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06 Oct 11:27

‘Thailand’s Greta Thunberg’ wages war on plastic

Didier “Ice” Iceman

Et en france?

Skipping school to glide through a dirty Bangkok canal on a paddleboard, Lilly fishes out rubbish in her mission to clean up Thailand, where the average person uses eight plastic bags every single day.

“I am a kid at war,” the bubbly 12-year-old says after a painstaking hour-long routine picking up cans, bags and bottles bobbing in the canal.

“I try to stay optimistic but I am also angry. Our world is disappearing,” she adds.

Thailand is the sixth-largest global contributor to ocean pollution, and plastic is a scourge.

Whether it’s for wrapping up street food, takeaway coffees or for groceries, Thais use 3,000 single-use bags per year – 12 times as many as someone in the European Union.

In June, Lilly won her first victory: she persuaded Central, a major supermarket chain in Bangkok, to stop giving out plastic bags in its stores once a week.

“I told myself that if the government did not listen to me, it would be necessary to speak directly to those who distribute plastic bags and convince them to stop,” she explains.

This month some of the biggest brands, including the operator of the ubiquitous 7-Eleven convenience stores, pledged to stop handing out single-use plastic bags by January next year.

Mindsets have started to shift this year with the deaths of several marine mammals whose stomachs were lined with plastic, stirring emotions.

The demise last month of a baby dugong was mourned on social media, reviving discussion in the government over a proposed ban on most single-use plastics by 2022.

But critics say along with new rules there need to be enforcement mechanisms such as fines.

For now young activists like Lilly can help capture attention.

“You might be able to tune out all of the evidence and advocacy in the world, but it’s very hard to ignore a child when they ask why we’re trashing the planet that they have to live on,” says Kakuko Nagatani-Yoshida, regional coordinator for chemicals, waste and air quality with UN Environment.

‘It’s up to us’

Lilly is Ralyn Satidtanasarn’s nickname.

The Thai-American youngster started campaigning at the age of eight after a seaside vacation in southern Thailand where she was horrified by a beach covered in rubbish.

“We cleaned up with my parents, but that was not helpful because other waste was thrown out by the sea the next day,” she recalls.

Then came the global movement initiated by 16-year-old Greta Thunberg, who has become a key face in the battle against global warming.

Inspired by the young Swede, Lilly did sit-ins in front of the Thai government buildings.

“Greta Thunberg gave me confidence. When adults do not do anything, it’s up to us children to act,” she insists.

Though she often skips class to carry out her activism, she was not in New York alongside Thunberg for a protest on September 20 just days before the UN climate conference.

“My place is here, the fight is also in Southeast Asia,” she said at the time.

Even if she sometimes wants to take a break and “go play” like other kids, she also takes part in cleaning sessions organized by local association Trash Hero.

Other activists praise her but say she is up against massive corporate interests.

The main obstacle is the petrochemical industry, one of the main markets for plastics, accounting for 5% of Thailand’s gross domestic product and tens of thousands of jobs.

“Lilly is a very good voice for the youth of this country but the lobbies are very powerful and that makes any change difficult,” concedes Nattapong Nithiuthai, who set up a company turning discarded waste into flip-flops.

She can also count on the support of her parents, who help her write speeches to the UN and government officials.

Her mother, Sasie, herself a former environmental activist, adds: “At first, I thought it was a child’s fad, but Lilly hung on, so I decided to support her.”

AFP

06 Oct 00:25

Erdogan base rejects refugees, pressuring EU pact

Didier “Ice” Iceman

Important a savoir

As European and Turkish officials engage in high-stakes negotiations to salvage a 2016 pact to halt the flow of migrants along the Aegean route, patience among the Turkish populace is wearing thin with the 3.6 million Syrians living there.

Once-welcoming attitudes in Turkey toward victims of the eight-year Syrian conflict are worsening daily, creating both a liability and – in the view of some – an opportunity for President Recip Tayyip Erdogan.

Greece’s prime minister said on Friday that Turkey should not be “exploiting” Europe’s migrant crisis for his own ends, even as the Turkish leader threatened again to make a new incursion into northern Syria.

Recent polls suggest many Turks now regard the refugees with growing hostility, while the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Erdogan has also turned increasingly against them.

Erdogan has recently threatened to “unleash” the refugees on Europe, or return many of them to a still-to-be-established ‘safe zone’ in northern Syria.

“We are of course very worried,” one Syrian refugee shop keeper in the run-down Ankara neighborhood of Altindag told Asia Times.

Refusing to give his real name out of fear of reprisals against his family – both here and in Syria – he continued: “We know it’s still very bad in Syria, but here, you never know if tomorrow, you’ll still have a future.”

German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer, fresh off a visit to Ankara, warned on Friday: “If we do not help Greece, [and other] EU border countries, we will have an irregular migration policy that will lead to deadlock.”

Changing times

When the first waves of refugees arrived in Turkey in 2011, it was quite a different story.

“Our Turkish neighbors were great,” said Jemlin Mahmud, a Syrian refugee from nearby Aleppo who now lives with his family in the Altindag neighborhood of Solfasol.

In Turkey, some 97% of the refugees live within the host population, according to Unicef figures. “The neighbors gave us spare furniture for the house and helped us get connected to utilities and many other things,” he recalls.

Initially, with the Islamist AKP highly supportive of the Syrian opposition and the expectation that victory would be quick and the refugees would return, the government was also welcoming.

Yet, as the conflict dragged on and the numbers grew, the refugees became increasingly seen as a burden.

“Ankara says it has spent more than $40 billion so far on the Syrians,” Berkay Mandiraci, an Ankara-based analyst for the International Crisis Group, told Asia Times.

“Overstretch in terms of public services has contributed to negative public reactions.”

To try and offset some of the financial burden – and in response to a wave of Syrian refugees heading to Europe in the summer of 2015 – the March 2016 deal that EU foreign ministers are now trying to revive saw Brussels agree to supply some 6 billion euros to support refugees remaining in Turkey.

Row over financial support

Yet, the Turkish government says that four years on, only 2.2 billion euros have been disbursed. EU agencies accept this, but say that the very nature of the programs the EU funds means that the money will not all be spent at once, but over the course of several years.

The EU’s two largest programs are the Emergency Social Safety Net (ESSN) project, which dispenses monthly financial aid directly to refugees via e-cards, and the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education (CCTE) program, which pays the families of Syrian refugee children to return their kids to school.

“The money is not a budget support for Turkey,” Claudia Amaral, Head of Office for EU Humanitarian Aid, told Asia Times. “As the projects are rolled out, the money is dispersed.”

Yet this is far from satisfactory for Ankara. “You either give support, or you don’t,” Erdogan told the Turkish parliament in September.

“Sorry, but we can only put up with so much. Are we going to shoulder this burden alone?”

AKP on edge

Meanwhile, there has also been growing alarm in the AKP that its refugee policy has lost it votes at the polls.

An August 2019 survey by research company Metropoll showed that 80.7% of Turkish voters had a ‘slightly negative’ or ‘very negative’ attitude towards Syrian refugees.

Amongst AKP voters, the total was 62.3%. Earlier this year, the AKP also lost the mayoral elections in both Ankara and Istanbul to the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which has long criticized government policy on Syria.

The ruling party saw the losses as connected to the AKP’s support for the refugees. “In the aftermath of the elections, the government launched a power display in Istanbul against the most vulnerable: irregular migrants, including Syrian refugees,” Omar Kadkoy, a migration specialist at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey, told Asia Times.

Recent months have seen increasing reports of Syrians being arrested – around 1,000 in Istanbul in July alone, according to police figures – while there are also many unofficial reports of deportations.

In late September, for example, news came of a military vehicle crashing in Reyhanli in southern Turkey, near the Syrian border. Local press reported the six people killed in the accident as “irregular” migrants being transported back to Syria.

Meanwhile, many Syrian shop owners report, off the record, a jump in harassment from local law enforcement, who have torn down notices in Arabic, while licenses and permits have increasingly been revoked.

“My daughter wanted to get married,” says Mahmud, “but the municipal wedding salon wouldn’t let me hire its hall, as I’m Syrian.”

Political chip

The Metropoll survey also showed that what bothered Turkish voters the most about the refugees was ‘rising unemployment’.

The Turkish economy went into a downturn last year, which “pit Syrians against Turkish citizens in the informal job market,” Mandiraci says.

“In time, Syrians were also unjustly blamed for the overall economic deterioration.”

The survey also showed some 81.5% wanted to see assistance programs for the refugees cut.

“I can hardly find money for medicine, power and water,” says Ilnur Refik, a Turkish resident of Solfasol and construction worker who lost his job during the recent downturn. “Then I see the Syrians get all this help. What about me?”

Aid agencies are quick to point out, however, that the aid going to refugees never exceeds the level of social welfare services available to Turkish citizens.

Now, President Erdogan has said that he wants to return some two million refugees to a ‘safe zone’ in northern Syria, to be carved out by Turkish troops and their allies in territory currently held by Syrian Kurdish forces, which Ankara brands as “terrorists”.

This has caused alarm among aid agencies, as well as the refugees themselves.

“Our policy is quite clear,” the EU’s Amaral says. “Returns need to be done only when conditions are safe – and right now, we don’t think they are.”

Abdullah Habkimi, originally from Damascus and a refugee in Ankara for five and a half years, told Asia Times: “I’m sure all Syrian families would like to go back, but the situation there is really very bad.”

What future he and other refugees will have remains highly uncertain.

“The EU doesn’t want to relive the nightmare of 2015,” says Kadkoy. President Erdogan, on the other hand “never hesitates to use the Syrians for political gains.”

Read: Syria’s Afrin: a plundered settlement one year on

05 Oct 18:03

Persian Gulf Arab States Should Accept Iran’s Olive Branch

by Shireen Hunter
Didier “Ice” Iceman

message de paix

by Shireen T. Hunter

Hopes for some sort of breakthrough in U.S.-Iran relations were thwarted at the United Nations General Assembly last week. A supposed deal struck by French President Emmanuel Macron to arrange a telephone conversation between Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and U.S. President Donald Trump did not go through. According to Iranian sources, Trump had agreed to at least give a verbal promise that he would lift sanctions against Iran in exchange for a talk with Rouhani. But Trump later seems to have changed his mind, tweeting that the Iranian side had demanded that sanctions be suspended before talks could take place and he said “No.” Rouhani issued a statement saying that Iran had accepted most of the French plan, but in the end the U.S. did not agree. Regardless of which of these versions is closer to the truth, no talks took place. Consequently, most likely the United States will continue with its so-called maximum pressure strategy and Iran will carry on with its so-called maximum resistance effort.

Iran did not score any points with European leaders at the UNGA either. The three key European states—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—in a joint statement attributed responsibility for last month’s attacks on two oil installations in Saudi Arabia to Tehran, thus placing themselves solidly behind Riyadh and Washington.

A Slight Glimmer of Hope?

Despite setbacks at the international level to defuse Iran’s tensions with the U.S., a number of activities have recently happened at the regional level that might indicate a possible thaw in Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia, and therefore with other Gulf Arab states.

The first step was taken by Tehran, when it introduced its not-so-new plan for regional cooperation with the goal of achieving stability and securing the safety of international shipping in the Persian Gulf, especially in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s plan envisages cooperation among eight regional states—the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council plus Iran and Iraq. Earlier, Rouhani had said that Iran is willing to forget the past unfriendly actions of its Arab neighbors.

The Gulf states have not yet officially reacted to Iran’s latest proposal. But in an article in the Financial Times on September 30, Anwar Gargash, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, laid out conditions for any reconciliation, let alone cooperation, with Tehran. His conditions include Iran giving up nuclear weapons (which Iran has already done), stopping the production of ballistic and other missiles, and ceasing its support for regional proxies so as to respect the sovereignty of other states. Moreover, Gargash wants an agreement that goes beyond the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) and involves the Gulf states in the negotiating process. There is no chance that Iran will accept any of these conditions from the UAE, if it has not done so when asked by the U.S. and Europe. Nevertheless, this may be just the UAE’s opening gambit. In light of meetings that took place earlier this year between Iranian and Emirati officials, Abu Dhabi is not keen for a military confrontation with Tehran.

A Potential Softening of the Saudi Position?

While the UAE, despite earlier efforts to prevent a military confrontation with Iran, seems to be sticking to its uncompromising position, there have been faint indications that Riyadh might be willing to engage in dialogue with Iran to ease tensions. Only a short time ago, Saudi Arabia was talking of taking the war inside Iran, and indeed in 2018 it tried to incite upheavals in Iran’s Khuzistan Province. But after the recent oil attacks, Riyadh appears to favor a political solution to its problems with Tehran.

Saudi Arabia’s setbacks in Yemen, the aftereffects of the Jamal Khashoggi murder, and, most importantly, the attacks on its oil installations seem to have had a sobering effect on Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman. In fact, a spokesperson in Iran’s foreign ministry has acknowledged that Tehran has received messages from Riyadh. However, Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir, via Twitter, has denied that claim. He only acknowledged that some countries friendly with both Tehran and Riyadh have been trying to ease tensions between the two states. This Saudi position is understandable because Riyadh would not want to give the impression that it has lost the game of influence to Tehran. In fact, if there is any hope for some form of breakthrough in Saudi-Iran relations, neither side can appear to be the loser.

Iraq As the Go Between

It appears that Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, who visited Riyadh recently, might emerge as the go between for the Iranians and Saudis. While others, like Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, might also be interested in serving that purpose, Iraq is better positioned as a potential mediator, in part because Islamabad is too close to Saudi Arabia. Iraq has good relations with Tehran and many of its Shia population would want Iran involved in regional affairs so as to offer a counterweight to the region’s Sunni governments. Meanwhile, its Sunni population has good ties with the Saudis and would like to see the kingdom balance Iranian influence and thus enable Iraq to play a more independent role in the region. In an ideal situation, Iraq , instead of being an arena of Saudi-Iranian competition, could become a place of accommodation between the two states and serve as a model for other parts of the Middle East.

However, recent unrest in Baghdad and other major Iraqi cities, coinciding with the approaching Arbaeen ceremonies—which annually bring large numbers of Iranian and other Shia pilgrims to Iraq to commemorate the 40th day after the seventh century martyrdom of the Shia Imam Hussein—could very well scuttle Iraq’s mediation efforts.

Iran’s initial response to these overtures has been positive. For example, Ali Larijani, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, has said that Tehran would welcome talks with Saudi Arabia. Iran, too, has valid reasons to want a reduction in tensions with Riyadh. Although the September 14 attacks on Saudi Arabia did not lead to a military riposte either by Saudi Arabia or the United States, there is no guarantee that similar incidents in the future—whether Tehran is responsible for them or not—would not result in military confrontation. In short, at this juncture, both Tehran and Riyadh might have realized how dangerous the current situation is and the magnitude of the risks that they are running. Therefore, they might be willing to compromise.

