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Align Your Chakras with the Soothing Sounds of Jeff Bridges
If you've had a rough week, here's the perfect video to sooth your stress, calm your nerves, and help you get one step closer to mental and spiritual enlightenment. It's simple, really — just Jeff Bridges leading Conan O'Brien, Andy Richter, and last night's Conan audience in an omming session, which is a healthy and meditative experience and totally not awkward at all.
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La película maldita del porno americano
Hay muchas películas de la época dorada del porno que arrastran polémica, mitos y leyendas. Unas, por el éxito masivo que consiguieron y las consecuencias que ello tuvo ('Deepthroat') y otras por incluir a menores ('The defiance of good'), exmenores ('Traci, I love you') o presuntas menores ('Dixie'). Y otras, como la que hoy comentamos, por ser una película de porno gay con un actor tan conocido (y hetero) como John Holmes y en la que los cuatro actores principales murieron de SIDA.
Holmes 'interpreta' a un Sultan que se folla y se deja chupar por unos cuantos chicos jóvenes. La película es realmente cutre, pero el hecho de tener a Holmes en ella le dio bastante fama.
Salió a la luz en 1983, cuando el tema del SIDA aún no era una preocupación general y ni siquiera se tenía mucha información sobre ello. Pero lo cierto es que cuatro de los hombres que participaron en la película murieron de SIDA, John Holmes incluido.
Sea cierto o no que Yale le contagiara el SIDA (Holmes y su familia aseguraban que no pudo ser por la droga, ya que jamás se pinchó), la verdad es que 'The Private Pleasures of John Holmes' es una de las grandes películas malditas del porn valley y una de las cintas clave a la hora de hablar del problema del SIDA en el mundo del porno.
"To a scientist, that's just incredible."
What Dog Breeds Say About Their Owners
“Guys with pit bulls are good in bed.”
BuzzFeedYellow / Via youtu.be
5 Struggles Of Being An ‘Intellectually Gifted’ Child

Many people assume intellectually gifted kids have an easy time in school. They can write, read, and do math multiple grades above their own. They grasp complex concepts faster than most of their classmates. However, it’s not easy to be intellectually gifted, and many intellectually gifted kids have a tough time in school.
1. They are bored most of the time.
The work the teacher gives them takes 10 minutes, so what do they do for the next 20 minutes while they wait for everyone else to finish? Draw? Daydream? They can’t chat to their friends because they’re still working. They ask the teacher for more work, but they don’t have any. They might’ve even faked being sick multiple times to escape the boredom of class.
2. Most schools cater to the lowest common denominator.
It’s very rare that teachers will push young kids to achieve more than they’re supposed to at their age. Eight-year-olds will be taught things eight-year-olds should know, so what happens when you’re eight but have the intellect of a twelve-year-old? Teachers don’t bring extra work to class for the students they know can easily do the work they give out.
3. They might end up being the teacher instead of the student.
Sometimes, when teachers don’t know what to do with you, you might end up becoming a teacher’s assistant. In second grade, whenever I finished my work early I was told to go and help a boy in my class who had severe brain damage. Helping a struggling classmate from time to time is one thing; becoming an unpaid teacher’s assistant is another.
4. If their talents aren’t nurtured, their full potential can never be reached.
Intellectually students sometimes never reach their full potential because of teachers holding them back academically. They won’t give them harder work; they’ll make them wait until everyone else has finished until they can continue with the next assignment. It’s frustrating for them to think about what might have been if they’d been allowed to work at a higher level.
5. Other kids might envy them and perhaps bully them.
Having kids envy you is fine—everyone is envious of someone. Being bullied for being naturally smart is ridiculous. Most intellectually gifted kids aren’t rubbing their intellect in anyone’s face; all they want is to be allowed to achieve what they’re capable of. 
Patton Oswalt Narrates A Short Film On Time Travel And Consumerism
The 5 Best And 5 Worst "I Wanted to Get Caught" Villain Schemes

Villains sure do like to be captured on purpose, don't they? We've seen it again and again as a trope, but it's not always a bad thing. Sometimes, it does show just how brilliant our bad guy is. And sometimes, it shows just how stupid our heroes are. Here are the best — and worst — times a villain got sent to the slammer deliberately.
BIZARROS - Complete Collection 1976-1980 + Sordide Sentimental 7"
As relacións sentimentais en galego
Gran parte do vocabulario que empregamos para definir termos do campo semántico das relacións sexuais ou sentimentais está furado por castelanismos ou castrapismos. É certo que o léxico deste ámbito adoita estar nas bocas das xeracións máis novas e polo tanto é dinámico. Mais iso non debe ser atranco para recordar algunhas formas tradicionais que hoxe están en perigo de extinción.
Cando dúas persoas establecen unha relación sentimental, en galego dicimos que gustan un do outro. “A Aldara deixou o mozo que tiña porque gustaba máis do médico de Folgoso”. A forma gustar de podémola aplicar noutros contextos, claro está. “Gusto máis das uvas ca dos amorodos”.
Hoxe dicimos que cando unha parella está inmersa nunha relación está saíndo. Na tradición galega usouse moito o verbo falar para indicar ese significado. “Ti sabías, Lucha, que a túa filla fala co meu sobriño Chuco?” ou “Eses que ti dis falaron pero agora nin se falan”. Reparade no valor do reflexivo, que axuda a evitar confusión entre os diferentes significados de falar.
A propia relación amorosa chámase namoro. O verbo namorar, amais de definir o nacemento do sentimento do amor tamén se refire ao propio acto de estar coa parella. “Moito tardades, nin que estiverades a namorar”.
O outro día vin no facebook un comentario sobre a foto dunha parella que dicía: “Vaia par de tortoliños”. O paxaro tórtola dise en galego rula ou rola. Non debemos nin adaptar nin traducir xa que rula en galego non serve para definir os namorados senón para dirixirse con cariño á persoa amada. “Miña rula bonita que convertes os meus minutos en amenceres”.
Cando o amor avanza e a parella empeza a convivir, sen voda polo medio, en galego usamos a palabra amigar e o adxectivo amigada/o. “Non casaron, están amigados”.
Amigo/a é unha palabra relativa á persoa amada xa desde a Idade Media. Aínda que nos últimos tempos gañou o significado de persoa coa que se mantén trato de afecto e confianza (bastante xenérico, non si?) permanece no galego vivo a súa acepción de amante. “Non esperou a ficar viúvo para meter a amiga na casa”.
No galego é máis habitual falar de home ca de marido. “Somos home e muller, de portas a dentro e de porta fóra”. Niso, o noso idioma é máis igualitario ca o castelán, que fala de “mujeres” si pero de “maridos”.
The Brazilian Town Where the American Confederacy Lives On
One day last spring, near an old rural cemetery in southern Brazil, a black man named Marcelo Gomes held up the corners of a Confederate flag to pose for a cell-phone photo. After the picture was taken, Gomes said he saw no problem with a black man paying homage to the history of the Confederate States of America. "American culture is a beautiful culture," he said. Some of his friends had Confederate blood.
Gomes had joined some 2,000 Brazilians at the annual
festa of the Fraternidade Descendência Americana, the brotherhood of Confederate descendants in Brazil, on a plot near the town of Americana, which was settled by Southern defectors 150 years ago. The graveyard is usually empty save for its caretaker or the odd worshipper drawn to its little brick chapel. On the April morning of the festa, a public-address system blaring the Confederate battle song "Stonewall Jackson's Way" had interrupted the cemetery's silence. Brazilians in ten-gallon hats and leather jackets called out greetings.
For miles around the graveyard, unfiltered sun beat down on sugarcane fields planted by the thousands of Confederates who had rejected Reconstruction and fled the United States in the wake of the Civil War—a voluntary exile that American history has more or less erased. Their scattered diaspora has gathered annually for the past 25 years. The party they throw, which receives funding from the local government, is the family reunion of the Confederados, one of the last remaining enclaves of the children of the unreconstructed South.
Brazilians filed past a Rebel-flag banner emblazoned with the Southern maxim: heritage, not hate. They lined up at a booth where they traded Brazilian reals for the festa's legal tender, printout Confederate $1 bills. (The exchange rate was 1:1—the Southern economy had apparently survived.) Kids flocked to the trampoline and moon bounce. Old-timers staked out shade beneath white tents. Early on, the line for fried chicken grew almost too long to brave.
Under a tent, I picked at some chicken and watched a young blond Brazilian woman maneuver an enormous Confederate-flag hoop skirt into a chair. I wondered what she made of the symbol. She introduced herself as Beatrice Stopa, a reporter for
Glamour Brazil. Her grandmother, Rose May Dodson, ran the Confederado fraternity. She'd been dancing at the festa since she was a kid.
I asked if she knew there was a connection between slavery and the American South. "I've never heard that before," she said. She wasn't sure why her ancestors had left the States. "I know they came. I don't really know the reason," she said. "Is it because of racism?" She smiled, embarrassed. "Don't tell my grandmother!"
Brazil itself outlawed slavery in 1888, more than two decades after the end of the American Civil War. Despite outwardly progressive efforts since then, the country has struggled to rid itself of the institution. The government passed legislation strengthening worker protections, including a 1940 constitutional amendment prohibiting employers from submitting their workers to "conditions analogous to slavery." But as Brazil grew more desperate to modernize in the early 20th century, farm owners started coercing wage laborers with debt and holding them in bondage. In recent years, government inspectors have found Brazilians trapped in debt on charcoal farms in Goiás, Haitian workers who have died on World Cup construction sites, and Bolivian immigrants in sweatshops at the center of São Paulo.
The town the Confederates built has been caught in this dragnet. On January 22, 2013, the Brazilian Ministry of Labor orchestrated a sting in Americana, the town where many of the Confederados had settled. It found Bolivian immigrants manufacturing baby clothes under the roof and supervision of two Bolivian bosses. The prosecutors broke up the factory, and in the suit that followed, they deemed the conditions they'd found execrable enough to constitute slavery.
Of all the people I asked at the Americana festival, not a single one had heard of slavery in his town.
Almost everyone had come to the festa dressed as an American—in jeans and boots, Johnny Cash T-shirts and camouflage. Visitors haggled at a booth stocked with Southern paraphernalia: aprons, quilts, commemorative glasses, a used copy of
The Autobiography of Malcolm X. An amplified voice called the crowds to pull their chairs up to the main stage—an enormous concrete slab with a flag painted across it and the words XXVI FESTA CONFEDERADA emblazoned at its top. The mayor of the nearby town Santa Bárbara d'Oeste surveyed his assembled constituents and welcomed the state representatives in attendance. "It's the first time I have the honor being here as mayor," he beamed, leaning over the microphone as descendants in homemade hoop skirts and sewn Confederate grays standing behind him hoisted flags up long, thin wooden poles. "But I've been here many times as a spectator, a fan." The banners of São Paulo, Brazil, Texas, the United States, and the Confederacy flapped languidly in the breeze. "North American immigration has helped build our region, has helped build Santa Bárbara d'Oeste, has helped build the city of Americana," he proclaimed. "That's what we celebrate today."
By and large, the thousands of Texans and Alabamans and Georgians who sailed to Cuba and Mexico and Brazil failed. They folded into cities and set up doomed plantations on rain-forest plots. By 1918, they'd dwindled enough to merit ethnographic study, and the American Geographical Society dispatched researchers to learn their ways.
But not Americana. Led by an Alabaman colonel, its settlers introduced cotton and turned the town into an industrial textile powerhouse. For generations their children spoke English with a drawl. Today the city of 200,000 boasts Latin America's largest cowboy-rodeo arena. The festa brings it great pride.
Men dressed as soldiers led the crowd in the Brazilian national anthem; one trumpeted an off-key "Taps." In the States this kind of gathering usually culminates in a battle reenactment, but the Confederados offered tamer fare, mostly dance performances headlined by a long-bearded local celebrity known as Johnny Voxx, whose black hat, sunglasses, black-leather-trimmed jeans, and black cowboy boots made him look like the hero of a spaghetti western.
"This is nearly perfect... This is what we want. I don't attach anything political. I like black people." – Philip Logan
Passing me a business card, Voxx said he'd googled a bit before he booked the Confederado gig. "I started studying just to know if the people here were racist or not," he said. "But like they say, 'Heritage, not hate.' I wouldn't be here if it was a party to celebrate racism." He stumbled through the English—what little he knows he learned from music and watching
Bonanza—and I wondered what his interpretation of country music could possibly sound like. But when he belted out "Cotton Fields," the crowd doubled. His intonation was perfect—the man sounded like Hank Williams.
I couldn't help bringing up the historical contradictions over and over—to Voxx, to descendants, to a group of local men who ran a weekly country-western movie club. But nobody seemed as uncomfortable as I was. "Our prejudice is very small compared with other people's," Pedro Artur Caseiro, a member of the movie club, told me. I asked what he loved about westerns, and he smiled dreamily, his chest puffed in affected military decorum, his hand on his wooden sword. "Good always trumps evil," he said. "Today what's missing, it seems like people don't believe in goodness."
Real Southerners—Confederate enthusiasts—had made the pilgrimage too. Ambling through the yard in his uniform, Philip Logan, a tall and portly Civil War reenactor from Centreville, Virginia, inspected the headstones: Ferguson, Cullen, Pyles. Born: Texas. Died: Brazil.
Accompanied by his girlfriend, a Brazilian woman with a bonnet and parasol whom he'd met online, Logan exhaled. "This is nearly perfect," he said. "This is what we want. I don't attach anything political. I like black people." As an active member of the Sons of Confederate Veterans, he reckoned constantly with what he considered exploitations of his heritage. "There's just so much animosity," he said. "Here it's like, seeing the Confederate flag, nobody cares. If I waved a Russian flag nobody would care."
At the entrance to the festa, two muscled bodyguards patted the attendees down, checking their arms and necks against four Xeroxed sheets of paper that outlined in Portuguese 42 white-supremacist symbols—the SS, the Iron Cross, the swastika, KKK. They'd been instructed to eject anyone with these markings from the party. It had been a problem in years prior.
As the party wound down and attendees made their way back to the fields where their cars were parked, I asked Érico Padilha, a non-descendant local, what he thought of the Confederate-slave connection. "I really don't like this idea, celebrating something about the South, because of slavery. I really don't like it," he said. "But here this party is not about politics, I think. It's about the culture."
The Confederados decamped for Brazil for a number of reasons—their children still bicker over why. Brazil had been trying for years to match North American and European agricultural development, and Emperor Dom Pedro II saw in these disaffected Southerners an opportunity to import American prosperity. He set up informational agencies across the South and offered subsidized passage to any American willing to emigrate. Newspaper ads for chartered ships appeared nearly every day, as did editorials mocking the plan, and Confederates jumped at the offer of cheap land on which to build new plantations, fantasizing about restoring the economy they'd watched crumble in the States. This would be possible because Brazil would allow them to keep their slaves.
Although Brazil outlawed the slave trade in the mid 1800s, it dragged its feet in banning slavery outright. Southerners wouldn't have been able to produce competitive cotton without it, and both the Confederates and Dom Pedro knew it. Even before the Civil War, Southerners had held conferences on moving slavery to the country. Once they emigrated, prominent Confederate officers scrambled to buy operational
fazendas already staffed with slaves. Cotton and tobacco didn't grow well in Brazil's soil, but established crops like coffee, orange, and sugarcane certainly did.
Brazil's race relations shocked Confederate sensibilities enough to send many émigrés back to the United States. "The black, who some admit will one day be our equal here, will already be found occupying the foremost and most honorable walks in society," one prospector wrote of Brazil in the
Galveston Tri-Weekly News after scouting the country for plots. He added, "Although the white fears he will someday cast his ballot in the same box with him here, he will find him not only voting there, but making laws—laws to govern whites who go there."
"So pronounced was their distaste," writes descendant Eugene Harter in
The Lost Colony of the Confederacy, "that in 1888, when a senator opposed to slavery was assassinated on the eve of Brazil's emancipation, the Confederados were first suspected." The public, however, felt differently. Lore holds that crowds gathered to celebrate outside Princess Isabel's palace as she signed abolition into law more than two decades after the American Civil War had ended.
"We never had a war in Brazil about slavery," João Leopoldo Padoveze, a Confederado whose ancestors were once slaves, told me. Like many, he asserted that the abolition of slavery was peaceful because Brazil never had a problem with racism. The concept that Brazil is a "racial democracy" has shaped the country's cultural identity for decades as a point of national pride. The Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre coined the term after he witnessed a man being lynched when he was a student in the Jim Crow South. Horrified, he came home with a newfound appreciation for his country as a place where ethnicities mixed freely, which he argued was evidence that in Brazil racism did not exist.
But even as Brazil wrote racism out of its history, slavery continued. Landowners, including Confederados with fazendas, hired wage laborers in place of their slaves. In turn, these laborers—impoverished farmworkers—have been replaced by a workforce that includes the tens of thousands of slaves, many of them immigrants, who live in Brazil today.
It wasn't until the 1970s that rural activists set up rescue centers for escaped workers and started to collect the stories in an effort to eradicate the practice. They presented their findings—evidence of thousands of Brazilian workers whose abuse and bondage the state had systematically tolerated—to the International Labour Organization, and in 1995 the ILO declared Brazil in contempt of its own constitution.
The shaming moved President Fernando Cardoso to make a now famous radio address that summer. "In 1888, Princess Isabel signed the famous Golden Law, which should have ended slave labor in this country," he said. "I say 'should' because, unfortunately, it hasn't stopped." Brazil would establish a task force to find and punish slavery across all industries. In the two intervening decades the government has taken multinational companies like Zara to task and freed 47,000 workers legally defined as "slaves."
Brazil's "secret inspection operations," as one ILO brochure dubs them, are some of the world's most rigorous. The country has publicly acknowledged and committed to reforming its abuses of labor on a scale few others have. This June, for example, activists won a 15-year battle to pass a constitutional amendment allowing the state to expropriate the land of businesses and farms found using slavery—an unthinkable penalty in the US.

