Didier “Ice” Iceman

Australia unveiled a draft law Friday to force Google and Facebook to pay news media for their content in a “world-leading” initiative sure to prompt a confrontation with the US digital giants. Treasurer Josh Frydenberg announced the “mandatory code of conduct” to govern relations between the struggling news industry and the tech firms after 18 […]

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Entre gestion rationnelle et frénésie boursière, l’industrie automobile est plus tiraillée que jamais...

C’est la deuxième fois que les élections sont reportées à cause du Covid-19. La tension monte entre le gouvernement intérimaire et le camp de l’ancien président Morales, dans un contexte d’épidémie où le système sanitaire, déjà faible, est complètement dépassé.

Just as the Mediterranean air was thick with talk that a military confrontation between Turkey and Egypt was brewing over control of Libya, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin flew into Ankara for consultations with his counterpart Sedat Önal on Tuesday. The two diplomats have since come out with a joint statement that they have […]

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Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh has been longstanding. The last time the two states clashed and exchanged fire was a set of skirmishes in 2016, which lasted for four days.

Now, the conflict has heated up again, but in different way. This time, the clashes are taking place outside the disputed district of Nagorno-Karabakh and have spilled over to the territory of Armenia.

The reasons behind this conflict are rooted in history. There had been border and territorial disputes between the two countries when they were both part of the Soviet Union, and at that time Moscow, particularly in Stalin era, tried to maintain its control over them by keeping these differences alive. But since the collapse of the Soviet Union, border disputes have remained an old wound that from time to time reopens.

On July 12, the two countries’ Ministries of Defense announced clashes in Tovuz district at the state border. The two sides accused each other of ceasefire violations and starting the skirmishes. The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry announced that at least 11 Azeri soldiers and one civilian had been killed while on the other side, Armenia reported the death of 4 of its soldiers in the clashes.

This new outbreak of tensions is especially challenging for Iran, which borders both countries.

Tehran’s policy towards the countries and their conflict is thus critically important. Both sides expect Iran to side with them, and the complicated regional situation has made it difficult for Iran to commit to either.

Iran’s official position has always been to emphasize resolving the issue between the two countries through dialogue and diplomacy. On July 15, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, in two separate telephone calls with the top diplomats of Armenia and Azerbaijan, called on both countries to show restraint and resolve the disputes through dialogue.

Also, in a later phone conversation with the new Azeri Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov on July 17, Zarif expressed Tehran’s readiness to mediate.

Iran is making these efforts at a time when hostility between the two countries has risen to a societal level. On July 16, thousands of angry Azeri citizens poured into the streets in Baku demanding the government to declare a mobilization and called on the army to stage a war against Armenia. The outraged Azerbaijani citizens called on their government to liberate the Nagorno-Karabakh region by invading Armenia. Azerbaijani police had to arrest several protesters to keep the volatile situation under control.

What is Iran’s real position on this crisis?

The complicated nature of the geopolitics of the region has made it more difficult for Iran to clearly define its policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. First of all, “Iran supports a peaceful solution,” a senior Iranian diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, told me. “We will by no means accept the interference of powers from beyond the region and international powers in this crisis, and our priority is to resolve the issue peacefully.”

The senior diplomat went on to say: “Another issue here is our opposition to the war. Although we support the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan in this crisis and we are interested in resolving the issue through dialogue in favor of Azerbaijan, when it comes to war and military conflict, we do not agree at all with this subject and prefer to maintain the status quo.”

This is despite the fact that Azerbaijan is one of Israel’s main allies in the region. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Azerbaijan as was the third-largest purchaser of Israeli arms in 2017, with purchases of $137 million. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, during his official visit to Baku in December 2016, revealed that Azerbaijan had up to that time bought $5 billion worth of Israeli weapons.

This is cause for concern for Iran. Israel, which is at the center of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s threat perception, has through Azerbaijan a strong presence on Iran’s northwestern borders. This increases Iran’s interest in a peaceful solution rather than a military conflict.

On the other hand, despite its close relations with Turkey, Iran does not seem to agree with Pan-Turkic ideas that Ankara supports, or with Turkey’s alleged desire to revive the Ottoman Empire in Central Asia.

