Didier “Ice” Iceman

For three years, my organization, Win Without War, and others helped pro-diplomacy activists make their voices heard in Congress in support of President Obama’s diplomatic efforts with Iran. Hundreds of thousands of them had done just that — signing petitions, writing emails, making phone calls, and meeting face-to-face with their representatives and senators in Washington and their hometowns. At every step of the way, congressional offices told us that pro-diplomacy voices had outweighed those opposed by ten-to-one. But then something strange happened. Suddenly, the calls for and against the Iran nuclear deal were coming in at an equal rate. 

It was unlikely that the success of having achieved a historic diplomatic nuclear agreement with Iran, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as its formally known, had suddenly made the U.S. public swing against diplomacy. Yet as paid TV ads attacking the JCPOA started popping up and the anti-diplomacy phone calls came pouring in, a dangerous mindset started to spread throughout the halls of Congress: It was going to be bad politics for Democrats to stand with the president and against a small cohort of powerful, deep pocketed special interests.

This was going to be a fight. Determined to defend diplomacy, progressives went all in, but so did anti-diplomacy forces. We now know, for example, that one organization alone, an AIPAC front group called Citizens United for a Nuclear Free Iran, spent $8.3 million on paid phone calls, most likely the very calls causing Congress to suddenly think the public’s opinion was mixed. Millions more were spent on television ads offering a dire preview of what would await any member of Congress who voted to support diplomacy. 

And in the heat of the long, hot summer, Rep. Elliot Engel, then the highest ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, announced he was breaking with President Obama, and would oppose the JCPOA. At the time, Congressman Engel no doubt thought he was making a safe political choice. His allies flooding the airwaves and phone lines against the deal would surely be there if he ever needed them in an election. Yet this past week, five years later, it’s likely that that decision — and what it said about Engel’s preference for conflict over diplomacy — cost him re-election. 

Much has already been written about Engel’s stunning primary loss to first time candidate Jamaal Bowman, a former middle school principal in the Bronx. Pundits argue that Bowman’s high profile endorsements from Sen. Bernie Sanders and Rep. Alexandria Ocascio-Cortez, Engel’s absence from his New York district at the height of the spring’s pandemic, and Engel’s embarrassing hot mic moment  (which helped send Bowman’s fundraising into overdrive) propelled Bowman’s victory over Engel. And there’s no doubt these factors played significant roles in the historic upset. But had it not been for Engel’s deep discord with his own party on foreign policy, there may never have been a primary challenge to capitalize on those moments and endorsements in the first place. 

It says something about House Democrats that they would let their most senior foreign policy position be filled by someone who, like Engel, was so at odds with the Democratic caucus on numerous foreign policy issues. But that is fundamentally what happened when Engel took over the gavel of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

He was one of only two dozen House Democrats out of 188 who ultimately voted against the Iran deal. Just one year later he would join with an even smaller group of Democrats to give the Republicans a narrow majority and defeat an effort to stop selling Saudi Arabia cluster bombs, bombs they were then dropping on civilians in Yemen. And of course this all followed his enthusiastic support for the Iraq War. Bowman made all of these issues central to his campaign and attacked Engel directly on this record. 

Others have laid out the full history of Engel’s awful record, so there’s no need to recount it all here. But what stands out is that on these issues, the biggest foreign policy questions of the day, the chosen Democratic foreign policy leader was, in some cases quite dramatically, at odds with the majority of his party. For years, the conventional wisdom was that such heresy simply didn’t matter if it was confined to foreign policy. The Democratic primary voters of New York’s 16th Congressional District just helpfully reminded everyone just how wrong that particular conventional wisdom was. 

The truth is that this is hardly the first, and likely won’t be the last time that voters send a Democratic member of Congress home for being hawkish. For instance, members of Congress who voted for the Iraq war were, over time, more likely to have been given the boot by their voters than those who opposed it. Meanwhile, despite the fever dreams of many political prognosticators in the summer of 2015 as attack ads about the Iran deal hit the air, no incumbent Democrats lost an election because of their support for the JCPOA. It turns out that being on the same page as the overwhelming number of Democratic voters is actually good politics. 

And now that the voters have spoken, House Democrats will face their own decision. Shortly following the November elections, the incoming Democratic caucus of the 117th Congress will gather in Washington to select its new leadership. Of course, like with all elections, the jockeying and campaigning doesn’t wait until the final vote and indeed is already well under way. Though the question before Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, and others is clear, will they once again allow their highest ranking foreign policy position to be filled by someone at odds with their own caucus and their voters, or will they heed the calls of change? 

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Si on désignait comme historiens tous ceux qui se mêlent d'histoire, le métier serait très largement pratiqué. La revendication se double parfois d'agressivité contre les adversaires qui disent le contraire mais aussi contre les historiens professionnels. Sur les ondes, Éric Zemmour, dont on ne savait pas qu'il était un historien mais seulement un polémiste, ne dit pas seulement des sottises sur le régime de Vichy : il déverse sa haine sur l'américain Robert Paxton, un universitaire réputé pour avoir (...)

- Régime d'opinion / Histoire, Idéologie, Désinformation, Science, universités, Mouvement de contestation, Racisme, Esclavage

Le Vietnam fait figure d’exemple dans sa gestion de la crise sanitaire du Covid-19. Une réussite qui permet au Parti communiste vietnamien (PCV) de regagner la confiance de son peuple.

Mauvaise nouvelle à l'aube de la mise en place définitive des objectifs CO2 pour chaque groupe automobile : les émissions moyennes de CO2 des véhicules vendus en 2019 ont connu une hausse, la troisième consécutive depuis 2017.

Le coronavirus, en plongeant l’industrie de l’énergie dans la crise, a précipité la chute du deuxième producteur de gaz naturel des États-Unis.

Plus de trente ans après la mort de l’auteur d’Astro Boy, un manga conçu à la manière d’Osamu Tezuka par une intelligence artificielle a été publié au Japon. Les données recueillies éclairent la façon dont travaillait le célèbre mangaka.

At a time when statues representing histories of slavery, racism and colonialism are being toppled across the United States and worldwide, Japan is moving in the opposite direction. It has – this very month – opened a new historical center that completely ignores historical crimes. These crimes are widely known: The mobilization of countless Chinese, […]

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Les deux pays s’opposent autour du barrage géant construit par l’Éthiopie sur le Nil. Alors que les dernières négociations ont échoué, l’Éthiopie a annoncé qu’elle commencerait à remplir l’ouvrage en juillet, avec ou sans accord. L’Égypte a porté l’affaire devant le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU.

Science talks with two experts in animal ethics who want to go beyond the three Rs

“How did it [Covid-19] spread through the rest of the world, and it didn’t spread through China?,” Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin asked in a June 23 television interview. “That’s what we want to know.”

That is quite a different question than the one US President Donald Trump asked in a May 21 briefing: “Do you think that China is giving the right number [of Covid-19 infections]? I don’t think so.” The Administration, it seems, has shifted ever-so-slightly from denial – the first stage of grieving in the Elizabeth Kübler-Ross list – to anger.

The post Why Covid-19 spread worldwide but not in China appeared first on Asia Times.

Libya’s post-Gaddafi crisis may soon enter a new chapter that would internationalize the conflict to a whole new level. In light of Operation Volcano Rage, the ongoing campaign led by Libya’s U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord to push General Khalifa Haftar’s forces in an eastward retreat, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi is threatening to deploy Egypt’s military into the fray. According to the Egyptian president, forces aligned with the Tripoli-based government capturing Sirte or Haftar’s base in Juffra is his “red line.”

There are now valid reasons for Libyans and the international community at large to fear a dangerous scenario whereby Egypt and Turkey clash with each other. Concerns about an Egyptian-Turkish military confrontation in Libya come after seven months of bold actions taken by Ankara in defense of the GNA, which denied Haftar the opportunity to achieve his objective of “liberating” Tripoli from the GNA. The deployment of Turkish drones proved to be a major game-changer that not only enabled the Tripoli-based government to survive Haftar’s onslaught, but also raised the specter of pro-GNA militias moving east to crush their enemies in Benghazi.

The GNA’s recent gains have left officials in Cairo and some other Arab capitals worried about Turkey establishing itself as the “kingmaker” in Libya. Questions about what has motivated Turkey to intensify its military intervention in Libya have spurred much debate across the Middle East and North Africa, as well as Europe. The Turks are unquestionably driven, at least in large part, by their energy interests in the gas-rich eastern Mediterranean. Also, following the Egyptian coup of 2013, which transformed Egypt from a Turkey-friendly Arab country to an anti-Turkish one, officials in Ankara do not want to see Haftar dominate Libya, which would only push Turkey into more of a state of relative isolation in the eastern Mediterranean.

Yet as many Arab actors see it, Ankara’s decisive actions in Libya factor into the Turkish leadership’s purported quest to re-establish the Ottoman Empire. Like other parts of the Arab region where Turkey has recently sent its military forces, or made plans to do so—including Iraq’s Sinjar, Syria’s Idlib, Sudan’s Suakin Island, and Qatar — Libya is a regional hotspot that the Ottomans once controlled. To many in the region, this fact of history cannot be ignored when assessing Turkish interests in Libya. Whether or not it is fair to argue that Turkey’s foreign policy is “Neo-Ottoman,” this is the perspective of many Arabs, including those who govern Egypt as well as Sissi’s patrons in the Gulf: the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

It is a safe bet that if Egypt’s military enters Libya to push back against Turkish-backed GNA forces, Cairo will receive high levels of support from its backers in the Gulf. Already, officials in Saudi Arabia and the UAE have declared their support for Sissi’s “red line” comments. In the event that Egypt enters Libya to fight against the pro-GNA forces, which Turkey sponsors, such an Egyptian military campaign would probably receive high levels of backing from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. As Samuel Ramani explained, the Saudis would likely give Sissi substantial financial backing while also bringing Saudi-backed Salafist forces in Libya to Cairo’s side in order to defend Haftar and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives from Operation Volcano Rage. Also, the Emiratis can be expected to lend support to Sissi in terms of logistics and air cover.