The Role of Outsiders

In view of the Persian Gulf’s geopolitical situation and the keen interest of outside players in its development, regional initiatives are unlikely to succeed unless they have the acquiescence of major players. Russia has already declared its support for the Iranian proposal. It is unlikely that China would object to it. However, the most important actor, the United States, is sure to oppose it. Already, the U.S. has revived the idea of creating an Arab version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Israel, too, will oppose any reduction in tensions between Iran and the Gulf Arab states. Since 2003, Israel’s regional strategy has been based on exacerbating these tensions and thus moving the Gulf Arabs to its side.

In short, despite a glimmer of hope for reduced tensions in the Persian Gulf, formidable obstacles remain. Yet, given the risks involved in the current situation, regional and international players should encourage reduction of tensions in the Gulf. It has become abundantly clear that Arab-Iranian enmity will not solve the Middle East’s other major source of tension, namely the Palestine problem. It can only result in another devastating war. By contrast, if successful, a process of reconciliation in the Persian Gulf could help defuse tensions in the Levant as well.

02 Oct 14:39

Ancient DNA traces the Black Death to Russia’s Volga region

Didier “Ice” Iceman

Un coup des russes encore

There, a single strain of Yersinia pestis is ancestral to all other strains studied
01 Oct 07:17

Suu Kyi and the generals drift apart in Myanmar

Didier “Ice” Iceman

Etvles royingha ?

As a general election draws near in Myanmar, a contest that will pit pro-democracy against military forces, political parties are already preparing for the 2020 race.

On September 27, the National League for Democracy (NLD) party that won the 2015 election commemorated its 31st anniversary with a spokesman’s lament that the nation’s democracy was not yet “genuine.”

In a gauntlet-dropping pronouncement, NLD delegates gathered in the old capital of Yangon said that the military-drafted 2008 constitution, which grants vast powers to the men in green, must be amended to promote more democracy.

At the same time, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, known as the Tatmadaw, has recently acted more like a politician than both incumbent president Win Myint and nominal national leader State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.

The military chief, who some suspect has presidential ambitions, has recently visited and donated to Muslim mosques, Christian churches and Hindu temples, in an apparent bid to raise his grass roots profile and soften his public image.

In parliament, where the Tatmadaw appoints a quarter of all delegates, military and aligned Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) MPs recently submitted proposals for their own constitutional amendments, which, if enacted, would give greater powers to the military-dominated National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), including the authority to dissolve elected assemblies.

Military members of parliament sit in the parliament for the historic presidential vote on March 15, 2016Myanmar's parliament will hold a historic presidential vote on March 15 expected to confirm that Htin Kyaw, a respected writer and longtime close friend of Suu Kyi will be the former junta-run nation's first civilian leader in decades. / AFP PHOTO / ROMEO GACAD
Military appointed MPS sit in parliament for the presidential vote on March 15, 2016. Photo: AFP/Romeo Gacad

Military-appointed MPs have also submitted a bill that would bar any political aspirant with a foreign citizen in their immediate family from serving as a minister in the central government or chief minister in any of the country’s 14 states and regions.

There is little doubt that the military-led proposal aims to ensure that Suu Kyi does not play a major role in the next government that emerges from the 2020 elections. Suu Kyi’s elder son, Alexander, is a US citizen, while the younger Kim is a British national.

All of this suggests that civil-military relations have hit their lowest ebb since 2010, when a previous military government started taking its first tentative steps towards democracy and Suu Kyi was still a political prisoner under house arrest.

Until now Suu Kyi and her NLD had taken a more accommodative stance towards the Tatmadaw than many observers anticipated in the aftermath of their landslide 2015 election victory.

That, and her refusal to criticize the military’s bloody offensive against Rohingya Muslims, for which she has shared the blame, have greatly diminished the Nobel Peace Prize winner’s global image and legacy as a pro-democracy icon.

Even so, there are rising indications that the military believes she may have outlived her usefulness as a shield against international pressure, as calls rise for Tatmadaw leaders to be held accountable for the Rohingya humanitarian crisis.

Myanmar State Counsellor and Foreign Minister Aung San Suu Kyi leaves after paying her respects to her late father during a ceremony to mark the 71th anniversary of Martyrs' Day in Yangon on July 19, 2018.Photo: AFP/Ye Aung Thu
Myanmar State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi after paying respects to mark the 71th anniversary of Martyrs’ Day, Yangon, July 19, 2018. Photo: AFP/Ye Aung Thu

Some top brass also seem to think Suu Kyi will seek to erode the military’s interests in a second elected term, a perception made real by the NLD’s statements challenging military power at its September 27 anniversary event.

What is also abundantly clear is that the Tatmadaw is concerned about Suu Kyi’s growing reliance on China, a dependence the military purposefully aimed to narrow by moving towards a more open society and re-engaging the West.

In the 1990s and 2000’s, military governments depended on China for economic and diplomatic support at a time when Western nations, including the US, maintained sanctions to penalize their abysmal human rights record.

But, according to internal Tatmadaw documents reviewed by Asia Times, the military’s top brass later came to view China’s rising economic and political clout in the country as a sovereign threat and looked to restore ties with the West to rebalance its diplomacy.

After a dramatic period of political opening, seen in the release of thousands of political prisoners, end of media censorship and a roll back of restrictions on civil society organizations, Myanmar quickly turned from pariah to darling of the West.

At the same time, China was put on a backfoot after certain of its big ticket investment projects, including the US$3.6 billion Myitsone dam, were either suspended or called into question.

But that all shifted back with the military’s brutal crackdown on Muslim Rohingyas, which since 2017 has forced an estimated 700,000 over the border into Bangladesh.

The United Nations and other international bodies have characterized the military’s “area clearance” operations in Rakhine state as “ethnic cleansing”, while the US and EU have re-imposed certain sanctions.

Myanmar’s soldiers march in a formation during a parade to mark the country’s 74th Armed Forces Day in Naypyidaw on March 27, 2019. Photo: AFP/Thet Aung

Some UN investigators have even mentioned the possibility of bringing top generals, including Min Aung Hlaing, as well as Suu Kyi, to the International Criminal Court for atrocities committed against the Rohingyas and ethnic minorities in other frontier areas.

European and American investors, previously bullish on what had being glowingly referred to as Asia’s “last frontier” market, are now reluctant to commit capital due to the negative impact it could have on their corporate reputations.

China has filled the Western gap with loans, trade and investment, not to mention diplomatic support at the UN. But that has put the Tatmadaw, the self-styled guardian of the country’s independence, at loggerheads with Suu Kyi’s civilian government.

It all represents a dramatic and significant shift, one that will likely become more pronounced as 2020 election campaigns begin in earnest. China had paid scant interest to Suu Kyi’s NLD until it scored its massive victory over the military-linked USDP at the 2015 election.

Now, ties between the NLD and Chinese Communist Party have “blossomed in high-level exchanges between Suu Kyi and Chinese leaders [and] interactions between party members on visits that mix tours of container terminals or education projects with boozy dinners and shopping trips”, Reuters reported on August 7.

Clearly, China will not repeat the mistake it made before 2015, when it put all of its proverbial eggs in the Tatmadaw’s and USDP’s basket. Even smaller political parties have reportedly recently received Chinese donations through local businessmen.

It is thus unsurprisingly that the Tatmadaw is watching with concern China’s strong re-emergence in the country. Some suggest the military may even see the country’s civilian politicians and other opinionmakers as a new enemy whose influence must be curtailed.

On the other side, after nearly four years in power, the NLD is keen to show economic progress it had earlier hoped Western investors would deliver to win votes in 2020.

China's President Xi Jinping (R) shakes hands with Myanmar's State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi as they attend the welcome ceremony at Yanqi Lake during the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing on May 15, 2017. Photo: AFP/Pool
China’s President Xi Jinping (R) shakes hands with Myanmar’s State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi during the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing on May 15, 2017. Photo: AFP/Pool

Instead, China has stepped in with big-ticket investment projects, including a deep-sea port at Kyaukphyu, a high-speed railroad connecting the Chinese border to the central city of Mandalay and hydroelectric power plants in a country still starved for electricity.

The military’s bid to empower the NDSC underlines its concerns about China, albeit indirectly. Six of the NDSC’s 11 members hail from the military. As currently configured, the NDSC has wide-reaching power over security issues, including the authority to declare a state of emergency after consulting the president.

It also allows the military to seize power in a situation “that may disintegrate the Union…or that may cause the loss of sovereignty.”

The NLD government has not called a single official NDSC meeting since assuming office in April 2016. Instead, in January 2017, it appointed its own national security adviser, Thaung Tun, a civilian and former ambassador.
Since November 2018, he has also served as head of a new ministry that seeks to boost local and foreign investment.

The amendments proposed by military and USDP MPs would require NDSC meetings to be held each month, and an emergency meeting convened at any time five of the council’s members request it.

It is unlikely that the proposed amendments will pass as long as the NLD maintains its strong majority in both houses of parliament. But some speculate that could change after the 2020 election.

The NLD may have lost support among the urban middle class and in ethnic states, where many feel they have been neglected by the government and are weary of decades of civil strife and war.

A woman wears stickers with the image of Myanmar's State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi on her cheeks as she attends a broadcast of the live speech by Suu Kyi in front of City Hall in Yangon on September 19, 2017. Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi reached out to the global community on September 19 in a broad appeal for support over a refugee crisis the UN has decried as "ethnic cleansing", urging outsiders to help her nation unite across religious and ethnic lines and offering a pathway back to the country for some of the Rohingya Muslims forced to flee by army operations. / AFP PHOTO / AUNG Kyaw Htet
A woman wears stickers with the image of Myanmar’s State Counselor Aung San Suu Kyi in front of City Hall in Yangon, September 19, 2017. Photo: Aw Htet

Many observers believe that the NLD will retain its position as the country’s largest political party after the 2020 election, not least because of Suu Kyi’s still strong popular support in rural areas.

But the NLD may fall short of a majority if parties in ethnic areas, not out of heartfelt support for the military but rather because they want political change, join political forces with the USDP.

Combined with the 25% of parliament seats constitutionally reserved for the military, the possibility of a USDP-led coalition cannot be ruled out.

Future politics will also be influenced by how gravely the Tatmadaw views China’s threat to national sovereignty. While the Tatmadaw would never overtly point to China as cause for a military intervention in politics, it could instead point to the threat of “insurgency and violence.”

The military-drafted 2008 constitution stipulates both as valid reasons for staging a Tatmadaw takeover after consulting with and securing the approval of the president.

Recent insurgent attacks at the military’s elite academy at Pyin Oo Lwin, renewed fighting in Rakhine and Shan states, and a security scare on September 26 that saw the military warn against “terrorist attacks” in Yangon, Mandalay and Naypyitaw, have all given the military the ammunition it needs to justify seizing power if it deems fit.

Recent events also appear to indicate that Min Aung Hlaing is softening the ground for an election run, though it’s unclear why he would want to become president, a largely ceremonial role, when he now has more power as head of the military.

Myanmar’s president is not directly elected by the people, but rather selected by an electoral college comprised of both elected civilian and military-appointed MPs.

Myanmar military chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing salutes during military exercises in the Ayeyarwaddy delta region in February 2018. Photo: AFP/Pool/STR
Myanmar military chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing salutes during military exercises in the Ayeyarwaddy delta region in February 2018. Photo: AFP/Pool/Stringer

However, if Min Aung Hlaing became president, he and the NDSC would have the power to dismiss the government and parliament, and reimpose direct military rule in the name of security. That, analysts say, could be enough incentive for the career soldier to gun for the presidency.

It is too early to credibly predict what will happen between now and the November 2020 polls, particularly in a country known for its unforeseen and sometimes seismic political events.

What is certain is that Myanmar’s civil-military relations are fast deteriorating and that the military is angling to strengthen, not weaken, its influence and power over politics ahead of pivotal polls.

30 Sep 07:58

Violence in HK ahead of China’s 70th anniversary

Didier “Ice” Iceman

On en parle moins

Fierce clashes broke out between protesters and riot police in Hong Kong Sunday as thousands marched through the strife-torn city, during a day of global protests aimed at casting a shadow over communist China’s upcoming 70th birthday.

Beijing is preparing for huge, tightly choreographed festivities from Tuesday to mark the founding of the People’s Republic of China, including a massive military parade that will revel in the country’s emergence as a global superpower.

But ongoing unrest in Hong Kong threatens to upstage those celebrations as the semi-autonomous city boils with public anger over the erosion of its special freedoms under Beijing’s rule.

Democracy activists in the financial hub had vowed to ramp up their nearly four-month-long campaign ahead of Tuesday’s National Day celebrations, which Hong Kong protesters have dubbed a “Day of Grief.”

Sunday witnessed the most intense clashes in weeks as police used tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannons at multiple locations for hours during running battles with rioters hurling rocks and gasoline bombs.

Using online forums and social media, demonstrators had called for “anti-totalitarian” rallies to be held around the globe. Marches were held in Australia and Taiwan, with more planned in some 40 locations across Europe and North America later in the day.

Clashes broke out before Hong Kong’s unsanctioned march had begun after angry groups in the shopping district of Causeway Bay surrounded and heckled officers who were conducting stop and searches.

But the tear gas fired by police only emboldened the crowds, who then began walking through the streets in their thousands.

Running battles

Extremists vandalized subway stations, tore down banners proclaiming the upcoming 70th-anniversary celebrations and set fire to makeshift barricades.

Many marchers were holding so-called “Chinazi flags,” a version of the Chinese flag with yellow stars arranged in the shape of a swastika.

Police spent hours firing tear gas and rubber bullets at different locations across the city center and were seen making multiple arrests throughout the day.

An AFP reporter witnessed masked men repeatedly beating pro-democracy protesters in Wanchai district using long sticks.

It was not clear if the men were officers dressed as protesters, a tactic increasingly used by the force.

A member of the media was also treated by volunteer medics after being hit in the face with a police projectile, while at least two men were attacked by democracy demonstrators and a taxi was trashed.

Hospital authorities late Sunday said 13 people were admitted, one in a serious condition.

A 20-year-old student, who gave his first name as Tony, was waving a Ukrainian flag.

Some of Hong Kong’s more extreme protesters have taken inspiration from the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution that ousted a pro-Russian president.

“We are hoping that if we connect to different parts of the world and fight against Chinese communism, we will win this movement,” he told AFP.

A 62-year-old protester, who gave his surname as Man, said he felt people’s livelihoods and freedoms had deteriorated since Hong Kong was handed back to China by Britain in 1997.

“I don’t want to topple the regime, but it definitely needs to change,” he told AFP. “It needs to seek a reconciliation with the people.”

Months of unrest

Over the last 17 weeks, Hong Kong has witnessed the worst political unrest since its handover to China in 1997 with huge pro-democracy rallies as well as increasingly intense clashes between police and a minority of violent protesters.

