Didier “Ice” Iceman

Bangladesh on Monday ordered operators to shut down mobile phone services to almost one million Rohingya refugees living in camps in the country’s southeast, an official said.

The move follows an outbreak of violence in recent weeks at the camps, most of whose residents fled into Bangladesh from Myanmar’s Rakhine state two years ago following a military crackdown on the Muslim Rohingya minority.

It also comes after none of the refugees turned up in late August to return across the border to conflict-scarred Rakhine, when a fresh push to repatriate the refugees to Myanmar fell flat.

Telecommunications operators have seven days to submit reports on the actions they have taken to shut down networks in the camps, said the spokesman for the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC), Zakir Hossain Khan.

“Many refugees are using mobile phones in the camps. We’ve asked the operators to take action to stop it,” he told AFP, saying the decision was made on “security grounds.”

The order stunned the Rohingya, one of their leaders said on condition of anonymity.

He said the ban would hugely affect Rohingya life, disrupting communications between different camps scattered across the border district of Cox’s Bazar.

“We won’t be able to communicate with our relatives living in Myanmar or other parts of the world,” the leader said. Many Rohingya, he said, rely on remittances sent by their diaspora and usually receive phone calls informing them of the money transfers.

Bangladesh has in the past tried to restrict mobile phone access in the settlements. But the move was not enforced seriously, spawning booming markets of mobile phone sets and SIM cards in the camps.

Police spokesman Ikbal Hossain welcomed the decision, saying the refugees had been “abusing” mobile phone access to conduct criminal activities such as trafficking of methamphetamine pills worth hundreds of millions of dollars from Myanmar.

“It will definitely make a positive impact. I believe criminal activities will surely come down,” he told AFP.

On Sunday police said a fourth Rohingya refugee was shot dead in the fallout over the murder of local ruling party official Omar Faruk by suspected Rohingya criminals.

Faruk’s murder led hundreds of furious locals to block a highway leading to a refugee camp for hours on August 22, burning tires and vandalizing shops visited by refugees.

Rohingya refugees have said the recent bloodshed has created an atmosphere of fear in the camp, where security has been tightened.

Rights groups have previously accused Bangladesh police of extrajudicial killings.

‘Isolate and victimize’

Local police said nearly 600 cases of drug trafficking, murders, robberies, gang fighting and family feuds were filed against the refugees since they arrived.

Bangladeshi security forces have shot dead a total of at least 34 Rohingya over the past two years, mostly for alleged methamphetamines trafficking.

There was no immediate reaction to the phone service shutdown from United Nations agencies, but a UN official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said it “would further isolate and victimize the already persecuted people”.

“Seeking to limit their communication amongst themselves, with Bangladeshis and people abroad, will serve to push them towards negative coping habits be it crime, violence or extremism,” he added.

The two countries signed a repatriation agreement in November 2017 but a first offer to return was rejected by refugee camp leaders in October.

UN investigators have said the 2017 violence in Myanmar warrants the prosecution of top Myanmar generals for “genocide”.

Bangladesh last week accused Buddhist-majority Myanmar of lacking the “will” to repatriate the Rohingya, after the latest failed attempt to return the stateless minority.

The Rohingya are not recognized as an official minority by the Myanmar government, which considers them Bengali interlopers despite many families having lived in the country for generations.

AFP

The diplomatic row that has erupted between Washington and Copenhagen over Greenland is just one part of a broader strategic battle being waged over control of the Arctic, according to one expert.

US President Donald Trump has canceled a trip to Denmark and launched a war of words with his Danish counterpart, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, after she rejected his idea of the US buying Greenland as “absurd.”

Mikaa Mered, professor of polar geopolitics at Paris’s ILERI institute of international relations said Trump’s unsolicited advances on the autonomous territory were a way to indicate US interest in the resource-rich Arctic – and to distract from domestic issues.

Control of shipping routes

Mered said Trump’s offer to buy Greenland was a signal to Arctic nations and China, which has shown interest in a region that is crucial for the control of new shipping routes opening up as ice sheets melt because of global warming.

“When it comes to the Russians, [Trump’s] logic is to say: ‘You won’t always be the main power in the Arctic even if you are the chair of the Arctic Council in 2021.'”

“And when it comes to the Chinese, the idea is … ‘We won’t let you get a foothold in Greenland,'” Mered said.

He said the US has already increased its presence by re-establishing a consulate in Greenland’s capital, Nuuk, and helping to finance new airports, education and social programs.

“The end goal is not to acquire Greenland per se but at least some new territory, some new pieces of land,” he said.

Washington could be angling to buy the Gronnedal naval base in southern Greenland, “which the Danes ultimately decided not to sell in late 2017 because the only interested buyers were Chinese,” he added.

Europe’s role

“It’s possible that this whole hullabaloo is a political, media and economic test balloon designed to see how strongly Europeans feel about Greenland,” Mered said, predicting the row could drag on.

“He will continue to use the case of Greenland, especially since Denmark is a fairly servile ally that won’t turn its back on the US because of this.”

Mered said the issue allows Trump to “make strides in the Arctic and at home.”

“Looking at the presidential election, he has everything to gain by carrying on: he gets the Democrats out of the news at a critical time with the start of campaigning for the primaries and he himself is kicking off a bunch of rallies.

In the US, “nobody knows where Greenland is, how it’s run…. There are so many things going on, he can continue to drag this out for several weeks.”

Trump’s take

Trump snapped back on Wednesday at the Danish prime minister’s “nasty” dismissal of his attempts to purchase Greenland, heightening a row which had already prompted the US president to scrap a state visit.

Trump, who made his name as a New York property mogul, characterized his idea of buying Greenland as essentially “a large real estate” deal, arguing it is a burden on Denmark as the autonomous territory’s economy depends heavily on subsidies from Copenhagen.

Speaking to reporters at the White House, Trump said he was not the first US president to have raised the idea of buying the vast Arctic island, which has housed an American airbase since even before it became formally a part of Denmark.

“Greenland was just an idea, just a thought. But I think when they say it was ‘absurd’ – and it was said in a very nasty, very sarcastic way – I said, ‘We’ll make it some other time,'” Trump said.

“We’ll go to Denmark. I love Denmark. I’ve been to Denmark. And, frankly, we’ll do it another time.”

The idea of the US buying Greenland was initially dismissed as a joke by some, but its strategic location has grown at a time when both Russia and China are flexing their muscles.

Danish colony

Greenland was a Danish colony until 1953, when it became part of the Danish Realm, and it gained “autonomous territory” status in 1979. Its 55,000 inhabitants – of whom 17,000 reside in the capital Nuuk – are more than 90% Inuit, an indigenous group from Central Asia.

The government of Greenland has insisted that the island is “not for sale” and Frederiksen told reporters on Wednesday that she fully endorsed that view.

“I am both annoyed and surprised that the US president has canceled a state visit,” said the prime minister, who had been preparing to host Trump early next month.