Dangerous game of chicken

There are no signs that Sissi’s threats are deterring the GNA-allied forces from continuing their eastward push. From a position of strength and with much momentum behind them, they are not seeking to enter round table talks with Haftar. The pro-GNA forces believe that Libya’s U.N.-recognized has the right to govern every inch of Libyan soil and that Haftar is a war criminal who must be defeated at all costs. From the GNA’s perspective, Sissi telling Libya’s internationally legitimized government what constitutes a “red line” is unacceptable.

On June 22, the GNA’s Defense Ministry issued a statement declaring that “it serves the interests of all brothers and friends to return Sirte and al-Jufra to the control of the state… We expect from all brothers and friends to support the legitimate government to achieve stability on the entire Libyan territory.”

Egypt, for its part, perceives a grave threat from the Muslim Brotherhood-linked factions and other Islamist actors who belong to the GNA and the militias that are loosely allied with the Tripoli-based government. As Sissi put it, an Egyptian military operation in Libya to push back against the GNA would “have international legitimacy” because his country would be fighting “threats from terrorist militias and mercenaries.” Like Abu Dhabi, the leadership in Cairo wants to see the Arab world as a Muslim Brotherhood-free region. Thus, Sissi’s regime does not want to have to live with a Turkish-friendly Islamist government in Libya that controls land along the Libyan-Egyptian border.

Implications for the West

Where is NATO amid this potential military confrontation between one its members and Egypt? The actors within this Western alliance are not at all on the same page.

France and Greece are sympathetic to the UAE and Egypt’s agendas in Libya. Both Paris and Athens have major problems with Ankara’s designs for the eastern Mediterranean. France has been a major sponsor of Haftar throughout the Libyan crisis, which has fueled significant friction between the French and Italians. Greece is supporting Haftar too, which fits into the country’s strategy for countering Turkish influence in the region, as does the recent Greek-Syrian rapprochement.

Italy is supportive of the GNA, which has contributed to a strengthening of Italian-Turkish relations. Rome’s perspective is that France has been totally misguided and reckless in backing Haftar, whose agenda in Libya is a major threat to Italy’s vital interest in stemming refugee flows across the Mediterranean. Like Qatar, Italy can be expected to give support in various forms to the GNA and, by extension, Turkey. However, one cannot expect the Italian military to enter the fray in order to boost Libya’s U.N.-recognized government if an Egyptian campaign against the GNA ensues amid the struggle for Sirte and Jufra.

Many are wondering if President Donald Trump’s administration would stand by America’s NATO ally, Turkey, or Egypt, which is ruled by his “favorite dictator.” The chances are good that Trump would not decisively side with one or the other. As is the case with countless international files, the Trump administration’s foreign policy is all over the map. Shortly after Haftar launched his westward offensive in April 2019, Trump spoke to Haftar by phone and congratulated him on his efforts to eradicate “terrorism.” Yet the administration has subsequently stressed its position that the GNA is Libya’s legitimate government and that Haftar is not a legitimate leader. Probably, the U.S. would give rhetorical support to the GNA, but not join Turkey in terms of giving arms to forces loyal to the Tripoli-based government.

An important Turkish objective in Libya has been to rally its NATO allies behind a pro-GNA agenda. In this regard, officials in Ankara may find themselves disappointed with a lack of support from the U.S. and other NATO members. At the same time, Egypt will likely receive strong support from many Arab League members, which the UAE will work hard to unite against Turkey’s actions in Libya as Abu Dhabi has done vis-à-vis Turkish military intervention in Syria and Iraq.

But the Egyptian military’s top brass is aware that entering Libya could easily lead to a nightmare. Turkey’s military has demonstrated its capabilities earlier this year in Idlib, and Turkish drones have also proven to be a huge factor turning the tide against Haftar in Libya beginning in late 2019 and early 2020. Egypt would likely find it difficult to decisively reverse the pro-GNA militias’ successes that have put Haftar on retreat. Additionally, against the backdrop of major terrorism and security challenges in the Sinai, an economy in horrible shape, and the COVID-19 pandemic, Sissi would be wise to reconsider his threats to intervene militarily in Libya.

Given these facts, the Turks and others in NATO must be hoping that Sissi is simply blowing hot air and sabre rattling. But if the Egyptian leader is not, the world may need to prepare for an Egyptian-Turkish war in Libya.

The post An Egyptian-Turkish War in Libya? appeared first on Responsible Statecraft.

China continues to lead the way in high-tech transportation, as it moves ahead with testing of the domestically-developed prototype magnetic-levitation train in Shanghai, China.org.cn reported. Designed with a top speed of 600 km per hour — nearly as fast as a commercial airliner — the testing prototype can check and optimize the key technologies and […]

The post China’s ‘floating’ maglev train in testing stage appeared first on Asia Times.

This article has been republished with permission from The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer.

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Nobel Prize-winning activist Malala Yousafzai, who moved to Britain after being shot for campaigning for girls’ education in Pakistan, described her joy Friday at graduating from Oxford University. Almost eight years after she was attacked by the Taliban on her school bus in the Swat Valley, the 22-year-old posted photos on Twitter of her celebrations […]

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De plus en plus de plateformes comme Netflix incitent à passer directement au film ou à la série suivante, en faisant l’économie du générique. Une hérésie, selon le compositeur britannique Daniel Pemberton. Il défend “un moment de contemplation essentiel”.

In December 2017, as Donald Trump was preparing to announce his intention to effectively recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, I warned of the risks of exaggerating the danger of such a move. If the protests die down after a few days, I cautioned, the United States and Israel would have made it clear that ignoring Palestinian rights really isn’t very consequential, and Palestinians will have been shown in no uncertain terms that diplomacy was a dead end. Sadly, that was all too prescient.

At the time, however, many observers were wringing their hands over the looming disaster. The region will explode, some said. The two-state solution will be dead, moaned others. And, of course, there were the warnings of a third Intifada. The Palestinian leadership eventually cut off all communication with Washington, but this has hardly been deemed a loss by either the Trump administration or the never-ending government of Benjamin Netanyahu.

None of the other feared outcomes came to pass, and U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital has become the new normal. Presumptive Democratic nominee Joe Biden has made it clear he will not reverse Trump’s action. And Israel’s ever-tightening occupation has continued merrily along ever since. So have its efforts to gradually improve ties with Gulf Arab countries. This has routinely been the case since the end of the second Intifada, dire warnings of disaster fail to materialize, and the cry of wolf has increasingly become a background buzz that is easily ignored.

Instead, what we see is a steady degradation of conditions for Palestinians and of their prospects for seeing their rights recognized in the near term. Will Israel’s plan to annex much of the West Bank follow the same pattern?

Pro-Israel lobbying groups seem to think this is different. AIPAC granted a special dispensation, an indulgence, if you will, for elected officials criticizing Israel’s annexation plan. Congressional Democrats took quick advantage of AIPAC’s temporary hall pass to call on Israel to shelve the annexation plan. But AIPAC also made it clear that they continued to oppose any practical measures to stop Israel. As a result, Democratic opposition is largely rhetorical, while the Republicans are generally following the uncertain lead of the Trump administration on the matter.

Still, even looking past the openness with which AIPAC dictated the boundaries regarding policy toward Israel, their behavior reflects real concern about how annexation will affect Israel’s standing in the public eye. That concern is not for the rights of the Palestinians, but for Israel’s ostensible democracy. Israel will be seen as an apartheid state, its supporters fear, and that will severely erode support for it in the long term.

Others express concern of a third Intifada, regional upheavals, the final nail in the two-state solution’s coffin — the familiar list of worries, and indeed maybe this will be the event that finally sets off such tremors. If it does, however, it will only be the last straw, not an historically unprecedented event.

In fact, annexation is important to Jewish settlers and their supporters precisely for its diplomatic and political value, not because it will change much on the ground. Israel already exercises control over all the areas it is considering annexing.

Annexation, in the Israeli parlance, means extending Israeli law over certain territories. But that law is already applied within the settlements, while Israel applies a hodgepodge of laws — some dating back to the days of Ottoman rule over Palestine, others to the days of Jordanian control of the West Bank, mixed with Israel’s own “emergency laws” and rules of engagement — to govern West Bank Palestinians, including those who live in Area A, the sites of so-called Palestinian “self-rule.”

As a result, little will change in the day to reality of Palestinian lives in the West Bank. That doesn’t mean they don’t care about annexation; it is deeply opposed among Palestinians, because it solidifies the system of apartheid that has defined Israel’s relationship to Palestinians under its rule, citizens and non-citizens, since the state was created. But in terms of daily life for Palestinians, the days after annexation will look much like the days before it.

Regional implications

Annexation would appear to threaten Israel’s ambitions to normalize its relations with its Arab neighbors. But, while this is likely a greater immediate concern than the effect on the Palestinians, it is narrower than it might seem.

Among the Persian Gulf states, annexation will certainly slow the progress toward normalizing relations for a while. But it won’t stop it, any more than Trump’s relocation of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem did, or any of Israel’s many moves to block diplomacy have done. There will be an initial response, a temporary halt in even the clandestine relations between the countries, perhaps, but in due course, business will resume. The lack of any visible change on the ground in the West Bank will facilitate accommodation to yet another “new normal.”

The one place where that might not be true is Jordan. King Abdullah II has warned the United States that he fears that annexation could cause significant conflict within Jordan, as well as between Jordan and Israel. While Jordan does not have census data, it is generally estimated that about half its population is of Palestinian descent. Annexation might change little on the ground, but for those millions of Palestinian refugees and Jordanian citizens of Palestinian heritage, it would mean the loss of what little hope they have for reclaiming their homeland. And they may well see the Jordanian government, with its fragile peace treaty with Israel, as complicit.