Although Iran has warm relations with Ankara, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s behavior in regional conflicts such as Syria and Libya in recent years shows that he is not reluctant to intervene against Iranian interests . For this reason, Tehran does not welcome a new war in the region, as sending Turkish troops to Azerbaijan to confront Armenia could pave the way for a formation of a pro-Turkish belt around Tehran’s northern borders.

In addition, a sizable ethnic Azeri population lives in Iran, mainly inhabiting the East and West Azerbaijan provinces, which border Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Armenia. This puts pressure on Iran to side with Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia, as some in the Iranian Azeri minority want Iran to provide military support to Azerbaijan.

Ruhollah Hazratpour, a lawmaker from Urmia, the provincial capital of West Azarbaijan in the Iranian parliament, warned Armenia on his Twitter account on July 13 to avoid “foolishness” because, in his words, the countries of the region would not allow the occupation of an Islamic territory by Armenia, which he accused of implementing Israeli and US policies.

Similar comments made by individuals from a Turkish-Azeri background in Iran have been abundant. Thus, the Iranian government has to take into consideration local sensitivities of its own large Turkish-Azeri ethnic group in its policymaking regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

While local Pan-Turk nationalists such as the aforementioned Iranian lawmaker are trying to win Tehran’s support for Baku in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the pretext of supporting a fellow Islamic country, Tehran acts according to its own national interests rather than Islamic or Shia beliefs. Furthermore, while Azerbaijan maintains closer ties with Israel than Armenia does, the relations between Iran and Armenia have been traditionally warm and close. Given all this, Iran is more interested in resolving the issue peacefully than other actors are and would not welcome the eruption of violent conflict between its two neighbors.

The post How will Iran respond to renewed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia? appeared first on Responsible Statecraft.

Conséquence inattendue de la crise du Covid-19 : certains Français ont décidé de faire changer leur plaque d'immatriculation avant de partir en vacances, notamment pour éviter les dégradations. C'est tout particulièrement le cas des Mayennais.

Cinq présidents ouest-africains étaient à Bamako jeudi 23 juillet pour tenter de dénouer la crise en cours, mais sans y parvenir. Un sommet extraordinaire de la Cedeao a été convoqué, alors que la région s’inquiète de cette déstabilisation politique du Mali.

Ahmed, who lives in Tripoli, Libya, texts me that the city is quieter than before. The army of General Khalifa Haftar, who controls large parts of eastern Libya, has withdrawn from the southern part of the capital and is now holding fast in the city of Sirte and at the airbase of Jufra. Most of […]

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What’s green and carbon friendly to operate … is “whisper quiet” … can carry 70 passengers through the sky … and hardly use any fuel? According to a British firm that unveiled the concept, it will be the largest commercial hybrid plane in the world.   The 70-seater “hybrid electric regional aircraft” (HERA) designed by the […]

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Beijing’s ambassador to London has warned Britain against stationing a new aircraft carrier in the Pacific, arguing it would be a very dangerous move in a newspaper interview published Saturday. Liu Xiaoming, China’s top envoy in the UK, told The Times that as London cuts trading ties with the European Union later this year, it should […]

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Après une journée de cessez-le-feu, Erevan et Bakou ont repris, le jeudi 16 juillet, leurs affrontements transfrontaliers, les plus violents depuis 2016. Les deux belligérants, en conflit depuis des décennies, s’accusent mutuellement d’avoir commencé les hostilités qui ont fait plusieurs morts et blessés des deux côtés.

The news of a 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement secretly signed between the Iranian government and China has been the hot topic of the last few weeks, generating a considerable amount of speculation, exaggeration, and politically biased interpretation. In reality, the accord does not seem to have the potential to revolutionize the path of China-Iran relations, which has been quite consistent since 1979.

Much of the hype brewed around the agreement has been pushed by political figures and organizations that have agendas to promote. The former President Ahmadinejad, rallying his base in the Gilan province, pointed to the supposed secrecy of the accord, predicting its rejection by the Iranian nation. From his exile in Washington, Reza Pahlavi denounced the “shameful, 25-year treaty with China that plunders our natural resources and places foreign soldiers on our soil.” The son of Shah mentioned the “stationing” of Chinese troops in Iran as part of the agreement, implicitly quoting a Petroleum Economist’s piece published in September 2019, which I spent some time to debunk. Interestingly, the same author penned another piece published by OilPrice on July 6, 2020, quoting the same enormous figures presented last year and highlighting a “new military element with enormous global security implications” added to the 25-year agreement.

