee back to Afghanistan appeared first on Responsible Statecraft.

How the Military-Industrial Complex is Using the Coronavirus https://www.thenation.com/article/world/coronavirus-defense-budget-spending/ … our @CIPolicy duo @BenFreemanDC @WilliamHartung write for @thenation

Les publications françaises sur l’intelligence artificielle et ses conséquences sociétales ou stratégiques sont généralement extrêmement pessimistes. Le tableau général est l’entrée dans un monde inhumain dirigé par des algorithmes, marqué par une explosion des inégalités tant dans le domaine de la richesse que de la santé.

Un monde dans lequel les États-Unis et la Chine se disputent le leadership tandis que l’Europe – et la France – serait réduite à un rôle de spectatrice impuissante n’ayant pour seul choix que celui du protecteur dominateur derrière lequel se ranger.

Le livre de Christophe Victor Le monde qui vient, publié chez Plon en août 2019, vient à contre-courant de cette tendance majoritaire. Selon lui, les jeux ne sont pas faits et l’avenir reste à écrire : « Le monde qui vient n’est pas par nature pire ou meilleur que le monde que nous quittons, il sera ce que nous en ferons. Il existe un chemin entre l’utopie techno-libertarienne de la Silicon Valley, le modèle techno-dirigiste qui se construit en Chine et la tentation du retour en arrière ou du repli sur soi des populistes de tous bords. À nous Européens de le construire. »

Certes, le tableau actuel est saisissant et la percée des géants digitaux américains et chinois pourrait conduire au découragement et laisser penser que les places sont prises et que le rapport de force est désormais établi. L’auteur liste d’ailleurs les huit premières capitalisations boursières mondiales au 31 décembre 2018 selon le Financial times global 500 : 1- Microsoft ; 2 – Apple ; 3- Amazon ; 4 – Alphabet (Google) ; 5 – Berkshire Hathaway ; 6 – Facebook ; 7 – Tencent ; 8 – Ali Baba. Sur ces huit valeurs, sept sont donc des valeurs technologiques liées directement à la révolution numérique. Cinq n’existaient pas ou se lançaient tout juste il y a 20 ans. Aucune n’a encore atteint l’âge de 35 ans.

Christophe Victor évoque d’autres chiffres marquants :

• 3 000 milliards de dollars, c’est la capitalisation boursière combinée des GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft)
• 600 milliards de dollars de trésorerie dans leurs caisses
• 58,2 milliards de dollars de dépenses en recherche-développement en 2016, soit plus que les dépenses intérieures de la France dans ce domaine
• 2,3 milliards d’utilisateurs actifs mensuels de Facebook dans le monde
• 147 milliards de dollars de volume brut de marchandises échangées via Amazon en 2016 sur le marché américain, soit deux fois plus que le volume du commerce entre les États-Unis et la France.
• 1 000 000 000 d’heures de vidéo visionnées chaque jour sur YouTube

On sait aussi qu’Elon Musk, co-fondateur et PDG de Tesla, a dans un premier temps levé des fonds considérables pour envoyer des êtres humains sur Mars. Ce nouveau milliardaire se place sur un terrain qui n’était ouvert auparavant qu’aux États, et encore, seulement aux superpuissances. Les États sont donc désormais directement concurrencés par des entrepreneurs du numérique qui se financent sur les marchés privés. Ils ont imposé leur priorité et leur agenda. Au passage, ils emmagasinent les données personnelles.

Le « grand remplacement », à l’origine thèse d’extrême droite, qui consisterait en l’évincement des Blancs d’Europe et de France par des « envahisseurs » venus du continent africain-, peut également être interprété, dans un contexte de déploiement de l’IA, comme celui des emplois salariés par des machines, des robots, des algorithmes… Le piège serait d’aboutir à une société dirigée par une poignée de personnes, polarisée entre quelques activités à haute valeur ajoutée et des activités à très faible valeur ajoutée, notamment dans la sphère domestique, effectuées par le reste de la population.

Où en est l’Europe ? En 2000 elle lançait la stratégie de Lisbonne avec pour ambition de devenir « l’économie de la connaissance la plus compétitive et la plus dynamique. »

Au regard de la situation actuelle, l’échec est patent, les financements ne sont pas au rendez-vous. On a sacrifié le long terme au profit du court terme, on a manqué d’ambition. Résultat, il n’existe aujourd’hui aucune plate-forme Internet d’origine européenne – ni africaine ou latino-américaine d’ailleurs.