Normally, the United States is receptive to Jordanian concerns, but this moment features some unusual strain. Republicans want to extradite a Palestinian-Jordanian woman who proudly admitted to participating in a 2001 bombing of an Israeli pizza shop that claimed the lives of fifteen people, including an American woman. Ahlam Tamimi had been serving multiple life sentences in an Israeli prison when she was released as part of the exchange for captive Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in 2011.

But Jordan and the United States are in the process of negotiating an extradition treaty, and the lack of that mechanism — along with the fact that Tamimi is a popular talk radio personality — complicates matters. The understandable antipathy toward Tamimi, who reportedly was happy to have helped kill not only civilians, but young children, is countered by the fact that Israel set her free, making it problematic to her supporters that the U.S. would then try to re-imprison her for the same crime.

A bill passed in December places U.S. aid to Jordan in jeopardy if Tamimi is not extradited. This could complicate an already tangled situation for the Trump administration, which seems to be trying to tailor Israel’s annexation plans to maximize their electoral benefit in November.

This is the price we pay for a policy based on U.S. support for Israel rather than on the universal rights of both Israelis and Palestinians. Annexation should not be deemed right or wrong based on the vexations of the Israeli, Jordanian, or even the Palestinian leadership. Rather, it should be opposed because it is illegal, immoral, and unjust. Any other argument is either too weak or too cynical to prevail.

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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan gambled big in Libya and won big – so far. This victory portends important changes in the politics of the Mediterranean. For Turkey has succeeded not only in demonstrating its determination to become the dominant player in the Eastern Mediterranean, but also in showcasing its military prowess and wherewithal. The […]

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Tandis que les pays européens pleurent des dizaines de milliers de morts, l’archipel est sorti de la crise avec un nombre de morts étrangement faible. Du taux d’obésité aux mœurs sanitaires, en passant par l’immunité croisée, les facteurs qui entrent en ligne de compte sont nombreux.

Exilée au Canada, après des mois d’emprisonnement et de torture au Caire pour “immoralité” et “déviance”, Sarah Hegazi, la militante égyptienne de la cause LGBT, s’est donné la mort. Dans le monde arabe, c’est surtout la presse libanaise qui évoque son suicide et condamne la répression des homosexuels.

MANILA – In a major blow to Philippine press freedom and democracy, a regional trial court found Maria Ressa, founder of the independent Rappler news platform and perhaps the country’s most prominent journalist, guilty of violating a cyber libel law. The verdict, which has been roundly criticized as politically-motivated and aimed at stifling Rappler’s critical […]

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America’s pundits and politicians have largely concluded that a new Cold War with China — a period of intense hostility and competition falling just short of armed combat — has started. “Rift Threatens U.S. Cold War Against China,” as a New York Times headline put it on May 15th, citing recent clashes over trade, technology, and responsibility for the spread of Covid-19. Beijing’s decision to subject Hong Kong to tough new security laws has only further heightened such tensions. President Trump promptly threatened to eliminate that city-state’s special economic relationship with this country, while imposing new sanctions on Chinese leaders. Meanwhile, Democrats and Republicans in Congress are working together to devise tough anti-Chinese sanctions of their own.

For anyone who can remember the original Cold War, the latest developments may seem eerily familiar. They bring to mind what occurred soon after America’s World War II collaboration with the Soviets collapsed in acrimony as the Russians became ever more heavy-handed in their treatment of Eastern Europe. In those days, distrust only grew, while Washington decided to launch a global drive to contain and defeat the USSR. We seem to be approaching such a situation today. Though China and the U.S. continue to maintain trade, scientific, and educational ties, the leaders of both countries are threatening to sever those links and undertake a wide range of hostile moves.

Admittedly, some of the steps being discussed in Washington to punish China for its perceived bad behavior will have little immediate impact on the lives of Americans. A lot of the threats, in fact, may turn out to be little more than good old-fashioned chest thumping. Consider, for instance, the proposal floated by the top-ranking majority and minority members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Oklahoma Republican Jim Inhofe and Rhode Island Democrat Jack Reed, to fund a multibillion dollar “Pacific Deterrence Initiative” intended to bolster American forces in Asia. That effort, they avowed, will “send a strong signal to the Chinese Communist Party that the American people are committed to defending U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.”

Well, that was easy! All we, the taxpaying citizens of the United States, need to do in this opening salvo of a new Cold War is salute Congress as it funnels yet more billions of dollars to the usual defense contractors and thereby “send a signal” to Beijing that we will “defend U.S. interests” somewhere far across the globe. (Now there’s a moment to wave your American flag!)

But don’t count on such a moment lasting long, not if a new Cold War starts in earnest. A quick look back at the original one should remind us that we’ll all pay a price of some sort for intensifying hostility towards China (even if a hot war isn’t the result). Perhaps, then, it’s none too soon to consider how such a world would impact you and me.

A Feeble Economic Recovery

For most Americans, the first consequence of an intensifying Cold War could be a weaker than expected recovery from the Covid-19 economic meltdown. Anything that stands in the way of a swift rebound — and a new Cold War with China falls into that very category — would be bad news.

Unlike in the original Cold War, when Washington and Moscow maintained few economic ties, the U.S. and Chinese economies remain intertwined, contributing to the net wealth of both countries and benefiting this country’s export-oriented industries like agriculture and civilian aircraft production. Admittedly, such ties have also harmed blue-collar workers who have watched their jobs migrate across the Pacific and tech companies that have seen their intellectual property purloined by Chinese upstarts. Donald Trump stoked resentments over just such issues to get himself elected in 2016. Since then, he’s sought to disentangle the two economies, claiming we would be better off on our own. (America first!) As part of this drive, he’s already imposed stiff tariffs on Chinese imports and blocked Chinese firms from gaining access to American technology.

Feel free to argue about whether China has abused international trade rules, as Trump and his allies have charged, and whether imposing tariffs (paid for by American importers and consumers, not Chinese suppliers) is the best way to address that country’s economic rise. The key thing to note, however, is that economic growth in both places had slowed in the wake of Trump’s trade war even before Covid-19 hit. As 2019 drew to a close, in fact, the prospect of yet higher tariffs and intensified economic warfare was already dragging down the whole global economy.

And while some experts believe that a relaxation of tariffs and other steps to improve U.S.-China trade would stimulate the economy in tough times, Trump and his China hawks, led by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and White House trade adviser Peter Navarro, appear to view this moment as the perfect opportunity to double down on anti-Chinese measures. The president has already hinted that he’s prepared to order yet more tariffs on Chinese products and take other steps to hasten the “decoupling” of the two economies. “There are many things we could do,” he told Maria Bartiromo of Fox Business in mid-May. “We could cut off the whole relationship.”

Cut off the whole relationship? Some policymakers claim that such a decoupling would stimulate growth at home as American firms shifted manufacturing back to the United States and its close allies. This argument, however, ignores two key factors when it comes to Americans desperate for work now: first, many of the tasks currently performed by Chinese workers will be shifted to plants in Mexico, Thailand, Vietnam, and other low-cost manufacturing hubs; and second, any relocation of entire production lines to this country will take years to accomplish and, in the end, undoubtedly wind up employing more robots than workers. Bottom line: economically, an intensifying Cold War is guaranteed to scuttle any chances of a rapid recovery from the Coronavirus Depression, dampening employment prospects for millions of Americans.

Military Spending, Not Recovery Stimulus

And here’s another thing a new Cold War guarantees: a significant increase in military spending at a time of ballooning national debt and a desperate need for investment in domestic economic recovery.

By the end of June, unless Congress votes additional assistance, much of the $2.2 trillion in emergency pandemic relief voted by Congress will have been used up, leaving millions of jobless Americans and many small business owners in dire straits. Democrats in the House of Representatives did unveil a plan for an additional $3 trillion in emergency funding, including aid for struggling states and cities and another round of direct payments to citizens. White House officials and many Republicans insist, however, that any further giveaways to ordinary Americans will raise the federal debt to unsustainable levels (a problem that never worries them when it comes to tax cuts for corporations and the wealthy). So passing anything like that stimulus package appears ever less conceivable and July may leave millions of Americans unable to pay rent as well as other essential expenses.

When it comes to increased military spending, however, Republicans have no such qualms. Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas, for example, has introduced a $43 billion Forging Operational Resistance to Chinese Expansion (FORCE) Act. (Nifty title, huh?) Its goal, he claims, would be to “help thwart the Chinese Communist Party’s main geopolitical aim [of] pushing the United States out of the Western Pacific [and] achieving cross-strait unification with Taiwan via military force.” It includes, among other things, $3.9 billion for another Virginia-class submarine (that’s in addition to the $4.7 billion requested for such a sub in the Pentagon’s proposed 2021 budget) and $3 billion for more of one of the most expensive weapons systems in history, the F-35 jet fighter (and that’s in addition to the $4.6 billion requested for 48 of them in that same budget).

With the Democrats desperate to demonstrate their own anti-Chinese credentials, passage of the FORCE Act, or the somewhat more modest Pacific Deterrence Initiative introduced by Senators Reed and Inhofe, appears to be a sure thing. In fact, the need for yet more military funds may prove to be the Republican rationale for rejecting calls for additional pandemic relief.

But won’t higher military spending act as an economic stimulus, just as it did during World War II when it helped lift the United States out of the Great Depression?

Indeed, passage of the FORCE Act or a variant of it will pump additional money into the economy. But today’s military-industrial complex bears little relation to the one of 80 years ago when millions of workers were mobilized to churn out thousands of tanks and planes monthly in an all-out drive to defeat Nazi Germany. Nowadays, military hardware has become so complex that most of any dollar spent on a new plane, tank, or ship goes into specialized materials and computer systems, not armies of laborers. So the billions of dollars for one new submarine and additional F-35s are likely to generate only a few thousand extra jobs, while spending the same amounts on health care or elementary school education would generate many times that number.