The “leak” of the final draft of the accord that has circulated since last week, however, suggests a much less spectacular, definitely more realistic, picture. While the 18 page document flashes out what undoubtedly is a comprehensive, long-term partnership with various strategic ramifications, it does not depart much from the premises and scope of the roadmap of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, or CSP, publicly agreed to by Xi Jinping and Hassan Rouhani in January 2016. Yet, the document presents some interesting elements. China will become Iran’s privileged partner in the development of various strategic projects ranging from energy infrastructure, to telecommunications, software development, banking, railroads, and ports. On the other side, Tehran will regularly supply Beijing with its oil for the next 25-years. The military section of the accord is wide-ranging and calls for a joint commission for military industries, investment, design and production of armaments. However, there is no mention of Chinese military personnel deployed in Iran, nor of the deployment of long-range China-modified Tupolev bombers and fighter jets in Hamedan and other dual-use airports suggested by OilPrice.

Overall, the terms of the agreement presented in the 18 page draft expand the already existing framework of the CSP. The absence of specific references to the amount and exact allocation of resources, the implementation mechanisms, and clear deadlines suggest that the accord per se does not represent a major departure from the current trajectory of China-Iran relations, nor a blow to Beijing’s Persian Gulf strategy. Vice versa, the vagueness of the agreement, as well as its overall limited potential, are grounded in the bilateral, regional, and global dynamics that involve Beijing and Tehran.

Since 2016, both the Chinese and Iranian discourses about the CSP has been dominated by big announcements and constant references to the long-lasting friendship existing between the two countries. However, the excitement periodically emerging around the partnership has rarely been matched by its actual implementation. The effect of Washington’s maximum pressure campaign, which has radically changed the context within which Beijing and Tehran defined the CSP, and China’s tendency to realize ad hoc projects rather than remaining committed to broader arrangements have significantly exposed the implementation limits that are intrinsically part of the 2016 cooperation framework. Even from a political perspective, while China has vocally opposed U.S. unilateral sanctions and, recently, rebuffed the proposed extension of the United Nations Security Council arms embargo on Iran, its effective commitment to a sustained comprehensive strategic partnership with Tehran is not detached from systemic considerations.

In the last decade, China has progressively increased its footprint in the Persian Gulf. To reach what now is a stable and arguably successful presence in such a contentious region, Beijing adopted a unique strategy. Rather the mimicking the approach of the United States, the PRC has consolidated good relationships with every regional actor. At the apex, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iran enjoy the status of China’s comprehensive strategic partners. The underlying result of this strategy is a careful and constant act of balancing aimed at navigating successfully the rivalries and security concerns of the Persian Gulf states, pushing the idea of win-win cooperation that works both at the bilateral and regional level. The result is that China is not likely to jeopardize the relationship with its Arab partners by pushing too far its partnership with Iran. As Dr. Jonathan Fulton, non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, pointed out talking about how likely China is to become a major arms supplier to Iran after the expiration of the UNSC embargo, “in isolation, it makes perfect sense” but such a move would “alienate several Iranian rivals across the Middle East, many of which are also strategic partners for China” — something that Beijing does not want.

At the global level, China is engaged in a complex, multi-layered competition with the United States. Historically, Iran has been directly and indirectly involved in it, enjoying Beijing’s will to support Tehran as a balancer to Washington’s regional presence, but also suffering China’s tendency to prioritize its relationship with the United States over that with Iran. A good example of the relevance of the China-U.S.-Iran triangle comes from the interplay between the U.S. maximum pressurecampaign and the U.S.-China trade war. In January 2020, the U.S. Treasury lifted sanctions on a unit of COSCO, the Chinese shipping giant, sanctioned in September 2019 for transporting Iranian oil after the expirations of waivers. Interestingly, the decision came after the two parties agreed the Phase One trade agreement earlier that month: a plausible sign that the Iranian dossier was discussed during the negotiations. It is clear that China needs a partnership with Iran that is flexible enough to serve its own broader strategic interests, sometimes at the expense of the partnership itself.

Overall, China and Iran have reasons to cooperate and mutual interests that could be progressively expanded in the coming years. However, this will not come at the expense of China’s growing footprint in the Persian Gulf and, more importantly, not without a much more robust and detailed set of goals and implementation mechanisms than those established by the final draft of the 25 year comprehensive agreement, a reality check that significantly downplays many of the exaggerated claims about the China-Iran Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

The post To understand the China-Iran deal, forget the hype and look at the context appeared first on Responsible Statecraft.