Beatrice Stopa, a Confederado descendant and reporter for Glamour Brazil
In a drab office in Campinas, labor inspector Joao Baptista Amancio slid a stack of files on the Americana slavery case across a table. The sting had ended in a great, and rare, success. Amancio's office had followed the case to the top of the supply chain and levied $95,000 in fines on Lojas Americanas, the national brand that was selling the clothes. Though Brazil's antislavery operations are some of the world's finest, successfully prosecuting a case is slow and arduous. Conditions need to be egregious.
Amancio, a soft-spoken bureaucrat in Reeboks and khakis, raided the factory along with another inspector, four federal police officers, a prosecutor, and a judge. They were following up on a 2011 case in which they'd found six undocumented Bolivians making clothes in a home factory but had elected not to prosecute the work as slavery. They wanted to make sure that the sweatshop had stayed closed.
Instead they found five Bolivians making baby clothes in a broken-down shed with cracked walls, water damage, and a moldy ceiling caving in. Four young women shared a grimy concrete cell, sleeping on makeshift bunks, their clothes strewn across their beds and on the floor. They had no furniture to speak of; they couldn't close their doors. Amancio said they worked 12-hour days, six days a week, churning out fabric on faulty sewing machines. They were paid, but irregularly and based only on how much they produced.
Two of the workers fled when the Ministry of Labor descended. Amancio's office never found them—he suspects they'd run to São Paulo. Flight is not uncommon, Amancio told me. Factory overseers trap workers in abusive conditions by convincing them that the Brazilian authorities will deport them for working illegally, even though Brazil accepts Bolivian migrant workers as a part of a free-trade agreement.
"They fear being caught by authorities," Amancio said. "That's what holds them. They only trust the employer, the guy exploiting them. He exploits that fear." The three who stayed in the Americana factory all listed Gabriel Miffia Alanes, their overseer, as their emergency contact for the ministry.
The workers hardly spoke. They hunched over their machines, feet exposed, looked at the ground, and avoided questions. So the ministry used its discretion, picked up on subtler things. Workers glanced at Alanes for visual cues, regarded him with what the ministry called "reverential terror." But the clincher was the door. When the authorities asked the workers to show them the keys they used to get in and out of the factory, none could produce one. The door locked from within, and the ministry said this showed that Alanes kept his employees trapped inside.

A hillside near Americana
The case in Americana is somewhat typical of Brazil. It matched the story of another Bolivian immigrant I met one night outside a Peruvian restaurant near a strip called Cracolândia,* a drug-plagued strip in São Paulo. Edwin Quenta Santos worked there as a server—the first real job he'd had since escaping his violent cousin's factory in Guarulhos, not far from the São Paulo airport. He lived in a rat-infested, windowless concrete changing room near the restaurant and slept in a child's plastic race-car bed. He still wasn't working legally, and made minimum wage, though he consistently worked a few hours past the supposed end of his shift. "We could say it's still a little bit like slavery," he said, letting out a laugh.
Edwin called his story his "testimony"—he'd never spoken to the police, never told his children or his wife what he'd endured. He'd moved on and tried to forget, but then he'd heard rumors that his cousin Severo Oyardo Santos was running a sweatshop once again. He wanted people back home to fully understand what Severo had done.
In 2009, Severo visited Edwin in La Paz, Bolivia. Severo had lived in São Paulo for about ten years, and Edwin was shocked at how well he seemed to be doing. He bragged that he owned a factory that was expanding, and he was looking for more help. He told Edwin that he could triple his income if he moved to Brazil to work. Edwin said he borrowed about 500 reals ($190) from Severo for a plane ticket and an additional 500 reals to tide his family over until he could send back his first check.
"I thought,
Well, if he is lending me five hundred reals just like that, it means everything is going to be OK over there," Edwin said.
When Edwin arrived in São Paulo, paid traffickers known as
gatos sidled up to him as he waited with his suitcase for his cousin. Gatos prey on Bolivians who arrive in the country with no connections, offering work in unlicensed clothing factories hidden in back offices or homes. This kind of work—dispersed, small-scale exploitation rather than obvious torture on farms—is booming. Last year was the first on record that Brazil busted more urban slavery rings than rural ones. "They offered to pay for my hotel, said they had rooms available for work. They kept offering," Edwin said. "Then my cousin arrived."
Severo drove Edwin to his compound near the airport and introduced him to the 20 or so extended family members already working there. They threw a little welcome party in the cramped kitchen. The concrete house was three stories high, and it had no front door—just a gated carport with a padlock, whose key Severo kept hidden. Severo parked his car on the street, reserving the carport instead as a home for his guard dogs. If Edwin wanted to leave outside of the one trip a week his cousin allowed, he'd have to scale the back wall and make sure to be back before he was caught. He knew the kind of punishment his cousin could inflict—he recalled watching him beat his children. "He's bigger than me," Edwin said.
The workers followed a strict schedule, rising at five and working till midnight, sometimes stopping only for a 15-minute lunch. They drank water from a well covered in algae. They slept six to a room on the compound's top floor or else in the sewing factory itself, pushing their machines aside at night and sliding in thin mattresses. Edwin didn't know how to make clothes, so he started out cooking and cleaning as his family members sewed.
According to Edwin, when he asked his cousin for money, he screamed that it was Edwin who owed him money. They'd talk wages only once he put a dent in his debt for the plane ticket and loan. Severo was evasive and would lie to family members who wanted to settle their accounts, refusing to pay them in full. In Edwin's time at the factory, the only worker who managed to persuade Severo to give him the money he was due was a cousin with papers who had threatened to report his boss to the federal police if he didn't pay up and let him go.
The workers followed a strict schedule, rising at five and working till midnight, sometimes stopping only for a 15-minute lunch.
Edwin struggled to learn to sew. He fumbled with the machines, ruining fabric. It took him a month to make what his cousins could make in four days. A businessman who contracted with Severo would show up at the house and demand faster production. "If my cousin said he couldn't do it, he would say, 'That's your problem, you have to deliver tomorrow,'" Edwin told me. On those nights, he and the others often did not sleep.
His family in Bolivia begged him to send money. Eventually they moved to a cheap rental house, and his wife took their children out of private school. Edwin lied when his son and daughter asked how he was doing; he felt too ashamed to admit the situation. "Imagine that I came from Bolivia with a good plan in order to overcome the low lifestyle of my family," Edwin explained. "Imagine how my children would have reacted, or my wife, or my parents. That's why I contained myself. I felt incapable of doing anything."
It grew increasingly obvious that Severo had no intention of compensating anyone fairly, and they all slowly stopped working. A cousin or a nephew would say he wanted to leave, and Severo would tell them to pack their bags. He'd load them into his car and drop them off penniless at the bus station in Guarulhos. Edwin didn't know where each had gone. He waited, still in debt and without connections in Brazil, as work in the factory slowed and then came to a halt. Eventually, only he and Severo's children remained. Then one evening he found his bags packed and out on the curb. Edwin slept in the locker room at a soccer field for three days, collecting himself before he headed into São Paulo to look for work. He ultimately made his way to the Peruvian restaurant near Cracolândia.
The afternoon after I met Edwin, I drove to Severo's compound in Guarulhos and waited for his car to pull up. A stout man with a puggish face slammed the door and waddled toward the gated carport.
"Who's judging me?" he demanded when asked if he'd been running a factory. "I have to know." There was no factory inside, he said, just his children, home from school, and a cousin or two visiting. He showed me his home. On the second floor there was an empty, white-tiled room filled with gleaming sewing machines. A heap of felt filled a bin in the corner. Nobody was working, but the machines were spooled.
"It's all lies made up by jealous people, good-for-nothings," Severo said.
I asked why there were so many machines inside if he wasn't running a factory. There'd been one in the past, he confessed. But he'd closed it.
"Seamstresses only want to work little and earn lots, and that can't be, you know?" he said. "So better to end that."

Severo Oyardo Santos's compound in Guarulhos, Brazil, where Edwin Quenta Santos was held in slave-like conditions
The morning after the Confederado festa, I drove the 30 miles from the old Southern graveyard to the address the ministry's records listed as the sweatshop run by Gabriel Miffia Alanes and Eusebia Villalobos Tarqui, the Bolivian couple who'd been caught with slaves in Americana. The GPS led to a bulldozed lot, the plywood and steel skeleton of a house built atop it. On the corner I saw a shoddy two-room building, its yellow-brown walls the same color as the dirt. I wondered, as I walked out to a man in a bucket hat and work boots, if that shack had been the factory.
The man squinted at me as I asked him what he was doing. Puzzled, he said he was at work building a bank. He hadn't heard that there had been a factory here, but there were some Bolivians currently living in the house right across the street. He didn't know anything about them—who they were, if they worked—but they only ever left in the morning and at night. They walked by with their heads down and never said hello.
It took a few minutes of knocking on the house's rust-red-painted metal door for a man with black hair and sallow cheeks to stick his head out. His forearm, stuffed into the pocket of his shorts, bore a scorpion. Behind him baby clothes hung on a clothesline against a concrete wall.
I asked him if there had been a factory in his house. "Yes," he said. "But it's been closed for a while." The ministry had come around months ago. "There were no problems," he said. "Everyone had their papers."
When I asked if he'd heard about slavery across the street, he bristled. "It's not slavery," he said. "When I first came from Bolivia, I worked from seven till midnight. I wanted to work those hours. The owner never forced me. If I worked like a Brazilian, from seven till five, I wouldn't make enough money."
Grasping, I brought up Alanes, the Bolivian neighbor caught with slaves in his factory the year prior. Did he know him? He hesitated, and then he said, "That's me."
Of course. The address I'd gone looking for—the one in the ministry's files—led to the house where Alanes and his family slept. This was their workplace, the factory across the street, where he'd allegedly kept his workers locked inside. A year after the ministry raided Alanes's sweatshop, freed his workers, and successfully linked the case to a national chain, the sweatshop still stood, and Alanes was still inside it.
He disappeared into the house, but soon after, a woman wearing a scrunchie came to the door—Tarqui, his wife. She laid out the situation: The only people working in the factory these days were herself and her husband. They made shorts for a São Paulo private school, but if they showed the logo, they'd lose the business, which they couldn't afford. That understood, she opened the gate and motioned for me to follow.
A year after the ministry raided Alanes's sweatshop, freed his workers, and successfully linked the case to a national chain, the sweatshop still stood, and Alanes was still inside it.
A concrete walkway led past small cinder-block dwellings to an enormous tin-roofed pavilion propped up by plywood poles at the back of the lot. Fabric, plastic wrapping, and cardboard boxes covered the floor. Two faded laminate posters—one with an old lineup for Palmeiras, a São Paulo soccer club, another with an aerial mountain shot of La Paz—were tacked onto the water-stained walls. Light fixtures dangled from the ceiling. Part of the roof had collapsed and showed the sky. A dozen yellowed sewing machines rested on card tables.
Tarqui turned toward me in the room's corner, picked up a pair of red nylon school athletic shorts, and folded her arms. She said the school paid 90 centavos—about 35 cents—per pair and she and her husband churned out about 2,000 per week. In exchange, her children attended the school. She insisted that her children never worked. (Amancio, the labor inspector, said he suspected otherwise.)
To hear Tarqui tell it, she fell into managing a sweatshop by accident. In 2001, she moved to Brazil at the invitation of a Bolivian she knew who'd married a Brazilian man and needed a nanny. She boarded a bus and braved the two-day ride to São Paulo. She eventually left the nanny job to work in a factory; after a while, she and her husband opened their own. They'd pick up contracts, have a week to make 1,000 pairs of shorts. Unable to do the job themselves, they'd go meet Bolivians in the town square. They hired one, then another, and by 2011 the Ministry of Labor was knocking on their door.
"Here I feel a little lost," Alanes told me. "Tired too."
The ministry ordered HippyChick Moda Infantil, the company that sold Alanes and Tarqui's clothes to Lojas Americanas, to pay both the workers and the factory owners severance and "moral damages." It took five days or so for HippyChick to pay the workers. After that, they boarded buses and left for good. Alanes had no idea where they'd gone. It's this absence, more than anything, that marks Brazil's record of the case in Americana, and of its slavery operations writ large. The workers gave no testimony and left no trace.
As for the lock and key: At first, Alanes said the ministry was lying. Later, on the phone, Tarqui admitted that they'd kept the door locked, but insisted that workers had access to a key. She said that they'd been robbed before. In November of last year, Brazil's federal judiciary opened a criminal case against Alanes for keeping workers in conditions analogous to slavery, a crime punishable by up to eight years in prison.