Conscription

And then there’s the issue that should be on the minds of every young man and woman in America (along with their parents, grandparents, and loved ones): the draft.

In contrast to the original Cold War, young men in this country are no longer obliged to serve in the U.S. military, though they (and their female counterparts) may choose to do so, whether for patriotic reasons, economic need, or both. Even though the United States has been continuously involved in “forever wars” since the 9/11 attacks, the armed services have been able to use a variety of economic and educational incentives to keep the ranks filled (and avoid the public outcry over those wars that would surely have accompanied a draft). This was possible in part because the numbers of soldiers engaged in combat at any given moment was not huge in comparison to, say, the Korean or Vietnam War eras and because vast numbers of troops were no longer on tap to “contain” the Soviet Union in Europe.

A full-scale Cold War with China could, however, prove another matter entirely, even if Pentagon manpower requirements were somewhat diminished by U.S. troop withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq. Large force deployments will undoubtedly be needed to engage in a modern version of the “containment” of China, not to speak of deterring the further adventurism of Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Can this be done with an all-volunteer military? Not if tensions rise with Beijing.

Count on it: at some point, the question of conscription is bound to come up. So far, the Department of Defense has not opted for reinstating the draft — a move that would require congressional approval and undoubtedly ignite intense political debate of the sort top officials would prefer to avoid right now. Still, the leadership’s overarching guidance, the National Defense Strategy of 2018, made it quite clear that the United States must expect to face years of intense rivalry with its “great power competitors” and that such an epic struggle could well require the full mobilization of America’s war-making capabilities. “Long-term strategic competition [with China and Russia],” it claimed, “requires the seamless integration of multiple elements of national power.” Conscription was not specifically mentioned, but given the new focus on a rising China and a reckless Russia, it will be on the table sooner or later.

Repression and Discrimination

Another feature of the original Cold War that you should expect in a new one is an environment of repression, intolerance, and discrimination. In this case, it would be against Chinese-Americans, Chinese students and researchers currently in this country, and non-Chinese viewed as in any way beholden to that power. Sadly enough, signs of this have already emerged. Officials from the FBI and the National Security Council have, for instance, been dispatched to leading Ivy League universities to warn administrators against admitting or retaining Chinese students who may be collecting scientific and technical information to share with government-sponsored institutions at home. Concurrently, some 30 Chinese professors with ties to such institutions have had their visas denied, despite a history of collaboration with American academics. In a more dramatic move, the chair of Harvard University’s chemistry department, Charles Lieber, was arrested in January for failing to report income he had received from a Chinese university.

Many American academics have criticized such actions as an assault on academic freedom. Increasingly, however, U.S. officials insist that they represent a necessary component of the new Cold War. And while those officials also insist that our adversary in this struggle is the Chinese government or people associated with it (however tangentially), many Chinese-Americans are increasingly experiencing suspicion and hostility just for being Chinese. “Chinese-Americans feel targeted, and that’s really hurtful,” said Charlie Woo, a prominent Chinese-American businessman.

The experience of the first Cold War suggests that this sort of intolerance and repression will only increase with potentially chilling effects on intellectual freedom and the already deeply unsettled racial situation in this country.

Hot War

And never forget that cold wars always risk becoming hot ones. Looking back, it’s easy enough to remember those years of the U.S.-USSR standoff as a relatively war-free era, since the two superpowers were fearful that a direct conflict of any sort between them might spark an all-out thermonuclear conflagration, leaving a planet in ruins. In reality, though, both sides engaged in a grim assortment of bloody “proxy wars” — regional conflicts in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, among other places, involving troops from one superpower and local allies armed by the other. In addition, the U.S. and the Soviet Union nearly found themselves in direct conflict on several occasions. The most notable, of course, was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when Moscow installed nuclear-armed ballistic missiles in Cuba and the U.S. nearly went to war — which would probably have turned into a nuclear conflict — to remove them. Only a last-ditch negotiating effort by President John F. Kennedy and his Russian counterpart, Nikita Khrushchev, averted such an outcome.

It’s easy enough to imagine that both contemporary versions of such proxy conflicts and of the Cuban Missile Crisis could emerge from a growing confrontation with China. An incident on the Korean Peninsula, no matter how it was sparked, could quickly turn into just such a proxy war. The greatest danger, however, would be U.S. and Chinese forces facing off directly, perhaps due to a naval clash in the East or South China Sea.

At present, American and Chinese warships encounter each other on a regular basis in those waters, often coming within shooting (or even ramming) range. The U.S. Navy insists that it’s conducting permissible “freedom of navigation operations” (FRONOPS) in international waters. The Chinese — claiming ownership of, and often building up, the many small atolls and islets that dot those seas — accuse the American ships of infringing on their national maritime territory. On occasion, Chinese gunboats have sailed dangerously close to them, forcing them to shift course to avoid a collision. As such incidents multiply and tensions increase, the risk of a serious faceoff involving loss of life on one or both sides is bound to grow, possibly providing the spark for a full-scale military confrontation. And there can be no question of one thing: an intensifying Cold War with China will only increase the odds of such a thing happening.

No one can say at what point you or any of us will begin to feel the direct effects of this new Cold War, only that, as tensions and hostile acts heighten, the consequences will prove harsh indeed. So cheer now, if you approve of measures already taken to isolate and punish Beijing, but think carefully before you embrace a full-blown Cold War with China and all that it will entail.

This article has been republished with permission from TomDispatch.

The post The new Cold War with China appeared first on Responsible Statecraft.

Avec le confinement, il se trouve que je n’ai pas pu voir ma sœur depuis le nouvel an. Idem pour ma mère, qui de son côté s’est flingué le dos. Pour organiser une visioconférence de « consolation », j’ai redécouvert à quel point les webcam integrées dans les laptop sont affreuses. Et si on tentait le smartphone en guise de remplaçant ?

Il n’y a qu’à voir les rageux fans d’Apple gueuler sur la qualité médiocre (c’est même pire que ça : c’est moins bon qu’avant) de la cam intégrée aux derniers macbook pro qui coutent deux smic pour comprendre le problème : même chez Apple qui fait rarement dans le compromis, un composant pourtant peu onéreux par rapport au reste de la machine se retrouve être juste honteux. Apple, qui vante les qualités de son application Facetime, qui utilise une source vidéo affreuse, ça fait tâche dans le tableau.

Mais il ne faut pas croire que le problème est spécifique à la marque à la pomme, sans vouloir aller jusqu’à des webcam 4k60fps intégrées (on a pas souvent les réseaux pour envoyer une telle image, sans parler de la décoder à l’autre bout de la « ligne »), la différence flagrante de la qualité des webcams comparées aux évolutions constantes année après année des capteurs de smartphone me rend perplexe, à croire qu’on ne peut pas capitaliser sur ces évolutions. Je suis de près l’apparition des modèles de laptop qui sortent avec une plateforme Ryzen 4000 (partie CPU de Ryzen 3000 et GPU Vega en 7nm), et le constat est le même à chaque fois : quelque soit la cible de l’appareil, la webcam est au maximum en 720p 30fps, ce qui est désormais limite en 2020. Je demande pas la lune, mais avoir au moins du fullHD avec en bonus, sur les hauts de gamme, du 60FPS, me parait loin d’être impossible ni trop cher en 2020, non ?

Arrive quand même l’horreur : la webcam du PC de ma mère. Un modèle 17″ Asus à base de Core i3 4000m d’il y a donc six ans, fourni avec Windows 8.1, dont la webcam est sobrement intitulée « USB Camera ». Le mieux que j’ai pu apprendre est qu’elle est fabriquée par Realtek, mais je n’ai rien trouvé d’autre comme référence ni pilote, car c’est celui de Microsoft qui est utilisé, et qui date de… 2006. Vous la sentez la merde ?

Voilà, et encore, c’est une image fixe, en 640×480 donc, la résolution que j’utilisais pour mon écran en 2002. Et je vous épargne la photo le soir avec 4 fois moins de lumière. Dans la pratique en vidéo si on arrive à obtenir 10 images par seconde c’est tout le bout du monde. Alors imaginez quand un Skype vous étire ça sur l’intégralité de votre écran 16 pouces (celui de ma sœur), ça donne quelque chose de tellement immonde que je renonce à vous l’afficher, pour préserver votre santé mentale et visuelle.

Le smartphone en remplacement ?

J’avais déjà eu cette idée dans le passé, sans avoir été au bout de la démarche en cherchant et en testant, mais avec l’idée de la comparaison naturelle entre la qualité d’image des smartphones même d’entrée de gamme (en gros, pour le prix d’une Logitech StreamCam, on a un smartphone 4G complet avec un écran de 6″…),  cette expérimentation a naturellement refait surface. Entre le débit d’image, la résolution, la gestion de la lumière bien plus optimale, les possibilités éventuelles sur le zoom et j’en passe, bref, c’est une aventure qui se tente.

J’ai donc eu l’occasion de faire le test sur deux ordiphones différents : mon Huawei P20 Lite dont il est prévu que je vous donne des nouvelles pour ses deux ans, et le Huawei Y5 version 2019. Mais tout smartphone Android un peu récent fera l’affaire, pour peu qu’il ait un peu de patate quand même, parce qu’on a vu la différence entre les deux déjà, on va le voir.

DroidCam, l’application de référence

Malgré son nom, DroidCam est techniquement disponible sur Android et iOS, et les applications PC Windows ET Linux sont également de la partie. Oui oui, aussi pour Linux, mais j’ai eu l’occasion de faire le test d’abord sur Windows, comme ça pas de jaloux.