La Commission européenne a lancé un bras de fer avec les géants digitaux américains sur le thème de l’atteinte à la libre concurrence, mais il a fallu sept ans à la Commission pour condamner Google pour son comparateur de prix, sept années pendant lesquelles les concurrents du géant américain ont souffert, ou même disparus.

« Finalement, le modèle que nous propose la Chine de Xi Jinping n’est pas si éloigné de celui que veulent construire Mark Zuckerberg, Peter Thiel ou Sergey Brin. Ils organisent chacun un contrôle de plus en plus absolu des individus, l’un au bénéfice du pouvoir politique, l’autre au profit du pouvoir économique. » écrit Christophe Victor.

« Ce face-à-face entre les États-Unis et la Chine pourrait bien être la chance de l’Europe. Distancée ces dernières années dans le domaine de l’innovation, elle pourrait incarner à l’avenir un modèle de société, mettant le progrès technologique au service d’un développement durable et plus solidaire, où l’homme serait mieux respecté dans ses libertés. Un modèle équilibré entre celui techno-dirigiste de l’Empire du Milieu et celui techno-libertarien de la Silicon Valley. » estime Christophe Victor.

« La place de l’Europe peut être dans le monde celle d’une gardienne de l’éthique et des libertés, une « vigie » du progrès technologique qui n’abandonne pas pour autant l’efficacité économique ». Cette conclusion est optimiste. Mais l’Europe et la France sont-elles en mesure d’agir vite et fort en ce domaine ? Pour le moment tout le monde est d’accord avec le constat d’une indispensable action volontariste – sauf à être déclassé – mais pas sur la nature et l’ampleur que cette action doit prendre, sans parler de son financement.

Cet article est également disponible sur MédiapartLeClub.

Une présentation des sources d’information principales pour Debian.

Sources officielles bien connues

La base reste évidemment le site officiel https://www.debian.org/index.html (en Français https://www.debian.org/index.fr.html) où l’on retrouve les liens vers les Mailing Lists, le Wiki, le téléchargement…

Un article récent Les canaux de communication officiels de Debian revenait sur quelques sources à suivre pour avoir de l’info. À titre personnel je suis uniquement https://www.debian.org/News/ qui a le bon goût d’avoir un flux RSS et informe de la publication des mises à jour Debian (Debian 10.3, Debian 9.12…), je remonte ensuite l’info sur le Jdh.

Les packages

On rentre dans le dur et indispensable pour les sysadmins, devs, power users tournant sur Debian.

Debian Packages permet de faire une recherche sur le nom d’un package https://packages.debian.org/search?keywords=smartmontools, on retrouve le numéro de version pour chaque distrib, la disponibilité pour chaque architecture.

À partir de là en cliquant sur la version Debian qui nous intéresse (jessie, stretch, buster, buster-backports, bullseye, sid) on arrive par exemple sur https://packages.debian.org/buster/smartmontools avec un descriptif, les dépendances du package, la possibilité de le télécharger directement en bas de page ainsi que des informations précieuses à droite : Rapports de bogues, Journal des modifications Debian, Page d’accueil (le site/dépôt principal du projet).

J’y vais plusieurs fois par jour, voir la version proposée, me renseigner sur la disponibilité d’un package, son descriptif, éventuellement son poids et dépendances.

snapshot.debian.org plus pointu surtout utile pour faire du packaging, à partir de https://snapshot.debian.org/package/smartmontools/ on retrouve les versions du package au fil du temps (très utile pour packager une version avant un bug gênant) puis https://snapshot.debian.org/package/smartmontools/7.1-1/ donne accès aux sources et binary packages.

On arrive au must pour moi le Debian Package Tracker, initialement pour les développeurs je le considère comme le point central et d’entrée pour avoir toutes les informations sur un paquet car tous les liens importants y sont centralisés.

À gauche sur https://tracker.debian.org/pkg/smartmontools general avec la source du paquet, son maintainer, les uploaders. versions avec les liens vers qa.debian.org (Debian Quality Assurance) et les snapshots. Les versioned links donnant accès directement aux fichiers .dsc, changelog, copyright, .rules et control.