Gabriel Miffia Alanes continues to operate a home factory even after being convicted in 2013 of using slave labor.
Daniel Carr de Muzio, the de facto Confederado genealogist, swung open the heavy wooden door to his house in a gated ten-year-old development called Jardim Buru in the São Paulo countryside. A pickup truck with a Confederate flag sat in the driveway. De Muzio grew up in Brazil steeped in his family's Confederate heritage. His grandmother referred to Abraham Lincoln as "that man" until the day she died, and his grandfather threw away his baseball cards depicting black players. In adulthood, de Muzio remained devoted to his American roots, making his money by translating English to Portuguese and speaking with a Southern drawl.
Inside de Muzio's house, a sunken den with chandeliers gave way to floor-to-ceiling windows looking out over a backyard filled with eucalyptus trees and subtropical varieties of lemon. On a credenza next to a glass tray of alcohol sat three miniature flags: Brazil's, the United States', and the Confederacy's. Walking through the house in madras shorts and a T-shirt, de Muzio showed off his collection of family and Confederado memorabilia—books and papers and crinkled old photos. A stained copy of
Facts the Historians Leave Out: A Youth's Confederate Primer rested near his computer alongside a book called Lost White Tribes, in which de Muzio is featured.
Sitting in his back-porch rocking chair, looking over his verdant yard, he tried to disabuse me of the notion that the Confederados came to Brazil to keep practicing slavery. Slaves had nowhere to go after the Civil War, he told me. Brazil looked like a great option. "I'm sure they came voluntarily," he said. "These people, you know, they were raised by their masters—and they knew very little of how to get along by themselves on their own. They probably were very afraid of being alone."
For the Confederados, the legacy of the South is all innocence, no reckoning.
When I asked de Muzio if he'd heard of contemporary slavery in Brazil, he told me that he had—Haitians on construction sites, Bolivians in factories. His brow furrowed as he threw eucalyptus charcoal on the stove. "Now, that hasn't got a thing to do with us," he said.
Today, the Confederados are, for the most part, light-skinned upper-middle-class Brazilians, the legacy of the few Southerners who succeeded in preserving a simulacrum of their crumbling plantations. They celebrate a mythology that hardly contends with the past and keeps itself blind even to the present.
At the festa, I had met Cindy Gião, who was a visitor, not a descendant. She said she knew next to nothing about the Confederacy. She'd come on the invitation of her father's friend, Robert Lee Ferguson. Gião guessed she was Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and maybe Dutch in heritage. But she couldn't say for sure, and neither could most of her friends. No one knew, she said, "because it's so mixed." That's what so many Brazilians envy in the Confederados—a connection to one's past.
For the Confederados, the legacy of the South is all innocence, no reckoning. Their Confederacy is a collection of sounds and words and images: a Johnny Cash song, a western, a flag. White Southern bitterness has melted into kitsch—or else denial, oblivion. These are the blindnesses that render slavery invisible today.
"Brazilians are not very into our history," Gião said. "We learn it in school, but we don't have parties to celebrate what our ancestors did for us." Then she turned toward the stage to listen to a rendition of "Summertime" from Porgy and Bess and watch as a man hoisted the Brazilian flag up alongside the Stars and Bars.
Smoking Weed Can Be a Lot of Fun, but Let's Not Pretend It Doesn't Fuck You Up
[body_image width='1000' height='664' path='images/content-images/2015/02/05/' crop='images/content-images-crops/2015/02/05/' filename='smoking-weed-can-be-a-lot-of-fun-but-lets-not-pretend-it-doesnt-fuck-you-up-body-image-1423152827.jpeg' id='24863']
Photo by Jake Lewis
This post first appeared on VICE UK.
At last year's Notting Hill Carnival—before the Red Stripe, warm rum, and weak drugs hijacked my general awareness of everything around me—I noticed some teenage boys smoking a joint. As is the case every time I get a whiff of skunk, the aroma took me straight back to my teens and early 20s, flooding my mind with a barrage of memories that I'm aware were a lot of fun but can't really string together all that coherently.
I was instantly beaten around the brain with that old catch-22: instinctively wanting to take a huge toke while also being very aware that doing so would be a terrible idea. That the innocent Nike foot soldiers in front of me would morph into a terrifying kaleidoscope of bum-fluff demons, their neon rosary beads and NOS balloons forming some kind of oppressive Goblin City on the streets of West London.
Not for the first time, I began to think about the sometimes pleasurable, often worrying, mostly confusing legacy weed has had on my life. Because here's the thing: Getting high can be a lot of fun, but let's not pretend that smoking a load of skunk doesn't fuck you up a bit.
My first spliff wasn't particularly memorable; smoking weed just became a thing I did with my friends around the age of 16. And by "a thing," I don't mean a passing fad or an occasional pastime; it was all I did. Every day after school, we'd either sit in the park—or climb a tree in Hampstead Heath, if we were feeling especially motivated—and get high. I'm sure many of you have similar memories.
Sometimes we smoked soap bar and ended up with hot-rock holes in our clothes; sometimes we smoked bush weed—and a lot of it, because it was full of seeds and wouldn't get you lean if you didn't. But mainly it was skunk, the one your parents tell you is much stronger than the stuff they had in their day. Which, in fairness to your parents, is accurate: It's about five times more potent than that brown Thai stick stuff you get wrapped up in red string.
Not everyone has the same experiences with weed. The overwhelming amount of conflicting studies—the ones that prove cannabis definitely causes schizophrenia, or the ones that prove it definitely doesn't—should be evidence enough of that. Weed works for some people; it doesn't work for others. However, I can't help feeling there's a bit of a confirmation bias going on among some of those it does "work" for.
The majority of heavy smokers I know would tell you they can regularly get high and get on with their lives without feeling lazy, paranoid, or anxious. Press some of them a little harder and they'll admit that this isn't always the case; that they'll often find themselves experiencing more social anxiety and paranoia the morning after smoking compared with how they feel following a weed-free evening. Or that they can't suppress the thought that their heavy skunk consumption had something to do with their transition from outgoing 15-year-old to introverted 25-year-old.
Of course, all of this is qualitative at best—none of it has been recorded, tracked, medically qualified, or any of the other stuff it might take to convince the loudest voices on r/trees. However, the sheer number of people who've shared these feelings with me is enough to suggest there are probably others out there who are feeling the same but have chosen to keep up appearances around their friends.
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Photo by Jake Lewis
Looking back, I was definitely one of those kids. I lived close to a friend of mine in North London, and more often that not, if we'd been smoking I'd crash on his floor, the thought of a walk—followed by a night bus—down Holloway Road simply too much of an ordeal for my hazy brain. I knew I'd probably survive, but I couldn't deal with the stress of wondering if every person I saw might be a genuine nutter, out to punch me in the throat and steal my Nokia.
This sort of thing went on for years: smoking and kind of enjoying it (or at least thinking I did), before leaving whichever house I was in and readying myself to deal with all the bloodthirsty degenerates waiting for me outside. Bizarre, paranoid behavior began to seem normal; I accepted it as collateral for the apparent enjoyment of smoking weed with my friends.
I still wonder if weed made me act and think a certain way, or if that's just how I was at the time. I tend to think getting high exacerbates the negative thoughts we already have, and I recognize now that I was a pretty anxious, nervy kid. So smoking bud, given my propensity to feel anxious and nervy, was clearly a bad idea. Only, I felt I had to join in, because at an age where fitting in is more important than your own mental health, how could I say no?
Even now, hearing that people I once knew have gone through some kind of drug-induced psychosis doesn't seem all that dramatic. You just shrug your shoulders and try to remember how they were when you were younger. Weren't they always a bit weird? Or did skunk just do a total number on them?
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I suppose I'm lucky that I got away from weed before it got to me. My suspicion is that a lot of people simply smoke through their worries, refusing to admit that the moments of anxiety and paranoia are really happening.
I'm not anti-drugs in any respect, and I'm certainly not going to judge anyone for smoking weed. I'm also not suggesting that there's anything inherently wrong with cannabis (the medicinal benefits are numerous and deserve a ream of their own articles), or that some people really can't get through an eighth a day well into their 80s without any negative side effects.
But what I am saying is, if you smoke a lot of weed and do feel creeping thoughts of anxiety and paranoia, maybe just don't smoke so much? Or at least admit to yourself that what you're feeling is real rather than dismissing it and ripping another bong, because your brain will thank you in the long run.
Follow Charles on Twitter.
Anti-porn activists fail to realize the ’50 Shades of Grey’ movie plays right into their hands
Today, in missed opportunities: A large coalition of anti-fun activists are calling for a boycott of the forthcoming ’50 Shades of Grey’ movie on the grounds that it glamorizes a depraved, anything goes, “stick and stones may break my bones but chains and whips excite me” type of lifestyle. In an effort to combat its pernicious influence, they are using the hashtags #50dollarsnot50shades and #50shadesisabuse to plead with horny soccer moms across the nation to donate $50 to a women’s shelter instead of donating $12.50 to a naughty night out with their girlfriends. Because those two things are totally mutually exclusive. (Believe it or not, you can go see a movie about two people indulging in completely mutually consensual kink and make a donation to a worthy organization that helps abused women, like this one.)
“[Real women] don’t end up like Anastasia; they often end up in a women’s shelter, on the run for years or dead,” anti-sex work organization The National Center for Sexual Exploitation wrote on its Facebook page. “The money you would have spent on movie tickets and a baby-sitter or movie tickets, popcorn and drinks will go towards serving victims of abusive relationships like the one glamorized in the 50 Shades series.”
To which I say: Um, have they even seen Glamour’s iPad Q+A? Or any of the press tour, for that matter? Between the two main characters’ utter lack of chemistry, the film’s clunky dialogue and the stars’ unambiguous distaste for each other, the film, and everything said film stands for, it’s the most convincing anti-BDSM PSA to come along in years. Dakota Johnson–who presumably enjoys being paid to pretend she’s someone who likes different things than the things Dakota Johnson likes–has described the film’s sex scenes as “emotionally taxing” and a “technical” “task” to get through. Jamie Dornan literally said he had to take a long shower after doing “research” for his role at BDSM clubs, so traumatized was he by the things he saw there. Not since Andrea Dworkin has anyone quite so thoroughly disavowed both the practice and depiction of kinky sex.
One need only look at the BDSM community’s response to the poorly-written bodice ripper to see that these pearl clutching culture warriors have nothing to fear from it. “All the work that has been done to establish that BDSM is not a pathological symptom, but one of a wide range of normative human erotic interests, is in danger of being undermined by the success of Fifty Shades,” writes BDSM activist and researcher Pamela Stephenson Connolly at The Guardian. “Let’s hope we do not return to the days when people were discriminated against – losing children, property, jobs – for their interest in BDSM.”
Plus, let’s not gloss over the fact that BDSM activity is kink mutually agreed upon by both participants and not the infliction of abuse of one party on the other. It seems insulting to both victims of abuse and members of the BDSM community to assume otherwise.
See, missionary sex brigade? If you really want to convince people that power play is scary and wrong (not to mention patently un-sexy), you should be supporting this schlock with everything you’ve got.
h/t Washington Post; Image
Read the original Game of Thrones book proposal, in which Arya and Jon Snow fell in love
What did Game of Thrones look like when George RR Martin first imagined it?
British bookseller Waterstones posted, and then took down, what it says is a three-page proposal Martin wrote in October 1993 for what he planned to be "an epic fantasy trilogy." Many elements of it resemble what has taken place in the books and HBO show so far, but others are ... quite different.
If you're a Game of Thrones fan who is averse to possible spoilers, you probably shouldn't read on. Yet this proposal is so vastly different from what's been published and aired that you may not have much to worry about.
For instance, the proposal says that Arya Stark will fall in love with her (supposed) half-brother Jon Snow and that "their passion will continue to torment" them "throughout the trilogy." Eventually, Tyrion Lannister's own unrequited love for Arya would lead him into a "deadly rivalry" with Jon. Luckily, Martin decided to ditch all of those plot elements.
Waterstones and HarperCollins didn't respond to requests to comment on the proposal, but it's reportedly on display in the London office of HarperCollins. Read below:
Your Guide to the Koch Brothers, America's Favorite Dark Money Billionaires
With their recent pledge to spend $889 million on the 2016 presidential election, it's time to recognize a weird truth about American politics: The Koch brothers, namely Charles and David, with an assist from David's twin William, have a financial influence on par with the two major political parties.
Who are the Koch brothers? What is a Kochtopus? And should we all start preparing to live on boats by 2025? If you live in the United States, and you aren't planning to move to Mars before 2016, pay attention.
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David Koch. Illustration by Irene Rinaldi
WHO ARE THE KOCH
BROTHERS?
When you use the words "Koch brothers" in relation to
American politics, you're probably talking about Charles and David Koch. But
there are two more Koch brothers: Frederick, the oldest, and William, David's
twin. Here's the breakdown on the family.
FRED KOCH
The family patriarch is Fred Koch, who started what his sons
would later rename Koch Industries. Fred was a chemical-engineering graduate
from MIT, and he invented a new way of converting oil into gasoline, which he
used, largely, in the Soviet Union. Because of his presence there, he bore
close witness to Stalin's excesses, and it bred in him a deep—some would say
paranoid and pathological—distrust of Communism.
In 2010, Jane Mayer published the definitive profile of the Kochs in the New Yorker , and she wrote of Fred, "In 1958, Fred Koch became one of the original members of the John Birch Society, the arch-conservative group known, in part, for a highly skeptical view of governance and for spreading fears of a Communist takeover. Members considered President Dwight D. Eisenhower to be a Communist agent... 'The colored man looms large in the Communist plan to take over America,' [Fred Koch] warned. Welfare was a secret plot to attract rural blacks to cities, where they would foment 'a vicious race war.'"
Sounds like a fun guy, right? His sons thought so. Fred raised Frederick, Charles, David, and William in his image, forcing them to work long days on the family ranch and flooding them with his political opinions.
FREDERICK
The eldest of the Koch brothers, Frederick was essentially
disowned by his father when he decided to go to Yale instead of MIT and study
drama. In his
2010 New York magazine profile on the
Kochs, Andrew Goldman wrote, "Frederick busies himself, William says, 'buying
castles,' like the Schloss Bluhnbach in Austria, the former hunting lodge of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand." According to Mayer, Frederick moved to Monaco and
began collecting objects of historical significance. Politically, he appears to
play little role in the family now.
CHARLES
The second eldest, Charles is the brother who turned Koch
Industries into the second-largest privately-owned company in the United
States, with a revenue of $115 billion,
according to Forbes.
(David also played a role in the company, but most of the credit is given to
Charles.) Products under the Koch chemical umbrella include Dixie cups, Angel
Soft toilet paper, and Brawny paper towels, which
the Nightly Show's Larry Wilmore painfully discovered when he tried to boycott the company. Koch Industries
is also a leading producer of formaldehyde, and worked hard to fight the
government's labeling of the chemical
as a known carcinogen — an effort that ultimately failed after David resigned
from the National Institute of Health's board.
DAVID
Mayer and Goldman's 2010 articles were a shock to plenty of
folks in New York who had previously thought of David Koch as the rich guy who
just gave everyone money. David's philanthropy is the most complicating factor
in the Koch family narrative. In
The
Chronicle of Philanthropy
's top 50 philanthropists of 2013, Koch placed No. 24
with a donation to New York-Presbyterian Hospital of $101 million. Beyond that,
he's given $100 million to MIT, resulting in the creation of the David H. Koch
Institute for Integrative Cancer Research, and
hundreds of millions more toward a number of causes: fighting prostate cancer, which he
suffers from; renovating the Smithsonian's dinosaur hall; a wing at the
American Museum of Natural History; $65 million to the Metropolitan Museum of
Art; and $100 million to the State Theater of New York at Lincoln Center, which
was renamed the David H. Koch Theater and is home to the New York City Ballet
and New York City Opera.
David also had a rep as a playboy: Mayer wrote that he was "described by associates as 'affable' and 'a bit of a lunk,' enjoyed for years the life of a wealthy bachelor. He rented a yacht in the South of France and bought a waterfront home in Southampton, where he threw parties that the website New York Social Diary likened to an 'East Coast version of Hugh Hefner's soirées.'" He's since settled down with a wife, and told Goldman that prostate cancer had sapped his sex drive.
David and Charles are tied as the 9th-richest people in the world, and David is the richest man in New York City, eclipsing former Mayor Michael Bloomberg.
WILLIAM
If Frederick's the black sheep, William is the runt. Goldman
wrote that William lived in David's shadow, playing behind him on the MIT
basketball team and believing himself the least-preferred of the Koch boys
growing up. Goldman, among others, have attributed William's dogged pursuit of
America's Cup—he spent $65 million to win the amateur sailing competition in
1992—to be one protracted dick-measuring contest against Charles and David.
William's issues with the family took a litigious turn when he and Frederick tried to buy out Charles from Koch Industries. They failed, and William sold out his shares for $470 million, but believed he was undercut. The 15-year legal battle against his brothers—which included Charles and William cold-shouldering each other at their mother's funeral—ended in 2001 with a settlement. In the meantime, William started his own chemicals company, the Oxbow Group. He also collected art, including model boats and a photo of Billy the Kid, once had to file a lawsuit to evict a lover from one of his condominiums, and got duped by a wine merchant who sold him $5 million worth of fake wines. He's now married, for the third time, to a Rooney, as in the family that owns the Pittsburgh Steelers.
[body_image width='900' height='675' path='images/content-images/2015/02/05/' crop='images/content-images-crops/2015/02/05/' filename='a-brief-guide-to-the-koch-brothers-body-image-1423165082.jpg' id='24988']
Charles Koch. Illustration by Irene Rinaldi
WHAT DO THE KOCH BROTHERS
BELIEVE?
If you were to describe the Koch brothers' political views
in one word, it would be "libertarian." But through their pursuit of power and
influence—especially over the last few years—that easy label has been muddled
somewhat. Because despite their MIT educations, and David's endless fueling of
the arts and science research, the Koch brothers have become the financial
engine that makes the Tea Party go.
Both David and Charles were heavily influenced by Friedrich von Hayek's free-market bible The Road to Serfdom , and further by the work of Robert LeFevre, an advocate for the abolition of government. David ran as the Libertarian Party's vice presidential candidate in 1980, spending $2 million on the campaign. Among the party's goals were the abolition of various federal law enforcement and regulatory agencies, including the CIA, the SEC, and the Department of Energy. The party also wanted to eliminate Social Security, minimum wage laws, gun control laws, and income taxes—positions the Koch brothers still hold, to varying degrees. (On the flip side, they have become less vocal about legalizing prostitution and recreational drugs, which were also included in the party's platform that year.)
The Kochs' money didn't make much of a difference. Libertarian Party candidates received one percent of the vote that year, and David and Charles retreated from conventional politics into special-interest financing efforts. They continue to represent similar political positions, with the addition of advocating for repeal of the Affordable Care Act and trumpeting climate-change denial. The latter position is likely influenced by their business interests: according to UMass-Amherst's Political Economy Research Institute, Koch Industries ranked as the country's 13th-worst air polluter in 2013. And their support of the Tea Party has caused the Kochs to promote efforts against abortion and gay marriage and in favor of interventionism, all positions that the Kochs otherwise claim to oppose.
Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, one of the most liberal members of Congress who has been teasing a run for the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination, gives a pretty good idea of how the far-left feels about the Kochs in a statement on his website: "The agenda of the Koch brothers is to repeal every major piece of legislation that has been signed into law over the past 80 years that has protected the middle class, the elderly, the children, the sick, and the most vulnerable in this country."
HOW MUCH MONEY ARE
THE KOCH BROTHERS SPENDING?
A lot. A lot.
Here's how that $889 million compares to what various key elements spent in
2012, according to data compiled by
the Washington Post and the New York Times:
[body_image width='1000' height='500' path='images/content-images/2015/02/05/' crop='images/content-images-crops/2015/02/05/' filename='a-brief-guide-to-the-koch-brothers-body-image-1423165403.jpg' id='24992']
Graphic by Haisam Hussein
This means that, if spending levels were to hold steady into 2016, the Kochs would spend almost 50 percent more than the RNC and DNC combined and more than each candidate individually.
HOW DOES THE KOCH
NETWORK WORK?
Now this is where it gets tricky. It's notoriously hard to
get a full understanding of the Kochs' network—also known as the Kochtopus—because
they spread their spending across so many different organizations. In 2010, Meyer
wrote, "Tax records indicate that in 2008 the three main Koch family
foundations gave money to thirty-four political and policy organizations, three
of which they founded, and several of which they direct. The Kochs and their
company have given additional millions to political campaigns, advocacy groups,
and lobbyists. ... Only the Kochs know precisely how much they have spent on
politics."
Their network has only grown since then. Tracking the breadth of the Kochs' donations is now a Herculean effort, but Mother Jones compiled a fairly comprehensive list this past fall. The network is highlighted by a few major organizations. Here's the breakdown.
[body_image width='900' height='527' path='images/content-images/2015/02/05/' crop='images/content-images-crops/2015/02/05/' filename='a-brief-guide-to-the-koch-brothers-body-image-1423171145.jpg' id='25022']
Graphic by Haisam Hussein
On the research side, there's the Cato Institute, a libertarian-leaning think tank that the Kochs founded, and the Mercatus Center, a market-oriented research institution housed at George Mason University, each of which has received an estimated $30 million from the Kochs. The brothers have also bankrolled three groups that have played a central role in the Tea Party movement: Americans for Prosperity, which replaced the Kochs' old Citizens for a Sound Economy, and which has received an estimated $60 million from the brothers, as well as FreedomWorks and Freedom Partners.
The money the Kochs plan to spend on the 2016 election will likely be spread through these groups—particularly Americans for Prosperity and Freedom Partners—as well as countless other organizations, including dozens of smaller groups representing special interests. But thanks to campaign-finance laws, it won't even be clear how much of the money comes directly from the Kochs, and how much of it comes from their network of associates and organizations.
Follow Kevin Lincoln on Twitter
25 años de Antena 3: mis fracasos favoritos
Si tenéis más de 20 años, veréis algo la tele, y sabréis que Antena 3 celebra feliz su 25 aniversario. Lógicamente nos recuerda los programas que lideraron en audiencia y que todos recordamos: que si La parodia nacional, que si Un paso adelante… Hasta de Furor presumen los insensatos, un programa especialmente querido en Colombia.