The city’s summer of discontent was first triggered by an extradition bill to the mainland that has now been shelved.

But the movement has since morphed into a call for free elections and less intervention from Beijing.

On Friday and Saturday night, tens of thousands of people turned out for two peaceful rallies.

But there were brief clashes on Saturday night when police used water cannon and tear gas to beat back small groups of protesters hurling bricks and gasoline bombs at a government building.

Students are planning a one-day strike on Monday while activists have called for people to dress in black on Tuesday.

Under the policy of “one country, two systems,” China has offered tiny Hong Kong certain liberties denied to citizens on the mainland – including freedom of expression, unfettered access to the internet, and an independent judiciary.

But the arrangement is due to expire in 2047 and many accuse Beijing of eroding some of those freedoms in recent years.

Protesters are calling for an independent inquiry into the police, an amnesty for those arrested and the right to elect their leaders – demands repeatedly dismissed by China and city leader Carrie Lam.

– AFP

27 Sep 10:33

Japan airlines offer seat maps to avoid tots

Didier “Ice” Iceman

Le vrai service

Fed up with finding yourself next to a screaming child on a long-haul flight? On some Japanese airlines a seat map will warn you where potentially bawling babies are sitting.

The facility, offered as part of Japan Airlines’ “Smile Support” travel service for those with infants, is not new, but lit up the internet after a Twitter user praised it.

“Thank you, @JAL_Official_jp for warnings me about where babies plan to scream and yell during a 13 hour trip. This really ought to be mandatory across the board,” venture capitalist Rahat Ahmed tweeted.

A somewhat bemused JAL spokeswoman confirmed the feature, pointing out it was not a novel offering.

At least one other Japanese airline does the same: All Nippon Airways (ANA), where a spokeswoman confirmed its seat maps have shown where children are sitting “for a while.”

JAL’s maps indicate where infants under two are sitting, with a child icon to let “other passengers know.”

The revelation caused an internet firestorm, with supporters and naysayers battling it out.

“Answered prayers”, airline specialist site The Points Guy titled a post on the subject.

“Nice. But how long before we get upcharged for seats away from said babies?” one user asked.

Another called the map an unnecessary offering.

“Japan Airlines seat map helps avoid screaming babies. Why not just have noise cancelling headphones?!”

And some pointed out that babies aren’t the only troublesome travelers.

“Can we use the same software to avoid people who eat noisily instead?” one Twitter user asked.

“Will airlines also have maps for obnoxious passengers that drink too much, remove their shoes, hog the armrest or recline in my lap?” added another.

Ahmed reported Friday that he had arrived in New York after his JAL flight.

“Ironically chose to sat next to several babies on my two flights: Some great, some loud. It happens. Some adults were worse,” he tweeted.

AFP

27 Sep 10:32

Duterte’s dream train still stuck at the station

Over halfway into Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s six-year term, the train he promised to build across the southern island of Mindanao has yet to break ground.

Duterte, the first Filipino president to hail from the nation’s south, touted the Mindanao Railway Project (MRP) as among his government’s priority infrastructure projects during his first State of the Nation Address in July 2016.

Duterte has promised but yet to deliver a “golden age” of infrastructure development. The National Economic and Development Authority board, chaired by Duterte, approved the MRP’s first phase at a cost of 35.9 billion pesos (US$689 million) in 2017.

The failure to set the train in motion speaks as much to the Philippines complicated relationship with China, the train’s financial backer, as the government’s inability to push through expensive and complicated infrastructure projects.

In 2016, China offered to provide the Philippines as much as $24 billion in development and investment funds, in line with its ambitious $1 trillion Belt and Road Initiative and in recognition of Duterte’s diplomatic pivot towards Beijing.

To date, though, little of that largesse has been distributed for somewhat unclear reasons as Duterte sustains his diplomatic dalliance with his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping.

That includes Beijing’s commitment to the MRT, widely referred to as Duterte’s “dream train”, with financing agreements, masterplans and project designs still not finalized.

For Mindanao, the railroad has been a long-time aspiration for linking people, goods and services across the archipelagic nation’s second largest but still largely underdeveloped island.

Map of proposed Mindanao Railway System. Source: Philippine Department of Transportation

China has committed to fund the project’s Tagum-Davao-Digos (MRP-TDD) segment, a 102 kilometer first stretch of track that was supposed to start ground-breaking last year but was delayed apparently due to design changes. The MRP-TDD is the first phase of the longer 2,000-kilometer railroad that the government plans to build across Mindanao.

The train is designed to reduce travel time from the cities of Tagum to Digos, passing though Duterte’s hometown of Davao City, from 3.5 to 1.3 hours, DOTr data estimates. The agency expects MRP-TDD to accommodate at least 134,000 daily riders.

Disagreement over costs and design are slowing progress. In July, the Interagency Coordinating Committee-Cabinet Committee (ICC-Cabcom) approved a proposal to more than double the MRP-TDD’s cost to 82.9 billion pesos ($1.6 billion) to accommodate design changes.

The Department of Transportation (DOTr) now predicts that construction could commence within the first quarter of 2020 and that the line could be partially opened by February 2022, depending on bidding processes and financing negotiations.

“It is very likely that the design and build contract can be awarded around the end of January 2020,” Eymard Eje, DOTr assistant secretary for project implementation of the Mindanao cluster, told Asia Times.

He says his department expects to receive from Beijing a list of potential Chinese developers by the end of October. Eje also said he expects the loan agreement with China to be signed by March or April 2020.

The terms of those loans, including interest rate and payback period, are still unclear.

A commuter uses his mobile phone as a train arrives at a station in Pasay City, Metro Manila July 7, 2008. Photo: Reuters/Cheryl Ravelo
A commuter uses his mobile phone as a train arrives at a station in Pasay City, Metro Manila. Photo: Twitter

The Philippine Department of Finance (DoF) recently revealed that Chinese loans given for the Kaliwa dam and Chico River irrigation projects, both in northern Luzon island, carry 2% nominal interest rates with a 20-year maturity and seven-year grace period.

Eje said the winning MRP-TDD contractor will be required to partially operate (PO) the segment within 24 months of closing the contract. “This should enable the operation of the PO section before the end of the Duterte administration in June 2022,” Eje projected.

An original feasibility study, which the NEDA commissioned to a group of local consultants, has the MRP-TDD segment being built as a non-electrical single-rail track with provisions to allow eventual upgrades into an electrified double-rail line.

An Asian Development Bank study conducted in 2018 estimated the MRP-TDD segment’s cost at 80 billion pesos ($1.5 billion) which took into account previous unforeseen needs for additional structures such as viaducts and bridges, Eji said.

A further evaluation conducted by Arup Ove & Partners Hongkong Ltd, a global design and construction firm with projects in 33 countries, assessed the line’s cost at about 83 billion pesos ($1.6 billion), an estimate which the ICC-Cabcom approved, Eji said.

The higher project cost was due to further changes in civil and structural work needed to accommodate slopes and embankments along the track, and the incremental cost of fixed items such as engineering and project management, he explained.

Eje said that China, as the project’s main funder, is expected to nominate at least three of its state-run contractors to participate in the MRP-TDD’s bidding. He also said land acquisition for the line would affect some 1,900 landowners, representing a potential political risk to the project.

Eje identified potentially interested state-owned Chinese firms as China Railway International Group (CRIG) and China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC).

CRIG is a subsidiary of the China Railway Group Ltd, a Fortune 500 global company, according to its website. China Railway’s core business is the construction of railway infrastructure, both at home and abroad.

CCECC has expanded from an international railway contractor to project contracting, civil engineering design and consulting, labor services cooperation, real estate and trading. It has projects underway in over 50 countries in Asia, Africa, America and Oceania.

Li Lin, China’s consul general in Mindanao’s Davao City, tipped China State Construction Engineering Corp (CSCEC) and China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) as also potentially interested in bidding on the project.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (L) and Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte (R) raise a toast during a state banquet at the Malacanang Presidential Palace in Manila on November 20, 2018. Photo: AFP/Pool/Mark R Cristino

CSCEC constructed drug rehabilitation centers built and financed by the Chinese government in the Mindanao provinces of Sarangani and Agusan del Sur, Li said.

CCCC, which also specializes in building highways and railways, is conducting the feasibility studies for a bridge and expressway in Davao City, both donations of the Chinese government, Li noted.

CSCEC, which bid for but was not awarded the rehabilitation contract for war-torn Marawi City, and CCCC have already established representative offices in Davao City, the Chinese diplomat said.

Li said looking to Chinese firms as potential developers for the MRP-TDD is part of the “package of agreement” that comes with China’s loans and donations for infrastructure projects.

He was quick to add, however, that the Philippine government “could choose non-Chinese firms if it thinks they are better than Chinese companies.”

Li described the Mindanao railway “as one of the major cooperation projects between China and the Philippines” following President Xi’s state visit to Manila last November, an occasion that upgraded bilateral ties to “comprehensive, strategic cooperative relations,” according to Li.

Duterte visited China for the fifth time last month, at which he raised the two sides’ escalating South China Sea row with Xi. It was the eighth time that the two leaders have met since Duterte’s rise to power in mid-2016.

Duterte’s latest visit to China in August appeared to pay off financially, judging by the $219.7 million railway loan he secured for the Philippine National Railways’ long-haul project on the main island of Luzon.

Chinese consul general Li Lin gives an address in Davao City, April 27, 2018. Photo: Facebook

In the Asia Times interview, Li reiterated China’s commitment to fund the MRP-TDD, of which Beijing has said it is prepared to cover at least 80% of the project’s total cost.

The Chinese consul rejected speculation that China is luring the Philippines into a “debt trap” through big infrastructure project loans, not just in Mindanao but across the country.

“The Philippine government has the competence to pay back its debt…It is not an issue to worry about,” Li said, adding that granted “soft loans” will carry “low interest rates.”

27 Sep 04:01

Le cauchemar de « l'hôpital du futur »

by Frédéric Pierru
Didier “Ice” Iceman

Oui un cauchemar

« Du vent ». C'est ainsi que les urgentistes en grève ont qualifié le plan présenté par la ministre de la santé le 9 septembre. À des services au bord de l'implosion elle propose une enveloppe rachitique, ponctionnée sur d'autres secteurs, eux-mêmes en difficulté. Faut-il dès lors parler de « crise » de (...) / France, Santé, Médecine, Société, Économie, Entreprise, Capitalisme, Néolibéralisme, Protection sociale, Technologie - 2019/10
25 Sep 04:36

Saudi oil disruption could hit China hardest

Didier “Ice” Iceman

Interaction du monde globalisé

Saudi Arabia claims its oil production infrastructure, 60% of which was knocked off-stream in a pre-dawn drone attacks on September 14, will be running at full throttle again by month’s end, an assessment few energy industry analysts view as feasible.

While the Middle East waits to see how the US and Saudi Arabia ultimately respond to the attacks blamed on Iran, the impact on Asia’s oil markets is coming into clearer view, with China looking the most vulnerable to any prolonged disruption to Saudi supplies.

Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest oil exporter, the de facto leader of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel and the world’s third largest crude oil producer after the US and Russia. The Asia-Pacific, home to some of the world’s largest net oil-importing nations, is increasingly dependent on Saudi oil to fuel their fast-growing economies.

Last year, China imported 459.3 million tons (mt) of crude oil, a 10.1% year on year rise worth a record-breaking US$239.2 billion. That represented a 20.2% share of total global consumption, according to China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).

In 2018, the US imported 247.8 mt of crude oil, while India was the third largest crude oil importer at 226.6 mt, followed by Asian industrial heavyweights South Korea (151.3 mt), and Japan (149.3 mt), according to industry data.

But the attacks have put China’s reliance on Saudi Arabian crude oil exports into particularly sharp relief. In 2018, Saudi Arabia was China’s second largest oil supplier, providing 12.4% of its imports at a value of around $30 billion.

Source: Twitter/China Customs/Refinitiv Eikon

Over 40% of China’s oil supplies are delivered by Gulf countries, meaning China is especially vulnerable to a similar type of future attack on oil production facilities. Russia was China’s largest supplier at 15.8%, and Angola its third biggest at 10.4%.

China has traditionally relied on oil imports from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia and, more recently, the US. China’s imports of US oil, however, plunged 76% in the first half of 2019, due largely to the two sides’ escalating trade war.

US sanctions re-imposed last year against Iran’s energy sector have also forced China – though it is clearly finding ways to circumvent the restrictions – to cut at least 50% of its oil imports from Iran, according to ship tracking data firms.

That has further weakened Beijing’s stated drive to diversify its foreign sources of oil. Indeed, the Saudi oil production outages are showing just how vulnerable China has become to foreign oil supplies, a dilemma that vexed the US for decades until the shale oil revolution of recent years.

“China…will be the biggest victim of the attacks on the oil facility in Saudi Arabia,” Lin Boqiang, director of Xiamen University’s China Center for Energy Economics Research, said in a China Daily report just after the drone attacks.

China could soon be hard-pressed to replace not only quantities of Saudi oil, but also its particular crude oil blends that are better suited for most of China’s refineries.

The Abqaiq field, the Saudi oil hub knocked out of commission by last week’s attack, was the key hub processor for Arab Light and Arab Extra Light crude blends coming from the Ghawar, Shaybah and Khurais fields.

Image of the immediate fiery aftermath of the missile and drone attacks at Abqaig on September 15, 2019, in Saudi Arabia. Photo: Screengrab

Arab Light and Arab Extra Light crude oil grades make up about one-third of China’s total Saudi oil imports, according to Seng Yick Tee, a senior director with the SIA Energy consultancy.

On September 19, state-run oil giant Saudi Aramco informed multiple Chinese refineries that some of the buyers’ September and October term crude oil supplies would be affected by the attacks.

Japan also was informed by Aramco that it won’t be able to export the same grade of oil starting in October, according to Japanese media, signaling the Saudis are not exactly certain when the repairs will be finished.

According to media reports, several Chinese refineries said last week that Saudi supplies would be delayed by at least one or two weeks, while others reported that they would receive different crude oil blends than originally ordered.

Another refinery in southern China operated by Chinese state-run oil and gas major Sinopec received a notice from Saudi Aramco that it will be unable to supply Arab Extra Light crude, according to industry sources.

Its monthly contract for Arab Light crude will be switched to Arab Heavy as a substitute grade for September loading, a company source told global commodities data provider S&P Global Platts.

Switching crude oil feedstock for refineries could cause significant time delays, higher costs and technical problems since each individual refinery is usually configured to process specific crude oil types.

Sinopec said in a report earlier this year that, in response to the upgrading of the quality of oil imports, refineries in China are becoming more complex in their capacities.

A satellite image showing damage to oil and gas infrastructure at Abqaig on September 15, 2019, Saudi Arabia. Photo: US Government / AFP

If Saudi oil production operations can be brought back online by the end of the month, as Saudi Aramco claims, the problem for Chinese refineries will be limited.