Réduction du CO2 à la production, diminution des coûts, mise à l'échelle de l'appareil industriel, développement du réseau de distribution : les défis de l'hydrogène sont immenses. Pierre-Etienne Franc, le patron de l'hydrogène chez Air Liquide, dresse un bilan intéressant de ce carburant que beaucoup espèrent d'avenir.

Although former US Vice President Joe Biden’s just-released plan for dealing with climate change includes plenty of compromises with Greens from the left wing of his Democratic Party, the really good news is that he did not cave on nuclear power. Yes, his $2 trillion plan envisions enormous investments in renewable wind and solar energy. […]

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New technique uses electrodes to extract lithium from seawater

La reconversion en mosquée de l’ex-basilique Sainte-Sophie a suscité l’indignation de nombreux pays en Occident. Mais dans le monde arabe, les réactions sont plus mitigées et souvent teintées d’admiration à l’égard du président turc, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Après plus de 70 ans d’existence, la dernière boutique Tati au cœur du quartier Barbès va disparaître. La marque avait construit son succès sur la vente de vêtements à petits prix. Pour le quotidien britannique The Guardian, elle était un symbole de la mode accessible à tous.

Des dizaines de civils ont été exécutées autour de Djibo, à l’extrême nord du Burkina Faso, révèle Human Rights Watch. L’organisation des droits de l’homme met en cause les militaires, de plus en plus accusés d’exactions en marge de leur lutte contre le terrorisme au Sahel.

Une loi française votée fin mai interdit l’utilisation des termes “saucisse” ou “hamburger” pour des produits végétariens. Elle fait l’objet d’une plainte à Bruxelles pour non-respect des directives européennes.

Suite du cadavre exquis en cours avec Iceman. J’avais commencé ici, et après sa réponse et la mienne, puis de nouveau la sienne. Voici ma réponse :

Au Mondial de Paris 2016, celle qui était alors ministre de l'Environnement promet un million de bornes de recharge en France en 2020. Nous y sommes, et le tout récent rapport d'Avere France dénombre 30 000 points de recharge publics dans l'Hexagone en juin.

Chaque année, le Vietnam accueille quelque 15 millions de touristes internationaux. Un secteur porteur de centaines de milliers d’emplois disparus avec la crise économique liée à l’épidémie de Covid-19, forçant les ambassadeurs du tourisme à se reconvertir pour survivre.

Le drapeau d’une imaginaire République du Kivu a été hissé dans la capitale de cette province de l’est de la République démocratique du Congo, le jour même de la commémoration de l’indépendance du pays. Un symbole qui inquiète les autorités.

Hyundai, déjà investi dans l'hydrogène avec l'ix35 Fuel Celle (puis Nexo), annonce aujourd'hui la livraison des 10 premiers exemplaires, à la Suisse, du XCient : l'un des tout premiers poids lourds hydrogène au monde.

Le premier règlement en matière d’autos qui roulent seules vient de tomber et il est sévère. Au menu, entre autres : une limitation à 60 km/h et l’interdiction de quitter les voies séparées des autoroutes et les voies rapides. Des restrictions qui pourraient bien stopper net les investissements des constructeurs dans ce domaine.

Suivant la baisse spectaculaire des investissements de la Chine à l'étranger, les projets labellisés "Routes de la Soie" voient leur financement en chute libre depuis le début de la crise du coronavirus. Tendance lourde ou parenthèse ?

Japan’s huge public pension fund, the world’s biggest, said Friday it had suffered its largest annual loss since the global financial crisis, as markets tumbled amid the coronavirus pandemic. The Government Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) said it recorded losses amounting to 8.28 trillion yen ($77 billion) for the fiscal year that ended in March. “Stocks […]

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MANILA – Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte approved a draconian new anti-terrorism law on Friday, one that critics fear will accelerate creeping authoritarianism in the nominally democratic nation. The law’s passage came soon after United Nations’ High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet called on the “[Philippine] President to refrain from signing the law” because it […]

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Chaque humain a produit l’an dernier 7,3 kilos de déchets issus d’équipements électriques et électroniques, selon un rapport publié sous l’égide des Nation unies.