Vamos, lo normal en estos casos: éxitos y éxitos y éxitos, como quieres hacer parecer tú en tu twitter. Menos mal que estamos nosotros para recordar algunos de sus hostiones más sonados. Jojojojo. Y que hostiones. Son TANTOS, TANTOS, Y TAN VARIADOS que hemos tenido que hacer una pequeña criba y escoger, simplemente, lo que nos daba más ascopena. Así que acompañadnos en este desfile de titanics, con buques insignias del canal naufragando y ahogándose en el mar del bochorno. Antonio Hidalgo y Patricia Gaztañaga aún tienen pesadillas con estos shows.
Casi todos los programas de la primera etapa
Año: 1990
Hace mucho, mucho tiempo, existía una emisora de radio llamada de Antena 3, la radio favorita de los españoles. Todos sus locutores eran estrellas y líderes de audiencia: Encarna Sánchez, Antonio Herrero, Carlos Pumares, José María García….
Parecía lógico contar con ellos a la hora de arrancar la aventura televisiva. La expectación era alta, y los resultados decepcionantes. Lo normal cuando Barrionuevo y Pujol dan su bendición en tu primera emision. A los dinámicos presentadores se les veía mayores e incómodos con el medio televisivo: otros no tuvieron la paciencia necesaria para esperar a que todo el país pudiera “disfrutar” de sus espacios. Aún con todos los mitoplastas que dando el coñazo con lo de “la tele de antes sí que molaba”, ni a los del EGB se le ocurre decir que añoran ninguno de estos programas. Si A3 iba a triunfar no sería con su “all star” radiofónico.
Scavengers
Año: 1994
Género: Aventuras mongo-futuristas.
Una espectacular coproducción con otros países, rodada en “magníficos” decorados en los estudios Pinewood y con efectos especiales a cargo de técnicos habituados a trabajar para Hollywood. ¿Quién podía presentar esta propuesta internacional y galvanizante? Bertín Osborne, el David Hasselhoff español. Los concursantes tenían que pasar una especie de ginkana galáctica, guiados por el cantante cantamañanas, que venía de petarlo con Contacto contacto y que aquí estaba más perdido que El Rubius en una biblioteca. El despliegue de medios, tuvo un share decepcionante. En los 90, el rollo Star Wars se la soplaba a tu primo y tu cuñao. Y a ti.

Tres hijos para mí sólo
Año: 1995
Género: sitcom gafe
El canto del cisne de Enrique Pérez Simón, actor y presentador gafe donde los haya. Esto era la típica tontería de un padre soltero que tiene que educar varios niños y tal y tal y tal. Comenzó mal de audiencia, y para colmo, fue objeto de un cruce de denuncias por plagio entre su productora y la de Médico de familia. Emilio Aragón fue declarado inocente y la serie no pasó de tres capítulos, derrotada en tribunales y hogares por igual. Recordad como eran Canguros y Hermanos de leche y os haréis una idea de lo perjudicial que podía ser su visionado: ni el Videodrome del Cronemberg ése.

Dobles Parejas
Año: 1996
Género: concurso parejil
Pasada su época de concursante pero antes de ser el cineasta de más éxito (en taquilla) de nuestro cine, Segura era un friki que daba la lata en los platós de Pepe Navarro o Wyoming. Su presencia era obligada en cualquier suplemento dominical o programa de TV en el que se tratara algún aspecto de la cultura pop. Con este bagaje, Antena 3 le propone presentar un concurso donde un par de parejas se enfrentaba a diversas situaciones, con abundancia de dobles sentidos y bromas “picantes” para que se rieran matrimonios cuarentones de Fuenlabrada. Le colocaron a Raquel Meroño de co-presentadora y hala, a hacer el bobo. Duró cuatro semanas en antena (3), y su existencia parece haber sido borrada de la faz de la tierra. A Santiago se le veía nervioso, pero protagonizó algunas tomaduras de pelo memorables, riéndose en la cara de los fantoches que iban a concursar.

Maldita la hora
Año: 2000
Género: anti-Sardá
Máximo Pradera tenía un muy buen perfil tras varias temporadas en Lo + Plus, un programa bastante odioso pero que había caído en gracia a ese sector tan lerdo que presume de “buen gusto”. A3 no escatimó medios a la hora de promocionar el nuevo espacio, con un concurso para bautizar el espacio incluido. La gente podía votar entre “Max Attax” o el elegido “Maldita la hora”. Ganara quién ganara, nosotros perdíamos. Y Máximo y la cadena, también: Crónicas era intratable en su género, y Sardá le hizo un ayuken en la boca a Pradera. La nómina de invitados sosos y colaboradores odiosos contribuyó al desinterés del público. Victor Manuel y Ana Belén en la primera edición… ¡y LOS CAÑOS en la segunda!
Max no volvió a presentar y tuvo un contencioso legal con el canal. Después se dedicó a sus cosas de música clásica y creo que es más feliz. Un ejemplo claro de “iba a petarlo y le petaron”.
Todos los del desembarco argentino
Años: 2000 / 2001
Género: boludeces de pelotudos
En 2000, la parrilla de A3 daba un vuelco total. En la cadena confiaron productoras argentinas como Cuatro Cabezas o Ideas del sur para adaptar a la TV española formatos que habían triunfado allí. El CQC funcionó bien, a nuestro pesar, y en la cadena estaban tan hundidos que les daba igual 8 que 80. Así, Inma del Moral dejaba El Informal para conducir El Rayo. O “el rollo”, como le decíamos aquí. Antonio Hidalgo probaba suerte con el show de “humor” Showmatch (donde muchos vimos a Flipy por primera vez), y Alonso Caparrós andaba por ahí con Fugitivos en la ciudad.
El resultado de semejante reunión de astros fue sufrir cancelación tras cancelación. Tendría que llegar El bananero y su vídeo de I-Van para que perdonáramos semejante caterva de bodrios a nuestros primos de allende los mares. ¡Tinelli, sos un pelotudo!