À droite les bugs triés (I&N : Important and Normal, M&N : Minor and Wishlist, F&P : Fixed and Pending, etc.), les links avec la homepage du projet, les logs des builds, le popcon (Popularity contest, « concours de popularité » du package), browse source code, parfois quelques screenshots et enfin ubuntu où on peut suivre les bugs notamment.

La partie centrale news qui offre un flux RSS https://tracker.debian.org/pkg/smartmontools/rss permet de suivre le cycle de vie du package : Publication d’une nouvelle version du package sur le site/dépôt principal du projet, arrivée d’une nouvelle version dans unstable, migration dans testing, elle en est parfois retirée, etc. Très très utile notamment grâce au flux RSS, plus besoin d’aller voir si une nouvelle version est arrivée, l’information vient à nous.

La sécurité et les manpages

En tant que sysadmin il faut être au minimum inscrit sur debian-security-announce pour être prévenu par mail des problèmes de sécurité, en mode « actif » pour aller voir quels problèmes de sécurité touchent un package on se dirigera vers le Security Bug Tracker par exemple https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/source-package/bash.

Les manpages sont souvent oubliées à tort, une commande peut avoir un fonctionnement et des features différentes suivant sa version. https://manpages.debian.org/buster/bash/bash.1.en.html propose les manpages pour buster, testing, unstable et en d’autres langues parfois (Espagnol, Italien, etc.).

Les autres sources de qualité

Les cahiers du débutant par arpinux, Le cahier de l’administrateur Debian (pour Debian 8, on pourrait se dire que c’est périmé mais je vous le conseille encore vous apprendrez des choses), j’ai envie de souligner l’existence de DontBreakDebian en Français également.

Difficile ensuite de ne pas s’éparpiller mais on peut aussi citer les sites/forums/wikis gravitant autour de Debian (Debian-facile, debian-fr.org), les conférences (MiniDebConf), les vidéos (DebConf Videos).

Résumons

En ce qui me concerne je suis abonné à debian-security-announce, je suis via RSS les news et les packages (exemple smartmontools), je vais régulièrement sur Debian Package Tracker et Debian Packages.

Le maillage des informations chez Debian est complet et de qualité, j’y trouve tout ce dont j’ai besoin (et je suis très exigeant). Il est finalement possible d’avoir la totalité des informations traitant de cette distrib assez simplement moyennant la compréhension de l’Anglais (ce qui reste un point négatif).

Du point de vue de l'analyse de l'État et de la société chinoise, l'épidémie de Covid-19 apporte un certain nombre d'informations. Nous avons la possibilité de comparer les situations et les réponses face à une crise qui est, a priori, la même pour tous.

Saudi Arabia is launching an oil price war. That’s risky. https://wapo.st/2xllYbi 

En réalité, une pandémie du format de celle d'aujourd'hui est le test fatal pour toute la logique du néolibéralisme. Elle met à l'arrêt ce que ce capitalisme demande de garder constamment en mouvement frénétique. Elle rappelle surtout cette évidence qu'une société étant une entité collective, elle ne fonctionne pas sans des constructions collectives — on appelle ça usuellement des services publics.

There is a growing consensus that — to prevent Iran from spiraling out of control from the coronavirus epidemic and causing untold harm to the Iranian people — the Trump administration must immediately relent in its use of sanctions and allow Iran the ability to combat the epidemic through the purchase of necessary medical supplies overseas and the provision of a robust social safety net for the average Iranian facing economic catastrophe.

On Tuesday, the Trump administration responded to these calls by increasing sanctions on Iran with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accusing “[t]he Iranian leadership [of] trying to avoid responsibility for their grossly incompetent and deadly governance” and by alleging that “[t]he Wuhan virus is a killer and the Iranian regime is an accomplice.” Perhaps Secretary Pompeo would have some fair ground to stand on if not for the fact that the Trump administration’s own response to the epidemic will prove the most consequential failure of the modern American presidency, leading to the unnecessary deaths of tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of Americans. But Secretary Pompeo — acting consistent with protocol — lacked the shame to recognize his own failings and instead used the Iranian people’s suffering from an unrelenting medical crisis to further propagandize against Iran.