But, she added: “Denmark and the US are not in crisis, the US is one of our closest allies” and the invitation to visit was still open.

Her Foreign Minister Jeppe Kofod reaffirmed the strong relationship between the two nations, reporting that he’d had a “frank, friendly and constructive talk” with US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.

“US & Denmark are close friends and allies with long history of active engagement across globe. Agreed to stay in touch on full range of issues of mutual interest,” Kofod tweeted.

The State Department said that in this conversation Pompeo expressed appreciation for Denmark’s contribution as a US ally. He and his Danish counterpart also talked about “strengthening cooperation with the Kingdom of Denmark – including Greenland – in the Arctic,” the department said.

‘Show more respect’

The postponement of Trump’s visit – which was announced on Twitter – has sparked strong reactions in Denmark.

“Reality transcends imagination… this man is unpredictable,” said Morten Ostergaard of the Social Liberal Party, which is part of the ruling coalition.

“For no reason, Trump assumes that (an autonomous) part of our country is for sale. Then insultingly cancels visit that everybody was preparing for,” tweeted Rasmus Jarlov, a member of the opposition Conservative Party. “Are parts of the US for sale? Alaska? Please show more respect.”

Nonetheless, the conservative newspaper Jyllands-Posten wrote that Trump’s actions ultimately benefitted Denmark, highlighting Greenland’s geopolitical value.

The territory is home to the US airbase Thule, crucial during the Cold War as a first line of monitoring against a potential Russian attack.

But the melting polar ice sheet is opening up potentially major shipping routes, and untapped reserves of oil, gas and minerals will become increasingly accessible, leading Russia and China to show mounting interest in the region.

As far back as 1867, the US State Department expressed interest in the island. And in 1946, President Harry S. Truman offered $100 million in gold, or parts of Alaska, in exchange for Greenland.

– AFP

It doesn’t have the same superpower cachet as the US-China trade war, but Indonesia and Malaysia are moving towards a high-stakes confrontation with the European Union (EU) that has been brewing for years.

Over the last two years, an increasingly environmentally conscious EU has moved to phase out imports of palm oil for biofuel because, it argues, the commodity’s production causes mass deforestation. Indonesia and Malaysia are the world’s two largest producers of palm oil, with the sector accounting for between 2-3% of Indonesia’s gross domestic product (GDP).

In March, the EU further restricted the number of biofuels made of palm oil that may be counted toward the bloc’s renewable-energy goals. By 2020 member states must ensure at least one-tenth of their fuel consumption comes from renewable fuels, but palm oil-based products won’t count. By 2030, the EU aims to stop all imports of palm oil.

Then, on August 14, the EU escalated the situation when it reintroduced tariffs on subsidized palm oil imports from Indonesia, following an probe which found Jakarta’s subsidies for domestic producers distorted the market and were “a threat of material injury” to European firms.

The tariffs, which range from 8% to 18% depending on the Indonesian producer, offer protection to European biofuel firms that have suffered since the EU scrapped duties on Indonesian imports last year on orders of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The provisionally re-imposed tariffs will last until December, but could be extended for five years. Days before the EU’s announcement, Jakarta threatened to retaliate by increasing its tariffs on EU dairy imports from between 5-10% to 20-25% if Brussels went ahead with its new duties.

“The EU can impose something on us as long as the parameter is fair, but if the parameter is not fair, then that is an act of protectionism and trade war,” Enggartiasto Lukita, Indonesia’s trade minister, was quoted saying in local media. “We can’t just be quiet when there is unfairness.”

Indonesia and Malaysia are mulling a joint punitive response. Following a visit by Indonesia’s recently re-elected President Joko Widodo earlier this month, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad told the Nikkei Asian Review on August 19 that the two countries were still “thinking about” taking the EU to the International Court of Justice.

Last month, the two nations also spoke about taking the European bloc to the World Trade Organization (WTO) by November over claims its phasing out of palm oil imports is “discriminatory.”

Indonesia argues that the EU is employing protectionist policies aimed at curbing Southeast Asian-produced palm oil to benefit European-made vegetable oils such as sunflower and rapeseed. WTO rules allow countries to try to influence other nations’ environmental policies through trade terms, though not solely for protectionist purposes.

“This is about world trade, and we have to look into trading practices first. If it breaches any international law, of course, we will go to the international court,” Mahathir said.

The EU’s decision to phase out palm oil imports by 2030 is predicated on the bloc’s finding that its cultivation has caused the highest level of deforestation of any crop worldwide, allegedly responsible for 70% of new acreage cleared for cultivation, compared to just 4% for corn and soybeans.

The Council of Palm Oil Producing Countries, which represents Malaysia and Indonesia along with other nations, claims the EU is using “scientifically flawed” evidence to come to its conclusions. Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur have called on the EU to instead help them make palm oil farming sustainable, rather than abandon it altogether.

The Malaysians have gone on the rhetorical offensive against the move. The former Minister for Plantation Industries and Commodities referred to the EU’s policy as “crop apartheid.”

A recent Bloomberg op-ed written by an academic with the assistance of Malaysia’s Prime Minister’s Office called it “blatant hypocrisy” and “a form of modern colonialism that has no place in today’s world.”

The same piece, originally wrongly attributed to Mahathir, called on Britain, once it leaves the EU in late October, to distance itself from the bloc’s palm oil ban. In return, Malaysia has promised London a bilateral free trade deal, which Britain will need if it leaves the bloc through a so-called “no-deal” Brexit.

But the EU won’t easily back down to Malaysia and Indonesia’s rhetoric and divide-and-rule tactics in Europe.

Brussels is desperate to play a much bigger role on the world stage, and capitulation would be seen as a sign of weakness in what is one of the EU’s first major principled global trade stands, especially if the bloc wants to be seen as an independent actor from the US and China.

Moreover, environmentalism has taken on more political relevance following European elections in May, which returned an even greater number of Green politicians to the European Parliament. The president-elect of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, even had to promise a bold “green deal” to win enough votes from environmentalist parliamentarians.

While certainly political in Europe, politics are also driving Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur’s confrontational positions on trade. Malaysia’s election in 2018 saw the nation’s first ever change of government, where the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) which has run the country through coalitions since independence lost out to Mahathir’s Harapan coalition.

One big reason why the Harapan coalition triumphed was because Mahathir – who led UMNO as prime minister between 1981 and 2003 before defecting to the political opposition – was able to win over enough of UMNO’s traditional rural Malay supporters.

For instance, the poor Malay farmers and smallholders connected to the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), a government agency charged with resettling rural inhabitants, often on palm oil plantations, were until last year’s election seen as UMNO’s “rural fortress.”