Los vigilantes de la tele
Año: 2002
Género: miedo y asco en la tele
No fue el primer programa dedicado íntegramente al zapping. Tampoco el más exitoso. En realidad no tenía nada de memorable: hemos tenido que hacer un esfuerzo titánico para acordarnos de “aquello que salía Ismael Beiro de la tele”. El gaditano afirma en su web que fue “co-presentador” del espacio, junto con Manu Carreño. Otra mentira más, como tantas que le pillamos al ganador de GH1 a lo largo de los años. Beiro era un mero colaborador, bastante poco gracioso una vez apartado de la dinámica de la casa: no vale sólo con ser andaluz, amigos. En todo caso, ¿a quién le importa, si el espacio no pasaba del 9% de las de antes de la TDT? Al paredón con todos.

Estudio de actores
Año: 2002
Género: reality aburrido
Una de las hostias históricas del canal. Siempre a rebufo, volvían a seguir la estela del éxito ajena. Pasó en su día con GH y ahora se repetía la historia con Operación Triunfo. Era el momento de los realities de talento, pero dedicado a la actuación en lugar de a la música. Se encerraba a unos actores y se seguía día a día sus clases y convivencia, mientras preparaban algún numerito. Era, básicamente, un coñazo de campeonato y en general, un tema algo impenetrable para el espectador medio que piensa que “Arturo Valls es un cachondo” y Dani Martín “no lo hace mal”.

Corazón dormido
Año: 2002
Género: WTF TV
2002 fue un año aciago para la cadena, que encadenaba más hostias que Yamcha y Andrómeda juntos. Esto no se escapaba al espectador de a pie: yo mismo le dediqué un artículo hace ya 12 años (!!!!) a sus debacles, y existía hasta una web llamada “Hundamos Antena 3”, para hacer escarnio de las dificultades de la empresa y reírse del poco tirón de cosas como El castillo de las mentes prodigiosas (¡que al menos tuvo una final y un ganador, cuidao!)
Tampoco es que necesitaran ayuda: con productos como Corazón Dormido se lo montaban muy bien ellos solitos en el noble arte del fracasar. Duró una emisión. UNA. Y os lo resumo en una frase: Antonio Hidalgo presentando un programa en el que hipnotizaban gente.
ZACA.

Código Fuego
Año: 2003
Género: serie gremial.
Tras el éxito de series “de profesiones” como Periodistas, Policías o Prostitutas, llegaba el turno de los bomberos. La idea tenía posibilidades: era un entorno original y que daba facilidad para colar escenas de acción en la trama. La productora contó con el beneplácito de la cadena y tiró la casa por la ventana, fichando a dos estrellones del cine español como José Coronado y Maribel Verdú. Claro que al final había poca acción y mucha charla en los habituales e interminables episodios de la ficción española. Y en la tele, la Verdú no se podía desnudar, con lo cual se reducían bastantes sus recursos interpretativos.
Y eso, que si esto está en la lista ya sabéis lo que pasó. A3 promocionó el producto a lo grande y lo retiró, como suele pasar, por la puerta de atrás. Curiosamente, podemos volver a ver la serie en el servicio “a la carta” (odio esta expresión) de Antena 3.
No es programa para viejos
Año: 2008
Género: Debate
Un programa dedicado a los adolescentes, repleto de menciones a redes sociales y hasta con “videobloggers” para dar opiniones, buscando arrastrar a la audiencia juvenil que venía de ver la exitosa Física y química. ¿Y qué mejor que poner a una Patricia Gaztañaga ya cercana a los 50 para presentar tan juvenil espacio?
No es programa… comenzó fuerte, con un debate sobre sexualidad repleto de momentos de vergüenza ajena, muy celebrado en el foro de Putalocura y con apariciones de Haplo Schaffer en su época más televisiva. Salía un amigo mio confesando su virginidad y todo! Incluso a mí me llamaron, aunque era demasiado mayor, por lo que parece. Qué más da: lo vio poca gente y tras su estreno el programa perdió interés y audiencia “a toda mecha” que dirían SJK. En 6 emisiones lo dejaron K.O. y la Garrañaga nunca se recuperó de la hostia.
18, La serie
Año: 2008
Género: culebrón teenage
Al salir de clase mostró el camino y hasta A3 fue capaz de seguirlo bien con Nada es para siempre. El mundo necesitaba soap-operas adolescentes, pero por suerte o por desgracia, 18, la serie no iba a ser la que guiara una nueva oleada. Era lo de siempre: amoríos y puñaladas de jovencitos, con la historia de un grupo de pop-rock como elemento troncal. Algunos dicen que el horario no era el indicado pero nosotros sabemos la realidad de la situación: el contar con aluien llemado DAVID DE GEA como actor. Que vale, que NO es el del Atleti. Pero da igual, ya la relación trae mala suerte.