Secretary Pompeo offered a few throwaway lines on the U.S.’s willingness to assist the Iranian people in their time of immense and unmitigated suffering, stating that the Trump administration “continue[s] to offer assistance to Iran in numerous ways” and citing “an open humanitarian channel to facilitate legitimate transactions even while ensuring [the U.S.’s] maximum pressure campaign denies terrorists money.” But these offers of assistance, if real at all, amount to little more than a cruel joke so long as the Trump administration targets all productive sectors of Iran’s economy with sanctions, denies Iran the ability to accrue and repatriate any export revenue, and severs Iran’s access to global markets for sanctionable and non-sanctionable goods alike, including medicine and medical supplies.

Untold numbers of Iranians will succumb to the disease, and some because Iran lacks the medical capacity, including the medical equipment, necessary to provide care for all who acquire the virus. Iran’s medical sector has long been in turmoil, and U.S. sanctions are a chief reason for this. But, as tragic as this will be — and some analysts suggest that the death toll in Iran from coronavirus could reach the millions before all is said and done — the fate of those who survive the disease will be hardly better, as Iran faces absolute economic ruin in the months ahead. While other countries, including the United States, provide for far broader social safety nets and adopt macroeconomic policies to buffer key industries from collapse, Iran will be prevented from doing so due entirely to U.S. sanctions. Iran, which was already in the midst of a massive economic recession, will be presumptively barred from providing a safety net for their people through these catastrophic times.

Some in Washington rejoice at this prospect. For them, what matters is that Iran is kept weak. Watching Iranian society spiral out of control and the country start to tear at the seams is a blessing in their estimation — a sign that “maximum pressure” worked to achieve at least some of its objectives. For this reason, hawks are urging the Trump administration to avoid “bailing out the mullahs,” in their racist-speak, by lifting sanctions or permitting the International Monetary Fund to extend a loan so that Iran can purchase the medical supplies it needs to combat the virus. Iranian suffering, after all, is the necessary byproduct of keeping Iran weak, isolated, and alien to itself and the world.

Such depravity has no limits. Not only is the Trump administration’s policy to Iran wrongheaded and ignorant, it is also fundamentally immoral — and nowhere has this been more clear than in the present crisis. Holding an entire people hostage in the moment of their deepest crisis is what the most thuggish of regimes do the world over. Yet that is the policy Secretary Pompeo advances towards Iran today.

The post The immoral cruelty of the Trump administration’s refusal to grant Iran sanctions relief amid its COVID-19 crisis appeared first on Responsible Statecraft.

At a dinner party in mid-February, an architect told me that he was having a problem finishing his building projects. It was the carpets.

Most wall-to-wall carpeting for big construction projects in the United States, he explained, comes from China. The coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan — and the subsequent shutdown of many Chinese factories — was having a ripple effect across the global economy all the way down to the carpeting in U.S. buildings.

The global spread of a new pathogen has exposed the fragility of modern life. As it moves around the world, the coronavirus has compromised the circulatory system of globalization, dramatically reducing the international flow of money, goods, and people. The disease has done so rather economically, by infecting fewer than 100,000 people so far. Extrapolation and fear have done most of the work for it.

In the world of things, the coronavirus has infected the global supply chains that connect manufacturers and consumers. Port traffic in Los Angeles, the largest U.S. port, declined by 25 percent in February. Container traffic in general was down over 10 percent last month.

Manufacturers that depend on the sourcing of components in far-off countries had already been rethinking their participation in the global assembly line because of tariffs, the costs of transport, and increased automation. This “reshoring” will get a boost from the disruptions of the coronavirus.

People, too, are not moving around as much. Airline service in and out of emerging hot spots — South Korea, Italy — has been cancelled. Airline ticket sales last week were down 10 percent over the same period last year. The cruise industry, after outbreaks on a couple big ships, has taken a major hit.

After blithely ignoring the coronavirus outbreak in China for most of February, markets took a major dive in the final week of the month. The stock market lost $6 trillion in value last week, its worst showing since the financial crisis of a decade ago. This is testament to both the persistence of the disease and the incompetence of certain national leaders, notably Donald Trump. Despite the intervention of the Federal Reserve and other central banks, market volatility continues.

It might seem ridiculous to expect that a pathogen, even one that spreads at the rate of a pandemic, could reverse an economic trajectory that’s more than a century in the making. But the coronavirus outbreak coincides with attacks on economic globalization from many different quarters.