Yet the Harapan coalition won 19 out of the country’s 52 FELDA constituencies at the poll. To keep these constituents on side – especially now that a renovating UNMO will cooperate with the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party to win back supporters in the Malay heartlands – Mahathir’s coalition will need to show that it stands for the interests of rural Malays, even if that means jeopardizing relations with a key trade partner.

A similar situation exists in Indonesia. At April’s presidential election, the incumbent Joko Widodo easily beat his opponent Prabowo Subianto by 55.5% to 44.5%.

But Widodo faced strong criticism from rivals other his alleged mismanagement of the rural economy and his supposed dependency on urban constituencies. Many feared that Prabowo could steal North Sumatra, a major palm oil-producing region which Widodo had won handsomely at the 2014 election.

In the end, Widodo won the race, but only after making costly promises to rural voters. In 2018, he almost doubled the number of recipients of the “family hope program”, in which the government hands out roughly US$55 every quarter to mainly rural families, representing nearly 10 million households or roughly 15% of the population.

On the campaign trail, Widodo promised another $28 billion for subsidiary projects if he won a second term. It probably also helped that Moeldoko, chairman of the Indonesian Farmers Association, a powerful lobby group, was strategically appointed as Widodo’s chief of presidential staff last year.

While Indonesia and Malaysia will likely have stable democratic governments for the next few years, their sustained popularity will depend on defending rural constituents, many of whom rely on palm oil for their livelihoods.

The Council of Palm Oil Producing Countries claims that at least two-fifths of palm oil’s work output in Malaysia and Indonesia is done by smallholders, not big agribusinesses. But while Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur might be able to sound tough fighting the EU’s actions, there isn’t actually much they can do.

Both nations need the EU as a trading partner more than the EU needs them. Almost 10% of all Indonesian exports are shipped to the EU, yet the EU sells less than 1% of its goods to Indonesia. Bilateral trade in goods between Malaysia and the EU, now its third largest trading partner, was worth $44.1 billion last year. Of this, Malaysia enjoyed a trade surplus of US$12.7 billion.

Indonesia’s threat to increase tariffs on EU dairy products to 20-25 % won’t likely be a major deterrent to the bloc’s position on palm oil; the bloc’s dairy exports accounted for a little over 2% of its total shipments to Indonesia last year.

Malaysia, meanwhile, has threatened to back away from purchasing $1 billion worth of military hardware from European states and dangle its planned procurements elsewhere. But losses to the arms sector are unlikely to faze EU environmentalists pushing for the palm oil ban nor deter the majority of member states uninvolved in the weapons trade.

Claims that Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur will take the issue to the WTO, and even the ICC, are similarly quixotic. WTO officials in Geneva have already ruled that trade policy can be used to address environmental sustainability concerns, as long as applied measures are not bald protectionism.

In fact, the WTO specifically noted that the Indonesia-European Free Trade Association Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, signed in December last year, includes conditionality on Indonesia’s environmental progress.

Moreover, any compliant filed to the WTO would likely take years to adjudicate, especially if Indonesia and Malaysia argue that the EU’s ban is motivated by protectionism, with a decision finally made after irreversible damage had already been done to their palm oil sectors.

The two nations’ palm oil exports to the EU are already in decline. The Netherlands, long the EU’s largest palm oil importer, saw its deliveries of the product from Malaysia decline 9.1% between 2017 and 2018, and fell another 8.4% in the first half of this year, according to Malaysian Palm Oil Council data.

Rising Asian demand represents a potential hedge. Malaysia’s exports to India, already the largest importer of its palm oil, doubled in the first six months of this year, while exports to China, its second largest market, rose by more than 10%.

But by confronting the EU, Indonesia and Malaysia risk making other sectors of their economies causalities to palm oil. While palm oil is an important export to the EU, often the two nations’ biggest single exported good to the bloc, it is worth less than 20% of their total trade with Europe.

Last year, Indonesia exported some $18.5 billion worth of goods to the EU, with palm oil accounting for about $2.1 billion of the total – or just 12%, down from about 17% in 2016. By picking a bigger trade fight, Jakarta risks jeopardizing the other 88% of that trade.

Longer-term thinking is arguably in order. Indonesia is Southeast Asia’s largest economy, and the world’s 16th biggest, yet it was only the EU’s fifth largest trading partner within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc in 2017.

The EU has indicated it is keen to broaden that trade. Following the signing of bilateral free trade agreements with ASEAN members Vietnam and Singapore this year, Brussels is eager to push ahead with talks with Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.

While FTA talks with Malaysia were postponed in 2012, only two years after they began and unlikely to recommence anytime soon, the EU is having better luck with Indonesia. The eighth round of talks of a so-called EIFTA took place in June in Jakarta, and another round is set for early December.

The escalating palm oil dispute will no doubt disrupt these talks. But Jakarta likely knows that while its palm oil exports to the EU are worth around $2 billion per year – and already declining year-on-year – a FTA with the EU would almost immediately boost Indonesian exports to the bloc by between 17.3-17.7%, or around $7.5 billion, according to an EU assessment report released in April.

Moreover, an EU-Indonesia FTA could increase Indonesia’s global export figures by up to 2.2% as it “will lead to trade diversion with third countries in addition to the creation of new trade,” the report assessed.

But while it does not make good economic sense for Indonesia and Malaysia to pick a trade fight with the EU, it makes certain political sense for Mahathir and Widodo’s elected governments.

Jack Ma isn’t just China’s most-famous tech guru. He’s also a one-man economic think tank.

This latter distinction wasn’t part of Ma’s vision for Alibaba. But 20 years on, Ma’s US$450 billion e-commerce juggernaut arguably offers greater insights on China’s zigs and zags than Beijing’s notoriously dodgy data. No company is more on the frontlines of China’s middle-class consumer sector. And for now, Alibaba’s numbers suggest China is holding its own amid a deepening US-China trade war.

Suddenly, though, Ma’s creation is acting as a weathervane of another sort: Hong Kong’s rapidly declining business confidence.

Few financial stories earned more headlines in recent weeks than Alibaba’s US$15 billion listing in Hong Kong. Officials in Beijing were mighty disappointed that Ma did his 2014 initial public offering in New York. A Hong Kong share sale seemed just the thing to restore the city’s mojo amid intensifying headwinds.

Yet the city could lose Ma again. He is shelving the deal as political chaos collides with Donald Trump’s China tariffs.

Hong Kong is already on the verge of recession thanks partly to epic anti-China protests clogging the city’s streets. It shrank 0.4% in the second quarter from the January-March period. That was before giant demonstrations closed the airport at one stage and paralyzed prime shopping areas.

The city’s ports, among the world’s busiest, were already under tremendous pressure from US President Trump’s tariffs. And from the slowest mainland growth in 27 years in the first quarter.

Chief Executive Carrie Lam’s government is tossing US$2.5 billion in fresh stimulus at the economy. The immediate priority is protecting jobs and offering relief to what officials call “peoples’ financial burden.” The fallout from 11-plus weeks of pro-democracy protests forced the cancellation of almost 1,000 flights, disrupted business and sent investors scurrying from “Asia’s world city.”