Por arte de magia
Año: 2014
Género: Ahora lo ves, ahora no.
Antena 3 le dio un show a Anna Simón, cuyo mayor mérito es estar buena. Y no cualquier programa, no… ¡un concurso de magos! Como para ver tetas tenemos internet, pues picamos pocos. El concurso guardó su mejor truco para el último programa: desaparecer sin avisar ni dejar rastro. ¡Bravísimo!
Como decíamos, la lista es interminable: desde Ada Madrina de Carmen Sevilla al Noche, Noche de Emilio Aragón. Podríamos hablar de pléyade de realities olvidados (X Ti, Unan1mous, o el lamentable El Marco, entre otros), o quizá de descalabros recientes como Los viernes al show. En realidad pegar palos a A3 es tan fácil que en la mayoría de listados aparece El Bus como fracaso en audiencia. No lo fue, pero la emisora daba tanta pena que daba esa sensación. Telecinco tendrá lo suyo dentro de poquito, que ya les va tocando el aniversario. Y la existencia de Las bodas de Sálvame no puede caer en el olvido.
10 verdades como puños, por el teniente Frank Drebin ('Agárralo como puedas')
The internet is full of men who hate feminism. Here's what they're like in person.
Some men have always been wretched. It only took the internet to make it obvious.
Women — some women, at least — have always known. For all the sense that we are in a generation finding a new voice, it may be more accurate to say that we are in a generation where an old voice has finally found volume.
Volume brought consequences. Organized intimidation is now fair game for anybody audible to the mob, and everyone is audible online. The most public victims of last year's Gamergate rage — women like Anita Sarkeesian, Zoe Quinn, and Brianna Wu — were not radicals. Very few of the women who have found themselves violently threatened on the internet are. To view Sarkeesian's Feminist Frequency videos after reading accounts of her harassment is to be surprised chiefly by how uncontroversial her analysis feels. She points out that the video game industry caters to men; women, when included, are typically set dressing, as victims of violence or sexual reward. Is any of this truly in doubt? Is any of it more radical than a new voice reciting an old liturgy?
Yet she was harassed as if she'd proposed revolutionary insurrection, and so during the last week of August, Sarkeesian, an ordinary woman with a message so innocuous that a sane world might deem it obvious, was forced to flee from her home.
As it happens I'd spent several nights in August with one of her antagonists. He claims he's not the kind to send explicit threats, and he wasn't involved in Gamergate. He's just a man who takes a dim view of Sarkeesian, he says, and hasn't been afraid to tweet her about it. He doesn't think much of feminism in general, or at least of what he says feminism became once the voting and the jobs and the abortion rights were sorted and the word became a dog whistle for "self-pity and sexism toward men." His name is Max — although it isn't, of course — and he is a men's rights activist. I found him because I wanted to know what these men were like, not on Reddit or on Twitter or on any other forum where they are actively engaged in their cause, but in ordinary life — relaxed, after having a few, and without a keyboard to take it out on.
"I'll make you a bet, hundred dollars," Max tells me the first night we hang out. "If both of us stood up on this table right now and started yelling what we think about feminism, somebody might tell you to shut the fuck up. But they would lynch me."
Men's rights activism has been in the undercurrent of American culture since at least the 1970s and has been largely explicit in its role as a backlash against feminism. The movement has neither a central platform nor any acclimated leaders, but the central themes are consistent: It is men, not women, who are oppressed. Men are required to enter the selective service; women are immune. Men typically lose their children in otherwise equal custody disputes. Men are expected to work dangerous and difficult jobs in construction and agriculture. Beyond these overt disadvantages, they claim more subtle systemic disrespect from a culture increasingly focused on what they take to be feminine values, from emotional expressiveness to total sexual and reproductive liberation. When they vary, it is in extremity, with some merely decrying the "anti-male" attitude of feminism and others seeking, for example, to reverse the criminalization of marital rape.
When I met him, Max lived in the River North neighborhood of Chicago. River North is — at 70 percent white in a city where the white population is 32 percent and declining — one of the few places one can live in the Chicago where it is still possible to avoid even a vague awareness of the city's racial and cultural dynamics. I found Max on Reddit, on a forum largely devoted to making fun of teenage leftists on Tumblr. It was only good luck that he lived in my city and was willing to talk.
In the popular imagination, men's rights activists are "neckbeards": morbidly obese basement dwellers with a suspect affection for My Little Pony. But Max is remarkably unassuming in appearance, handsome enough and normally tall; equally imaginable in board shorts and a snapback as he is in the sort of graduation suit one wears to a first post-collegiate interview downtown. He was raised in St. Louis, one of two children. (He has a brother, younger: "He goes to school in Seattle. Kind of a hippie.") His parents are alive and married. Before Max was born, his father was a unionized carpenter in Newark, New Jersey, part of a long line of the same until the 1980s came around and Max Sr. followed the dawn of management consultancy into a white-collar job and the Midwest suburbs. When Max came to Chicago in 2006, it was for college ("not the first in my family to go to college but the first to go at the normal time" — that is, at age 18). Four years after graduating, he has a solid entry-level job at an area financial institution. "Plenty of women work there," he offers in the middle of a preliminary biographical rundown. "They're getting paid the same as me." We had not yet begun discussing politics.
Max fits in with the crowd at the faux-Mexican bar where we spend several nights in August. Eight-dollar tequila shots; polo shirts tucked in or dress shirts tucked out of pre-faded jeans; groups of guests emitting an oscillating screech from every booth. "This is just, like, my neighborhood place," he tells me the first time we walk in the door. Not the kind of spot he'd "hit up" on a Friday, or where he'd look for what he insists on calling "action."
"These girls here are a little ... eh," he said. "Could be fun. Definitely annoying." (Distinguishing them from the similarly well-highlighted, halter-topped women he shows me on Facebook as examples of what he's "into" requires some capacity for discernment I do not possess.)
He has a different-colored polo on all three nights I see him.
Max was not a member of Gamergate proper. This isn't terribly uncommon: Men's rights activists exist who disdain that particular episode, if not for its virulence then for its celebration of men who prefer Dungeons and Dragons to Monday Night Football. Similarly, there are Gamergate activists who remain stubbornly committed to the idea that they are ethicists of video game journalism, wholly detached from "men" as a generalized political class. But these vagaries — the specific grievances of Gamergate, the sort of person who self-applies "MRA" versus the sort who prefers some other acronym — are merely symptoms of a broader male sense of victimhood. It is this victim complex I intend to tell you about, not the particular schisms between reactionaries. I am interested in the style of man who makes all such factions explicable. The kind who has in these last decades felt the theoretical foundation of his inherited supremacy begin to crumble and gone into defensive crouch, lashing out at every grain of sand that shifts beneath his feet.
Some section of men have always jealously guarded their privilege, but we are for the first time seeing what happens when that same section begins to lose the assumption of its divine right. It isn't that they're monsters. Max is this kind of man, and he is not some fountain of malevolence. He is the mildest kind. I spent August with a well-adjusted man in a polo shirt who would never think to hurt someone except in self-defense, but he comes from a pot where new anger is boiling. And at least one of the bubbles so far was named Elliott Oliver Rodger, the 22-year-old man who went on a shooting spree last year near the University of California Santa Barbara — an act he said was the result of being rejected by women.
"I'm not one of those guys who's obsessed," Max tells me on our first night together. "Like, yeah, I comment on articles. I'm on Reddit — which, by the way ... it's not, like, a hub for MRAs or anything. There are plenty of feminists on there — but I do that and I tweet and stuff. But only a few hours a week max, and most of it is just reading the news."
He says this, I think, to distinguish between himself and the common, not-altogether-inaccurate conception of men's rights activists as sexually frustrated loners with too much time on their hands. But the caveat comes with some regret, as though Max wishes he were more involved in fighting the good fight. "Like, I didn't go to that big men's rights conference earlier this summer, but ..." The thought is interrupted by the arrival of his enchiladas, a subsequent discussion of our waitress's outfit, and some thoughts on "the market forces" and "basic social realities" behind it that he thinks I might be interested in.
(She is wearing what I can only describe as a perfectly ordinary outfit for a waitress: white blouse, black jacket, black pants. Max has a more elaborate take: "It's like halfway between modest and revealing. Adjust for social morals and it's, like, Victorian. She wants dignity. She wants to be chased. Same time. And fine, that's how it's always been, but I bet she'd say, ‘I didn't wear this for you!' Like: yes you did. Not because she wants to sleep with me. It's to get tips. But when you go out later, it's to attract a guy. And there's nothing wrong with that, you know?")
The discussion is not terribly dissimilar from or any less agreeable than one between any two men at any bar like this bar, except that Max is a new kind of reactionary (and I know this) and I am a lefty feminist writer who takes a dim view of his politics (and Max knows this as well). I'm not surprised to learn that those politics took shape in high school.
"When I was, like, 10 or whatever I'm sure I would've said I was a feminist if I'd known the word," Max says. "My mom says she's a feminist. And I guess in the way my mom means it, I still am. But she doesn't know how it is now. For her, feminism means ‘everybody is equal,' but if you said that now, these social justice warriors on Tumblr would call you a sexist and garbage and tell you to die. But I didn't realize that at first. I thought feminist meant ‘women should be able to vote and have jobs,' which I'm obviously cool with."
Max says he wasn't terribly unpopular in high school, but read more than was socially viable — most of it on the computer. ("No girlfriend," he says. "What else are you going to do when you're 15?") Contemporary social media didn't exist in the way-back of 2002, so Max spent his time on forums dedicated to a single topic or else loading the full homepages of magazines in lieu of direct links to stories. "People our age are lucky we got that," he says. "I think it helped us learn to seek out information on our own and not just ‘like' what's popular." (Max is 28.)
Max became interested in the usual gateway drugs of men's issues: paternity rights, the selective service, requirements that mothers sue for child support before seeking state assistance. The term "men's rights activist" wasn't one he encountered in those days; he still says he prefers thinking of himself as a "humanist."
"Putting ‘men' right in the name is a deliberate response to feminism, I think. Because feminists claim to be about everybody, but really they're about women first. So [the MRA name] is kind of trolling them, I guess."
I ask him if it's such a bad thing for feminism to be primarily concerned with the interests of women. "Maybe a hundred years ago," he says, "But, like, in 2014? Women have all kinds of advantages that men don't."
Such as?
"I just don't like this us versus them."
This, Max says, is why he has been a capital-letters MRA since at least 2010. But he is aware of the broad brush he's self-applying, and there are several things he's quick to say he isn't. He is not a Pick-Up Artist, he says. He is not a Red Piller. He is not a "Man Going His Own Way." These distinctions are important within the labyrinthine network of reactionary masculinity movements, and confusing one with another is as easy and potentially treacherous as similar conflations between factions of the left. I don't imagine tribalism pays much mind to politics. It's only that when Max closes his laptop he reenters the world heir to every privilege the nation can afford. The variously maligned social justice activists he makes fun of on /r/TumblrInAction have no such refuge.
There are some other things Max is proud to be. He is an outspoken atheist and an active libertarian. The contours are the same: a proactive anticlericalism and a distaste for regulatory apparatus couched in a vague sense that this distaste constitutes a moral stance.
This trinity is not uncommon. A survey taken last year of the Men's Rights subreddit found that 94 percent of their membership identified as "atheist" or "religiously indifferent." Another, broader study of the men's rights movement on Reddit found that 84 percent identified as "strongly conservative," with particular policy preferences along a libertarian, not traditional, bent. For those of us hailing from the nominal left, these associations have at times felt unnatural: right-wingers using the rhetoric of social justice to argue for the traditional status of men, all the while eschewing, in a way more typical of the left, the patriarchal religious institutions that have classically underpinned these values. When Max speaks about one ideology, he can hardly help bringing in the others; for him, they are all related, distinct expressions of the same worldview.
On our first night I ask him if there was ever a God in his life. We have ventured at last into a deliberate political conversation. "This is God right here," he says after slamming down a shot of Fireball.
He is surprised that I want to discuss religion and politics, but not disappointed. He seems eager to get into these subjects.
"I think religion is probably one of the biggest threats to society," Max says. "I think feminism and statism and all of that — it's not explicitly about God, but it's definitely the same religious impulse, you know?"
For Max, religion is something of a starter pack for a lifelong indoctrination into Big Lies. "I know it isn't realistic or anything, but I think if we got rid of religion, that whole kind of way of thinking about things, where you just subscribe to what you're told, where you believe these ridiculous statistics about women or in stuff like the wage gap." (Max has a very long explanation of the "wage gap myth," one that seems cobbled together from multiple readings of a few different blog posts.)
"I just think [the willingness to believe anything] starts when you're a kid with Jesus, and it sets you up to be that way your whole life about everything. When I was a kid I would have called it ‘conformist,' but that sounds kind of lame, right? But that idea."
He orders us another round and continues on with what has become a familiar line from men's rights activists (or "new atheists" or libertarians): the explicit claim that they are the last remaining purveyors of reason. "They just won't use logic"; "I'm just arguing logically"; "I'm only interested in evidence": You can't scroll down a comment section without flashing past a few of these, and they are tribal markers, not real claims. "I mean, it's ridiculous that these people go on about how I have so much power because I'm a white dude," Max continues. "Like, Americans would rather elect a gay Muslim philanderer president than an atheist. Libertarians are treated like a joke. If you think people are mean to feminists on Twitter, you should see the stuff people say about MRAs. Or just, like, you know, 'Die, white-cis-scum, die.'"
He laughs, but it feels deliberate. Otherwise he might sound like he was getting worked up.
After a pause: "Like, if I'm 'privileged,' I'm privileged to have had parents who encouraged me to think for myself." Max says this in a tone more serious than his usual dorm-room bull session affect. But the smile comes back quickly: "I guess I'm oh-so-oppressed then, huh?"
For all his derision toward the "professional victimhood" of feminists, there's something a little less than sarcastic in Max's own sense of oppression. Hard-pressed as the social justice left is to admit any advantage, the West these last decades has seen the rhetorical value of victimized stance. The irresistible cudgel of "I am oppressed and this is my experience and you cannot speak to it because you do not know" is valid enough, of course, especially in those cases where ordinary enculturation does not provide natural empathy toward some suspect class. But it is a seductive cudgel, too, especially alluring when it can be claimed without any of the lived experience that makes marginalization a lonely-making sort of suffering. American Christians are "persecuted" now; men are the ones being "squelched" by feminism; white Americans are the victims of "reverse racism." The "victim card" is a child of the '70s, and 40 years out, who wouldn't use it, no matter how disconnected from reality? We are typically aghast when reactionaries accuse the maligned of perniciously employing this rhetorical immunity, but they are not wrong to see how the trick might be exploited. The irony is only that they know this possibility in virtue of their own projection.
For all Max's talk of equal opportunity ("It isn't the same as equality of outcome!" he quotes), for all his dismissal of those who blame institutional inhibitors of happiness ("Structural oppression might as well be Jesus. He's there! You just can't see it! But trust me! I'm a priest of Tumblr and we can see it, you stupid heathens!"), for all his casual derision toward the very notion of groups who might be justified in feeling that the world was not made for them, he is entirely possessed by the idea that it is men like him who bear the true brunt of society's hatred and that it is they, not the feminists or the statists or the faithful, who see the true extent of this structural injustice.
For Max, it is all a crusade. The struggle against the church, the state, the women. It is a battle about genuine issues: issues maligned by a majority too easily beholden to the prevailing taste consensus. The stakes are high and immediate, persuasion by comment section possible and, moreover, important because the trouble with most people is that they "haven't really thought about it for two seconds." The whole trinity flows from this sense of displacement. Libertarianism follows from recognizing of a colluding party system within a power-hungry state too quick to shut down big questions. Men's rights activism follows from the bizarre misapprehension (fueled by a disconnect between the opinions of visible intellectuals and the average populace) that feminism has reached suffocating heights of power. He is a rebel with one cause in three bodies, and the pushback — from friends, from me, from the nation's opinion apparatus itself — only therefore fuels his indignation toward a society too willing to neglect inconvenient truths about the world.
In activist circles of any kind, it is common to hear that injustice is a kind of sight that cannot be unseen. All of it seemed so hyperbolic until I started noticing it. Now I notice it in everything. The "it" is typically some kind of institutional bias: the ways in which women are routinely encouraged to defer to male judgment; the way in which race, without overt malice, permeates even simple American interactions. Before, we were post-gender and post-racial, without need of an Equal Rights Amendment, on track toward total marriage equality. Then you hear something, or live it, or read it, or see. The world today is now more like history, and the motives of the people in it are more suspect than before.
Reviewing my notes from my first night speaking with Max, I become more confident that his life is some strange inversion of the same epiphany. One day, he is comfortable as a man and comfortable with what masculinity means in the world. The next, he can see behind the veil, and all that goes away. Social justice through a mirror, darkly: Men are the ones subject to genuine oppression, the ones whose issues are taken as uninteresting and unimportant. They are the ones taking terrible jobs and being drafted; committing suicide at incredible rates; losing their children, their spouses, and their homes while nobody else seems to care; shouting in the wilderness while a feminist majority squelches their dissent.
I am not the first to notice this. Last year, John Herrman noticed the same inversion in the Awl. "A great number of men, online and off, understand feminism as aggression," he said, "They feel as though the perception of their actions as threats is itself a threat. In other words, they too believe that unsolicited public attention is inherently aggressive, but only when that attention takes the form of criticism, and only when it comes from women. They live this belief on the streets, where they are nearly unaccountable, and argue it online, where they are totally accountable."
Looking at my notebook, one observation, underlined at the time, stands out: "Max says he needs online MRA communities because on normal internet, he gets shouted down and talked over." A different kind of activist might call that a safe space.
If men's rights activism has a Gloria Steinem, a kind of central activist figurehead, it is Paul Elam, the founder and publisher of A Voice for Men. The website is one of the oldest and, if there is such a thing, most respected hubs for MRA activity. Elam and his staff do, at the very least, engage in genuine advocacy on behalf of men. Moreover, they don't typically stray past boorishness and into outright campaigns of harassment, although I cannot help feeling myopic in citing this fact as some kind of high water mark amongst the MRA set. I send him an email, and he writes back quickly. We arrange a call.
Like Max, Elam sees his issues as a crusade, his atheism as important, his politics as moral in their antisocialism. He was a substance abuse counselor by trade. It was in this context that he began to see. He remembers the first time, working for a men's treatment facility in Houston, waiting in the hall with an invited speaker, a woman about to go in and address the clientele.
"I was standing outside the group room and we were waiting for her to go in, just chatting for a moment about our work," he says, "And just before going into the group, which she was being paid quite a bit of money to do, she says, 'One of my favorite things in the world is to take men's macho bullshit and shove it down their throats.' I saw a lot of this in the treatment field," Elam says, "It's just she said it in such a particularly stark and direct way. At that point I thought, Something needs to be done about this."
The trouble continued. "I went to the administration about that particular incident," Elam explains. "And everyone who worked at that facility looked at me like I was nuts and said, 'What's the problem?' That's how pervasive this issue is."
Elam could see the truth. Nobody else could see. While the issues of paternity rights and the destruction of the family would come later, Elam's transition from counselor to pseudo-civil rights hero grew naturally out of his prior life.
He recites a litany of charges against modern psychotherapy, its anti-masculine focus on effusively articulated feelings. If one dismisses for a moment the bizarre unreality of men subject to brutal gendered discrimination, it doesn't sound terribly different, in sense or scope of conspiracy, than the complaints of feminist academics so often mocked by men of Elam's kind.
"If you want to bet that this woman identified as a feminist, I can tell you for a fact that she did, and she wasn't the only one who talked that way in that field.
"I do think that is abusive," he tells me, "when you send the message to your clients that they are either failing or succeeding based on your expectations of a stereotype." Through a mirror darkly: Elam says it is his group, not organized feminism, that is earnestly engaged in destroying traditional gender roles. It reminds me of a Pascal aphorism from the Pensées: "How is it that a lame man does not annoy us while a lame mind does? Because a lame man recognizes that we are walking straight, while a lame mind says that it is we who are limping."