Environmentalists, for instance, have long been skeptical of unrestrained global economic growth. The threat of climate change has sharpened that critique and placed it squarely in the middle of mainstream debate.

Meanwhile, worsening economic inequality has called into question the capacity of economic globalization to lift all boats in a rising tide. Even the IMF has acknowledged the pernicious impact of this inequality (but without engaging in the necessary institutional overhaul to address the problem).

Finally, a slowing of global economic integration over the last decade suggests that the world may already have passed peak globalization.

On top of these systemic challenges, a rising political populism has targeted the global economic elite as the enemy of “the people.” Donald Trump challenged this elite and their orthodoxy of free trade by imposing tariffs on allies and adversaries alike and by withdrawing U.S. participation in big trade pacts, like the Trans Pacific Partnership.

The trade war he began with China has had perhaps the greatest impact. It has hit both economies hard, with job loss, higher bills for consumers, and lost markets for manufacturers and farmers. The recent agreement between Beijing and Washington notwithstanding, most of the tariffs remain in place.

Meanwhile, the UK finally pulled out of the European Union this year, which was a victory for economic nationalists. Populists elsewhere have railed against what Steve Bannon calls the “Davos class.” Neoliberal orthodoxy has given way to pronouncements of America First, Brazil First, and the like.

Such a setback is not necessarily fatal. Globalization has been challenged before by financial crises, pandemics like the Hong Kong Flu, even the specter of Y2K.

This time around, however, the failure of the global community to establish new rules of the road for the economy, the environment, and health care is creating a perfect storm of international disfunction. If something with a relatively low mortality rate like the coronavirus — between one percent and four percent, compared to 50 percent for Ebola — can do such a number on the global economy, perhaps the patient was already suffering from some pretty dire underlying conditions.

Pandemic

When people travel, they bring all sorts of luggage, including pathogens.

Thus was the great era of exploration also the dismal era of genocide. Explorers to the New World brought a panoply of diseases like smallpox and measles that were new to the indigenous communities. The colonial invaders subjected the Americas to war and slavery. But it was those diseases that were largely responsible for a catastrophic reduction in populations up and down the Americas. As many as 56 million people, or 10 percent of the world population at the time, died by the beginning of the 1600s. The mortality rate for the indigenous communities was an astonishing 90 percent.

In exchange, the explorers returned to their native countries with syphilis, a horrible disease to be sure, but it didn’t radically depopulate Europe.

Pandemics are closely associated with the movement of traders and soldiers. Roman soldiers returning from Mesopotamia were responsible for the plague that ravaged the empire in the second century AD, one of several pandemics that helped end Rome’s global dominance. The bubonic plague of the fourteenth century began in China and reached Europe via merchant ships carrying flea-infested rats. In the modern era, soldiers returning home from fighting in World War I spread the Spanish flu, killing up to 50 million people.

This last pandemic was one of the factors behind the collapse of the first wave of modern globalization. Prior to the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the world had never been more tightly connected with steamships, trains, and the telegraph serving as the connective tissue. Trade as a proportion of GDP stood at 14 percent on the eve of the war.

The devastation of World War I followed by the flu epidemic dealt a heavy blow to world trade and economic integration. The global economic depression of the 1920s, the rise of various types of nationalism, and a second world war ensured that, by 1945, trade as a proportion of GDP had dropped to a mere 5 percent.

Modern globalization is made possible by modern medicine. A couple of pandemics have broken out since 1945, but they haven’t disrupted the global circulatory system. In the ancient Akkadian language, the word for epidemic disease meant “certain death.” Only recently have medical professionals been able to handle outbreaks of disease on such a scale.

Thanks to a second wave of globalization, trade would rise again to the levels it registered in 1914 — but only by the late 1980s. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, a third wave of globalization removed more barriers to the movement of goods and money. Even China, a nominally Communist country, joined the World Trade Organization at the end of 2001. It has since offered its own version of globalization through the Belt and Road initiative that places China at the center of a burgeoning network of trade and finance.

The coronavirus, by itself, will not put an end to this most recent wave of globalization. Like the flu pandemic of 1918, it could contribute to a trend of greater fragmentation. Or, by serving as a reminder of how the health of humanity has been mutually dependent across borders for millennia, the latest outbreak could prompt a rethinking of how the world works together.