But if repairs at the two damaged oil- producing installations take much longer, as some analysts speculate, China will have to reformulate its plans, including cutting refinery run rates and importing more refined fuel products from other countries, including significantly the US.

That will conceivably give the US another pressure point on the Chinese economy as the two sides enter another round of negotiations in their trade war.

US crude oil exports, mostly derived from shale production in the Permian Basin in west Texas and eastern New Mexico and the Eagle Ford Shale in south Texas, consist mostly of lighter and sweeter crude oil, with less sulfur content than medium and heavier crude blends.

Lighter crude blends allow for the production of higher quality refined products and hence trade at a premium over heavier, more sour crude oil blends.

The attacks on Saudi supplies have also highlighted another market trend: the emergence of US dominance in both global oil and gas markets, coincident with a decline in Saudi Arabia’s decades-long role as the world’s swing producer.

If the US had not ramped up its oil production capacity in recent years, bringing millions of extra barrels per day onto global markets, oil prices would have spiked way more than they did in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on Saudi Arabia.

As it happened, prices for global oil benchmark Bench crude jumped $12 per barrel to $69 per barrel, but then fell back to around $64, where prices have been trading for much of the US summer season.

Conceptual image of Chinese bank notes and oil wells. Photo: Twitter

If a similar scenario would have ensued a decade ago, before the US shale oil revolution, oil prices could have jumped by as much as 30-40% and not retreated as quickly as they did, industry analysts say.

The more moderate market response, the analysts say, can be largely attributed to US oil production dominance. In just six years, US crude oil production rose so rapidly that it surpassed that of both Russia and Saudi Arabia, increasing from 5.5 million bpd to now over 12 million bpd.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) said earlier this month that booming shale production already allowed the US to briefly overtake Saudi Arabia as the world’s top exporter of oil and refined products in June, after US crude exports surpassed 3 million bpd.

23 Sep 14:10

Papua New Guinea backtracks on China debt refinancing

Didier “Ice” Iceman

La dette, le.soft power

Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape has backtracked on an announcement saying he had asked China to refinance the country’s $8 billion debt, insisting the statement was released without his knowledge.

A statement from his office on Tuesday said the recently appointed PNG leader had asked China’s ambassador for help in refinancing the country’s 27-billion-kina public debt during a meeting in Port Moresby.

But on Wednesday afternoon, Marape’s office released a new statement saying it was “false” that he was “going one way to China” to tackle the country’s debt.

He said PNG was primarily discussing trade with China while examining debt options with undisclosed “non-traditional partners.”

“We are in discussion with many of our bilateral partners to access very low cost concession finance to give us some breathing space,” Marape said in the statement.

“This includes our discussions with (the) World Bank, ADB (Asian Development Bank) and some other possible non-traditional partners.”

Cash-strapped PNG’s public debt stands at about 33 percent of GDP, with interest repayments at 15 percent of the government’s annual expenditure.

Marape, who took office less than three months ago, said he intended “to refinance bad and expensive loans secured by the previous government” but would not add any “reckless” burden to the country’s economy.

“I have put (a) stop to more borrowings and loans until we are satisfied that the project cost-benefit analysis establishes (a) return on the loans we might secure,” he said.

Marape has vowed to combat endemic corruption at home and rebalance the country’s relationships with allies and multinational companies mining PNG’s rich mineral resources.

Beijing has been strengthening ties with PNG and other Pacific nations by boosting engagement and offering loans for infrastructure in the region.

That has raised concerns in Australia and the United States, which are now competing with Beijing to maintain their Pacific influence in the face of China’s rise.

AFP

23 Sep 04:35

Libya’s Stalemate Could Lead to Dreaded Partition

by Guest Contributor
Didier “Ice” Iceman

A craindre en effet

by Imad K. Harb

The apparent hiatus in large-scale fighting between Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Fayez al-Sarraj, and the renegade General Khalifa Haftar, who commands the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA), should not be misconstrued as leading to peace in the battered country. In fact, the ceasefire that was arranged for the Muslim Eid al-Adha holiday in August was punctuated by bombings and troop movements, reminding everyone that the festering Libyan crisis continues to threaten the unity and survival of whatever remains of state institutions. The GNA, assisted by powerful militias, still presides tenuously in Tripoli and extends its writ over a swathe of territory in western Libya while the LNA boasts of controlling the rest of the country.

This generally sums up an unfortunate reality in Libya on the 50th anniversary of Muammar Qadhafi’s coup, in September 1, 1969, against King Idris al-Sanusi and his establishment of republican rule that later evolved into a jamahiriya (republic of the masses), one that was practically bereft of state institutions. That the late colonel’s failure at leadership and governance was at least partly responsible for the current situation is a given. Since his killing in 2011, however, the failure of other Libyans and those in the international community to hold the line on keeping Libya a unified country has become a testament to the vagaries of elite carelessness and multilateral neglect. To be sure, the international community’s shirking of responsibility to prevent the final collapse of post-2011 Libya is tantamount to complicity in the creation of conditions for Libya’s partition—as well as complete anarchy and chaos in northern Africa.

The (Un)Peaceful Ceasefire

Despite a large show of force and ambitious assault on Tripoli, which began in April, Haftar’s Libyan National Army has not been able to dislodge the forces of the United Nations-recognized GNA from the capital. In fact, GNA forces seem to be on the offensive against the LNA and have gained significant territory. Sporadic skirmishes are almost daily occurrences—notwithstanding the agreement on a ceasefire last August––that only remind Libyans that control of Tripoli has not yet been settled, and thus that Libya’s fate and future developments remain in flux. These skirmishes are slowly producing a military stalemate that could harden battle lines, ones that would possibly demarcate, in the future, the borders of two equally weak rump states. Both of these certainly would be dependent for their well-being, at least for the foreseeable future, on the munificence of outside actors.

On September 16, Haftar’s forces carried out air raids on the GNA-held city of Sirte on the Mediterranean. On September 7, three GNA fighters were killed in military operations against LNA positions outside the capital. On the same day, at a press conference in Abu Dhabi, General Ahmed al-Mismari, spokesman for the LNA, predicted a quick end to the Tripoli battle, asserting that the only way to end the Libyan crisis is through military means and that the time for dialogue is over. On September 2, Libya’s international airport at Mitiga was temporarily closed down after an attack by Haftar’s forces. These September skirmishes were preceded by a warning in late August by United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres––whose organization is mediating the crisis––that Libya was on the verge of a full-scale civil war. By September 9, Haftar’s assault on Tripoli, which started last April, had killed 1,200, injured 6,000, and displaced about 120,000 persons, according to figures from the United Nations.

The military developments were accompanied by other unsettling actions and declarations. In early September, Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC), officially part of the GNA despite its reluctance to proclaim allegiance, limited its kerosene supplies to the Haftar-controlled areas because some was used in military operations against Tripoli. The NOC asserted, however, that all civilian needs in those areas are being met. In response, UN diplomats said the east is planning to start its own oil firm to secure supplies not only to its areas but also to forces fighting in Tripoli 1,000 kilometers away.

It should be remembered that over the last few years, Haftar and his supporters have tried to play games with institutions assumed to be the responsibility of the GNA. The seaport of Benghazi, under Haftar’s control, appears to have regained its position in maritime trade, and its revenues go to the eastern government in Tobruk, not to the GNA. Haftar’s control over vast oil fields gives him leverage if the international community allows him to have his own oil exports. Between 2016 and 2018, Haftar and the Tobruk government printed almost 10 billion Libyan dinars in Russia, claiming that they were covering a cash crunch in areas under their control. That step threatened the authority of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) as the regulator of financial activity in the country. Today, Haftar is relying on private banks in the east––which are regulated by the CBL––to fund his war effort against the GNA, thus putting the bank and the entire financial situation in the country in jeopardy if he fails to repay his debts. Last March, there were reports that the eastern government sold 32 billion dinars’ worth of bonds (equal to $23 billion) to fund its salaries since 2014, after bypassing the CBL and GNA.

Feeble Peace Negotiations

As time passes without a decisive end in sight to the GNA-LNA battle for Tripoli, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) continues its efforts to find an accommodation between the two parties, although Haftar’s assault on Tripoli last April meant the demise of such efforts. On September 4, UNSMIL’s head, Ghassan Salamé, delivered a solemn message to the UN Security Council about several outstanding and disturbing issues facing Libya and his mission. These included Haftar’s assault on Tripoli, the shelling of airports and public buildings, kidnappings and disappearances, illegal supplies of weapons, entry of mercenary forces, and outside interference, among others. He warned the council of two possible scenarios in Libya’s future if the international community neglected its commitment to peacefully resolve the Libyan crisis: 1) “a persistent and protracted low intensity conflict” that kills more Libyans, and 2) “a doubling down of military support to one or the other by their external patrons,” which may lead to regional chaos. Trying to maintain some hope for his mission, Salamé obviously did not want to broach the prospect of partition.

Salamé’s meetings with Haftar do not appear to have led to a breakthrough, given the general’s belief in a military solution to the crisis. On September 9, Salamé announced that Haftar agreed to withdraw from Tripoli, but only after he receives “guarantees” that he is given important portfolios in any new political arrangement. Juxtaposed to what he announced last July about his unwillingness to negotiate with the GNA’s Sarraj, Haftar’s acceptance means nothing. In fact, the different tones reflect the general’s military position. Last July, he was on the verge of conquering Tripoli; today, however, his forces appear to be losing momentum in the face of a determined GNA that is supported by several militias in the west.

Still, Salamé is committed to his transitional deal for the country. Briefly, it consists of a plan for nationwide consultations between the different parties to discuss holding presidential, parliamentary, and local elections and the writing of a draft constitution. The UN envoy has worked since 2017 to involve the eastern government and General Haftar as well as Tripoli’s GNA and its associated Presidential Council, but so far little commitment has emerged on Haftar’s part. Last June, the GNA’s Sarraj––following an ill-advised telephone call from US President Donald Trump to Haftar––proposed a peace initiative that includes national reconciliation and amnesties, excluding for those accused of war crimes. Importantly, however, Sarraj and his government’s initiative view Haftar as having been “destroyed” with no role to play in the future of Libya. In other words, Libya’s future looks to be contingent on two simultaneous realities: a stalemated battlefield near Tripoli, as Haftar insists on conquering it; and a stalled peace process, as Salamé fails to convince Haftar to give compromise a chance. And it does not appear that the general is willing either to halt his assault on the capital or accept an agreement.

The Role of Outsiders

Haftar could not be holding Libya’s fate in his hands were it not for the support he receives from interested outside actors who are seemingly unconcerned about his intransigence; these primarily include the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. While all have expressed support for Salamé’s UN mission, they remain committed to Haftar’s fortunes. His declared credentials as someone who fights the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya have endeared him to this trio, which considers the group a terrorist organization. The UAE has assisted Haftar by equipping his forces with armored vehicles and drones. Recently, it began building a military base in neighboring Niger to assist the general. His spokesperson, Ahmed al-Mismari, held a news conference in Abu Dhabi to declare that only a military solution can resolve the Libyan crisis; this should be enough proof that Emirati officials are fully behind him. From a geopolitical standpoint, the UAE’s support to Haftar resembles Abu Dhabi’s backing of secessionist forces in Yemen and in Somalia’s Somaliland and Puntland.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have provided financial and military assistance to Haftar; in fact, they interceded on his behalf with the United States after he launched his assault on Tripoli. Their action prompted President Trump to call the renegade general to thank him for his work in fighting extremists, practically giving him license to hold on to his positions vis-à-vis the GNA. Riyadh also pledged to finance Haftar’s campaign against Tripoli. Now, with his campaign stalled and after frictions with the UAE following the latter’s change of heart in Yemen and support for secessionists there, Saudi Arabia may look to extricate itself from supporting Haftar and instead pledge to help the UN’s Salamé. Others like the United States, France, and Russia do not appear to want to be deeply involved in helping to reach a peaceful outcome. Indeed, Paris and Moscow have preferred to look out for their own interests instead of assisting the UN mission. Still, at the last meeting of the G7, world leaders issued a communiqué calling for an international conference on Libya but asserted their support of the current UN mission led by Ghassan Salamé.

By comparison, Turkey has taken a strong position supporting Sarraj and his Tripoli-based Government of National Accord. This support is helping to change the Libyan crisis into a proxy war in which the UAE and Turkey compete to provide their clients with the necessary means for political and military survival. To be sure, the GNA finds itself in a bind: with an arms embargo in place since 2011, and with Haftar receiving military support from the UAE and elsewhere, limited options force it to accept assistance from Turley. Last July, a former Libyan official welcomed Turkish help that could fill a void in the GNA’s defenses, which are currently heavily reliant on ground troops from western Libyan militias. Turkey has supplied the GNA with armored vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles. In this stance, Turkey’s position does not differ from that of Qatar on Haftar, the GNA, and the political solution to Libya’s conflict. Qatar also called for an international investigation into an attack on a detention center near Tripoli last July, which was blamed on Haftar.

Fear of What’s to Come

While both domestic competition and outside intervention are fueling the dangerous Libyan conflict, General Haftar’s challenge to the GNA and rejection of UN mediation are central elements in the feared partition of the country. If he hampers Salamé’s mission and insists on a military solution to the conflict with the GNA––a task so far unattained––it is hard to prevent him from imposing a fait accompli on the areas he controls. What adds to this possibility is the fact that eastern Libya may look like an economically viable entity that could be supported by both the UAE and Egypt, despite the international problem of legitimacy that option could create for Haftar and his Arab backers.

Dissuading Haftar from pursuing either his ill-advised assault on the capital or de facto partition requires an international commitment to the current UN mission Salamé leads, notwithstanding the setbacks it has suffered. Nevertheless, this international commitment should take into consideration how to stop the UAE and Egypt’s interference in, and support for, Haftar’s two choices. The Trump Administration has an essential role to play in this endeavor because of its relationship with Abu Dhabi and Cairo. Perhaps the Saudi and Yemeni challenge to the UAE’s support to south Yemen’s secessionists will convince Emirati leaders that their ambitions there—and in Somalia and Libya—should be curtailed. As for Egypt, the American ability to use levers of pressure, economic and military, may be enough to demonstrate to Egyptian officials that their country’s security is best defended and preserved with a unified Libya, one with strong, internationally supported institutions the late Qadhafi considered dispensable.

Imad K. Harb is the Director of Research and Analysis at Arab Center Washington DC. To learn more about Imad and read his previous publications click here. Republished, with permission, from the Arab Center.