Elam isn't without his objectivity. Unlike Max, he knows, for example, that his position is a rare one. Elam is not convinced that most people (normal people; the women in his office, if there were women in his office) take his crusades as common sense and only don't say so out of fear. His manner gives rise to a suspicion that he has been lonely a long time, not in the literal way, but self-consciously stranded in a shrinking section of the world. He is committed in part to his work because if more ground is lost, he will be lonelier still. If more ground is lost, there may not be room at all. Men are suffering, he says. He is suffering, but he doesn't say that outright.
All of it breeds a certain paranoia, one I encountered in all the men I spoke to. A feeling likely justified by the ordinary reaction to men's rights activism, that outsiders, especially outsiders writing for mainstream publications, are not to be trusted. That they agreed to speak to me at all remains surprising, especially in Max's case: He is friendly, willing to sit down, but insistent that his identity be protected. He seems, like so many zealots, to believe at once that he is righteous and vital and also that speaking out under his own name will bring unsavory consequences beyond his willingness to suffer.
At one point during our conversation, Elam says: "I'm just going to be frank with you, I've been through countless interviews with the media." As a result, he says, he understands why I need to ask him questions from a "mainstream" (read: feminist) sensibility, but "in a society that when we even try to talk about the issues, people are screaming bloody hell, trying to shut us down, calling us hatemongers and everything else, trying to silence us — that seems to me to be a very skewed point of view from which to be questioned." Despite this, he is nothing but polite. Indeed, none of the men I spoke to about these issues are anything but friendly, almost eager to persuade. I suspect that this is because I am, despite everything, a straight white man. To Elam, and to Max, I am a heretic, but I am not an infidel. I can still be saved.
I see Max again a few nights after our first meeting. I relate some of my conversation with Elam, and Max is quick to echo his bafflement. "I mean, people keep saying we're full of hate. We're just these angry, hateful dudes, you know? Like, we can't get laid, we hate women, all of that. And we come back with statistics, like rational argument, like an actual debate and are like, ‘No, listen, here's this and this and this with men' and here's, like, the logical fallacy in your argument, and they just call you, like, a cis-het shitlord and move on."
There's a temptation, brought on by the claustrophobia of extended conversation, a bit by empathy, and a bit by drink, to be taken in by the spirit of the argument. Men face certain social difficulties idiosyncratic to our sex, and while they are not systemic in the way that women's issues are, nor half so severe, I find it easy to sympathize with Max's frustration. In the bar, insulated as we are, when he begins talking about "just wanting human rights," I can only see his face, hear the exasperation in his voice, connect, instinctively, to that face and voice in part because they are well-mannered and in part because they are like my own. In that moment I can, if I like, forget that these issues, legitimate enough on their face, are carried out from a place of one-upmanship, that their expressions, except in rare cases, are solely as debating points, hurled between invective and harassment and the oldest hack tropes about women's bodies and choices. I can forget those things, if I like. I'm only a heretic.
A presentation at last summer's International Conference on Men's Issues. (Fabrizio Costantini/For The Washington Post via Getty Images)
"I know this is like, almost a Fox News cliché way of saying it, but feminism and a lot of this stuff has been, like, a fundamental transformation of American society. We can't even see how far it's gone yet," he says. "I just think it's important to be wary of that and point out when you think things are getting too far from the truth."
He is almost starry-eyed while saying it, his voice quieter, slightly higher. Sincerity isn't quite the word so much as it's performance. Max knows how to tone the romantic's innermost profundity. Perhaps he doesn't do it consciously, but he's stealing from the movies all the same. At once ideological, forceful to the point of edgy outsider charm, and eminently reasonable, asking only for a consensus over what any fool can see. It isn't surprising that this seduces so many young men.
It's all terribly reasonable, until it isn't. This night corresponds with a particularly bad episode of police misconduct in Ferguson, and at some point we stop talking about the plight of men to watch a news live stream on my phone. Max's reaction is immediate: "This is crazy," he says a few times. "It's police brutality. I know people who say this isn't about race, but I don't get it. Like, this is obvious racism." A promising sign, but then, after a minute, "Man, feminists wish the cops treated them like this. Then they'd actually be oppressed." There's always another shoe with Max.
"Okay," I say about halfway through our second night. "Let's pretend for a minute that I take all of your issues seriously." ("How good an actor are you?" he interrupts, laughing.) "Let's say I believe men are maligned, women are taking advantage of them and profiting from it. And I believe all of this and I come to you, a men's rights activist, and say I want to get involved and help. Shouldn't I be concerned that a lot of people on your side don't seem to be doing legal or political work so much as sending death threats?"
No, Max says. The extreme behavior is mainstream in feminism these days, not in the men's rights movement. Elam claims much the same thing. Speaking about the men's rights conference he organized last summer, he explains, "Feminist activists have come out and pulled fire alarms, harassed attendees, interrupted and protested. When we had a conference on men's issues in Detroit, there was a demonstration, pressure on the hotel to shut us down. We eventually had to change venues. How much of what is really going on are you paying attention to, sir?"
Max never asks me that question outright, but I can hear it, minus the "sir," beneath a lot of what he says. I ask about the harassment of feminists — of women in general, on the street, in their homes, by classmates and strangers. How much is he paying attention to, for that matter? He shrugs it off. "I don't really see any of that stuff," he says. "I mean, I'm sure it happens? But it's not, like, organized, anyway. Guys catcalling don't have meetings to plan it."
(Years ago I was standing on a metro platform with a woman I knew. It was around 3 in the morning; we'd walked a mile to our train. She says it's the first time she's gone that stretch of road without being catcalled. I ask why. The answer is obvious. She says most men won't do it if the woman looks like she's with her owner.)
Other headlines coincide with our time together. James Foley is beheaded by ISIS; the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas breaks down. Max blames both on religious extremism and says he can't understand why "the good Muslims" don't denounce terrorism.
Extreme behavior is a sore spot for any movement, and nobody is more forgivable than one's own. Max concedes that some MRAs and associated activists go too far. "Some people doxx feminists and call their houses," he tells me. "That isn't cool. You can criticize these people, you can try to debate them, but threats are way out there."
So does he denounce the violent elements on any of his forums? He has tweeted unkind things to feminists. Does that encourage the ones who cross the line?
"What's the point?" Max asks. "I mean, it's only a couple guys, really. It's super fringe. They're not going to stop just because I say so." He fiddles with his burger. "You just have to develop a thick skin and try to ignore it. The feminists. Me. All of us. You know? Just ignore the crazy shit."
Near the end of our call, Elam had this to say: "Of course there's anger out there. I've never seen a social movement, including women's liberation, the black civil rights movement, gay rights, that did not involve some anger. So this whole idea that oh my god they're angry is rooted in the very misandry and the very bigotry that we're trying to address."
Perhaps Elam is simply more self-aware than Max is, but it is difficult to hear them talk this way and maintain credulity. It all sounds a little I'm maligned, and I'm oppressed, and society is too backward for the revolution I'm bringing, but I don't say so.
I ask Max if he has a girlfriend. Yes, he says, that they've been seeing each other a few months.
A couple of weeks go by. Vague plans had kept Max busy on the weekends; I've traveled out of town to report another story. It is September now, and we are sitting in Max's apartment.
His having a girlfriend is curious. Earlier in the evening, Max had told me (or rather had paraphrased, perhaps unconsciously, from a dozen articles and frat house bull sessions) that the base tragedy of feminism was the transformation of American women. Their entitlement. Their schizophrenic affect toward the dominance of men. Even the ones who are not feminists have been spoiled by the culture. Like "male allies" in the eyes of internet feminists, ostensibly uncorrupted women are valuable but often suspect.
At any rate, he likes this girl. She might be "marriage material," he says.
"Are you surprised?" he asks.
"By what?"
"That I have a girlfriend."
"No." I look out the window and consider that the view of the skyline alone might be worth a night in bed with a proverbial can of paint.
"Yes you are. Come on. You don't think women could possibly respect themselves and want to be with some evil sexist pig like me."
He is teasing me. Joviality is one of Max's preferred diffusion tactics. Taking on a deliberately inflated voice when directly addressing our differences is designed to produce an effect whereby we might wink at one another: We are both metacognizant, we both know the clichés about the other side. It isn't entirely ineffective. Max is naturally charismatic, and I am not surprised he has a girlfriend, only that he wants one. He looks down at his phone and smiles. Something on Twitter. He types. I wonder what kind of charisma he's employing there.
"I thought American women were all ruined," I say.
"Not all of them. You know what I mean. Just a lot. And you can never know. So it's hard to trust or invest in anybody long enough to find out."
"This girl isn't a feminist, though, I assume?"
"No. That you can see a mile away."
"So she's more traditional?"
"No. I'm not, like, looking for a housewife."
That Max is not seeking a 1950s fantasy is important to him. He asks me to say so explicitly.
"She's just cool," he tells me. "She doesn't have time for that social justice warrior stuff. She's in law school."
He shows me a picture. I'm not much for intuiting whole personalities from photographs, but I agree she has a look, an irrepressible appearance of sincerity without the usual attendant inexperience. She's capable. It's in her brow line, somehow.
Before meeting with Max for the third time, I'd placed another call to a more public face of men's empowerment. This time it was to Daryush Valizadeh, a writer popularly known as "Roosh V." He made his name as a Pick-Up Artist, one of the professional sort, a peddler of the best underhanded "one weird trick"s for seducing any woman. He is the author of more than a dozen self-published books, each of which offers tips for picking up the women in a country he has visited (the best way to exploit the insecurities of Poles evidently diverges at a book's length from the ideal manipulation of Norwegians).
Roosh is the owner of a website as well: Return of Kings, with the tagline "For Masculine Men." What dignity Elam's A Voice for Men retained does not interest Kings; this is a site that revels in its aggression. Looking late last year, without venturing past the first page, I found the following headlines: "Street Harassment Is a Myth Invented by Socially Retarded White Women"; "Twitter is Partnering with SJWs to Prevent Women from Facing Consequences"; "5 Lines That Potential Wives Cannot Cross." (I am particularly haunted by number five: You have left your old family and joined mine.) This is not a men's rights magazine but something more pure: an expression of rage, admittedly proudly, against the prevailing tide of feminism.
"I think there are two problems going on right now," Roosh told me. "First: If you're a man, society has no role for you except ‘listen to what women want.' Second, related, is that culture is telling men to hate themselves."
Of the three men I talk to, Roosh is by far the most charming. He has none of Elam's middle-aged weariness, nor the irregular intensity of cadence that makes one think of sandwich board prophets. What Max possesses in natural charisma, Roosh has given a practiced sophistication. He is funny and acutely aware that this goes much further in building rapport with a potentially hostile journalist than Elam's bitter complaining about "countless interviews" gone wrong ever could.
Roosh's story is typical for the movement. He sees a culture laid to waste by contemporary values, by feminism and the left. The decline is existential, robbing not only men but women of purpose and therefore happiness.
"There was a study. It said that women are less happy now than at any other time," he says. (He's referring to "The Paradox of Declining Female Happiness," an influential 2009 paper published in the American Economic Journal.)
"This was based on surveys; I don't know how accurate it is. But you see women who are addicted to their phones. They're having to work in a job that, let's be honest, is a glorified way to push paper. Do they feel happy? Do they seem happy?"
I suggest that happiness is fungible and that paper pushing may be a genderless misery.
"Are you telling me that a woman now is actually happier working for a boss in a corporate office who can fire her just because the quarterly report was bad, more so than serving her husband in a comfortable home?" he says. "I don't buy it. I just don't buy that women or anyone is amazingly happy because they can buy a new iPhone every year. If we define happiness by being a consumer zombie, then yes, maybe that's right. But anyone who has chased that knows there's no gold at the end of that rainbow."
He doesn't make a bad sophomore-year Marxist, Roosh.
I repeat this sentiment to Max at his apartment. He says it sounds a little "lefty," but he gets the drift. "Yeah, sure," he tells me, "but, like, people are adults. They can make their own choices about what to buy." (Max and I have this conversation while playing his new Xbox. He points out after about an hour that he has only put out games specifically criticized by Anita Sarkeesian).
"I thought Roosh V. was more of a pick-up, screw-the-family, get-laid sort of dude," Max says.
As did I.
For all his writing about how to sleep with multiple women, Roosh says it would be better the old way. The way where men had one partner and women had one partner. But, he adds, "It's easy to look back into the past and extract the best things that they did, and hope and wish that we had that. Of course, as humankind marches on, we can never pick and choose. So I'm thinking, what is the best deal that a man can do where he doesn't get screwed, where he doesn't have his life ruined, where he doesn't get imprisoned for something like a false rape accusation?"
In Roosh V.'s ideal world, there would be no need for men like Roosh. He claims no deep biological imperative beneath his seduction tactics. Only a culture falling apart in the West, marriages dying as women are no longer beholden to the pillars of its stability. Hooking up, going out, getting laid: These are just distractions, perhaps the best distractions still available, and Roosh fancies himself pragmatic.
I hang up the phone thinking this is all a bit more fatalistic than I'd thought.
Relating this all to Max in his apartment, I wonder what his girlfriend thinks of all of this.
"Do you talk to her about your views?" I ask.
"Uh. Not as such," he says. This is a peculiar construction for anyone, especially for someone with Max's instinct for putting others at ease.
"Are you afraid to?"
"No," he says, "No, of course not."
In the elevator a moment later: "I mean, don't get me wrong, she knows where I stand."
In June of last year, Time's Jessica Roy attended the first annual men's rights conference outside Detroit, a conference Elam was central in organizing. Among the litany of predictable observations — the destructive politics, the hostility and rage, the incomprehensible self-pity — Roy reported encountering a feeling she did not anticipate.
"What I didn't expect," she writes, "was how it would make me feel: sad and angry and helpless and determined, all at the same time. Moreover, I didn't expect to talk to so many men in genuine need of a movement that supports them, a movement that looks completely different from the one that had fomented online and was stoked by many who spoke at this three-day conference."
When Max and I were children, we would have looked the same. Middle-class, semi-suburban, precocious, with stable families and access to college-prep education. We might have had similar opinions too. Max comes from a family of nominal Democrats; he was one himself to the extent a child can be, and still is to the extent that he voted for President Obama in 2008 before switching to Gary Johnson in 2012. We aren't so different now, really — except in our work, our politics, our culture, and our fundamental outlook. This occurs to me on our first night together. When did the divergence begin? It is a question I have asked before, of high school classmates now married, of old friends, of a teenage drug dealer I knew who by 19 had been declared technically dead on three separate occasions.
So what happened? Social media came, perhaps. Max sees our age cohort as the last without all its information curated by Facebook or Twitter. This is true, but because of this we were also the last insulated, without conscious effort, from the inevitable exposure to marginalized voices brought by social media. Talk to high school students now: they've heard critical theory about gender and society and race that many of us even slightly older did not hear until the world made us. They accept it as obvious, not revolutionary. The difference between Max and me is whether we take this to be a bad thing. We were different: Max and I were both adults or nearly so before it became clear that we were living in a time when no matter how we felt about it, the theoretical foundation of our privilege was, if not nearly crumbling, at least suspect even to the mainstream.
Normative male dominance is a legacy best disposed of, but that does not mean it is not the norm, or that its loss, especially to those raised to expect its constant comfort, is not a precious and frightening possibility. For some, even little tremors are enough to set you on uncertain footing. Some stumbling men get angry, even when they've got a girlfriend, a finance job, and a million-dollar view of River North. They turn to the crusade. They cast themselves the victims. This should not surprise us. Some men, some small but loud and dangerous number, will become violent by instinct, threatened by any rustling in the trees.
Out with the bad, but Roy puts a finger on the absence: What good will come in after it? What kind of movement will support kings reduced suddenly to paupers? This is not our first concern, of course. It's not something that lends itself to sympathy or pity, but it should provoke some empathy.
At one point in our conversation, Roosh pauses for a minute, then says this: "When you teach men to hate themselves without giving them a role model, without giving them a masculine idea of who to be ... how can we be surprised that men are just lost? They are completely lost right now, and no one is doing anything to solve this problem."
Months after my last encounter with Max, I was in a bar in Chicago explaining this story to a friend. Gamergate had escalated. Sarkeesian had just appeared on the Colbert Report. "So is this guy Max one of these people making bomb threats?" my friend asks. I don't think so, I say, but I don't know. He was nice to me, but...
I decided to call. I walk outside and reach him; by the sound from the other line, he, too, is at a bar somewhere. He says hold on to somebody beside him, and a moment later is outside, too, on some other street in some similar part of the city.
He says no, he's cut it out with tweeting angrily at feminists. It's gone too far, he says. He likes debate, and maybe when things calm down he'll get back into it. Are you afraid of how this is all making your movement look? I ask. He says no: These guys are weird video game nerds anyway, they're just upset, they aren't fighting for a real cause beyond their own hurt feelings.
I ask if he feels bad about acting out in the past. If he regrets anything he said to anyone online, if he thinks he is part of the reason that ordinary women have been fleeing from their homes.
"I don't know," he tells me. "I don't feel great about it. Seriously, dude, I was thinking about when we were hanging out, and I don't think it's the best way to persuade people, on social media and stuff, you know?"
Sure. Then why did he do it at all?
"I don't know, man. You know. It's all so quick. You see something and it bothers you and you feel annoyed and, like, without thinking about it, you just, like, lash out a bit. Shitty Facebook comment or tweet or whatever. We've all been there. You're, like, right then, pissed or whatever. It's just an in-the-moment thing. You feel bad about it the next day."
"You do?"
"Sure."
"Do you apologize?"
"For being critical? No, I mean, they were still wrong."
Emmett Rensin is the deputy editor of Vox First Person.
First Person is Vox's home for compelling, provocative narrative essays. Do you have a story to share? Read our submission guidelines, and pitch us at firstperson@vox.com.
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Now that I have your attention, any of the german ghettoers knows of any job offerings??
Pascal Comelade + Les Limiñanas – Traité de guitarres triolectiques (2015)
Pascal Comelade is a multi-instrumentalist who released more than 26 albums in his career. After great collaborations with Robert Wyatt, PJ Harvey, Bob Wilson, Faust, and Jeanne Moreau, Comelade is surprising us once again. He teams up with his the successful band that comes from Perpignan just like him: the French duo acclaimed by the Californian rock scene, Les Liminanas. It’s been noted that their are traces of Serge Gainsbourg, Beck, Stereolab, Gospel, Yeh-Yeh, guitar fuzz freakouts, and Nugget’s-era stompers in the Limiñanas music. The band’s fusion of traditional French “ye ye” stylings with the cigarette-smoking cool of the New York underground of the late-’60s has dazzled listeners since it’s inception making the live unit the toast of concert stages worldwide.
320 kbps | 102 MB UL | HF | MC ** FLAC
01. Stella Star (2:33)
02. Carnival of souls (3:23)
03. The Nothing-Twist (1:53)
04. (They Call Me) Black Sabata (3:49)
05. You’re Never Alone with a Schizo (3:47)
06. Why Are We Sleeping (2:47)
07. El Vici Birra-Crucis (2:25)
08. Green Fuz (3:17)
09. T.B. JerK +++ (3:08)
10. Wunderbar (0:43)
11. A Wall of Perrukes (2:39)
12. One of us, One of us, One of us… (2:20)
13. Dick Dale n’était pas de Bompas (2:59)
14. Ramblin’ Rose (2:13)
15. Yesterday Man (2:19)
16. I’m Dead (3:24)
Menús para tódolos petos
Ola Pincha(e)Disqueiros! Hoxe quixera tratar un tema que a priori parece complexo pero certamente non o é.
O prezo é un factor relevante a hora de ir comer fóra? Pois claro que si! (A min polo menos non me cabe a menor dúbida) Dicíavos que o tema “parece complexo” porque habitualmente leo moitos blogues e críticas gastronómicas de todo tipo e moitas veces a descrición dos pratos e do local é exquisita pero falta o prezo. Para mín (non sei se para vós igual) pérdeme toda a gracia o que lin… Máis que nada porque non sei se podo permitirme ter esa experiencia e porque non sei se a relación calidade/prezo foi óptima.
Dito o anterior, quero deixarvos unha relación de locais con menú e o seu prezo, desde o máis baixo ata o máis alto para que todos teñamos opción a saír a comer fóra sabendo de antemán o que imos gastar.