Financial Secretary Paul Chan warned that “recent social incidents” are still feeding into official economic data. Translation: investors haven’t seen anything yet in terms of weakening growth and volatile markets.

Ma’s decision to pull Alibaba’s listing suggests even Chan’s caution could be overly optimistic. The Alibaba news came right after brewer Anheuser-Busch InBev shelved a nearly US$10 billion share sale. This is sure to deter other companies in the pipeline, dealing additional blows to market confidence.

The Hang Seng Index’s 10% drop since has investors eyeing opportunities in Singapore, Taiwan and elsewhere. The question now, though, is whether Ma cancels the deal altogether. As of June, Alibaba had more than $30 billion of cash on hand. Perhaps Ma could forego a secondary listing for some time.

Ma finds himself in a tough place. In November 2018, global punters were tantalized by news that China’s most prominent capitalist is a Communist Party member. Given tensions between Beijing and Hong Kong, Ma risks angering Chinese President Xi Jinping by gifting the city such a big deal, and now. Xi’s government, after all, appeared to play a role in last week’s ouster of Cathay Pacific Airways CEO Rupert Hogg.

Ma’s hesitancy casts an additional pall over Hong Kong’s business climate and a uniquely fragile moment. It would’ve potentially been the biggest equity deal of 2019 – and the largest follow-on share transaction in seven years. Not surprisingly, preparation for Alibaba’s quasi-homecoming has been underway for some time.

Alibaba was the Hong Kong exchange’s best hope of making some headway against New York and other rivals. In 2018, Hong Kong even loosened rules to encourage Chinese tech titans to sell shares closer to home. Alibaba was the first to answer the call.

Protests show no sign of letting up. One on Sunday attracted as many as 1.7 million demonstrators, roughly a quarter of the population. That is hurting commerce, spooking tourists and almost surely prompting executives to revise 2020 growth plans. The protests also may be having a bigger effect globally that meets the eye.

Louis Gave of Gavekal Research argues that the recent global stock selloff had more to do with Hong Kong than with economic data out of China, the US or Europe.

“Last week’s occupation of Hong Kong’s airport undeniably raised the stakes in the tussle between the city’s protesters and the government,” Gave says. “Hong Kong’s raison d’être is to be a trade, service and logistics facilitator for the Chinese economy and the broader Asian region.” The airport occupation, he adds, “increased the probability that mainland forces might intervene in Hong Kong, potentially unleashing a chain of events that could prove cataclysmic for global growth.”

Protesters want Lam to step down. They also are demanding that she officially withdraw an extradition bill that sparked the worst crisis since the 1997 handover to China. That law would allow Hongkongers to be spirited away to the mainland. Odds are, things will get worse before they get better.

Slowing global growth hardly helps. Though Trump is delaying his latest tariffs – 10% taxes on $300 billion of goods – he’s still spoiling for a brawl with Xi, if not with Asia more generally. Trump’s clumsy effort to use Hong Kong as a bargaining chip in trade talks met with complete silence from Xi’s team.

The bottom line for companies is that the road to 2020 is more about damage control than investment, hiring or innovating. For governments, it’s about marshaling fresh fiscal and monetary efforts to safeguard growth.

Not a great environment for growth over the next six months. Yet as Ma’s delayed listing shows, fallout from chaos in the streets and markets could exceed even the gloomiest forecasts.

Gorillas are big business — translating directly into tourism dollars, according to the latest stats from Rwanda tourism officials.

Rwanda confirmed it sold 15,132 mountain gorilla permits worth US$19.2 million to tourists in 2018, higher than the $15 million sold in 2016 before Rwanda increased the permit price from $750 to $1,500 in 2017, an official from Rwanda Development Board said in Kigali.

The central African country has registered an increase in demand for the tracking permits of the endangered species, said Belise Kariza, chief tourism officer of RDB, while addressing reporters about the upcoming annual baby gorilla-naming ceremony commonly known as Kwita Izina, Xinhua reported.

At least 25 baby gorillas born late last year and this year will be given names in the 15th Kwita Izina ceremony held in Musanze district, northern Rwanda, on September 6, she said.

British supermodel Naomi Elaine Campbell, American singer Shaffer Chimere Smith popularly known as Ne-Yo, former Dutch football manager and player Louis van Gaal, and former English Premier League Arsenal FC captain Tony Adams are among those who will participate in this year’s event, she added.

Last year, Rwanda hosted 1.7 million visitors, representing an increase of 8% compared to in 2017 due to efforts made by the government to promote Rwanda as a tourist destination in Africa, the official said.

The national parks revenues reached over $20 million in 2018, up from over $18 million recorded the previous year, said Kariza.

Mountain gorillas are an endangered species with an estimated over 1,000 remaining in the world. They live in the Bwindi Impenetrable National Park in Uganda and the Virunga Mountains, a range of extinct volcanoes that border the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, the report said.

Kwita Izina was introduced in 2005 with the aim of creating awareness of conservation efforts for the endangered mountain gorilla.

For three decades prior to the first official gorilla naming ceremony, the naming of baby gorillas was carried out by rangers and researchers that closely monitor these unique animals on a daily basis.

According to RDB, US visitors spend an average of $12,000, making them the most lucrative market, Rwanda’s New Times reported. Chinese nationals spend an average of $1,084, ranking tenth.

Nigerians are the top African spenders, spending an average of $1,498 per stay, ranking higher than Australians and only slightly below the French.

“This is proof that our (tourism) strategy to target this market is bearing fruit,” Kariza noted.

She attributed the rising number of high-end visitors from Nigeria to the flight link that the national carrier RwandAir has established.

The national airline now connects Kigali and two cities of Nigeria — Lagos and Abuja, the New Times reported.

Visitors coming to Rwanda mainly go for gorilla trekking in the Volcanoes National Park or visit other national parks like Akagera National Park – home to the Big Five animals, as well as Nyungwe National Park for canopy walk and birding, among others.

Currently, Akagera National Park dominates other parks in terms of visitors. It was the most visited park with 51, 724 visits in 2018, an increase of 17% compared to 2017.

In the same period, Nyungwe National Park received 15,665 visitors, up 9%.

As Vietnam begins preparations for the Communist Party’s 13th National Congress in early 2021, a quinquennial event at which the nation’s next leaders will be decided, cadres’ and cliques’ positions on China could determine who wins and who loses.

At a Central Committee plenum in May, the Party began selecting “strategic cadres” – the next generation of apparatchiks deemed “moral” and untainted by corruption by current leaders – who can be selected as members of the powerful committee in 2021.

Carl Thayer, a Vietnam expert and emeritus professor at the University of New South Wales in Australia, says that as the leadership selection process intensifies over the next sixteen months, “it is likely that the focus will turn on how the next [Party] Secretary General will handle relations with China.”