22 Sep 06:02

Israeli Iron Dome system needed for Saudi defense

Didier “Ice” Iceman

Lien diabolique

The US Department of Defense has announced it will send additional troops and possibly the Israeli Iron Dome system to Saudi Arabia and the UAE to reinforce air defenses. While the exact locations for additional air defenses have not been announced, the most likely deployment would be along Saudi Arabia’s northern border facing Iraq and Iran. The US will also install some point defense systems (radars plus guns) around critical oil facilities and military bases.

The Israeli Iron Dome system is the best system for protecting Saudi assets from a similar attack. The US Army bought two Iron Dome batteries from Israel with delivery expected in 2020. Whether Israel could quickly deliver a system to meet the current urgent need is unclear. Right now the US lacks ideal systems to counter cruise missiles and drones.

Iron Dome was developed by Rafael in Israel and Raytheon in the United States to deal with the threat of short-range missiles, primarily those being fired by Hamas in the Gaza strip. The system has performed brilliantly against these threats. Each Iron Dome battery includes three to four stationary launchers that contain  20 Tamir interceptor missiles and a battlefield radar system. The US is buying 240 Tamir interceptor missiles, 12 launchers, and two radar systems and command trailers.

The Iron Dome system has performed remarkably well over the past eight years, according to defense writer Sébastien Roblin. “Since 2011, the Israel Defense Force has used the Iron Dome system to shoot down over 1,700 unguided rockets and mortar shells launched by militants in Lebanon, Syria, and the Gaza Strip against Israeli communities. An Iron Dome battery can also engage aircraft, drones, large artillery shells and possibly even cruise and ballistic missiles – as proven by its shootdown of an Iranian Fateh ballistic missile on January 20, 2019.”

It is likely the US will also temporarily deploy additional Patriot air defense batteries, particularly around the oil fields, and put radars on towers to better detect incoming cruise missiles and drones. Patriot was never optimized against cruise missiles or drones, but it can nevertheless provide some defensive capability.

Patriot can be augmented by rapid-fire gun emplacements that can provide terminal defense. These can be cued by ground-based radar and feature electro-optical sensors.

The best of them is the Navy’s Phalanx rapid-fire 20mm gun system. The land version of Phalanx is called C-RAM for counter rocket, artillery and mortar system and has a forward-looking infrared camera to identify incoming threats. The US and British forces used C-RAM in Iraq.

There are other systems in Europe that might be available if the US asked for them. These include the  Nächstbereichschutzsystem MANTIS: 35mm fully automated C-RAM system, produced by Rheinmetall based on Oerlikon’s Skyshield and ordered by the German Air Force and in use from 2011.

Italy also has an excellent system called DRACO that uses a super-rapid 76mm gun. Its main advantage is its 76mm (3 inch) round which can effectively destroy larger threats such as cruise missiles. The 20mm rapid-fire systems probably need to hit larger targets multiple times.

It has to be strongly emphasized that the US is poorly prepared against cruise missile and drone threats, which is why it turned to Israel for help.

Training will be a critical issue for US Army and Air Force personnel to learn to deal with cruise missile and drone threats. At the moment, US forces are not trained for this sort of mission but might receive training from Israel which has faced such threats for some time. Israel could give this help bilaterally and might even attach some of their personnel to US forces. Of course, Saudi and UAE permission might be needed, but it is unlikely the help would be rejected under the circumstances.

An additional problem is the need to eliminate spies that have been planted in Saudi Arabia by Iran. There isn’t much doubt that infiltrators around the oil installations directed the cruise missiles and drones to their targets. Whether they used TV guidance or laser is irrelevant: what matters is that they were able to move about in the Kingdom with equipment supplied for that purpose. These threats need to be found and removed.

The addition of US forces is, of course in lieu of retaliation against Iran. But in this kind of warfare, the defender is always at a major disadvantage if he has to wait to be attacked and can’t knock out the threat at its origin point. Israel, for example, has aggressively gone after drone and missile threats and knocked them out, whenever it can find them, using excellent intelligence and sophisticated and coordinated counter-threat operations.

US intelligence is far from adequate. Whatever forces are moved to the Kingdom, the lack of adequate intelligence remains a major problem. The Defense Department will have to dig deep into its bag of intelligence tricks to operate a credible defensive system in the region. Most noteworthy, much more attention will have to be given to human intelligence (HUMINT) than relying solely on technical intelligence (for example, ELINT or electronic intelligence). Whether this can be achieved is open to debate.

Overall the US move is only a first step, but its deficiencies have one silver lining: the US will now be obliged to more rapidly move toward a proper defense capability against cruise missiles and drones.

20 Sep 03:09

Une purge politique est en cours au Cachemire

Didier “Ice” Iceman

Et pas que là

Depuis que l’autonomie de la région indienne a été supprimée par le gouvernement Modi, toutes les figures démocrates de l’État du Jammu-et-Cachemire ont été arrêtées. Par application d’une loi extrêmement contestée.
19 Sep 05:19

Plus de 600 plaintes contre cette campagne sur les menstruations à la télé australienne

Didier “Ice” Iceman

masquer la réalité, c'est tellement mieux

Faire apparaître du sang menstruel dans une publicité à la télévision, est-ce contraire à l’éthique ? Non, tranche l’organisme de régulation des publicités en Australie, malgré les plaintes de téléspectateurs.
18 Sep 07:14

Taliban kill 48 in bloody day ahead of Afghan polls

Didier “Ice” Iceman

le bain de sang continue entre tribus

Taliban suicide bombers killed at least 48 people and wounded dozens more in two blasts Tuesday – one at a campaign rally for the president and the other in Kabul – with the insurgents warning of more violence ahead of elections.

The first attack saw a motorcyclist detonate a suicide bomb at a checkpoint leading to a rally where President Ashraf Ghani was addressing supporters in Parwan province, just north of the capital, killing 26 and wounding 42.

Just over an hour later, another blast also claimed by the Taliban rocked central Kabul near the US embassy. Authorities initially did not give casualty figures, but later said 22 people had been killed and a further 38 wounded.

The explosions came after US President Donald Trump, objecting to a previous deadly Taliban blast, abruptly ended talks with the Islamist extremists earlier this month over a deal that would have allowed the US to begin withdrawing troops from its longest war.

In a statement sent to media claiming responsibility for both of Tuesday’s blasts, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said the attack near Ghani’s rally was deliberately aimed at disrupting the September 28 ballot.

“We already warned people not to attend election rallies. If they suffer any losses that is their own responsibility,” the statement said.

At the scene near Ghani’s rally, roughly an hour’s drive north of Kabul, the remains of a burnt motorcycle, with a body on top, were covered by a blanket, next to a badly damaged police car.

Women and children were among the casualties, Parwan hospital director Abdul Qasim Sangin told AFP.

The president was unhurt. He later condemned the attack, saying the incident proved the Taliban had no real interest in reconciliation.

“As the Taliban continue their crimes, they once again prove that they are not interested in peace and stability in Afghanistan,” Ghani said in a statement.

Talks ‘dead’

Sixty kilometers (40 miles) away in Kabul, a shopkeeper, Rahimullah, said he had been sitting inside his shop when the second blast came.

“The wave broke all the windows,” he told AFP.

“I rushed outside and saw several bodies just across the street. This is the second time in less than a month that a blast has broken our windows. I just fixed them a week ago.”

The UN’s mission in Afghanistan also criticized the Taliban, accusing them of showing “despicable disregard for civilian life & fundamental human right to participate in democratic process.”

These and other attacks “demonstrate blatant disregard for the people and institutions of Afghanistan,” US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a statement.

“For Afghans to truly reconcile, the Taliban must begin to demonstrate a genuine commitment to peace rather than continue the violence and destruction that causes such inordinate harm to the Afghan people and the future of their country,” Pompeo said.

The elections will see Ghani face off against his own Chief Executive, Abdullah Abdullah, and more than a dozen other candidates, including former warlords, ex-spies, and onetime members of the country’s former communist regime.

For weeks, the election had been sidelined by the US-Taliban talks, with many Afghans and observers expecting the vote to be cancelled if a deal was agreed. Even candidates did little in the way of campaigning.

But with the deal off, Ghani and his rivals have begun the race.

Ghani is seeking a clear mandate backing negotiations with the insurgents on a lasting peace in Afghanistan.

Trump’s declaration that the US-Taliban talks were “dead” spurred the insurgents to declare last week that the only other option was more fighting.

Observers had warned that the Taliban, who hope to weaken the future president, will do anything they can to upend the election.

Turnout for the vote is set to be low. Experts cite fear of violence and a loss of hope among voters following widespread fraud allegations during the 2014 election.

AFP

15 Sep 15:17

India’s democratic dictatorship

Didier “Ice” Iceman

ça ne plaira pas à Modi

Amid much fanfare, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has completed a hundred days of its second term. Despite his government’s poor record, Modi remains immensely popular personally. This does not bode well for Indian democracy.

The Modi government’s supporters tout a slew of new repressive legislation – including the criminalization of talaq-e-biddat, the Muslim practice of “instant divorce” – as a display of resoluteness. Likewise, Modi’s recent abrogation of Jammu and Kashmir’s special status, guaranteed under Article 370 of India’s constitution, was undertaken amid a statewide lockdown. Political leaders were arrested, and telephone and Internet services were suspended. There is no telling what will happen when the lid is taken off the pressure cooker. Yet most Indians are offering unstinting support.

Modi’s supporters have less to say about the economy, which is in free fall, and relations among religious communities, which have never been tenser. (The unmanned Moon landing of which they had hoped to boast failed when the robotic rover crashed on the lunar surface on the eve of the hundred-day anniversary.)

Modi’s enduring popularity may mystify his critics. Most of the out-of-the-box solutions he has attempted have done more harm than good. For example, his government’s disastrous demonetization of 86% of India’s currency in 2016 was probably the single biggest blow to the Indian economy since independence, costing millions of jobs and undermining growth. But that does not seem to bother most voters, for whom he comes across as a decisive, no-nonsense leader, willing to break with tradition and attempt bold solutions to India’s intractable problems.

This response has left many in India scratching their heads. Here is a prime minister who has upended practically every civilized convention in Indian politics. He has sent law-enforcement authorities to pursue flimsy charges against opposition leaders, promoted ministers whose divisive rhetoric has left Muslims and other minorities living in fear, and intimidated the media to the point that press coverage of his administration is an embarrassment to India’s democratic culture.

Moreover, Modi’s government has discarded, for the first time in the history of India’s parliamentary standing committees, a bipartisan tradition that accords a member of the leading opposition party the chair of the External Affairs Committee (a position I previously held). Instead, Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has decided that it will hold its own government accountable.

Fervent nationalism

For many of Modi’s admirers, such flagrant authoritarian displays simply don’t matter. In their view, after decades of too much “soft-hearted democracy” and pandering governing coalitions, a “tough” Indian leader was long overdue. Those of us whose faith in India’s democratic system was absolute now face the sobering realization that its roots may be shallower than we had allowed ourselves to believe.

India is now in the throes of a fervent nationalism that extols every Indian achievement, real or imagined, and labels even the mildest political disagreement or protest “anti-national” or even “seditious.” Almost every independent institution has been hollowed out and turned into an instrument of the government’s overweening dominance.

In the case of the tax authorities, this is less surprising. But now agencies responsible for financial investigations, law enforcement, and the government’s intelligence-gathering machinery, and even famously autonomous bodies like the Election Commission and the judiciary, are not exempt from such concerns.

Under Modi, political freedom is no longer regarded as a virtue. The new standard of social order is control (by the authorities) and conformity (by everyone else). As the scholar and commentator Pratap Bhanu Mehta recently noted, “it is difficult to remember a time” when the “premium on public and professional discourse marching to the state’s tune was as high.”

Communal relations battered

Predictably, communal relations have worsened dramatically under BJP rule. The alienation of India’s Muslim community is so severe that even some of the government’s staunchest defenders have acknowledged it. For 3,000 years, India was a haven for the persecuted of all nations and faiths. Today, it rejects Muslim Rohingya refugees from Myanmar and publishes a National Register of Citizens that excludes millions of largely Muslim people who were driven to India as refugees after 1971, and their Indian-born children. There are also murmurs of a new push to eliminate the personal laws that minority communities are allowed to retain to govern their family practices, and to adopt “anti-conversion” laws aimed at restricting missionary activity.

Before our eyes, India’s very character is being transformed by a government with no regard for institutions, understandings, and practices maintained since independence. “Boldness,” it seems, is all that matters.

For liberal democrats like me, the increasingly salient concern is that this could be what the Indian public – modestly educated and misguided by the BJP’s skillful propaganda – really wants. As Mehta asks: “Is, somehow, this exaltation of power, control and nationalism a completion of our own deepest desires?”

In any case, if these first hundred days of Modi’s second five-year term are any indication, India may well soon cease to be the country Mahatma Gandhi struggled to free.

 

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2019
www.project-syndicate.org

15 Sep 06:36

Pompeo blames Iran for attack on Saudi facilities

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has blamed Iran for Saturday’s attack on Saudia Arabian oilfield facilities, while Riyadh has vowed to respond, raising tensions in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia said it was ready to respond to drone attacks claimed by Iran-aligned Yemeni rebels on two major oil facilities, which has severely disrupted production, as Washington blamed Tehran for the strike.

US Secretary of State Pompeo blamed Tehran for the attack, saying there was no evidence it was launched from Yemen. “Iran has now launched an unprecedented attack on the world’s energy supply,” Pompeo said on Twitter.

“The United States will work with our partners and allies to ensure that energy markets remain well supplied and Iran is held accountable for its aggression,” the top US diplomat added.

The strikes sparked fires at the state-owned Aramco oil plants and prompted furious condemnation from the top US diplomat, who blamed Tehran for the strike.

A Yemeni rebel spokesman claims responsibility for the attack. Photo: Supplied

Meanwhile, on Sunday Iran dismissed as “meaningless” the US accusations that it was behind the drone attacks on Saudi oil installations, suggesting Washington was seeking a pretext to retaliate against the Islamic republic.

“Such fruitless and blind accusations and remarks are incomprehensible and meaningless,” foreign ministry spokesman Abbas Mousavi was quoted as saying in a statement.

“The Americans adopted the ‘maximum pressure’ policy against Iran, which, due to its failure, is leaning towards ‘maximum lies’,” Mousavi added.

Huge palls of smoke rose into the sky after the pre-dawn attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais, two key Aramco facilities in eastern Saudi Arabia as the giant prepares for a much-anticipated stock listing.

The drones triggered multiple explosions, forcing state-owned Aramco to temporarily suspend production at the two facilities, interrupting about half of the company’s total output, Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman said.

The Iran-linked Huthi rebels said they launched “a large-scale operation involving 10 drones” on the facilities, the group’s Al-Masirah television reported.

Following a phone call between US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the White House condemned the attacks on “infrastructure vital to the global economy.”

Prince Mohammed had earlier issued a statement saying the kingdom was “willing and able” to respond to this “terrorist aggression,” according to Saudi state media.