Segundo dun menú (6€) de O Cesto.
Para empezar polo máis simple cabe destacar que o J de Joker ten un menú por 1.99€. Este consiste nun prato que varía cada día (simple, lóxicamente) e unha botella de auga pero avísovos que xusto a semana que vén suben a 2.5€ o seu prezo ou a 3€ se o queres con caña ou refresco. Indo de menos a máis, temos O Periquillo, onde atoparemos un menú que consiste en primeiro + segundo + sobremesa + pan (bebida aparte) por 3.90€. Se estás pola zona do Auditorio non o dubides, en O Cesto por 6€ tes un menú completo con primeiro + segundo + sobremesa (bebida aparte pero moitos estudantes piden unha xerra de agua, que é gratuíta). Outra opción polo mesmo prezo na rúa de San Pedro é tomar un medio menú no Dos Eles. Se estás pola Alameda tes o medio menú de A Táboa de Picar por 7€, prezo que tamén custa o menú de Casa Antonio.

Primeiro dun menú (9.9€) no Avelaiña.
A partires destes prezos empezamos a ter máis opcións. A maioría dos locais da zona do Polígono do Tambre teñen menús económicos: O Carro 7.5€, Adega Bello 8€, Tordoia 8€… Outra boa opción a este prezo é O Alto Do Vento ou a Casa Lola, este último en Bertamiráns. Por 8.5€ podes xa ter menú no Don Manuel, o completo do Dos Eles, ou incluso podes ir pola semana a A Cañiza, en Camporrapado. Se queres pulpo, por 9€ podes ter pulpo e churrasco en O Eixo. Por 9.2€ recoméndoche que vaias a probar o menú do Tropic, en Bertamiráns, de seguro que saes satisfeito.
Subindo aos 9.5€ temos opción tan boas como O Son do Miño ou Casa Rosinda e se nos estiramos ata os 9.90€ podemos desfrutar dun bo e variado menú no GastroBar Avelaiña, xusto detrás da igrexa da Alameda.

Sobremesa dun menú de 3 pratos do Susos (10€).
Por 10€ podes irte de enchenta ao San Carrodio, darte un festexo con pulpo na De María en Cacheiras, probar as opcións do menú do Quercus, no polígono Costa Vella, ou ir calquera día (comida ou cea) a tomar o menú do Susos. Por un pouco máis de 10€ tes a opción de acudir A Tita ou O Entrerrúas. Se nos animamos por 11.5€ o Garum ofrécenos un curioso menú por ese prezo (e dannos unha tarxeta para que o décimo saia gratis). Subindo aos 11.90€ o Resas ofrécenos un menú con toques asiático-tradicionais (e ademais unha tarxeta para que o sexto sexa gratis). Por 12€ podes desfrutar de tomar un menú no precioso local de A Curtidoría, na rúa da Conga. 12.5€ é o prezo do menú do Curro da Parra e 13.5€ de O Pazo de Altamira.

Primeiro dun menú (15€) de A Tafona.
Seguimos subindo o listón de prezos… Que facemos con 15€? Pois por ese prezo temos o menú de A Moa, na rúa de San Pedro, ou de A Tafona, na praza do Matadero. Se sodes dous e é noite de luns a mércores podedes animarvos co menú degustación do Resas por 30€ duas persoas.Segue habendo opcións por 15€? Pois si, por 15€ podes desfrutar do menú do Caney, que tamén oferta menú degustación por 40€. Se vos apetece sair de Santiago, o menú dos domingos de A Cañiza é brutal e custa iso, 15€. Recorda que por 18€ tes o menú de mercado do Quercus, local que xa citei antes.
Se sodes dous, é destacable que no GastroBar Avelaiña teñen un menú degustación por 40€ dúas persoas. Se tedes coche eses 20€ é o prezo do menú semanal de A Casa dos Martínez, en Padrón. 21€ é o prezo do menú da merenda cea da Taberna do Abastos 2.0. Chegando os 23€ temos a opción de ir ao Spa Quinta da Auga e degustar o menú do seu restaurante Filigrana.

Un dos varios pratos dun menú de 25€ en A Cañiza.
Por 25€ mandaríavos (por teceira vez xa) á A Cañiza a tomar o menú mariscada pero, se non temos coche a man e é domingo, podedes desfrutar por ese prezo dun brunch en Romero, en Galeras. 30€ é o prezo do menú do Xan Xordo (estrada vella do aeroporto), no que comes marisco a esgalla.
Se temos 35€ a man podemos ir de novo a A Tafona a probar o seu menú degustación pequeno, chamado miúdo, ou entrar de cheo a probar o menú de mercado no Ghalpón do Abastos 2.0. 45€ será o prezo do menú de mercado (longo) de A Tafona e finalmente 65€ era o prezo do menú longo do Mesón Roberto, en Brion, a última vez que fun.
Cabe destacar que lóxicamente faltan moitos locais, pero isto é un pequeno intento de guiarvos por Santiago e arredores. Coma vedes hai opcións para todo tipo de carteiras. Espero que vos sirva esta ‘pequena lista’. ¡Ata outra!
Segue as historias de El Zampón de Compostela no seu blog
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Detenida una septuagenaria y su hijo por vender droga desde su piso de Santiago
Something economists thought was impossible is happening in Europe
Something really weird is happening in Europe. Interest rates on a range of debt — mostly government bonds from countries like Denmark, Switzerland, and Germany but also corporate bonds from Nestlé and, briefly, Shell — have gone negative. And not just negative in fancy inflation-adjusted terms like US government debt. It's just negative. As in you give the German government some euros, and over time the German government gives you back less money than you gave it.
In my experience, ordinary people are not especially excited about this. But among finance and economic types, I promise you that it's a huge deal — the economics equivalent of stumbling into a huge scientific discovery entirely by accident.
Indeed, the interest rate situation in Europe is so strange that until quite recently, it was thought to be entirely impossible. There was a lot of economic theory built around the problem of the Zero Lower Bound — the impossibility of sustained negative interest rates. Some economists wanted to eliminate paper money to eliminate the lower bound problem. Paul Krugman wrote a lot of columns about it. One of them said "the zero lower bound isn’t a theory, it’s a fact, and it’s a fact that we’ve been facing for five years now."
And yet it seems the impossible has happened.
Why did economists think negative interest rates were impossible?
Well think about it. A bond with a negative interest rate is a guaranteed money-loser. Why would you buy one if you can just hold cash instead?
The traditional view has always been that no one would. People thought that the interest rate on bonds can't fall below zero because at that point people will just hold onto their money.
Where are negative interest rates happening?
Broadly speaking, borrowing at negative cost is happening on the European continent. Mostly in the Eurozone, but actually most severely in Switzerland.
- In early February, Nestlé (which is headquartered in Switzerland) saw its four-year euro-denominated bonds trading at a negative interest rate.
- Countries like the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, and Austria all saw bonds trade at negative rates.
- In early February Finland became the first European government to see negative rates on the initial sale of bonds.
- On February 28, Germany sold five-year bonds at negative rates, proving that the negative trend isn't a fluke trading trend _ a big, mainstream country is being paid to borrow money.
Why have interest rates gone negative?
In the most literal sense, negative interest rates are a simple case of supply and demand. A bond is a kind of tradable loan. Whoever is selling the bond is offering to pay the buyer interest in exchange for his money. If there isn't much demand for buying the bonds, the interest rate has to go up to make customers more willing to buy. If there's a lot of demand, the interest rate will fall. Mathematically speaking, nothing special happens to this process when the interest rate hits zero. If there's still a lot of demand, then the rate just goes negative. Simple.
In this specific case, a few things are driving the supply/demand dynamic.
One is that European investors seem very pessimistic about the overall economic outlook for the continent. That's making them reluctant to invest in risky, but potentially high-yielding ventures. Things like government debt from really well-run northern European countries or banal global food conglomerates are in high demand.
The other is that European governments are very reluctant to increase the supply of debt available. Germany, for example, is now running a budget surplus, which makes German debt scarce. A lot of people around the world would be happy if Germany went and gave a bunch of money to Greece and Spain, or announced a massive infrastructure building plan, or sharply reduced sales taxes. And if it did that, it would entail a lot of new debt, which would soak up demand. But northern European countries aren't responding to high demand for their debt with more borrowing. So prices just keep falling.
Isn't buying a money-losing bond insane?
It all got started with Denmark. Denmark doesn't use the euro as its currency. But as an official matter of government policy, it pegs the value of its krone to the value of the euro. But while Denmark's economy looks pretty similar to the economies of Eurozone members like Finland, Germany, or the Netherlands, it's much stronger than Greece or Portugal or Slovenia.
Because of that strength, foreign investors have the notion that in the long-term, the value of the krone is likely to go up relative to the value of the euro. If you think of buying Danish bonds as a currency play, then buying them at negative interest rates can make sense.
This was all a little strange, but not all that unexpected. It just turned out that the dynamics around small countries trying to maintain currency parity with much larger neighbors were a little bit weird.
Things changed in January 2015 when the Eurozone's central bank launched a program of quantitative easing — in other words, printing money and using it to buy government bonds.
How did quantitative easing change things?
QE is supposed to help the economy by reducing interest rates. Increased demand for government bonds makes the interest rate on them cheaper, making them less attractive to private investors. That's supposed to inspire private investors to increase their demand for other investments — loans to businesses or homebuilders, for example — which boosts the economy.
But now, here's the catch. The Eurozone has one central bank — the European Central Bank — but there's no consolidated Eurozone debt, no "eurobonds."
So when the ECB goes out and buys bonds, it needs to buy the bonds of its member states — a little Belgium, a dollop of Portugal, a smattering of Finland, a dose of Italy, etc. But one consequence of the Eurozone crisis of 2010-2011 is that people think the Eurozone might break up. If the Eurozone does break up, you're going to be way better off owning the debt of a rich and stable country like Germany than the debt of a country like Spain that's much poorer and facing an uncertain political situation. So whatever the interest rate on Spanish bonds, the rate on German bonds is sure to be lower.
In other words, if the ECB takes steps to make Spanish interest rates really low, then the interest rate on more creditworthy eurozone countries has to go below zero.
Okay, but still … why would you buy a negative interest bond?
This is a very good question. The basic financial mechanics of negative interest rates are easy enough to see. But why not just hold cash in your bank account? It's not entirely clear what's happening, but here are three major motivations that market insiders say are in play:
- Safety: A bond is backed by the full faith and credit of the government that issues it. Bank accounts are only government-guaranteed up to a certain extent — most European countries cover 100,000 euros. Very rich people and big companies have more money than that and need to do something with it. Obviously you could fill shoeboxes with paper money, but there are safety risks with that, too.
- Passive funds: Because people thought negative interest rates were impossible, few institutions have rules in place that were designed to accommodate this situation. Pension funds, mutual funds, and other impersonal investment vehicles have rules and formulae they're supposed to be following. To the extent that those rules call for the holding of safe bonds, some bond-buying can simply happen on autopilot.
- Banks: Banks can't store their spare money in a bank account. Instead, they store reserves with a government-run central bank. A certain amount of reserves are required by regulators. But banks can also store "excess" reserves. The European Central Bank is currently charging a fee on excess reserves, which means it makes more sense to park excess cash in government bonds.
What are the implications going forward?
The big one is that central banks, including the United States', may want to consider being bolder with their interest rate moves. For years now, the Federal Reserve's position has been that it "can't" cut interest rates any lower because of the zero bound. Instead, it's tried various things around communications and quantitative easing. But maybe interest rates could go lower? Unlike the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve pays a small positive interest rate on excess reserves. Fed officials normally say this doesn't make a difference in practice, but it looks like negative rates on excess reserves may be the key to negative bond rates.
At the moment, the Fed is debating how quickly to raise interest rates, but with inflation still running well below 2 percent maybe it should try cutting them — paired with a change in reserve policy, if necessary.
For Europe, one question this raises is whether issuing some Eurozone-wide debt might make sense. Voters in Germany and other more-creditworthy countries have historically been reluctant to share credit risk with the likes of Greece and Italy. But with the interest rates involved so incredibly low, it's not clear that this is a huge downside. And German savers might appreciate the creation of a new debt vehicle that would be safe and also have a positive interest rate.
14 Reasons Ritchie Valens Remains A Rock 'N Roll Legend
Come on, let’s go.
His music stands the test of time.

Ritchie Valens died on February 3rd, 1959, his career lasting mere months (he was signed to Del-Fi Records on May 27, 1958), but his music still resonates today.
Public Domain / Creative Commons / Via en.wikipedia.org
He wrote "Donna," which is probably the single sweetest tribute to a high school love.
The perfect song for slow-dancing while staring deep into someone's eyes, "Donna" was written for Ritchie's real-life girlfriend, Donna Ludwig. Sigh.
Del-Fi Records / Via youtube.com
You can't listen to "Come On, Let's Go" without wanting to dance.

Go on, try it. See? It's science.
Del-Fi Records / Via youtube.com
He took a traditional song, "La Bamba," and made it all his own.
Valens transformed a traditional Mexican folk song into the stuff of rock 'n roll legend.
Del-Fi Records / Via youtube.com
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