Things fall apart?

China will prove pivotal in determining which direction the world heads.

At the moment, economic pundits in the West are exhibiting a degree of schadenfreude at Beijing’s difficulties. Kenneth Rapoza, for instance, argues in Forbes that “The new coronavirus Covid-19 will end up being the final curtain on China’s nearly 30 year role as the world’s leading manufacturer.” The global assembly line was already shifting away from Chinese sources as a result of Trump’s tariffs, so the pandemic only reinforces this trend.

China could still come out a winner in all of this. No longer dependent on low-end manufacturing, it could invest its surplus capital into an even greater push toward higher value-added production, particularly in the digital sphere. This shift could facilitate a major reduction in the country’s carbon footprint as well.

Much depends on the U.S.-China relationship. Long before the coronavirus crisis, the U.S. policy elite had already moved away from supporting engagement with China. China was already prepared for disengagement. It had laid the groundwork for an alternative globalization, denominated in the renminbi and financed by the country’s considerable trade surpluses. Many countries in China’s vicinity opted to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative and receive financing from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

At the very moment that China and the United States need to forge a new consensus on economy and environment, the two countries are heading in different directions. And that will make it very difficult for the international community, such that it is, to come up with global solutions to what are increasingly global problems such as climate change and pandemics.

Because of the coronavirus, China has rediscovered how dependent it is on the rest of the world — to buy Chinese products, to supply Chinese consumers, to provide raw materials for Chinese business, to service Chinese tourists.

China’s projected growth rate for 2020 has been revised down from 6 percent to 5 percent, but it might drop even further. Sociologist Walden Bello has long argued that the Chinese economy is in fact quite fragile — with overcapacity in the manufacturing sector, a real-estate bubble, high rates of debt, and growing inequality.

With the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing was hoping it could grow its way out of these problems. That strategy depends on a number of unknown variables, which in the short term include the persistence of the pandemic and the results of the upcoming presidential election in the United States.

The coronavirus is a wake-up call for both Beijing and Washington. The new status quo of a revived Cold War between the two hegemons is unworkable. It’s time for another wave of globalization, but this time one that reduces carbon emissions, proceeds more equitably, and strengthens the capacity of international institutions to fight pandemics.

It won’t happen without U.S.-China cooperation. And that won’t happen without a different U.S. president and a different approach in Beijing.

This article has been republished with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus.

The post Will the coronavirus kill globalization? appeared first on Responsible Statecraft.

Encore une ?!

Je vais encore ajouter une ptite odroid dans mon harem. Ce coup-ci elle ne sera pas à la maison mais un peu éloignée à la campagne. Le but est de remplacer un disque dur externe mal en point. Et tant qu'à remplacer un disque dur à l'agonie autant en mettre un vrai, plus robuste en réseau.

Mais pourquoi toute une Odroid ?

Le disque dur externe ne servait à peu près jamais en mobilité mais à 95% pour du backup. Du coup je me suis dit que ça ferait une pierre deux coups : un disque pour le backup maternelle et … un disque pour mon backup. Et pour ça, une Odroid HC2 c'est nickel : c'est tout petit, ça fait pas de bruit, ça consomme vraiment rien, le disque est bien au frais, c'est juste un peu moche (pas selon mes critères cela dit).

En plus ça me permettra de faire l'occasionnel SAV plus facilement qu'en passant par TeamViewer. Même si j'en ai de moins en moins besoin, c'est toujours chiant.

Objectif

Du coup le but, c'est de monter une ptite Alpine Linux dessus, y installer un skeudur, Samba et voilà pour le moment. J'ai opté pour un skeudur de 4To qui sera tranquille pour au moins dix ans vu la volumétrie à stocker… Une ptite carte SD de 64Go (vu le prix, prendre moins aurait été con).

Comme d'hab je choisis Alpine car c'est tout ptit, la surface d'attaque est minimale. Le risque de bug est d'autant plus amenuisé, que je n'utiliserai quasiment aucun soft. Je me contenterai vraiment du strict minimum. Les updates seront rares et très rapides.

Je n'exposerai rien sur les Internets en plus. Moins de risque de mauvaise surprise.

Une fois qu'elle aura mis le gros de ses données dessus, selon la volumétrie, j'en ferai un backup versionné chez moi. Comme ça, même en cas de crypto locker vorace, je devrais être à même d'avoir une version clean des données.