Fraught bilateral relations have come into stark relief in recent weeks as China has ramped up pressure on Vietnam to stop exploring for oil near the Vanguard Bank, a contested feature in the South China Sea.

It is usually taken for granted that such disputes won’t upset broad fraternal ties between two of the world’s last few ruling communist parties, which have remained on friendly terms even when they appear on the verge of violence.

Hanoi is frequently keen to stoke nationalist feelings, but not so much that it affects diplomatic and trade relations with China, or unintentionally fosters too much of a sense of people power among the repressed Vietnamese public.

But anti-China nationalism among the Vietnamese public, often sparked by sea disputes, could play a bigger role in Party affairs, especially if the current dominant clique centered around Party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong struggle to win the support for their China position among rising new generation Party cadres.

The Party’s legitimacy rests largely in a fast-accelerating economy – one of the fastest growing in Asia – and safeguarding that status-quo. But one way in which the Party could bolster its standing among the public, however, would be to take a harder line vis-a-vis China.

In a Pew Research Center survey conducted in 2017, some 64% of Vietnamese respondents saw a growing Chinese economy as bad, while 92% said Chinese power and influence was a threat to their country.

Yet anti-China nationalism – as opposed to the party’s state-enforced strain of ideological nationalism – tends to also overlap with pro-democracy sentiment the Party ruthlessly suppresses.

For the last three years, Vietnam’s politics seemed strong and stable. Back in 2016, Trong secured a majority of votes – and a pass on
his age, then 72, which should have seen him retire – to remain in the post for another five years.

Trong, who rose through the ranks as an editor of a communist periodical and respected theoretician, represented the party’s traditional consensus-based, decision-making ethos and its abhorrence of individualistic leaders. He has also been at the forefront of maintaining ideological ties to China.

At that year’s National Congress, he routed then-prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung, a populist politician who was at the time mounting a campaign to become the next party chief.

Where Trong represented an old-fashioned belief in the Party’s role over society, Dung was the embodiment of a new Party cadre who saw personal advancement and financial gain as the new norm within the party.

Dung wanted the new capitalist classes to have more influence within the ruling party; Trong wanted the ruling party to have more control over the fast-rising capitalist classes.

Trong won and quickly launched a far-reaching campaign against corruption and immorality within the Party, one that appeared to ape Chinese President Xi Jinping’s power-consolidating purge of his Communist Party.

But Trong has so far studiously steered clear of reorienting foreign policy, continuing instead the Party’s traditional approach of building “as many friends as possible”, even as Beijing ramps up its aggression in the South China Sea.

If the 2016 National Congress was basically a contest between the old and new, the upcoming event in early 2021 will be more complex, with competing notions of how to handle China a potential dividing and deciding factor.

Currently, there is no standout candidate to replace Trong, who will be 76 years old in early 2021. Having served two terms, Trong will almost certainly step down as Party chief, though he could remain as state president, a position he took on last year when the incumbent died in office.

Even this, though, will require informal rules that have governed Party decisions for decades to be fudged or reformed. One analyst who requested anonymity reckons there could be a “succession crisis” leading to instability in the Party, significantly at a time when the country needs deft and strong leadership to manage rising regional tensions, including with China.

Tran Quoc Vuong seems Trong’s natural heir, serving as his anti-corruption czar as head of the Central Inspection Committee since 2016.

When the once-powerful Dinh The Huynh, another Trong ally, was forced to retire from some his posts last year due to ill-health, Vuong took on even more authority as executive secretary of the Party’s Secretariat, which is charged with implementing Politburo and Central Committee policies.

But Vuong has no real experience in a senior government position – he is a committee man of a yesteryear – and by 2021 will be 65 years old, so would be expected to retire unless usual age restrictions are relaxed.

Another Trong loyalist who is thought be in the running for top job is Pham Minh Chinh, a ex-vice police minister who in 2016 became head of the powerful Central Organization Commission, which sits just below the Politburo but is responsible for nominating and approving the appointment of Party officials. That means he is the gatekeeper of political offices.

But, as Nguyen Khac Giang, a senior research fellow at the Vietnam Institute for Economic and Policy Research, has pointed out: “there has never been a secretary general who previously worked as the head of the Central Organization Commission. There is a clear logic for that, as such a person will be seen as too powerful when holding the top post and securing all the senior personnel files.”

Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc could make the transition from civilian government head to party chief, just as his former boss wanted to do in 2016. But he will by then be 66, and, more inhibitory, he hails from the country’s south, which would make him the first ever southern party chief, an unlikely development.

There is now a debate within the Party about loosening the mandatory retirement age of 65, says Thayer. If accepted, it would allow the party’s geriatric politicians to maintain power, and would certainly improve the odds of Vuong being named the Party’s next chief.

This handwringing and wrestling over Party decorum and tradition will take place at a crucial period for the nation’s foreign policy.

Recent Chinese aggression near Vanguard Bank has shown that Hanoi’s traditional policy of appeasing Beijing isn’t working. Vietnam stopped oil exploration in 2017 and 2018 in contested sea areas in response to Chinese threats, yet the pressure has continued. Hanoi’s more robust response this time around likely indicates a realization that yielding to past pressure has only emboldened China.

Whether Trong will maintain the Party’s traditionalist foreign policy of balancing relations between China and the West, allowing the country to maximize benefits from both, or take a new path, will be seen in the coming months.

Trong has already upended many of the Party’s traditions while in power, meaning he could yet flip the script on policy towards China. Hanoi’s relationship with Beijing “will come to a head” in October when Trong is expected to meet US President Donald Trump in Washington, said Thayer.

“One important issue is whether to raise bilateral relations from a comprehensive to a strategic partnership. This is obviously inter-connected with Vietnam’s relations with China.”

If Trong does upgrade relations with the US, it will represent one of Vietnam’s biggest foreign policy shifts in decades, and would mollify a growing number of Party members who are demanding stiffer action against China.

But if Trong does not make such a bold move, and if he attempts to again appease China through traditional means while Beijing ramps up pressure in the South China Sea, it could prompt a backlash from within the Party.

Indeed, a new generation of Central Committee members could try to take more responsibility in choosing the next set of Party leaders in 2021, and thereby reduce the Politburo’s power.

A groundswell of opposition to Trong’s foreign policy stance might not be enough to dislodge his entire clique, but senior Politburo members would no doubt have to heed rising anti-China sentiment, both inside the Party and at the grass roots.

“If there is a push for a younger leader it will likely come from within the Central Committee,” said Thayer.

Maintaining the status quo in foreign affairs could also be problematic if other senior Politburo members are perceived as tainted by their soft stances on China.

Phuc could well stay on as prime minister for another five years after 2021 and, though seen as a competent pair of hands, his civilian government made an enormous error in early 2018 when it floated a proposal to allow foreign companies to lease land in special economic zones (SEZs) for up to 99 years.