Washington’s condemnation of Tehran throws into doubt expectations that Trump is trying to arrange a meeting with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani at the upcoming United Nations assembly.

Saudi security guards outside the Aramco oil processing plant in Abqaiq, reportedly the world’s largest, in the oil-rich Eastern Province in February 2006. Drones were used to attack this facility on Saturday. Photo: AFP

Saudi interior ministry spokesman Mansour al-Turki said there were no casualties in the attacks in the kingdom’s Eastern Province.

But the full extent of the damage was not immediately clear as reporters were not allowed near the plants where Saudi authorities swiftly beefed up security.

The attacks on the Abqaiq plant – Aramco’s largest oil processing facility – and nearby Khurais, which hosts a massive oil field, “resulted in production suspension of 5.7 million barrels of crude oil per day”, the company said.

Aramco CEO Amin Nasser said work was underway to restore production and a progress update would be provided in the next two days.

Smoke billows from an Aramco oil facility in Abqaiq, about 60km southwest of Dhahran in Saudi Arabia’s eastern province, on September 14, 2019. Photo: AFP

Production halted

Explosions at the plant also led to a production halt of an estimated two billion cubic feet of gas per day, Prince Abdulaziz said.

The UN’s Yemen envoy Martin Griffiths said he was “extremely concerned” over the latest attacks, which also drew swift condemnation from Riyadh’s Gulf allies, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Kuwait.

In recent months, the Huthi rebels have carried out a spate of cross-border missile and drone attacks targeting Saudi air bases and other facilities in what they say is retaliation for a long-running Riyadh-led bombing campaign on rebel-held areas in Yemen.

Last month, an attack claimed by Huthi rebels sparked a fire at Aramco’s Shaybah natural gas liquefaction facility – close to the Emirati border – but no casualties were reported by the company.

Rebel drones also targeted two oil pumping stations on Saudi Arabia’s key east-west pipeline in May, shutting it down for several days.

Growing rebel attacks underscore how Saudi infrastructure, including oil installations, are increasingly vulnerable to the Huthis’ steadily advancing weaponry – from ballistic missiles to unmanned drones.

The Abqaiq plant, which Aramco says plays a “pivotal role” in its operations, has been targeted by militants in the past.

In an attack claimed by Al-Qaeda in February 2006, suicide bombers with explosive-laden vehicles attempted to penetrate the processing plant, killing two security guards.

The two bombers also died in the attack, which failed to breach the compound, authorities reported at the time.

The United States and Saudi Arabia have blamed Tehran for multiple attacks on tankers in the Gulf, and in June, Trump called off air strikes against Iran at the last minute after it downed a US drone.

The latest attacks come as Saudi Arabia accelerates preparations for a much-anticipated initial public offering of Aramco, the world’s most profitable company.

The mammoth IPO forms the cornerstone of a reform programme envisaged by the powerful crown prince to wean the Saudi economy off its reliance on oil.

Aramco is ready for a two-stage stock market debut including an international listing “very soon,” its CEO Amin Nasser told reporters on Tuesday.

Saudi shares dropped 3% at the start of trading Sunday, the first session after the attacks on the two major oil facilities knocked out more than half the kingdom’s production.

The Arab world’s largest capital market shed some 200 points in the first few minutes after the opening bell, before regaining some of the losses.

The key energy sector plunged 4.7%, while the telecom and banking sectors each slid 3%.

AFP

14 Sep 17:30

Shinzo Abe se dote d’un gouvernement en ordre de marche pour la réforme de la Constitution

Didier “Ice” Iceman

ça peut être inquiétant

Avec la nomination surprise du fils d’un ex-Premier ministre dans le cadre du remaniement ministériel et le renforcement des conservateurs, Shinzo Abe prépare le terrain pour son projet de réforme constitutionnelle.
14 Sep 17:29

Afghanistan: A Failure to Tell the Truth

by Guest Contributor

by John Glaser and John Mueller

Speaking to the press in the Oval Office in July, President Trump acknowledged the need to “extricate ourselves” from Afghanistan. “We have been there for 19 years,” he complained. “It’s ridiculous.” This was not the first time Trump had talked about the war this way. He clearly does not believe in the mission. Negotiations with the Taliban—led by Zalmay Khalilzad, the administration’s Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation—showed considerable progress, until President Trump ostentatiously canceled a prospective meeting at Camp David to formalize the framework deal that had been reached “in principle.”

Though talks will likely continue, despite Trump’s insistence that they are “dead,” major obstacles remain. It still is not clear how the Kabul government, in which the United States has so heavily invested for almost two decades, can survive in the face of a resurgent Taliban without the U.S. military there to protect it. And many in the Trump administration who favor an indefinite residual U.S. counter-terrorism force in Afghanistan would prefer no deal rather than one calling for complete withdrawal.

Nevertheless, the reality is that the United States cannot win the war in Afghanistan on the terms stipulated by the three presidents who have waged it, at least not at an acceptable cost. As Lisa Curtis, deputy assistant to the president and senior director for South and Central Asia at the National Security Council, puts it, “no one believes that there is a military solution to this conflict.” The Taliban now holds more territory than at any point since 2001, and the regime in Kabul ranks as one of the worst in the world on corruption and human rights. After 18 years of trying to quell the Taliban insurgency and to build an independent and competent Afghan government, army, and police force, a recent Inspector General report concludes that security forces are still “not able to protect the population from insurgents in large parts of the country.”

The Need for an Honest Assessment

One of the reasons the war has persisted, despite the many signs of mission failure, is because of the culture in the Department of Defense and how it interacts with U.S. politics at the national level. In their public portrayal of the war, U.S. military leaders have persistently depicted a rosier picture than the facts warranted. In 2014, Gen. John Campbell told National Public Radio that the good news of progress in Afghanistan “sometimes [doesn’t] make the media,” that “the Afghan security forces [are] really stepping up their game,” and that he was “excited about the future here.” In 2013, Gen. Joseph Dunford talked about “the inevitability of our success.” In 2011, David Petraeus said that U.S. forces had “reversed the momentum of the Taliban.” In 2010, Gen. Stanley McChrystal optimistically predicted that “success is still achievable.”

Overly optimistic portrayals are partly a result of institutional habits and a view about civil-military relations that calls for focusing on tactical and operational facts on the ground while leaving broader strategic and political assessments of the war to elected leaders. Some military leaders publicly misrepresented the course of the war to avoid the hit to troop morale they expected would result from more honest and critical presentations. Others felt strongly that negotiations with the Taliban should only occur from a “position of strength,” which they felt was always just around the corner. And sometimes the deception was flagrant: media reports revealed in 2011 that commanders tasked with briefing Congressional delegations in Afghanistan deliberately misled members of Congress about the progress of the war.

After his second deployment to Afghanistan, Army Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis (now retired) spoke out publicly against this kind of distortion. In 2012, he wrote two reports, one classified and one unclassified, and briefed members of Congress on his conclusions. “Senior ranking U.S. military leaders have so distorted the truth when communicating with the U.S. Congress and American people in regards to conditions on the ground in Afghanistan that the truth has become unrecognizable,” he wrote, adding that “If the public had access to these classified reports they would see the dramatic gulf between what is often said in public by our senior leaders and what is actually true behind the scenes.”

Nonetheless, elected officials are often deferential to military leaders and national security advisers. In part, this is due to the superior subject area expertise of military and national security professionals, but it is also because going against such advice can be politically costly.

When President Barack Obama came into office in 2009, the senior military leadership strongly favored a troop surge in Afghanistan. The White House, according to Vali Nasr, a senior adviser on Afghanistan and Pakistan at the State Department at the time, was “ever afraid that the young Democratic President would be seen as ‘soft’” if he went against the military’s recommendations. Ben Rhodes claimed the administration’s Afghanistan policy review was “shaped by leaks from the military designed to box Obama into sending more troops into Afghanistan.” Obama himself complained that the military was “really cooking the thing in the direction that they wanted.” It appears that, as then-CIA director Leon Panetta put it, “No Democratic president can go against military advice, especially if he asked for it.” 

President Trump faced a similar kind of pressure. The advice Trump received from his military advisers was overwhelmingly supportive of continuing the mission—and adding another 4,000 troops. According to Bob Woodward’s account, Trump initially pushed back: “You guys have created this situation. It’s been a disaster. You’re the architects of this mess in Afghanistan. You created these problems. You’re smart guys, but I have to tell you, you’re part of the problem. I want to get out, and you’re telling me the answer is to get deeper in.” On one occasion when Trump expressed skepticism about a troop surge, his then-secretary of defense, James Mattis, told him, “Unfortunately, sir, you have no choice,” basing this conclusion on an absurd spasm of threat inflation holding that the troop increase was necessary “to prevent a bomb from going off in Times Square.”

In the end, Trump acquiesced. When he was subsequently asked, “Can you explain why 17 years later we’re still there?” he replied: “We’re there because virtually every expert that I have and speak to say [sic] if we don’t go there, they’re going to be fighting over here. And I’ve heard it over and over again.”

An Institutional Failure

That presidents are confronted with such unanimity is a monumental failure of executive branch policymaking. Military leaders have an obligation to provide honest assessments of the wars civilian leaders get us into. The failure to do so has contributed to some of the worst foreign policy blunders in American history.

The reluctance to scrutinize sacred cows, such as the safe haven myth, is a problem that extends well beyond the Department of Defense. The professional foreign policy class in Washington, concentrated in the various national security agencies of the executive branch, is subject to a powerful bias in favor of action over inaction, troop surges over withdrawal. As a result, the advice presidents receive from this expert community tends to reflect these biases.

And, despite what certainly appears to be a costly history of abject failure in Afghanistan, the military has a strong parochial interest in avoiding the perception that the war has been lost (therefore ensuring additional resources to continue waging it), and in distorting the potential for success, misleading successive commanders in chief as well as the American people. And in choosing to evaluate the battlefield measures of “success” in such a way as to disassociate them from the political ends to which they are supposed to be tied, the top brass have forsaken the basic Clausewitzian doctrine taught in every military academy.

It is a fantasy to pretend that the Taliban can be defeated and that a constitutionally bounded, democratic, and competent Kabul-based government can be left in its place. A Taliban victory might occur after an American military withdrawal, but this does not present a serious security concern to the United States. In particular, the threat of a terrorist safe haven is minimal and based mostly on the myth that territorial harbors provide great utility in conducting transnational terrorist attacks. Narrower elements of the mission, including quelling the opium trade and securing a lasting human rights regime, have substantially proven to be futile over almost two decades of effort and are not objectives that the U.S. military, a tool for protecting the country from threats overseas, is well suited to addressing.

In 2010, nearly 10 years ago, Obama mused, “It is very easy to imagine a situation in which, in the absence of a clear strategy, we ended up staying in Afghanistan for another five years, another eight years, another 10 years. And we would do it not with clear intentions but rather just out of an inertia. Or an unwillingness to ask tough questions.” Time is up.

John Glaser is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. John Mueller is a political scientist at Ohio State University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute.

11 Sep 16:06

Le Cambodge entre sanctions européennes et opportunités chinoises

by Jean-Raphaël Chaponnière
Didier “Ice” Iceman

La.descente continue

Partant d'un niveau de revenu très faible, le Cambodge, avec ses 16 millions d'habitants, est depuis dix ans l'économie la plus dynamique d'Asie. Sa croissance, très inégalement répartie, crée de nombreux emplois salariés. Elle est tirée par l'exportation d'habillement et la construction dopée par la Chine.
08 Sep 15:27

Afghan women fearful as US-Taliban deal looms

Didier “Ice” Iceman

Et on ferme notre gueule

The historic deal between the US and the Taliban leaves unresolved the fate of Afghan women, whose fragile gains could come under threat as the brutally repressive insurgents seek to expand their influence.

Strictly patriarchal Afghanistan has long been one of the world’s worst places for women, but for a relatively small group – mainly in urban cores like Kabul – key freedoms such as education and the right to work proliferated after the Taliban fell in 2001.

Several pioneering women around the Afghan capital have deep fears about what comes next.

‘Taliban haven’t changed’

Suraya Pakzad directs a women’s empowerment group and runs various shelters, educational centers and job training workshops across Afghanistan.

She said Afghan women had made tremendous advances over the past 17-plus years, including in politics and business. But for her, the coming months pose a grave danger. And once again, it is mainly men who are deciding women’s fate.

“We don’t know what the Taliban have in mind for us, but we know the Taliban have not changed,” she said, recalling the days when the insurgents were in power and frequently stoned women to death, banned them from school and forced them out of public spaces.

“Peace is good to silence the sound of guns, but the fear is a bad deal may also silence all voices,” said the 48-year-old Kabul resident, whom Time magazine named as one of the world’s most influential people in 2009.

‘Women will suffer’

Zahra, a 24-year-old artist and designer who only gave her first name, has had to overcome many hurdles to follow her dream.

“When I started working as an artist, instead of receiving encouragement, many people told me it was not a good profession, especially for a woman,” she recalled.

They told her: “You cannot have a good income from doing art and told me to quit before it is too late,” she said.

Zahra, who was only a child when the Taliban were in power, said if the militants return to Kabul, most women will quickly lose their jobs.

“We, the women, have struggled a lot to gain our rights, and we cannot afford to lose them. I believe the war will not end, even if there is a peace deal,” Zahra said.

For her, many Afghans’ views of women’s rights have evolved since 2001, but by no means to the extent where men see women as having equal rights.

‘We won’t accept them’

Haida Essazada, 23, is head of Afghanistan Youth Network, a resource for young people in a country where more than 62 percent of the population is under 25.

“We are working every single day to bring change to this society,” Essazada said. “We want it and we mean it, and if Taliban are not going to accept our rights, we won’t accept them either.”

She doubted whether the Taliban could ever really adapt their views. While the insurgents paid lip service to women’s rights during negotiations with the US, they always framed them in the context of “Islamic values” – which are open to broad interpretation.

If the Taliban become “part of our government, the only concern I have is that they will not accept women’s rights as fully as they should,” Essazada said. “I’m really worried about our future because the current generation, my generation, is a totally different generation.”

Marghuba Safi, 40, has since 2016 run a Kabul business that makes soaps and creams, many of whose ingredients are sourced from an organic farm.

“We are happy to have peace in our country, it is our big dream but we have concerns,” she said, expressing doubts that women like her could continue working if Taliban influence grows. “I am a single mum, I am responsible for my whole family, for my children, for my house,” she said.

Safi employs about 20 women, most of them recovering drug addicts, to help run her farm. If they are no longer allowed to work, it would be like an “explosion”, she said.

Fawzia Amin owns a beauty salon in Kabul and employs about 15 women on her staff. She fears her business would be devastated by any surge in the influence of the Taliban, who barred women from leaving their homes and punished women who resisted wearing an all-covering burqa.

“All the women in Afghanistan, they are really afraid,” Amin said. “We are very tired right now … [but] I have to fight.”