Pour rappel, l’application fonctionne en deux parties : la partie installée sur mobile capture l’image du téléphone et crée un « serveur vidéo », qu’on peut ensuite soit consulter directement dans un navigateur (on a que l’image), soit contacter via l’appli client sur PC qui va créer une webcam virtuelle pour y transmettre le flux récupéré sur le téléphone. On peut aussi capturer le son du smartphone, mais pour avoir tenté de faire un comparatif, la qualité du micro ambiant du smartphone n’est pas forcément plus agréable que le micro intégré du laptop, et on est toujours à des années lumière des micro-casques donc… Deux modes de fonctionnement sont possibles, le premier simple via le wifi/réseau local, le deuxième via USB qui demande un peu plus de manipulations que je n’ai pas testé.

Premier constat : les devs sont bons, les applications aussi bien mobiles que PC sont simples et très fonctionnelles. Par contre, leur site web c’est de la merde en barre : aucun menu de navigation, ni de moteur de recherche, on doit sauter de page en page pour tenter de trouver nos informations (j’en ai surtout eu besoin pour la partie Linux, j’y reviendrai). On se croirait revenu sur un de mes premiers essais de site web en 1998 en cours d’informatique en seconde.

Deuxième constat : l’application mobile existe en deux versions, une « gratuite » et une payante. Je mets gratuite entre guillemets parce qu’on sait que désormais, l’affichage de publicité n’a rien d’innocent et désintéressé dans l’univers Google et du Web en général. Pire, et là c’est vraiment gonflé de leur part, la résolution du flux vidéo du smartphone est limitée, dans la version gratuite, à 640×480. On garde les autres avantages comme la gestion de la lumière et la fluidité relative à la puissance du smartphone, mais merde, on est plus en 2002. La version payante propose en plus une tétrachiée d’options supplémentaires qui permettent de contrôler plusieurs éléments du smartphone directement depuis l’appli, comme le zoom, l’autofocus, la balance des blancs, l’allumage du flash, etc, mais ils auraient au moins pu amener le 720p par défaut quoi !

Usage sous Windows, avec le laptop de ma mère

Comme je l’ai évoqué, l’application est simple, efficace, s’installe sans pourrir votre PC. On aimerait voir des freeware comme ça plus respectueux de nos machines en 2020 ! L’interface est simple, on lance, on saisit l’adresse IP du téléphone (et le port si on s’est amusé à le changer), et une seconde après on a l’image qui doit s’afficher, sauf si on a laissé le téléphone sur la table évidemment Mais il suffit dès lors de cadrer l’image qu’on souhaite partager. En fonction des téléphones et de l’usage final, on peut poser le « capteur » contre l’écran , ça masquera une petite partie de celui-ci mais si on n’a rien à manipuler en paralèlle, ça peut le faire.

Ensuite sous Skype, on sélectionne la webcam « DroidCam » et on constate le résultat :

On a la même résolution, mais on est à des années lumière en termes de qualité et de fluidité. Ma sœur me l’a fait remarquer quand on s’est amusé à faire un comparatif entre les deux En clair, solution validée, même pour ma maman quand elle se retrouvera autonome pour ça.

Usage sous Linux, laptop pro et perso (c’est pareil)

Pareil parce que les deux sont sous Manjaro, la seule différence c’est que sur le PC du boulot je suis resté en noyau 4.19, alors que sur mon perso c’est du noyau 5.4. Oui, que du LTS. Je vous expliquerai probablement pourquoi sur le laptop du boulot j’ai du revenir au 4.19 en 2020, c’est marrant aussi. Enfin dans les deux cas, j’ai pu faire fonctionner le système sans trop de problèmes, mais évidemment, ça n’a pas été aussi fluide que sous Windows. L’installation aucun souci, via AUR c’est d’une simplicité absolue. Mais la suite…

D’abord, le module noyau v4l2loopback-dc qui permet de créer la webcam virtuelle n’est pas chargé par défaut, il faut manuellement « modprober » ce qui se fait en mode administrateur. On a vu plus souple, le point positif c’est que le module est fourni via DKMS il est donc mis à jour proprement en cas d’update noyau. Et c’est là en fait que j’ai découvert la limitation de la résolution, le module crée par défaut une webcam en 640×480, même si le flux est en résolution supérieure. Il faut aller modifier, toujours en mode administrateur, le fichier de configuration du module pour changer les paramètres (pensez à créer le fichier chez vous s’il n’existe pas déjà) :

#cat /etc/modprobe.d/v4l2loopback-dc.conf
options v4l2loopback_dc width=960 height=720

Ensuite décharger le module (modprobe -r), et le recharger, parce qu’évidemment les paramètres ne sont pas pris à chaud. Et attention, si on met une sortie qui n’est pas dans le même format que la source, l’image est déformée. Dans mon cas j’ai quand même poussé jusqu’à 720p, ça étire un peu le flux d’origine mais comme je garde le ratio, c’est moins dégueulasse. On constate quand même une légère augmentation du bruit visible en faible luminosité.

Ensuite, la gestion du son est encore à part et vu les manipulations de la documentation j’ai abandonné direct. On parle de module Alsa, qui reste semble-t-il toujours aux commandes alors qu’on manipule pulseaudio au quotidien, donc j’ai du mal à comprendre comment ça fonctionne. 2020, et la gestion du son sous Linux a encore 20 ans de retard sur Windows, et on se demande pourquoi Linux ne s’impose toujours pas…

Enfin, une fois la partie « bas niveau » en place, on peut lancer l’application qui a exactement la même tête que sous Windows, donc adresse IP à saisir, et ensuite, on sélectionne la caméra dans Skype/Teams. La bonne surprise cependant, c’est que là où dans l’application Windows on me dit que les contrôles sont réservés à la version DroidCamX (donc payante), sous Linux je peux contrôler le zoom, l’autofocus et le flash  Sur le laptop boulot on a donc une webcam avec la même résolution, mais l’ouverture est plus large, l’image plus fine et lumineuse et la fluidité un peu meilleure. Sur le laptop perso, la webcam fait déjà du 720p avec une gestion relativement propre de la lumière, la fluidité n’est pas parfaite mais ça peut suffire pour des petites visio-conférences. Y’a quand même du bruit donc faut pas être exigeant sur la qualité de l’image.

L’alternative qui n’a pas fonctionné pour moi

J’ai cherché à voir si une option permettant une meilleure qualité sans devoir balancer sa carte bancaire à Google existait. Il semblerait, elle s’appelle Iriun Webcam, dont le fonctionnement est siimilaire à savoir appli mobile+appli desktop. Il permet d’exploiter la 4K si le téléphone le permet, mais de mon côté, j’ai rencontré beaucoup de problèmes. Déjà, l’installation avec le paquet AUR déconne parce que le md5 de l’archive téléchargée par le script d’installation n’est pas le même. Les développeurs n’ont pas spécialement envie de penser qu’on est sur PC et qu’on a besoin de contrôles de versions, donc j’ai tenté l’installation à la main (on clone le dépot AUR, on modifie le PKGBUILD, et makepkg -si dans la foulée). Mais une fois v4l2loobpack manuellement chargé au niveau du noyau (module officiel pour faire une webcam virtuelle) et le logiciel lancé, ben écran noir sur la capture, pourtant le smartphone indique bien que la connexion est établie. Aussi, le flux semble coupé très très régulièrement, du coup, au bout d’un quart d’heure de manipulations sans résultat, j’ai lâché l’affaire.

Je ne l’ai pas testé non plus sous Windows, si vous avez expérimenté avec hésitez pas à partager, à ce moment de l’histoire j’ai décidé que j’avais autre chose à faire que de débugger des applis qui ne me donnent déjà pas beaucoup d’infos sur leur fonctionnement.

Ça manque cruellement d’open-source

Car oui, tous les éléments testés ici ne sont pas open-source. Et c’est un vrai problème des deux côtés, aussi bien au niveau du smartphone où l’on dépend du store fermé de Google ou d’Apple, que du côté du PC où l’on ne peut pas forcément s’assurer que l’application n’en fait pas un peu trop, pour un logiciel qui a accès à la webcam. Sur Linux, comme ça dépend d’un module noyau (modifié dans le cas de DroidCam), c’est un peu tendu pour s’assurer du suivi du bon support lors des montées de version (même si globalement l’infrastructure v4l2 est assez stable).

Il y a bien eu une application appelée SmartCam, dont les fichiers sont toujours disponibles, mais elle n’a pas été mise à jour depuis 2013 voire plus vieux encore pour certains, et autant dire que ça commence à faire vraiment trop dans le monde de l’informatique.

En attendant, et vu la qualité du résultat même avec une résolution décevante avec la version gratuite, vous avez une solution de rechange pour les webcam intégrées aux laptop, ou pour votre PC de bureau. Y’a juste un truc que j’ai pas vraiment abordé : le fait qu’il faut poser le téléphone dans une position pas trop désavantageuse pour votre visage

PS : c’est évident pour certains, mais je rappelle que si vous êtes moche comme moi à la base, une bonne webcam ou un bon smartphone n’y changera rien. On verra juste mieux à quel point vous êtes moche

Rohingya refugees infected with coronavirus are fleeing quarantine in their Bangladesh camps because they fear being transferred to an isolated island in the Bay of Bengal, community leaders said Thursday. At least two infected refugees have gone missing since testing positive for the virus after the first Covid-19 death was reported Tuesday, they said. About […]

The post Infected Rohingya refugees fleeing quarantine appeared first on Asia Times.

L'influence dominante de la Chine en Asie du Sud-Est vient de subir deux revers importants. Les Philippines ont décidé de revenir sur leur décision d'abroger le traité militaire qui les lie aux États-Unis. Par ailleurs, le Cambodge refuse de céder à la marine chinoise le port en eau profonde de Ream qui fait face au Golfe de Thaïlande.