When the Vietnamese public came to perceive this meant selling out parts of the country to China, it sparked some of the largest nationwide protests in years.

“There is no doubt nationalism will play a part in the succession politics in Vietnam, but we are not sure of its degree and to which sections it will affect,” Giang, the analyst, told Asia Times.

Taiwan’s Defense Ministry has finally selected a base for the squadron of new F-16V fighter jets that the self-ruled island is expected to purchase from the US to beef up its defenses against threats from mainland China, according to local media.

Taiwanese newspapers say the Taitung Air Force Base, located on the Pacific coast in the southeastern county of Taitung, will house and service the new F-16V tactical wing.

Military planners chose the site with a view to taking advantage of the rugged mountains that run through central Taiwan, which could serve as a natural shield against S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missiles that the People’s Liberation Army bought from Russia. The new F-16s will also guard the Pacific coast against any attacks launched by the PLA from the east.

The site is also favored because the hangers at Hsinchu Air Base on the west coast near Taipei – facing China’s Fujian province – are almost full.

The PLA’s warplanes must cross the Miyako Strait or the Bashi Channel to reach the Pacific. China has frequently conducted drills near or around Taiwan since 2019, demonstrating that it has the capability to attack any point on the island, even from the Pacific Ocean.

A defense official said the air force was in the process of evaluating pilot, technician and other personnel requirements for the new F-16 fighter wing, adding that even if the follow-up of the sale progresses smoothly following Washington’s approval, the new fighters would not arrive in Taiwan until 2023, due to production and logistical constraints.

The new F-16s will eventually replace the territory’s French-made Mirage 2000s, which are expensive to operate and difficult to maintain.

Taiwan asked the US in the first quarter of this year to approve the sale of a fleet of advanced F-16s. However, the deal was stalled because the Trump administration did not inform the US Congress of the sale before the start of the summer recess. It was announced on the weekend that the Trump administration has sent Congress an advisory notice that it intends to sell Taiwan 66 new F-16V fighter jets for US$8 billion.

American Institute in Taiwan director Brent Christensen said in a recent speech, “These investments by Taiwan are commendable, as is Taiwan’s ongoing commitment to increase the defense budget annually to ensure that Taiwan’s spending is sufficient to provide for its own self-defense needs. And we anticipate that these figures will continue to grow commensurate with the threats Taiwan faces.”

Also read: Taiwan’s new F-16s boost regional role of US

My first reaction to the recent death of Khmer Rouge leader Nuon Chea was to recall the phrase about “the banality of evil.” I can remember listening to Nuon Chea nearly a decade ago as he testified during the trial of Khmer Rouge leaders at the international tribunal near Phnom Penh.

The genocidal regime’s Brother No. 2 sounded calm — and indeed banal — refusing to show any regret for playing a key role in the deaths of an estimated 1.7 million Cambodians. They died in the late 1970s through torture, execution, starvation and forced labor. He was serving a life sentence when he died earlier this month at the age of 93.

The term “banality of evil” was first coined by the author Hannah Arendt when she covered the trial of Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann in an Israeli court. The Israelis had captured Eichmann in Argentina in 1960 and subsequently tried him in Jerusalem for war crimes. He was convicted and hanged.

Most of the obituaries of Nuon Chea describe him correctly as the Khmer Rouge’s chief ideologue and the right-hand man of Pol Pot, the radical Maoist movement’s leader. But Nuon Chea was much more than that. He was the Khmer Rouge’s chief organizer and, equally important, he was in charge of security.

“I don’t think the banality description fits him,” said Stephen Heder, a leading expert on the Khmer Rouge and a research associate at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London’s Centre of Southeast Asian Studies.

“He was not merely a functionary cog in the crushing wheel of history, but the steely, determined key figure whose job it was to turn Pol Pot’s radically fundamentalist Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist and Maoist dreams into reality by any and all means necessary,” Heder said.

Unlike Eichmann, Nuon Chea was “irreplaceable, and without his efforts what became the Pol Pot regime would never have come into being,” Heder said. “He indeed remained unrepentant to the end, not wavering ideologically or otherwise from his ruthless dedication as a true believer in Pol Pot’s revolutionary visions.”

I had covered the war in Cambodia as a reporter with the Christian Science Monitor on-and-off for five years, starting when the first fighting broke out in the spring of 1970 between war-hardened Vietnamese troops and an inexperienced US-backed Cambodian Army.

For most of the war, I and other reporters had little idea who the leaders of the Khmer Rouge were. But it was obvious they could be extremely brutal. Every reporter I knew who was captured by Khmer Rouge soldiers was killed.

This was in contrast to the Viet Cong, or North Vietnamese, who captured a number of reporters during the wars in Vietnam and Cambodia but eventually released them.

I know of only one exception, which occurred in 1970 when Vietnamese troops turned over two American photographer friends to the Khmer Rouge. I was with the two, Sean Flynn and Dana Stone, just before they went on motorbikes up a highway in eastern Cambodia never to come back.

During the Cambodian War from 1970 until the spring of 1975, I saw a small group of Khmer Rouge defectors and, on another occasion, I took a photo of a single Khmer Rouge soldier with his arms tied behind his back. But none of us knew the names of the secretive Khmer Rouge leaders. Nor did most Cambodians.

It was only in 1974 that a French Roman Catholic priest gave me my first clear insight into the radical but still mostly faceless Khmer Rouge.

Father Robert Venet had lived in the Cambodian countryside for decades, residing as a missionary in a village where he had built a church, reservoir and fish farm. In 1974, the Cambodian Army had pushed northward from Phnom Penh into central Cambodia in an attempt to capture territory that had been lost to the Vietnamese.

When fighting erupted, Cambodian refugees began streaming by the thousands out of the area west of the provincial capital of Kompong Thom. Among them was Robert Venet.

Executed for small ‘crimes’

Venet helped me to interview some of the refugees and told me of the harsh restrictions the Khmer Rouge were imposing on local villagers. In the village where Venet had lived for decades, the Khmer Rouge began executing people for crimes as small as stealing a chicken or raising the mildest objections to their conduct.

Dissenters or those accused of other “crimes” were taken from their homes and told they were going to see “higher authorities.” They never returned. Many villagers resented restrictions on religious practices and the fact that the Khmer Rouge put Buddhist monks to work in rice fields.

Fortunately for Venet, Vietnamese troops in the area he worked in heard of his popularity among local villagers and provided him with enough protection to get him out before the area fell under Khmer Rouge control.

After a five-year war against the US-backed Cambodian government, the Khmer Rouge took power after the fall of Phnom Penh in mid-April 1975. They immediately began rounding up and executing officials who had failed to escape the city. I left Phnom Penh just a few days before the takeover.

They ordered the inhabitants of Phnom Penh to immediately leave for the countryside. This massive exodus from the capital turned out to be a disaster for many – and it was listed as one of the war crimes that Nuon Chea faced many years later.