Loyalists cheering deal

Meanwhile, Taliban loyalists are cheering the prospect of a deal with the US that after 18 years of grueling conflict will see “defeated” American “invaders” finally go home.

While details of the deal have not been announced, it is widely expected the Pentagon will slash its troop presence in Afghanistan in return for various Taliban commitments.

Taliban fighters and supporters in and around Kandahar, the southern Afghan province that is the birthplace of the Islamist movement and a key stronghold.

Mohammad Manzoor Hussaini, who previously fought for the Taliban, was until two years ago hiding out in Pakistan but returned to Kandahar as the group’s influence strengthened.

Mohammad Manzoor Hussaini, who used to fight for the Taliban, says many are cheering the prospect of American ‘invaders’ leaving after 18 years of war. Photo: Javed Tanveer / AFP

‘Islamic values’

All Afghans want is a peace founded on “Islamic values”, he said, using the same stock phrase the Taliban have used in talks with the United States.

The term is seen as contentious because it is open to broad interpretation, and the Taliban are known for pushing some of the most extreme views of the Islamic faith, including an almost total denial of all freedoms for women.

“Afghans wish for peace, moreover they want a dignified peace based on Islamic values, and peace among all Afghans,” Hussaini said. “Afghans should trust each other, and should be honest to each other, and should not pay attention to any foreigners”.

But if things are handled poorly, the war could go on for another 20 years and spread to other countries too, Hussaini warned.

Leaving with ‘shame’

Hafiz Mohammad Wali, a gardener from the Shahjoy district of Zabul province, which neighbors Kandahar, was delighted at news that a deal is likely to see the US military draw down its forces.

“For nearly 20 years, we have been hoping for this news, to see the Americans leave Afghanistan with shame,” he said. “People now are praying for peace in the country. We have fought a lot, and the fighting still continues today.”

Like most of Taliban supporters, Wali worried about whether the group would be able to make a separate agreement with the Afghan government.

“Our main concern is how the Taliban and the Afghan government make peace,” he said. “Afghans have been fighting with each other for years in the villages and districts. Will they sit together? This is not just my concern, but other villagers are also worried about it.”

Until now, the Taliban have refused to talk to the administration of President Ashraf Ghani, whom they view as a US stooge. The upcoming withdrawal deal with the Taliban is expected to require “intra-Afghan” talks between the insurgents and Kabul.

‘Defeated’ America

Mullah Gul Agha, a Taliban commander from the Marja district of Helmand province, another insurgent stronghold, said Afghans would never accept foreigners as their “masters”.

“The Afghans have been fighting invaders for decades, once it was the Russians, today it is the Americans and the British,” Agha said. “With the Help of Almighty Allah, we have defeated them again.”

The toll the war has taken on the US military – more than 2,400 US troops killed in combat and thousands more with horrendous wounds – would make America think twice before invading other countries, he said.

“Afghans accept a poor, humble life, but never anybody as their masters,” he said.

Mullah Rauf, who was once a Taliban commander in central Ghazni province, was optimistic that peace might finally come to Afghanistan after 18 years of conflict. “Both sides in this war are tired,” he said.

“I am very happy America is leaving, because they didn’t give Afghans anything but war and destruction, and thousands of Afghans were killed… If Afghans join hands, they can prevent more destruction and bloodshed.”

AFP

08 Sep 15:27

Why China is picking a fight with Vietnam

Didier “Ice” Iceman

Des années que ça dure

If simmering tensions erupt into full-blown conflict in the South China Sea, increasingly it seems the first shots to be fired would be between China and Vietnam.

The two rival sea claimants have been locked in a weeks-long standoff over the energy-rich Vanguard Bank, with neither side apparently ready to back down. While China opposes any rival claimants’ move to develop energy resources in contested sea areas, the current confrontation with Vietnam may serve a dual strategic purpose.

Derek Grossman, a senior defense analyst at the RAND corporation, a Washington-based think tank, has argued that if China was to launch a military offensive in the South China Sea, its most likely choice of combatant would be Vietnam.

Vietnam is Beijing’s “preferred warm-up fight,” he wrote earlier this year before the Vanguard Bank standoff, reasoning it is “a middle-sized power that should be easily defeatable” by the Chinese military.

Although conflict is still unlikely, Beijing is again ramping up its aggression and “gunboat diplomacy” by pressuring Hanoi to end its exploration for oil and gas in the contested waters.

In July, a Chinese survey ship, Haiyang Dizhi 8, along with an armed flotilla, spent weeks sailing near the Vanguard Bank, a maritime area well within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

In mid-August, after it seemed the survey ship had returned to China, it reappeared in Vietnamese waters where local and Russian energy firms are jointly exploring for oil.

Vanguard Bank area circled in red. Image: Wikimedia Commons

Last year, similar pressure from China forced Hanoi to cancel a US$200 million oil exploration contract it had entered with Spanish energy firm Repsol. China claims almost 90% of the South China Sea through its so-called nine-dash line map, a wide-reaching demarcation which was rejected by an arbitral tribunal at The Hague in July 2016.

The BBC’s Vietnamese service reported on September 3 that the deep-water crane Lam Kihn was moved by state-owned China Oil and Gas Group into Vietnamese waters, a move that will inevitably heighten tensions.

If true, China and Vietnam could be in for a repeat of their volatile 2014 standoff, when the state-run China National Offshore Oil Corporation moved its semi-submersible Hai Yang Shi You 981 oil rig and fishing militia into waters claimed by Vietnam near the Spratly Islands.

China’s alleged move of the Lam Kihn crane into Vietnamese waters comes as Vietnam and the nine other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) take part this week in inaugural maritime naval exercises with the United States.

It also comes just a month before Vietnamese President and Communist Party chief, Nguyen Phu Trong, is expected to make a high-profile state visit to Washington, at which the US and Vietnam could upgrade their relations to a “strategic partnership.”

Chinese and Vietnamese forces last came to blows in 1988 during a skirmish around the South China Sea’s Johnson South Reef, a clash that killed 64 Vietnamese soldiers. That followed on a brief but bloody border war in 1979 where both sides lost thousands of soldiers.

Times have changed since those previous short-lived conflicts. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is now one of the world’s largest and most well-equipped militaries. In 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the PLA “to be fully transformed into world-class forces” by 2050. Yet there is believed to be deep insecurity in Beijing about how prepared the military is to fight a large-scale conflict.

Xi has spoken about the PLA suffering from “peace disease” because they haven’t been in an actual conflict situation for decades. Given the turnaround of senior officials since the last real conflict in 1979, most have never been in a war.

Chinese President Xi Jinping reviews a military display of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy in the South China Sea on April 12, 2018. Photo: Reuters/Li Gang/Xinhua
Chinese President Xi Jinping reviews a military display of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy in the South China Sea on April 12, 2018. Photo: Xinhua

Dennis Blasko, a noted observer of the Chinese military, argued in February that despite the considerable investment in weaponry and technology, and massive structural reforms, there remains “a lack of confidence in PLA capabilities and a failure of the PLA’s educational and training systems to prepare commanders and staff officers for future war.”

“Therefore,” he added, “the senior Chinese military leadership demonstrates little or no enthusiasm to commit the PLA to actual combat against a modern foe, preferring to achieve China’s national objectives through deterrence and actions short of war conducted by a combination of civilian, government, paramilitary, and military forces.”

This insecurity will factor into who China sees as a viable opponent. Fighting India on land and high in the Himalayas “does the PLA little good” to prepare for air and naval warfare, Grossman wrote. Conflict in the Korean peninsula would likely be far too violent and close to home.

Fighting against Japan, the Philippines or South Korea would probably involve the American military, as each have security alliances with the US. The Taiwan Relations Act commits Washington to coming to Taiwan’s defense in the event of Chinese military aggression.

Beijing would “prefer a conflict that is winnable” and “Vietnam is fundamentally incapable of sustaining operations on par with China due to shortfalls in capabilities, training, and manpower,” Grossman has argued.

Less academic analysis has gone into how the Vietnam People’s Army’s (VPA) sees its own position. Hanoi tends to be more secretive than Beijing while its academic circles are even more hermetic. The Ministry of National Defence published its last defense “white paper” a decade ago, to mark the 65th anniversary of the VPA’s foundation.

Analysts agree, however, that Hanoi is taking military matters increasingly seriously as tensions in the South China Sea escalate year by year.

Businesswire reported in April that Vietnam’s government earmarked US$5.1 billion for military expenditure in this year’s budget, about a third of which will go towards defense equipment procurements. Some analysts estimate that Hanoi’s military spending could rise to $7.9 billion by 2024.

There are also certain signs of concern about the military’s readiness – and the need to do more. In June, the National Defense Journal, run by Vietnam’s Defense Ministry, published an essay on the military’s training and human resources.

Performers dance with large national flags marking an anniversary of Vietnam's communist regime in Hanoi, February 3, 2017.  Photo: AFP/Hoang Dinh Nam
Performers dance with large national flags marking an anniversary of Vietnam’s communist regime in Hanoi, February 3, 2017. Photo: AFP/Hoang Dinh Nam

“The training of cadres in the military is not even and balanced; content and training programs are still slow to innovate; the update of new military knowledge and technology in training is not higher,” it warned.
Clearly, Vietnam has a much weaker military than China’s.

Vietnam spends about $5 billion a year on its military; China spends $220 billion. China has five times the number of active personnel as Vietnam, and has ten times the number of aircraft (3,187 to 318) and almost 11 times as many naval vessels (714 to 65). China also has much better equipment; the People’s Liberation Army Navy has aircraft carriers and destroyers, assets Vietnam lacks.

Most analysts reckon that, given this asymmetry, Vietnam’s only strategic choice would be defensive in the event of a conflict. Still, there doesn’t appear to be a consensus on this in Hanoi.

In an article for the National Defense Journal published on August 30, Information Minister Nguyen Manh Hung – who is also a major-general in the VPA and a former chairman of Viettel, a military-owned conglomerate – wrote that “in the future, if war happens to our country, it will be a people’s war to protect a developed country against the enemy’s aggression.”

However, he noted that “in the wars against our ancestors before, and our Party later, our nation often faced enemies with outstanding military power and strength, but we took the offensiveness as the dominant ideology, instead of passiveness or passive defense,” he wrote.

“Offensive thoughts,” he added, creates unity amongst the people, and a belief that they won’t surrender regardless of how strong the enemy is. He, however, also used the phrase “phòng ngự tích cực”, which is similar to the Chinese concept of an “active defense” or “positive defense” – a term used in the 1980s by then-leader Deng Xiaoping to mean strategically defensive but operationally offensive.

A Vietnamese soldier stands watch overlooking the South China Sea. Photo: Facebook

This would certainly suggest that senior Vietnamese Communist Party officials are seriously weighing the possibility of war, and how it might be waged. It is thus probably not a coincidence that the Communist Party has given newspapers more leeway to write about this year’s anniversary of Vietnam-China border wars.

Reports from earlier this year suggest that Vietnam has been quietly expanding its maritime militia and arming more of its coast guard in preparation of even more aggressive tactics by China’s equivalents.

Given the military mismatch, Vietnam’s greatest deterrence would likely come through international partnerships. And Hanoi has been busy making new friends. For instance, Vietnam agreed last month to expand defense ties with South Africa, while Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison reaffirmed their military cooperation during an anticipated visit to Hanoi.

Vietnam has also signed new defense agreements with the European Union and Japan this year. Most important, however, would be if Hanoi could win more strategic assurances from its former battlefield foe the US.

Much thus hangs on Trong’s upcoming visit to Washington. While mostly facile – US relations with Vietnam are far better than the semantics would belie – it would send a stronger signal that America is backing Vietnam, and serve as a long-term deterrent to China, if the two sides agreed to upgrade their strategic relations.

It will almost certainly stop short of a defense pact, since the Vietnamese Communist Party’s internal rules – the so-called “Three No’s” – forbid it from signing military pacts with other nations. However, an ungraded partnership could allow for more US naval vessel visits to Vietnam – something that Washington wants – and perhaps a commitment from Hanoi to purchase more military hardware from the US.

Vietnam currently buys about four-fifths of its military equipment from Russia and a tenth from Israel. In return for more purchases, Washington may offer clarity over whether Vietnam will be sanctioned over the prolix Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which can sanction nations that purchase weapons from Russia.

US President Donald Trump (L) speaks with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Phu Trong at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi on February 27, 2019. Photo: AFP via Vietnam News Agency

Vietnam has been temporarily exempted from CAATSA, and former secretary of defense James Mattis had sought a waiver for Vietnam. But to make the exemption more permanent Hanoi must show that it is reducing its dependency on Russian military imports.

Also by purchasing more American military hardware, Vietnam would reduce its considerable trade surplus with the US, something known to irk the Donald Trump administration.

Washington has certainly been firm against Beijing’s latest actions in the South China Sea, which the State Department described as “coercive interference in Vietnam’s longstanding oil and gas activities.” The State Department also noted last month that China is trying to block access “to an estimated $2.5 trillion in unexploited hydrocarbon resources” in the South China Sea’s waters.

The US Defense Department, meanwhile, highlighted in a report last year that China is the world’s second largest consumer of crude oil and the third largest country consumer of natural gas. Moreover, its reliance on imported gas, which accounted for 67% of its needs in 2017, could grow to 80% by 2035, therefore raising the importance of untapped resources in the South China Sea.

The US will need to show that it is serious about ensuring Vietnam’s security vis-a-vis China. Hanoi no doubt remembers that then US president Barack Obama declined to defend a treaty ally when China seized the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012. Neither did Obama provide any support to Vietnam during the 2014 Hai Yang Shi You 981 standoff.

Trump has continued largely in the same vein, making stern statements but not backed by action when China successfully forced Vietnam to cancel oil exploration deals last year and in 2017 in contested South China Sea areas.

China’s pressing maneuvers near the Vanguard Bank, and its alleged moving of a crane into Vietnamese waters, are arguably now more dangerous as its vessels now have access to new naval and air facilities on artificial features it has developed in the sea.

A satellite image of the Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea. Photo: Planet Labs

This means that vessels no longer need to return to mainland China for refueling and maintenance during journeys into the South China Sea. It also means they can patrol much closer to the Vietnamese coastline and for longer periods of time.

China’s Haiyang Dizhi 8 now faced off with Vietnamese vessels at Vanguard Bank reportedly went to a new naval base established on the nearby Fiery Cross Reef, not the Chinese mainland, to refuel before returning to the contested feature.

If the standoff with Vietnam escalates into an armed confrontation, it could provide China a test case of its readiness for a possible bigger fight in the contested sea in the years to come.