Vietnam has been an anomaly for many outsiders throughout the Covid-19 pandemic. How has a developing country with limited health infrastructure appeared to have pulled off the impossible? Others have outlined the methods used to contain the virus, and whatever your thoughts about them, Vietnam has, once again, proved effective in fending off its latest intruder. […]

The post Vietnam won’t offer Covid privileges to the rich appeared first on Asia Times.

Japan may wield its significant voting power at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to prevent Lebanon from receiving a multi-billion dollar bailout, should Beirut continue to shelter former auto executive Carlos Ghosn, a Nissan lawyer has told the Arab News. “Without handing over Carlos Ghosn, the IMF will not give Lebanon any money,” said Sakher […]

The post Japan could link IMF Lebanon aid to Ghosn return appeared first on Asia Times.

In his infinite ignorance, Donald Trump has invited world leaders to the White House for a face-to-face meeting at the end of June.

Unlike the other countries in the G7, the United States has yet to get the coronavirus pandemic under control. One of the hotspots that the White House itself has identified is none other than Washington, DC. And because of a poorly implemented re-opening of the economy, the American South is already beginning to experience a second wave of infections — in parts of Florida, Alabama, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Texas – that will gather force by the end of June because Trump refuses to consider another lockdown.

Meanwhile, the president himself is reluctant to practice social distancing or even don a mask: “Wearing a face mask as I greet presidents, prime ministers, dictators, kings, queens — I just don’t see it,” he said back in April. He peddles snake-oil treatments for COVID-19 that, incredibly, he swallows himself. The virus has already penetrated his inner sanctum.

As if that’s not bad enough, I wouldn’t put it past Trump to add three stops on a G7 itinerary — a nursing home, a prison, and a meat-packing plant — just to demonstrate that the United States is open for business (or to infect the world leaders that he has always despised).

Aside from French President Emanuel Macron, these world leaders have not jumped at the chance to set foot in the global epicenter of the pandemic. Naturally, they’re concerned about their own health.

Really they should be concerned about the health of American democracy. Instead of giving Donald Trump the legitimacy on the world stage that he so desperately craves, the leaders of the other G7 nations should be considering a boycott of the United States. They should threaten to sanction America as well, for that is the only language Trump understands.

The G7 has done it before — with Russia. In March 2014, after it annexed Crimea, Russia was indefinitely expelled from what was then the G8. The United States, the European Union, and several other countries also imposed economic sanctions on Moscow because of its actions in Ukraine. Most of those sanctions are still in place.

Trump hasn’t invaded and annexed any foreign territory, though he’s been eying Greenland for some time now. But under Trump, the United States has violated several international laws, unraveled numerous international agreements, and trampled on one democratic institution after another at home. He is a rogue president in a rogue party presiding over a rogue power.

As the president attempts to extend his reign of error to a second term, the international community should consider sending a message to the American people: Donald Trump is an illegitimate leader who is a threat to the planet. Mere criticism of the United States is not enough. The G7 should get the ball rolling by refusing to meet with Trump, in Washington or anywhere else.

I anticipate the Twitter backlash: Isn’t it unpatriotic for Americans to call for a boycott of their own country?

Quite the contrary. It’s proof of just how far patriotic Americans are willing to go to save our country and stop the violations of international law.

Violations at the Border

In one of the first acts of his administration, Trump issued a ban on travel to the United States from seven countries, all of them predominantly Muslim.

Federal courts almost immediately blocked the executive order. Trump reissued an almost identical travel ban. The courts blocked him a second time. Trump tried a third time, throwing in North Korea and Venezuela to obscure the intention of the order. Although the federal court system again blocked the Muslim ban, the Supreme Court allowed the administration to implement the policy as it reviewed the case. In June 2018, the Supreme Court upheld the ban 5-4.

Although the Supreme Court has decided by a slim margin that Trump’s action is legal in the U.S. context, his Muslim travel ban remains a violation of international law. It flouts all the UN conventions against discrimination, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also violates the Refugee Convention. Imagine the uproar if a country promoted a Christian travel ban. The United States would be first in line to apply sanctions.

But the Muslim travel ban was just the first volley in the administration’s attack on border crossers and international law.

Within a few months of taking office, the Trump administration began to tear apart migrant families. Before the courts could intervene, over 4,000 children were separated from their parents. Even worse, the administration did not track these family separations, so it couldn’t guarantee that children could reunite with their families. Even when a judge blocked the policy in June 2018, the administration continued its “zero-tolerance” policy, simply under a different name, and separated another 1,100 children from their families.

This is not just a violation of international law. It’s a moral outrage.

It’s gotten even worse. During the pandemic crisis, the administration has violated U.S. anti-trafficking laws by expelling hundreds of young people from the country. Write Nomaan Merchant and Sonia Perez in The Washington Post:

“Under a 2008 anti-trafficking law and a federal court settlement known as the Flores agreement, children from countries other than Canada and Mexico must have access to legal counsel and cannot be immediately deported. They are also supposed to be released to family in the U.S. or otherwise held in the least restrictive setting possible. The rules are intended to prevent children from being mistreated or falling into the hands of criminals.”

Even before the pandemic hit, the administration was violating non-refoulement laws. In July 2019, the administration changed its asylum policies to force the desperate to apply for asylum in a third country before reaching the United States.

The result has been the wholesale rejection of asylum claims. Only 1 percent of applicants under the Migrant Protection Protocols had been granted asylum through the end of January, and only two people have been granted refuge since March. According to the principle of non-refoulement, asylum-seekers can’t be returned to countries where they might face persecution.

The July 2019 action was only the latest barrier the administration has placed before asylum-seekers, all of which constitute violations of the non-refoulement principle. In November 2018, Trump attempted to block all asylum seekers from entering the United States through Mexico. A federal court ruled the policy illegal and prevented him from doing so.

This March, the administration tried again, using the pandemic as a new rationale. It generated pushback, but the administration shut down the possibility of asylum anyway. And it has started sending asylum-seekers back as part of the “Remain in Mexico” program.

Taken together, the Trump policies on immigration, refugee, and asylum policies are a massive affront to decades of patiently constructed international laws.

Targeted Assassination

So many people have been assassinated by U.S. drones that Americans have become dangerously inured to this violation of international law.

The Obama administration was responsible for the expansion of this program. But Trump has expanded even on Obama’s expansion. Worse, according to a new policy implemented last year, the administration no longer reports on the number of drone strikes and resulting civilian casualties outside of active warzones, which include Pakistan and Somalia.

Whether these drone strikes constitute a violation of international law hinges on whether they represent assassination, which is illegal, or lawful targeting in armed conflict. If the latter, they are permissible if done in self-defense or as approved by the United Nations. According to these standards, administration officials argue that the drone strikes the United States conducts in a warzone — for example, Afghanistan — are indistinguishable from more conventional aerial bombing.

But because so many U.S. drone strikes take place outside war zones where the United States is a declared combatant, international law experts like Philip Alston, former UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killing, have concluded that they often violate international law. Alston was particularly concerned about the CIA’s role in conducting drone strikes, which the Obama administration eventually scaled back after steadily increasing them. Trump, however, has reversed Obama’s policy.

Most of Trump’s drone strikes have been quiet and anonymous, at least so far as the U.S. media is concerned. The targets have also been, for the most part, non-state actors, so-called terrorists. The assassination in January of Qassem Soleimani, the head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was a different matter. He was a representative of a state with which the United States is not at war. The Trump administration might consider him a “terrorist.” But according to international law, the drone strike that killed him was an assassination, no different than if a U.S. attack had taken out Iran’s president.

The Trump administration claimed that the strike was done in “self-defense,” that Soleimani was planning an attack or attacks on U.S. targets. But it did not furnish any real proof of these imminent attacks. Soleimani’s past record, however noxious, does not constitute sufficient legal rationale for assassination.

Other Trump administration military actions have also violated international law, such as the 59 Tomahawk missiles it rained down on Syria in April 2017. The administration didn’t even bother to seek UN authorization. Nor did it do so a year later when it launched another missile attack on Syria in response to the government’s alleged use of chemical weapons.

The Trump administration could have argued that it was protecting a civilian population from extermination. But the missile attack came before a fact-finding mission could determine whether chemical weapons had been used. In any case, neither then nor subsequently has the Trump administration seemed to care much about protecting the lives of Syrian civilians.

But these Syrian attacks point to another reason to boycott the United States: the Trump administration’s fundamental disregard for international institutions and agreements.

International Agreements Sundered

The Trump administration has been gradually ripping up the international arms control regime that has been in place for decades.

First, it stepped away from the Iran nuclear agreement, which blocked the country’s path to acquiring nuclear weapons. Last year, it withdrew from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Agreement, a high point of U.S.-Russian efforts at arms limitation. And then, last week, it announced it would no longer participate in the Open Skies agreement, another landmark achievement to prevent accidental war that was negotiated in 1992.

Meanwhile, Trump wants to resume testing nuclear weapons, something that hasn’t happened in nearly 30 years. Technically, because the United States is not party to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Trump’s action would not violate an international agreement. But if the United States were to go ahead with a test, it would put enormous stress on the CTBT, which 184 nations have signed.

The administration’s arms control policy has become positively Orwellian. Trump’s arms control envoy Marshall Billingslea, for instance, seems to believe mistakenly that he was appointed head of the Pentagon. “We know how to win these [arms] races and we know how to spend the adversary into oblivion,” he said in a recent videoconference. What part of “control” does he not understand?

In addition to abandoning arms control, the Trump administration has hindered efforts to control carbon emissions by trashing the Paris climate accord. It has withdrawn from the UN Human Rights Council. It quit UNESCO. It has threatened to leave the World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization.

So, at what point does the international community decide that it has been attacked enough to strike back in self-defense? A boycott and economic sanctions seem more than justified given these three areas of violations: international human rights law, the laws governing the use of force, and the deliberate destruction of international agreements and institutions.

The Downsides of Boycott?