The Khmer Rouge also began rounding up and killing Vietnamese living in Cambodia who had survived killings by Cambodian troops. They also killed members of the Cham Muslim minority, which was another charge that Nuon Chea faced.

Years after the war’s end, I traveled to a village in Cambodia to meet Pol Pot’s brother, Saloth Nhep.

He told me that during the war he had no idea who the secretive Khmer Rouge leaders were. Only in 1976, after the war was over, did he learn from a notice posted in his commune’s cafeteria that his brother, whose real name was Saloth Sar, was then the country’s top leader.

Once international-supported trials of the Khmer Rouge leaders began three decades later, we learned much more about the Khmer Rouge. At the end of March 2009, the first of its key people to testify before the United Nations-backed tribunal was Kaing Guek Eav, known by his alias Duch.

He ran a notorious torture center in Phnom Penh known as S-21 where few prisoners survived. He took orders from the top leaders, and compiled meticulous records.

Chief executioner

Unlike Nuon Chea, Duch provided details of how the Khmer Rouge operated that had not been previously known. He was the only one of four indicted Khmer Rouge officials who at that point came close to telling the truth about what had happened.

It is still difficult even today to understand how Duch transformed himself from being a diligent and kindly teacher into the chief executioner at S-21, where at least 14,000 Cambodians were killed. While some died after being brutally beaten, many also succumbed to slow deaths from starvation.

Many of the men and women imprisoned at S-21 had fought for the Khmer Rouge but were later deemed to be traitors. Most had no idea why they were there.

In the meantime, Hun Sen, Cambodia’s long-serving prime minister, objected to any further indictments under the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, claiming that they would lead to civil war. But his critics say that he’s trying to protect some of his own officials who served with the Khmer Rouge. Only four indictments were ever issued.

Some might ask whether the much-delayed Khmer Rouge Tribunal was worth the cost, which according to one estimate exceeded US$300 million.

I think that the best comment on this came from Elizabeth Becker, a former Cambodian War reporter and author of the book “When The War Was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution.”

“The tribunal accomplished the critical task of bringing justice in a country where the leaders had refused to discuss what had happened,” said Becker.

Becker said that once the trial began the Cambodian government dropped its silence on the subject. The Khmer Rouge period, including Nuon Chea’s role in the tragedy, is now taught in schools and debated.

The best way to think of the cost of the tribunal, Becker said, is to think of it in terms of the number of victims — an estimated 1.7 million.

“The tribunal acknowledged the victims, gave dignity to their lives, and condemned the genocidal regime,” she said. “In this light, the tribunal is a bargain.”

Australia is poised to hold a parliamentary inquiry into the possibility of pursuing nuclear power, a controversial move in a country where energy and politics are closely intertwined.

“Nuclear energy has evolved since it was last seriously considered in Australia,” said Queensland Liberal National parliamentarian Ted O’Brien, head of the standing committee on environment and energy, in a statement.

“This inquiry will provide the opportunity to establish whether nuclear energy would be feasible and suitable for Australia in the future, taking into account both expert opinions and community views.”

A recent survey by pollster Essential showed community views are increasingly in favor, but still fall below 50%. However, when respondents were asked to consider a reactor being built close to their homes, property-obsessed Australians voted “no” at a rate of 78%, the poll showed.

At the same time, there are few constants in Australian politics and even fewer in the politics surrounding the energy sector, where disagreements on the environment and power have ousted prime ministers and lost elections.

The debate also comes as neighboring Pacific nations, some of which are losing land to climate change-driven rising waters, threaten to downgrade relations with Australia if it doesn’t agree to do more to curb its carbon emissions.

Still, one rare spot of bipartisanship over the years has been opposition to nuclear power, notably in a nation that boasts the world’s third-largest uranium reserves.

In 2009, Australia officially banned nuclear power in response to Japan’s Fukushima disaster. But at the behest of the prime minister, energy minister and conservative members of parliament, it will take another pass at the idea.

The renewed interest is being spurred by Minister for Energy and Emissions Reductions Angus Taylor’s enthusiasm for newfangled small modular reactors (SMRs), which are cheaper, allegedly safer and use less water.

Those reactor-types will be a focus of the upcoming parliamentary inquiry. British engineering company Rolls Royce, for one, is leading a UK consortium involved in developing SMRs aimed at producing affordable energy with a lower carbon footprint.

“Other countries are doing this all over the world. By using the right mix of technologies, including nuclear, the affordability-emissions reduction challenge is completely doable,” Benjamin Heard, founder of Bright New World, an environmental nongovernmental organization, told a resources conference in November.

As nuclear technology evolves, proponents argue there is an opportunity for Australia to become specialized in SMRs, which often only have capacity of 60 megawatts, far lower than the kind of baseload power Australia might need to replace large coal stations, though they can also be deployed in clusters.

That’s a burning issue for Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s government.

His pro-fossil fuel government is facing soaring power prices, a reduction of baseload power when AGL Energy’s large New South Wales coal-fired Liddell power station is retired over 2022 and 2023, and endless political drama over Australia’s emissions and their impact on climate change.

A nuclear plant would be a win for Australia’s resources sector but will also reduce emissions, despite general green-leaning dislike of uranium and nuclear power due to concerns over accidents and radioactive waste disposal.

Opposition has come from varied quarters, including from within Morrison’s Cabinet after Environment Minister Sussan Ley said she opposed nuclear power.

When Morrison took power from Malcolm Turnbull last year, before winning this year’s general election, he split the energy and environment portfolio in two, meaning Ley and Taylor must both sign off on any nuclear plans.

During Turnbull’s premiership, a group of 11 MPs from his party called for a review but it effectively went nowhere; however, on the campaign trail earlier this year, Morrison put it back on the agenda, telling a radio host in Launceston, Tasmania, it was “not, not” an option in the government’s proposed underwriting scheme.

This was followed by a push from conservative government parliamentarians including Craig Kelly, James McGrath, and former deputy prime minister Barnaby Joyce.

“I am not saying that there is a nuclear reactor coming to a shopping center near you but we have to be able to investigate all options,” Keith Pitt, a parliamentarian, told the Sunday Telegraph. “All I am calling for is an inquiry as to whether it’s a feasible option to ensure we are up to date with the latest information.”

The Queensland Labor-led government – which has huge renewable ambitions, while also signing off on the relentlessly contentious Adani coal mine – is so incensed it released a statement from cabinet minister Cameron Dick suggesting a Chernobyl or Fukushima-like disaster could destroy the state’s lucrative tourism industry.

Dick also says the cost of nuclear is now far higher than renewables, and “will need significant federal government subsidies to be viable, which will distort the energy market.”

Conservative opponents of alternative power sources have predictably said similar things about renewables.