08 Sep 15:25

Has Jordan Distanced Itself from Saudi Arabia?

by Guest Contributor
Didier “Ice” Iceman

On en parle peu c'est vrai

by Abdulaziz Kilani

At a time when Jordan’s economy is going through a crisis, it has become apparent that Amman is shifting its foreign policy. In July, the Hashemite Kingdom appointed a new ambassador to Qatar, which comes two years after it downgraded its relations with Doha as part of the Gulf crisis. In the same month, top Turkish officials visited the kingdom. These could be signs of Jordan aiming to deepen its ties with the two countries.

Although Jordan did downgrade its ties with Qatar in 2017, it did not cut off relations completely or join the so-called Anti-Terror Quartet (ATQ)—Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt—in their anti-Qatar blockade, as the Saudis seem to have hoped it would. In fact, it is believed that there has been ongoing communication between Jordan and Qatar during the two year Gulf crisis.

As a country that aims to play a positive role in the Middle East by hosting refugees and offering mediation where needed, the kingdom has withdrawn its support for the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Of course, such a withdrawal will not please Saudi Arabia, but the Jordanian government prefers diplomacy to getting involved in a war that has led to what is now the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. This became evident when it hosted the second round of the Yemeni peace talks earlier this year.

“Since the election of President Donald Trump, Jordan has been increasingly aware of the changing regional undercurrents and their possible effects on the stability of the kingdom at a time when Amman was battling chronic economic conditions,” Jordanian political commentator Osama Al Sharif told LobeLog.

Al Sharif pointed out that, in response to changing geopolitical conditions, Amman has realigned the kingdom’s foreign policy towards traditional allies.“King Abdullah was quick to take his country out of the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen. He also maintained diplomatic ties with Iran at the height of the Riyadh-Tehran tensions while getting closer to Turkey’s Erdogan even as Ankara’s relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt had worsened. The same can be said of Qatar, where Jordan stopped short of terminating diplomatic ties with Doha and recently reappointed an ambassador there.”

One of the main challenges that Jordan is dealing with at the moment, which may reflect a disagreement between Amman and Riyadh, involves its approach to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In March, during the 29th Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union conference that took place in Jordan, Saudi Arabia—alongside the United Arab Emirates and Egypt—opposed a recommendation that called for stopping normalization with Israel. However, the speaker of Jordan’s House of Representatives, Atef Tarawneh, refused to remove it from the conference’s final statement.

There are doubts as to whether the Saudis have really been competing with Jordan over its role as the custodian of the holy sites in Jerusalem.”The Saudis are aware that they are not competitive to the Hashemite family when it comes to the history of Islam,” Jordan’s former foreign minister, Kamel Abu Jaber, told LobeLog. “King Abdullah is the 43rd generation direct descendant to the Prophet Muhammad and the Saudis know this fact.”

Amman—which is committed to a two-state solution—has made it clear that it will not change its position on Jerusalem. King Abdullah said back in March, days after his return from a visit to the U.S., that Jerusalem is a “red line” for him and stressed that “no one can pressure Jordan on this matter.” 

Officials in Jordan are seemingly aware that, with over 2 million registered Palestinian refugees in the country, the kingdom may be the first country to suffer should the Trump administration implement its long-awaited peace plan for the Middle East. There appears to be a fear that if the plan were to force more Palestinian refugees to seek asylum outside the occupied West Bank and Gaza, they would most likely have no place to go apart from Jordan.

That, in turn, would have a devastating impact on the kingdom because of the present severe economic crisis the country is experiencing. Jordanian public debt equals 95% of annual GDP and the youth unemployment rate is 41%, according to The Economist, which also pointed out in June that over a million of Jordan’s 10 million people are poor.

Although Jordan has dealt with economic weakness, high youth unemployment, and high poverty for some time, economic conditions in the kingdom have worsened lately due to the influx of refugees and the decline of foreign aid. Last year, IMF-backed austerity measures led to widespread protests in the kingdom, which resulted in the resignation of Prime Minister Hani Al Mulki. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE held a summit in Mecca in the presence of Jordan and pledged to give $2.5 billion to the kingdom, but so far Jordan seems to have not received much of that sum.

Doha has pledged to provide 10,000 jobs and $500 million in investments in Jordan, a move that is undoubtedly appreciated by officials in Amman. So far, 5,000 Jordanians have already obtained work permits in Qatar. Moreover, on Sunday it was reported that King Abdullah invited Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani to visit the kingdom, and that the latter “welcomed” the invitation, another sign of the closeness in relations between Amman and Doha.

“Jordan has never wanted to have any kind of relationship but an excellent one with all the Gulf States, including Qatar,” Abu Jaber said. “It is the natural thing for Qatar and Jordan to strengthen their relations at this time.”

Jordan has been keen to maintain its relations with all regional countries. However, recent events have shown that there are areas in which Amman and Riyadh differ when it comes to regional issues, mainly the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. A Jordan-Qatar-Turkey alliance will likely be more aligned with the Palestinians in their approach to that conflict. What remains to be seen is how effective this alliance will be in advancing the Palestinian cause.

Abdulaziz Kilani is a British-Arab writer. He is also the editor-in-chief of Sharq Wa Gharb Arabic electronic newspaper. He tweets as: @az_kilani.

07 Sep 05:25

€100 million German insect protection plan will protect habitats, restrict weed killers, and boost research

Didier “Ice” Iceman

Pas grand chose ?

Staggering losses in insect populations prompt government plan
07 Sep 05:22

HK activists fly to Taiwan to drum up support

Didier “Ice” Iceman

Développement intéressant

Three prominent Hong Kong activists who are in Taiwan to drum up support have warned that China could clamp down on the former British territory’s protracted protests to stop them continuing after October 1, the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic.

Prominent activist Joshua Wong went to Taiwan this week, having just been released on bail after his high-profile arrest last weekend by Hong Kong police for organizing, inciting and taking part in an unapproved assembly in June, during which thousands laid siege to the police headquarters.

Wong, who shot to fame as the face of defiance against Beijing and Hong Kong’s government during the city’s Umbrella Movement five years ago when people demanded genuine universal suffrage, exhorted the Taiwanese to rally for Hong Kong and show solidarity on or right before October 1. On that day a big military parade will be held as the mainland celebrates its 70th anniversary.

Wong was accompanied by Lester Shum, a student leader in the 2014 movement, and Hong Kong lawmaker Eddie Chu. Earlier this week, the trio paid a visit to the head office of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party in Taipei and held an hour-long meeting with DPP members there.

In a stunning about-face, Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Carrie Lam deviated from her intransigent stance and announced on Wednesday evening that the contentious China extradition bill, which ignited months-long turmoil in the former British colony, would be officially withdrawn.

But Wong and Chu warned that even though the bill is now gone, Lam was very likely to invoke a colonial-era draconian law with far-reaching powers to impose curfew-like restrictions to ban rallies and cut off the internet, if her move to rescind the bill failed to mollify the people, especially before the October 1 deadline imposed by Beijing.

The trio meet politicians in Taipei. Photo: Central News Agency, Taiwan

“Beijing and the Hong Kong government must know that although they can shut down the demonstrations, people in Taiwan and around the world are standing in solidarity with us,” Wong said.

“I feel that Hong Kong and Taiwan are bound together in this struggle, that we are facing oppression by the same authoritarian regime, the same subjugating force from China. We hope to make changes, for Hong Kong to have democracy and freedom in the future and for Taiwan to defend what it has today,” he added.

Meanwhile, the trio also appealed to Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen to grant political asylum to Hongkongers in need.

In response, a DPP official told reporters in a press conference also attended by the three that if “our friends in Hong Kong” encounter an emergency that would require assistance from Taiwan, the island’s current law “would have the leeway” for that.

The Hong Kong activists also took part in a discussion forum in Taichung. The trio will leave for Germany and the US before returning to Hong Kong on September 23.

Read more: Beijing accuses Taiwan as HK spirals into crisis

Beijing wary of overplaying its hand in Taiwan

06 Sep 08:25

600,000 GPS trackers for people and pets are using 123456 as a password

by Dan Goodin
Dog plush toy with tracker attached.

Enlarge (credit: Shenzhen i365 Tech)

An estimated 600,000 GPS trackers for monitoring the location of kids, seniors, and pets contain vulnerabilities that open users up to a host of creepy attacks, researchers from security firm Avast have found.

The $25 to $50 devices are small enough to wear on a necklace or stash in a pocket or car dash compartment. Many also include cameras and microphones. They’re marketed on Amazon and other online stores as inexpensive ways to help keep kids, seniors, and pets safe. Ignoring the ethics of attaching a spying device to the people we love, there’s another reason for skepticism. Vulnerabilities in the T8 Mini GPS Tracker Locator and almost 30 similar model brands from the same manufacturer, Shenzhen i365 Tech, make users vulnerable to eavesdropping, spying, and spoofing attacks that falsify users’ true location.

Researchers at Avast Threat Labs found that ID numbers assigned to each device were based on its International Mobile Equipment Identity, or IMEI. Even worse, during manufacturing, devices were assigned precisely the same default password of 123456. The design allowed the researchers to find more than 600,000 devices actively being used in the wild with that password. As if that wasn’t bad enough, the devices transmitted all data in plaintext using commands that were easy to reverse engineer.

Read 5 remaining paragraphs | Comments

05 Sep 04:27

Iran’s Disappearing Forests Pose Environmental Challenge

by Guest Contributor
Didier “Ice” Iceman

encore une desrtuction indirecte

by Austin Bodetti

While Western think tanks have drawn attention to droughts and floods in Iran, the news media has ignored another critical environmental issue there: deforestation. Between 1900 and 2012, Iran’s forest acreage decreased from 19 million acres to 14.4 million, shrinking to 10.7 million by 2015. That year, Esmail Kahrom, an advisor to the Iranian Environment Department, predicted, “With the current deforestation, Iran will have no forest in the next seventy-five to a hundred years.”

“The problem is big if you consider the proportion of Iran’s forests to its total land,” says Zahed Shakeri, an assistant professor of forest ecology at the University of Kurdistan. “Since Iran is located in an arid zone, forests and other vegetation types have an important role in different aspects of life—social, ecological, and economic. Most of the forests are located on fertile soils, so, traditionally, the demand for changing land use to agriculture is high. Nowadays, many forested lands around the cities are becoming residential, commercial, or industrial areas.”

A number of factors have fueled deforestation in Iran, some caused by the country’s aggressive pursuit of economic development, others outside Iranian officials’ control. Contributors include construction, illegal logging, overgrazing, and wildfires spurred by climate change. The legacy of economic sanctions on Iran has also influenced this trend. As Iran has endeavored to spur its sanctions-afflicted economy, the country has built deforestation-inducing infrastructure.

“We lost some parts of our western forests in the Zagros Mountains during the war between Iran and Iraq and also the Caspian forests from mass tourism, land use changes, and mismanagement of forest harvesting,” recalls Naghmeh Mobarghaee, an associate professor of environmental planning at the Environmental Science Research Institute at Shahid Beheshti University.

Given forests’ ability to store excess rainwater, preventing disastrous runoff and retaining water for human consumption, deforestation in Iran has aggravated other environmental issues. Some environmental scientists blame the loss of trees for an increase in deadly Iranian floods.

“In the north and northeast, especially in Golestan, deforestation has been going on for quite a while,” says Amir AghaKouchak, a professor of civil and environmental engineering and earth system science at the University of California, Irvine, who has studied deforestation in Iran with satellite imagery. “Deforestation certainly played a role in the floods there earlier this year and previous years, and the problem is only expanding in Golestan and across the rest of Iran.”

From the independent parliamentarian Jalal Mahmoudzadeh to the hardline newspaper Kayhan, Iranians across the political spectrum have expressed their concern. Even the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an advocacy group linked to the People’s Mujahedin of Iran that spends most of its time pushing for regime change, has highlighted the environmental issue.

Iranian officials responded to these calls by establishing what they dub “National Tree-Planting Day,” initiating a crackdown on illegal logging, and requesting assistance from the international community, but some Iranian experts remain skeptical of these efforts.

“The Iranian government is also responsible for the problem—especially through inappropriate development plans, such as constructing irrelevant dams and changing the hydrologic systems, powerlines, highways, mines, and so on and likewise through the pervasive corruption within the government itself,” Shakeri tells LobeLog. “Some top members of the Iranian Parliament and even some ranking officials in Iranian ministries are among the biggest speculators who have ordered mass changes of land use in different forest ecosystems.”

Iran’s foresters argue that the country must adopt a more comprehensive policy if it wants to win its ongoing battle with deforestation, noting that Iranian forests will take many years to heal. The Tehran-based environmental scientist Mahdi Kolahi has proposed “a ‘transition period’ for at least ten years that aims not to cut any tree but preserves and manages forests and woodlands and extents by means of spontaneous regeneration, active planting, or both.”

Neighboring countries offer their own examples of what Iran might do to limit or even reverse deforestation. In Turkey, environmentalists are pressuring the government to limit the ability of foreign companies to clear forests. In Pakistan, a country facing an ecological crisis no less dire than Iran’s, officials masterminded a successful campaign to plant one billion trees.

“At the moment, Iran’s strategy is to protect forests from farmers, grazing, harvesting, and small-scale land use changes,” concludes Shakeri, “but there is no master strategy to address the problem in the right context. Iran must fight against high-level corruption, especially in the field of changing land use; apply expert knowledge when designing development plans in forest ecosystems; increase Iranians’ awareness of deforestation and its outcomes, especially via social media; and use traditional knowledge to protect forest ecosystems.”

As deforestation in Iran grows worse, the need for intervention grows more urgent. Mehr News Agency, part of Iran’s state-owned media, reported in 2016 that fifty thousand acres of Iranian forests suffered damage or destruction every minute, speaking to the extent of the problem.

While sanctions and wider tensions with the United States have likely hindered Iran’s ability to invest in environmental protection and, in particular, afforestation and reforestation, the extent of the country’s potential ecological crisis calls for an ambitious environmental policy. Iran can expect at least some assistance from the international community. The United Nations Development Program is already supporting reforestation in Golestan Province.

Spearheading a campaign against deforestation would allow Iran to overcome some of its wider challenges with environmental issues, given that forests can lower the frequency of droughts and floods that bedevil the country. As Afghanistan, Armenia, Iraq, Turkmenistan, and Iran’s other neighbors wage their own battles against deforestation, the need for reforestation has become all the more apparent. Iranians have shown the will to save their country’s forests, and reforesting Iran will secure it from some of global warming’s most devastating side effects.

“Improving land management and reforestation, if possible, would have a significant impact on decreasing floods in the long run,” argues AghaKouchak. “Of course, it requires investment and takes time for trees to grow, but they offer a more natural, less expensive alternative to other solutions on the table, such as large dams. A healthy forest would make a huge difference.”

Austin Bodetti studies the intersection of Islam, culture, and politics in Africa and Asia. He has conducted fieldwork in Bosnia, Indonesia, Iraq, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Oman, South Sudan, Thailand, and Uganda, and his research has appeared in The Daily Beast, USA Today, Vox, and Wired.

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