Okay, so what if the Trump administration deserves to be boycotted. That doesn’t mean that it’s strategically wise to do so.

After all, if all the globalists gang up on Trump, won’t that create a rally-around-the-president effect just in time for the November election? The very tactic designed to delegitimate Trump might end up boosting his reelection prospects.

Then there’s the perennial problem that name-and-shame tactics often don’t work with people or countries that refuse to be shamed. Virtually the entire international community agrees that the human rights situation in North Korea is abysmal. But the North Korean state doesn’t really care about the reputational damage it suffers as a result of all the official protests, UN inquiries, and grassroots campaigns. Trump seems to be similarly unshameable.

Finally, there is the challenge of collective action. The United States, despite its current difficulties, remains a powerful global actor. It’s not easy to pull together a coalition in the face of an administration determined to make deals with specific countries to destroy the unanimity required to implement a boycott and sanctions.

The first two counter-arguments are unpersuasive. At this point, nothing the international community can do will significantly alter Trump’s approval ratings. He has played his nationalism card so many times that the gambit can no longer win fresh converts. But there are still some independents and perhaps even some Republicans who would be swayed if the rest of the G7 censured the United States. These swing voters might still feel shame, too, if the international community repeatedly broadcasts the administration’s multiple violations of international law.

But let’s face it, the collective action problem is probably insurmountable. The G7 nations don’t have the guts to stand up to the United States. Trump acts with impunity, and they appease him. Thanks to the Chamberlains of the world, Trump has celebrated a Munich practically every day of his administration.

So, it’s up to popular movements to challenge Trump’s illegal actions and the international community’s appeasement of them. In developing a Boycott, Divest, Sanction campaign against the Trump administration, activists can take inspiration from the groups that worked with South Africans in the 1980s to bring down their apartheid regime.

I know, I know: everyone is hoping that Americans will solve this problem ourselves in November. But that might not happen.

So, people of the world, you’d better build your BDS box, paint “Break Glass in Case of Emergency” on the front, and stand next to it on November 3. If Trump wins on Election Day, it will be mourning in America. But let’s hope that the world doesn’t mourn: it organizes.

This article has been republished with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus.

The post Is it time to boycott the United States? appeared first on Responsible Statecraft.

« Résilience » : c'est le nom à la mode, donné à l'opération militaire de soutien à la mobilisation hospitalière contre l'épidémie de coronavirus, en France. Mais c'est aussi une potion que les armées auraient pu s'administrer d'abord à elles-mêmes. « Ce pourrait être l'armée américaine qui a apporté l'épidémie à Wuhan. Soyez transparents : rendez vos données publiques. Les États-Unis nous doivent une explication ! ». Ce tweet, le 12 mars dernier, de Zhao Lijian, nouveau porte-parole très offensif du ministère chinois des (...)

- Défense en ligne / Armée, Défense, Santé, France, Politique

Kishore Mahbubani est singapourien. Mais contrairement à la très grande majorité de ses compatriotes, il n’est pas d’origine chinoise. Il est Sindhi Hindou, une population hindoue originaire du Pakistan. En 1947, ses parents ont fui les persécutions qui ont accompagné la partition entre l’Inde et le Pakistan pour se réfugier à Singapour où il est né, en 1948. Il a été diplomate, notamment aux Nations Unies. Il est maintenant professeur à l’Université. C’est l’un des commentateurs les plus influents de la vie internationale.

Dans son ouvrage Has China Won ? Kishore Mahbubani nous explique que, dans la compétition que se livrent la Chine et les États-Unis, même si ces derniers sont toujours en tête, la Chine marque plus de points parce qu’elle fait moins d’erreurs que son rival outre-Pacifique. Pendant la guerre froide, l’Union soviétique est parvenue à atteindre, au mieux, 40% du PIB des États-Unis. Aujourd’hui la Chine est déjà à 60% et l’écart se resserre constamment.

Pour Kishore Mahbubani, la principale erreur de la Chine est de fermer son marché et de ne pas appliquer réellement les règles du commerce international. Depuis son entrée à l’OMC en 2001, la Chine a décuplé son PIB. Elle ne peut donc plus réclamer la protection similaire à celle d’un pays en voie de développement dont elle bénéficiait lors de son adhésion. Selon Kishore Mahbubani, le fait d’exercer des barrières non tarifaires et de ne pas respecter la propriété intellectuelle prive également la chine de soutien à l’étranger. Enfin, il note que la Chine ne doit pas sous-estimer les États-Unis, toujours capables de rebonds.

Cela étant, les États-Unis sont eux-mêmes coupables de nombreuses erreurs, selon Mahbubani. Pour l’auteur singapourien, ils devraient arbitrer entre le désir de faciliter la vie des 330 millions d’Américains et le fait de vouloir conserver la suprématie mondiale. Ces deux objectifs sont selon lui incompatibles car cela amène Washington à augmenter ses dépenses militaires de façon exponentielle alors que la Chine ne tombe pas dans ce piège. Elle a en effet compris que l’Union soviétique avait implosé en voulant suivre les États-Unis et ne veut pas commettre cette erreur. L’augmentation constante des dépenses militaires américaines est une erreur parce, selon Kishore Mahbubani, ce n’est pas par des moyens militaires que la rivalité entre Pékin et Washington se règlera. Une guerre conduirait à la destruction mutuelle des deux pays. C’est donc bien par la voie diplomatique que le conflit trouvera une solution. Dès lors, à quoi bon détenir plusieurs milliers d’armes nucléaires pour les États-Unis ? Les quelques centaines que possède la Chine suffisent à dissuader ces derniers. Un porte-avion américain coûte 13 milliards de dollars. L’ancien diplomate singapourien met en avant le fait que pour quelques centaines de milliers de dollars, le missile DF-26 peut le détruire.

Kishore Mahbubani est aussi très critique concernant le système diplomatique américain. Puisque c’est au niveau diplomatique que la compétition se joue, le fait d’engager dans les ambassades américaines les plus importantes des amis du pouvoir, ayant contribué financièrement à la campagne électorale, prive les talents de la diplomatie américaine de véritables postes. L’horizon est obscurci pour les diplomates américains qui ne peuvent rêver que de postes secondaires pendant que des amis du pouvoir sont nommés aux postes les plus prestigieux. Finalement, la diplomatie américaine souffre de ce système. Kishore Mahbubani estime qu’en misant tout sur le critère militaire, les États-Unis se comportent aujourd’hui comme l’Union soviétique au temps de la guerre froide et, en s’épuisant, donnent un avantage compétitif à la Chine qui, pour sa part, se conduit comme les États-Unis du temps de la guerre froide.

Le constat est le même au niveau diplomatique. La politique chinoise s’appuie sur les institutions internationales alors que Trump veut les détruire. Selon Kishore Mahbubani, la Chine est majoritaire à l’assemblée générale des Nations Unies alors que les États-Unis sont désormais beaucoup plus isolés.

Certes il y a l’argument démocratique. Les États-Unis sont une démocratie tandis que la Chine ne l’est pas. Là aussi Kishore Mahbubani vient prendre à rebours cet argument avec des arguments propres à un non-occidental. Il fait remarque d’abord qu’alors que la population chinoise est quatre fois plus importante que la population américaine, il y a 2 200 000 prisonniers aux États-Unis alors qu’il n’y en a que 1 600 000 en Chine. Il note aussi que s’il y avait une démocratie en Chine, le peuple élirait plutôt un leader agressif comme Trump et non pas un leader démocratique comme Obama.

Sa critique la plus fondamentale de la démocratie américaine concerne le mode de financement. L’auteur explique que les États-Unis ont une loi anticorruption pour l’étranger, le Foreign Corrupt Practicies Act. Cette loi stipule que si l’on verse de l’argent à des décideurs étrangers pour influencer leurs décisions, de lourdes pénalités sont infligées. Il explique qu’en réalité, depuis la fin de la limitation des dépenses électorales pour les campagnes, décidée par la Cour Suprême en 2010, on permet aux États-Unis ce que l’on interdit à l’étranger. Finalement toutes les donations, faites par les contributeurs, viennent influencer les décisions politiques et le poids de l’argent limite la démocratie américaine.

Toujours provocateur, Kishore Mahbubani affirme que la Chine n’est pas expansionniste. Lorsque l’Angleterre l’a conquise, l’Australie était à 90 jours de mer. La Chine n’était qu’à 30 jours et n’a pourtant pas essayé de conquérir les terres australiennes. Par ailleurs, il souligne que la Chine ne rendra évidemment jamais le Tibet et le Xinjiang, mais les États-Unis ne rendront pas non plus le Texas et la Californie. En fait, le PCC est ancré dans la civilisation chinoise plus que dans le marxisme-léninisme. Et depuis 2 000 ans, jamais les Chinois n’ont été aussi heureux que lors des 30 dernières années.

L’universitaire singapourien cite Kissinger qui met en avant le fait que les Chinois jouent plutôt au jeu de go où il faut patiemment encercler un adversaire, alors que les Occidentaux préfèrent le jeu d’échecs où il faut conquérir le roi le plus vite possible.

Enfin, le problème majeur est que le seul élément de consensus aux États-Unis est finalement l’opposition au péril jaune. J. Biden et D. Trump sont d’accord là-dessus et même George Soros, qui a financé très largement des campagnes pour tenter d’empêcher l’élection de Donald Trump, approuve sa politique antichinoise. Ce consensus aux États-Unis à propos de la lutte contre la montée en puissance de la Chine paraît extrêmement dangereux pour Kishore Mahbubani, qui estime que les Américains feraient mieux de chercher à conserver un niveau de vie et le bien-être de leur population plutôt que de lutter pour cette suprématie. Il considère que jamais, dans l’histoire doublement millénaire de la Chine, les Chinois n’ont été aussi heureux et même, dit-il, jamais aussi libres. Finalement, ils jouissent d’une certaine liberté, ils peuvent par exemple voyager à l’étranger. Bien sûr, ils donnent la priorité à la lutte contre le chaos. En Chine, l’ordre et la sécurité priment la liberté telle qu’elle est conçue dans le monde occidental.