Retroussage de manches

Au début j'ai voulu faire le gros flemmard en faisant un gros dd du début de la carte SD de l'odroid existante. Puis vu les débits pitoyables j'ai capitulé.

Je me suis donc rabattu sur une option à peine plus complexe : j'ai déjà une hc2 à la maison, je vous avais raconté son installation à l'époque. Du coup, bha j'ai pas refait pareil mais en sautant les étapes du rootfs !

• J'ai créé une partition sur la carte SD en ext4 (le moins d'emmerde à court terme).
• Dessus, j'ai juste passé un coup de rsync depuis l'HC2 qui tourne actuellement.
• J'ai ensuite remis les bouts du bootloader à base de /boot/sd_fusing.sh /dev/sdi.
• Une fois fait j'ai corrigé customisé deux trois trucs (la conf réseau, le hostname, généré des clés ssh).
• Le moment crucial de coller la SD dans la nouvelle Odroid.

L'accès réseau à distance

Bon, ma mère, avoir une machine dispo en SSH, ça lui fait une belle jambe. Et installer les mises à jour et tout ça va clairement pas lui plaire. Du coup, non seulement je vais lui offrir la SBC, mais la lui installer et surtout lui maintenir (“I'm a generous god”).

Du coup, il va me falloir un accès distant sécurisé. Bon, je mets ça en place aujourd'hui, je croise les doigts pour que ça tienne mais je vais tenter de faire un truc le plus simple possible pour que ça ait le moins de chance de casser possible. Je dois tout préparer en amont pour n'avoir qu'à brancher chez elle.

VPN

La première idée est de partir sur un VPN. Si je le fais ça sera à base de Wireguard, sauf que bon, le kernel du truc est plutôt du genre pré-colombien… du coup on peut oublier. Et je compte pas mettre autre chose niveau VPN.

Accès SSH

La seconde idée c'est l'accès SSH direct. L'idée me plait sauf que bon, je sais pas trop comment fonctionne sa connexion. Est-ce qu'elle est en IP dynamique ? fixe ? NAT ? CGN ? Bref, plein de risque que ça ne marche pas où qu'il faille tripotter son routeur et tout. Et ça sans avoir la certitude qu'à la première update du routeur ça se fasse jarter. Bref, ça ne m'enchante pas et j'ai pas super confiance.

Tunnel SSH inversé

La troisième idée c'est l'accès SSH inverse. Ouaip. Ça ne veut rien dire. En gros, c'est l'Odroid qui va initier la connexion et non l'inverse. Mais du coup par quelle diablerie ça fonctionne ?

Et bien, ma ptite dame je vous le dit tout de go, ça sera facile et automatique. Et comment ça fonctionne ? Par la magie d’un tunnel TCP et d'une connexion automatique de SSH. Et tout ça pour le prix d'un seul logiciel du doux nom de AutoSSH.

Et c'est cette solution qui est choisie !

AutoSSH

Ce petit logiciel est super simple, il initie une connexion SSH. Et dès qu'elle pète, il recommence. Voilà, ça ne fait que ça.

Donc si jamais la connexion déconne, si le serveur déconne ou autre, dès que ça sera de nouveau opérationnel, la connexion sera rétablie. C'est super pratique. Le seul inconvénient, c'est qu'Alpine ne fournit pas le ptit fichier d'init nécessaire pour OpenRC. Mais vous allez voir que c'est super simple.

#!/sbin/openrc-run

name="AutoSSH"
command="/usr/bin/autossh"
command_args="-M 0 -f -NR localhost:23:localhost:22 user@serveur"
command_user="root"

depend() {
        need net localmount
}

Le premier tour de force c'est de lancer ça au boot et le fait qu'autossh s'acharne à ce que ce soit tout le temps up.

La seconde partie de la magie réside dans le tunnel qui est défini par -R localhost:23:localhost:22. Cette option de SSH indique que le port localhost:23 sur le serveur SSH, est relié au port localhost:22 du client.