The issue, though one of bipartisan support, has seen varied reviews over the years, with the federal government commissioning a task force to study the idea in 2006. Then, the task force found nuclear would help contain emissions by up to 8%-17% by 2050.

It also found then cost estimates suggested that nuclear power would on average be 20%-50% more expensive to produce than coal-fired power “if pollution, including carbon dioxide emissions, is not priced.”

“No country of Australia’s economic size or larger is without nuclear power and we stand alone among 25 top economies in excluding its use for baseload power supply,” a parliament statement from 2010 says.

It also said that the public’s “perceived image [is] that uranium is dangerous. This has proven to be a major obstacle against any policy consideration of a nuclear alternative in Australia.”

Though Australia has some nuclear capability in nuclear medicine and a reactor at Lucas Heights, even nuclear-powered submarines were barely considered when the navy was looking to replace its six Collins Class submarines with a dozen new builds.

The winning French Shortfin Barracuda design will be a diesel-electric remodel of the original nuclear sub.

Dr Ziggy Switkowski put together a report for then-prime minister John Howard in 2006, but a dozen years later a follow up concluded the window for gigawatt-scale nuclear had closed, though the prospects of SMRs was not covered at the time.

In Australia’s current political climate, where a decade on it still lacks a coherent energy policy, concrete long term plans for cheap baseload power and an east coast gas crisis, nuclear is suddenly appealing.

And it’s being driven by a conservative government which believes its mandate comes from a vote against “climate hysteria” at the May election.

Politicians usually skeptical about emissions are also in favor of nuclear’s zero-emission footprint, which can be powered by digging more stuff out of the ground locally, a usual vote winner.

However, the logistics of a nuclear plant, from social license to staffing, are tremendous and will likely remain uphill work for a government that still lacks a clear energy plan.

The announcement in Colombo on Sunday by former Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa that his brother Gotabaya Rajapaksa will be his party’s presidential candidate in the election due to be held before December 8 electrifies the politics in the island country.

The announcement was expected, but there was an element of uncertainty lingering because the incumbent president, Maithripala Sirisena, also harbored ambitions of seeking a second term. Gotabaya was waiting for the approval of the US administration on his renunciation of American citizenship, which would qualify him to be a candidate under Sri Lanka’s electoral laws.

Sirisena has fallen in line, finally, sensing that his political future lies best in forming an alliance with Rajapaksa. A few hours before Rajapaksa made the announcement on Sunday, the visiting US acting assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia, Alice Wells, and US Ambassador to Sri Lanka Alaina Teplitz called on him at his official residence in Colombo to signal that Washington will not put hurdles in Gotabaya’s path and the coast is clear for the erstwhile American citizen to be a candidate in the presidential election.

“Fortune’s furious fickle wheel,” as Shakespeare wrote in his play Henry V, has come full circle. Mahinda Rajapaksa, who was overthrown in a “regime change” plot – which was hatched jointly by the US, the UK and India in January 2015 – is staging a comeback and his tormentors are scurrying for cover – seeking favors from him, sensing that Gotabaya’s victory in the upcoming election is a strong possibility and Mahinda is likely to be the next prime minister.

Mahinda is known to be a forgiving type by nature and even Sirisena, who betrayed him in 2015, is apparently hoping to get a cabinet post in the next government. Surely, Wells too came all the way to Colombo just in time, hoping to cash in on the Rajapaksa clan’s return to power.

US War Crimes Act

According to reports, US President Donald Trump’s administration put Gotabaya’s application to renounce American citizenship on the fast track and the rigorous scrutiny of such applications by the US Department of Treasury and the Department of Homeland Security stipulated under US laws has been waived in this case as an exception.

There is a delightful irony in the fact that Gotabaya would have come under the category of American citizens liable and punishable under the US War Crimes Act on account of his highly controversial role in the horrific violence in the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), having been the defense secretary at the time.

But Washington prefers to strike a Faustian deal if only Rajapaksa’s party, Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), will not stand in the way of finalizing the military agreements that the US has been seeking with the country, seeing it as a “military logistics hub” for the United States Indo-Pacific Command.

Quite obviously, Wells’ mission to Colombo aimed at ensuring that there was no slip between the cup and the lip. From Colombo, she is heading for New Delhi, where she will be joined by US Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan, who is also on a similar back-to-back mission to Bhutan and India “to advance the United States’ partnership with two nations that are critical to preserving the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region,” according to the State Department.

The US is pushing hard to anchor its Indo-Pacific strategy firmly in the South Asian region.

In the final analysis, leaders like Rajapaksa with a strong political base, cannot be pushed around, especially in the present multipolar setting in the world order. If Colombo grants military facilities to the US, similar facilities may be granted to China and perhaps Russia as well at some point.

Gotabaya said categorically in Colombo in his acceptance speech on Sunday that he would robustly safeguard Sri Lanka’s independence and strategic autonomy and give primacy to its economic development. Without a doubt, China will continue to be an influential player – in investment, trade and Belt and Road projects.

‘Cultural nationalism’

Mahinda Rajapaksa said openly in an interview last week that it was no longer an issue that Chinese submarines routinely visit Hambantota Port.

Gotabaya’s electoral platform bears a striking resemblance to that of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. He is also riding the wings of “cultural nationalism” (read: Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism), which has lately assumed strident overtones of Islamophobia. He’s a platinum-grade populist, too.

Interestingly, when asked about the SLPP’s stance on the Sri Lankan Tamil problem, Mahinda Rajapaksa has blithely drawn the analogy of the Modi government’s revocation of the special status for Jammu and Kashmir.

How does he view India-Pakistan tensions over Kashmir? Rajapaksa says: “What was done there [revocation of Article 370] was an internal matter of India, no? But still, I would say that being nuclear powers and neighbors, they [India and Pakistan] could sit together and talk.

“Perhaps a third party trusted by both could bring them both to the table, someone like the UN secretary-general.” One begins to wonder why India did such a foolish thing four years ago to undermine such a confident, strong leader in a neighboring country.

The prevailing national mood in Sri Lanka can be compared with the eve of the 2014 general election in India. It favors Gotabaya’s candidacy. Gotabaya cashes in on the “anti-incumbency” factor that works to the detriment of the present government, which is associated with rampant corruption, ineptitude and political infighting.

After the recent terrorist attacks, people are hankering for a “strongman” and forceful leadership. Gotabaya is also peddling big economic dreams and an aspirational electorate laps it up. He is openly pandering to nationalist sentiments. The only difference with Modi could be that Gotabaya hails from a “political dynasty.”

MK Bhadrakumar is a former diplomat who served for more than 29 years as an Indian Foreign Service officer with postings including India’s ambassador to Turkey and Uzbekistan.

This article was produced in partnership by Indian Punchline and Globetrotter, a project of the Independent Media Institute, which provided it to Asia Times.

Every day, some three million Agent Orange and dioxin victims in Việt Nam struggle to survive, living their lives with incurable wounds.