 

Un livre très stimulant, qui nourrit le débat par l’originalité et la vigueur de ses arguments.

 

Cet article est également disponible sur MediapartLeClub.

Like other authoritarian regimes around the globe, the government in Egypt is exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic. Under the guise of fighting the coronavirus, it is cracking down on critics and imposing more restrictions on personal freedoms. Egypt’s repressive regime, led by General Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, has taken several political measures over the last two months ostensibly to control the outbreak of the disease. These actions will have a long-term impact on Egypt’s political life that goes beyond the coronavirus crisis. Externally, Sisi is employing the pandemic as a way to score political points and improve his regime’s image on the international stage. Since the global outbreak of COVID-19, Egypt has dispatched medical shipments to a number of countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, China, and Italy. The irony of sending these supplies out of the country while Egypt itself is grappling with fighting the coronavirus is striking. In fact, Egypt’s politicization and exploitation of the coronavirus pandemic cannot be overlooked and should be examined closely.

Egypt’s COVID-19

Egypt’s mishandling of the coronavirus crisis comes as no surprise. After a few weeks of denial and dismissal of reports on the spread of the virus, the government began to acknowledge the increasing presence of COVID-19 in the country and took actions in order to contain its spread. However, these procedures seem to be neither working nor effective. On May 12, Egypt’s daily cases of COVID-19 were 347, raising the total number to 10,093, with 544 deaths.

In fact, this number could have been lower if the government had provided the needed medical support and assistance to medical professionals and hospitals. Importantly, worrisome reports indicate that several confirmed cases of COVID-19 have been found among doctors and nurses, which complicates the situation and affects the country’s capacity to fight the disease. According  to the World Health Organization, these health care workers account for around 13 percent of Egypt’s coronavirus infections. For example, in early April, Egypt’s National Cancer Center, the country’s main cancer facility, witnessed an outbreak of COVID-19 in which at least 17 doctors and nurses reportedly tested positive. Furthermore, Nagila Hospital, which was assigned for quarantining COVID-19 cases, had to halt new admissions because according to Mada Masr, half of the hospital’s 79 staff members were diagnosed with COVID-19, and two of them reportedly died of its complications.

The lack of protection for medical cadres in Egypt has resulted in a crisis between Egypt’s Health Ministry and the Doctors Syndicate in which the latter accuses the former of not taking measures to protect doctors and nurses treating patients with COVID-19. In addition, nurses and medical workers at Mansoura Health Insurance Hospital began a strike to protest the Health Ministry’s refusal to test them for the coronavirus. The World Health Organization has called upon Egypt to conduct more coronavirus tests and to apply more protective measures. As an example of the government’s utter failure in containing the virus, Egypt’s Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly announced what he dubs a “coexistence plan” with the pandemic. According to the plan, restrictions on such places as shops and restaurants will be eased and the country will be gradually reopened to go back to normal—a policy that will likely exacerbate the crisis and put more pressure on the country’s weak health care system.

Repression amid the Coronavirus Crisis

Egypt is treating COVID-19 as a political threat. The regime fears the spread of the coronavirus, coupled with the ineffective and feeble health care system, could lead to a new cycle of unrest and upheaval. Therefore, it clamps down on individuals who criticize the government’s response to the coronavirus. Over the past few weeks, Egypt’s security forces have arrested several young activists who criticized the government’s policies in tackling the COVID-19 crisis, accusing them of spreading “rumors and fabricated news on social media about the spread of the coronavirus in the country.” In addition, according to a statement issued by Human Rights Watch, at least two women with no known political affiliation were abducted and then disappeared, along with seven children, because of their critical remarks of the government’s measures in responding to the coronavirus outbreak. The children were later conditionally released.

Furthermore, on April 28, Sisi extended the state of emergency for another three months. Egyptians have been living under a state of emergency and this is the eleventh time it is renewed since April 2017, after terrorist attacks on two churches in Tanta and Alexandria that left approximately 45 people dead. Nevertheless, the most visible and dangerous political exploitation of the coronavirus comes with the recent amendments of the Emergency Law (Law 162 of 1958) that were ratified by Sisi on May 7th. These amendments will increase the power of the president and the military over civilians who might violate the law. According to a statement signed by nine human rights organizations, these amendments will “solidify the president and the military’s control over the judiciary” and expand the Military Prosecution’s jurisdiction to investigate civilians. They also “give the president the power to authorize the Military Prosecution to investigate crimes that violate the Emergency Law (Article 4).”

The Politics of Medical Aid

Over the past few months, Egypt has sent several shipments filled with medical supplies such as masks, gowns, anesthesia drugs and antibiotics, body bags, testing swabs, and the like to China, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. However, considering Egypt’s needs, the medical assistance to these countries did not arise from generosity or solidarity with their COVID-19 crises. Rather, it reflects the shrewd and opportunistic character of President Sisi, who is clearly exploiting this pandemic in order to score political points and improve his image in the international arena. Three of the recipient countries of Egypt’s medical assistance (the US, UK, and China) are strategic allies on which Sisi’s repressive regime can rely while a fourth, Italy, has legal problems with Egypt over the case of an Italian citizen who was murdered there in 2016.

Washington is a key ally to Cairo and President Trump is a strong backer of Sisi, having once called him glibly “my favorite dictator.”  Sisi’s shipment of medical supplies to the United States, which landed at the Joint Base Andrews in Maryland on April 21, was a smart gesture and strategic move that came amid one of America’s worst medical and economic crises in decades. Sisi’s propaganda arms have amplified the assistance to the United States and portrayed it as a historical move that shows “Egypt’s global leadership and capabilities.” It is noteworthy that Egypt is a major recipient of US foreign aid, getting more than $1 billion annually since 1979. Indeed, Sisi gained the praise and the compliments he was seeking from American officials. The State Department tweeted in Arabic to express gratitude to “President Sisi and the Egyptian people for their generous support to the American people.” Likewise did the National Security Council and the US ambassador to Egypt, Jonathan Cohen, who posted his message of gratitude in a video recording.

Similarly, the United Kingdom is a key political, economic, and military ally to Egypt. Both countries have enhanced their bilateral relationship over the past few years during which British investments in Egypt reached over $5 billion, particularly in the energy and oil industry. Egypt is also a major importer of British arms and military sales. According to Action on Armed Violence, an advocacy group that seeks to reduce the impact of armed violence around the world, the number of approved licenses for arms sales from the United Kingdom to Egypt has risen steadily over the past few years. Between 2008 and 2017 alone, there was a 750-percent increase in licenses given to Egypt, from 63 to 535. In addition, in 2015, London approved some $134 million of military arms exports to Cairo. Therefore, providing medical assistance to the United Kingdom during its hard-hitting coronavirus crisis will not only strengthen the Sisi regime’s relationship with London but also would portend some important payback in the longer term.

As for China, for which Egypt was among the first countries to show support and solidarity in its coronavirus crisis, the political and economic gains are remarkable. First, China is Egypt’s largest trading partner with a volume of bilateral trade of $10.58 billion during the first 10 months of 2019. Second, China is one of the largest foreign investors in most of the major projects undertaken by Sisi, which he uses to promote himself. The most important of them are the new administrative capital, Suez Canal Axis, and city of El-Alamein in addition to expanded power lines, such as the electrified train route “Al-Salam ­‑ Administrative Capital ‑ 10^th” with an investment of $1.2 billion from AFIC, a Chinese company. There are also Chinese investments in technology and in the service, agricultural, and tourism sectors. Third, China is one of Egypt’s major creditors, representing around 3.5 percent of Egypt’s all-time high foreign debt of over $112 billion. Therefore, sending medical supplies to China can ultimately translate into big rewards for Sisi’s regime.

On Italy, the stakes are higher. Sisi has a complex and problematic relationship with the current Italian government because of the case of Giulio Regeni, the doctoral student at the University of Cambridge doing field research in Cairo who was allegedly brutally tortured and murdered by Sisi’s security forces in 2016. Regeni’s case has damaged the bilateral relationship between Egypt and Italy over the past four years and created troubles for Sisi’s regime. Until now, Egypt has failed to provide compelling evidence on who killed Regeni and no one has been charged or held accountable for his death. Last December, the Italian prosecutor officially accused Egypt of deliberately trying to mislead the investigation. Furthermore, Regeni’s case has had impact on the collaboration between Egypt and Italy in regard to Libya; the two countries support different Libyan factions and have adopted divergent views on how to end the civil war and resolve the conflict. By sending two cargo planes filled with medical equipment to Italy, Sisi believed that he could change Italy’s position on the Regeni case and the conflict in Libya. This plainly reflected the president’s opportunism and moral bankruptcy.

Noticeably, Egypt has not sent medical aid to its regional allies and backers, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which are on the list of countries with the highest numbers of coronavirus cases in the Arab world, with over 42,000 and 19,000, respectively. In addition, both countries are facing economic hurdles, especially Saudi Arabia, because of the coronavirus challenges and the decline in oil prices. Finally, the optics of his moves show that Sisi cares more about the health care of his western allies than of his Arab counterparts, which can be counterproductive to his immediate concerns about the economic well-being of his country.

To be sure, the Egyptian regime appears to be interested in mollifying international criticism of its repressive policies and increased control of Egyptian society. Sisi’s control of domestic conditions and the Egyptian opposition has been complete since his coup in 2013. To him, what matters are relations with western benefactors and allies who are in a good position to help him garner the legitimacy he so lacks among his own people.

This article has been republished with permission from the Arab Center Washington DC.

The post Politics of COVID-19 in Egypt: between repression and opportunism appeared first on Responsible Statecraft.