Dans ce cas, les deux occurences de localhost n'indiquent pas la même machine. Le premier est le localhost du serveur, potentiellement, on peut ne pas le mettre, ce qui aurait pour conséquence que l'entrée du tunnel serait disponible sur toutes les interfaces réseau du serveur SSH. Ça voudrait dire que n'importe qui tentant une connexion SSH sur le port 23 du serveur arriverait réellement sur le port 22 de l'odroid. Perso, je préfère restreindre ça uniquement aux connexions provenant de localhost (donc le serveur). Le second localhost est l'odroid du coup.

Bref, avec ce petit montage, je suis à peu près sûr de toujours parvenir à récupérer la main sur la machine. Il me suffira de me connecter au serveur intermédiaire et sur celui-ci de me connecter avec ssh -p 23 root@localhost ce qui me connectera via le tunnel à l'odroid.

Samba

Bon, un ptit partage Samba des plus basique.

Je crée un utilisateur nunux, un utilisateur samba avec le même nom avec smbpasswd -a lutilisateur. Dans le montage, je file le dossier du skeudur à lutilisateur avec chown lutilisateur:lutilisateur /mnt/sata/samba -R.

Le fichier de conf Samba qui va avec :

[global]
 workgroup            = WORKGROUP
 force user           = lutilisateur
 bind interfaces only = yes

[skeudur]
 browseable = yes
 writeable  = yes
 path       = /mnt/sata/samba

Voilà, il ne devrait plus qu'à le rajouter dans le Window.

Trouver l'IP

Bon et si SSH a un souci ? Peu probable mais ça pourrait arriver. Un problème de clé ou le serveur ssh qui déconne.

Ça serait pas mal si je pouvais avoir ne serait-ce que l'IP. Du coup, j'ai pondu un ptit script d'une ligne à foutre dans le cron.

Le but est juste de faire une connexion http comme ça on récupère dans les logs du serveur web (une autre machine que le serveur SSH, comme ça c'est plus redondant).

Donc un ptit wget http://ip.du.serveur -O /dev/null -q . C'est chouette, avec ça je pourrai trouver l'adresse IP publique que la machine va utiliser.

Pas mal, pas mal du tout mais… Et si on chopait aussi les IP locales et tout ?

Allez j'arrête le teasing : wget http://ip.du.serveur -O /dev/null -q -U odroid-$(ip a s eth0 | grep inet | awk ‘{print $2}’ | tr ‘\n’ ‘-') et voilà. On récolte toutes les IP directement assignées à eth0 (donc pas d'IPv4 publique, mais on l'a via le log.

Voilà c'était la ptite ruse de sioux.

Bon bha ça c'est fait. Reste le plus difficile : configurer le windows. Configurer le décodeur TV de la freebox, pour pouvoir y accéder.

Et expliquer un peu comment ça marche :-)

Hanoi (VNA) – Le centre Education for Nature - Vietnam (ENV) a rendu public un nouveau court-métrage appelant à la fin de l'élevage d'ours pour leur bile.

Intitulé « Extraction de bile d'ours », le film raconte l'histoire du point de vue d'un ours en captivité. Il fait partie d'un projet de coopération à long terme entre ENV, Four Paws International, World Animal Protection et le gouvernement vietnamien pour mettre fin à l'élevage d'ours et promouvoir la protection de cette espèce sauvage.

Le film commence sur un ours couché à l'intérieur d'une cage froide et rouillée, dans une douleur extrême et à moitié conscient à cause de l'anesthésie. Il est ensuite libéré par son regrettable propriétaire de ferme qui décide de l'emmener dans un centre de secours pour une vie meilleure.

Selon la directrice adjointe d’ENV Nguyen Thi Phuong Dung, en raison de la forte demande, le trafic de bile d’ours était une activité rentable. Mais comme de plus en plus de personnes tournent le dos à la bile d'ours, et donc de plus en plus de propriétaires remettent volontairement leurs ours à des centres de secours.

''Grâce à ce film, nous nous attendons à ce que davantage de propriétaires transfèrent volontairement leurs ours afin que ces derniers puissent recevoir de meilleurs soins le reste de leur vie,'' a-t-elle ajouté.

Rien qu'en 2019, ENV a signalé que 34 ours avaient été transférés dans des centres de secours à travers le pays, dont 23 volontairement.

Le nombre d'ours en captivité au Vietnam a baissé de 4.300 en 2005 à 432 en décembre de l'année dernière. Jusqu'à présent, 34 villes et provinces du pays ont déclaré la fin de cet élevage. -VNA

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