Raul Barral Tamayo

Authored by Cláudia Ascensão Nunes via the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE),

Under the guise of fighting money laundering, the EU is making anonymous economic activity progressively harder...

Starting in July 2027, Europeans will no longer be allowed to pay businesses or professionals more than €10,000 in cash (roughly $11,500). Any transaction above €3,000 (just under $3,500) will require mandatory customer identification. This is another step toward political uniformity across Europe, stripping countries of autonomy and subtly pushing citizens toward the digital euro.

This measure, part of the new Anti-Money Laundering Regulation (AMLR), applies directly to all Member States. Under the pretext of fighting money laundering, Brussels is imposing yet another form of forced harmonization that ignores the principle of subsidiarity: the idea that decisions should be made at the level closest to citizens and national governments.

What was once a matter regulated by individual countries is now becoming a uniform mandate from Brussels.

This is a thinly disguised restriction not only on political freedom, but above all on economic freedom. Cash remains one of the last truly private means of exchange still available; unlike digital transactions, cash does not automatically create a centralized record accessible to banks or public authorities.

The use of cash is often associated with the intention to hide illicit activity. Yet the ability to conduct private and discreet transactions is a natural extension of property rights and freedom of contract. Many law-abiding citizens prefer cash for entirely legitimate reasons, including protection against financial instability or potential capital controls.

From that date onward, professionals will be forced to turn every transaction above €3,000 into a bureaucratic process involving identity verification, data collection, and the risk of penalties. This is yet another regulatory imposition that raises the cost of doing business, similar to the introduction of VAT in Europe decades ago, which pushed many small businesses to close their doors or move into the informal economy because of increased bureaucracy and compliance costs. Small entrepreneurs, already pressured by high taxes and excessive red tape, will once again bear the heaviest burden.

What were once simple voluntary exchanges will become sources of additional costs, delays, and state intrusion.

Once again, centralized authorities are creating regulatory complexity under the difficult-to-challenge justification of fighting crime, even though each country already has its own rules in this area.

More liberal countries such as Germany will lose flexibility, since they previously had no general limit on cash payments. The uniformity imposed by Brussels ignores cultural differences, particularly differing levels of trust in institutions. In some countries, cash culture remains deeply rooted, and confidence in digital systems is significantly lower.

This measure represents a gradual erosion of individual autonomy. If using cash becomes increasingly inconvenient for merchants and consumers, people will naturally migrate toward digital payments. Over time, this initially convenient shift will make the introduction of the digital euro far easier.

It is difficult to believe that it is mere coincidence that these restrictions are scheduled to take effect in July 2027 at roughly the same time the European Central Bank (ECB) plans to launch the first pilots of the digital euro. Cash becomes inconvenient and potentially risky at the same time digital money is presented as the practical alternative.

Once the principle is established that the state can limit private cash transactions, there is a strong tendency for those limits to become progressively stricter. European countries themselves demonstrated this pattern when they still controlled these rules nationally. Belgium, for example, steadily lowered its cash payment ceiling over the years to the current €3,000.

The most likely outcome is that the new European-wide limit of €10,000, which may seem relatively high today, will gradually be reduced further until using cash for most significant transactions becomes impractical. In reality, the vast majority of cash transactions are already well below this threshold. According to studies by the ECB, around 81 percent of all point-of-sale payments are below €25, and cash is predominantly used for small everyday purchases. This means that the €10,000 limit will mainly affect legitimate higher-value transactions, such as the payment of certain professional services that many citizens and small businesses still prefer to carry out in cash.

The digital euro, presented as a complement to cash, will arrive at a moment when cash has already been substantially weakened. Unlike cash, this system is traceable, programmable, and potentially subject to holding limits, expiration mechanisms, or usage restrictions.

China has already offered real-world examples. In several pilots of its digital yuan, authorities tested expiration dates on funds, meaning the money would lose its value if not spent by a certain date. This turns money from a reliable store of value into a tool that encourages spending according to government timelines. Such features demonstrate how programmable digital currencies can be used to control economic behavior, punish saving, and steer consumption in line with state priorities.

These are conditions fundamentally incompatible with the freedom that cash provides.

This accelerated yet discreet path toward a fully digital monetary system opens the door to an unprecedented level of financial surveillance and control in European history. By overriding the principle of subsidiarity, it will affect almost the entire continent.

The road to total societal control passes through the restriction of economic freedom.

Authored by Andrew Korybko,

Russia’s consequent focus on the western front might embolden US-backed NATO member Turkiye to accelerate its power play in the south at the risk of sparking another regional crisis after Ukraine.

Russian Ambassador-at-Large Artyom Bulatov warned in a recent interview that “Westerners, with energy worthy of a better cause, are erecting a new ‘Iron Curtain’, seeking to make irreversible the rupture – provoked by themselves – of socio-economic, trade, transport, interpersonal, cultural, and historical ties that have been built in the region not over years, but over centuries.” He also condemned the weaponization of regional interaction mechanisms like the Council of the Baltic States against Russia.

Truth be told, a new Iron Curtain is inevitable and has been since summer 2024 when the Baltic States and Poland combined their respective border fortification plans along NATO’s Eastern Flank to unveil what they now officially refer to as the “EU Defense Line”, which readers can learn more about here. This initiative will likely be expanded to include Finland too, thus stretching from the Arctic to Central Europe. Even in the event of a Russian-US rapprochement, which is now unlikely, these barriers will still remain.

Russian experts, who operated for so long under the influence of the wishful thinking fantasy that the EU is challenging Russia at its senior US patron’s behest and not due to its own ideologically driven hatred of Russia (contrary to its objective interests), are finally waking up to reality. New President of the Russian International Affairs Council Dmitriy Trenin, who issued an unprecedented clarion call in April for correcting foreign policy misperceptions, published a relevant piece in parallel with Bulatov’s interview.

Titled “The EU, Like ‘NATO 3.0,’ Will Remain Our Adversaries”, it dramatically begins by informing readers that “For the first time since 1945, the most pressing military threat to Russia is coming from Europe—European states themselves. This represents the most significant military-political shift for Russia since the victory in the Great Patriotic War.” The goal, Trenin believes, is “to split the Russian Federation into externally controlled components and turn them into semi-colonies of the European Union.”

This will be pursued through indefinitely perpetuating the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine together with ramping up sanctions and military pressure for undermining domestic political stability.

He shared five suggestions in response to these threats:

1) strengthen the homefront;

2) demonstrate willingness to strike targets in the EU (and actually do so if need be);

3) strengthen ties with China to the point of a de facto global alliance;

4) exploit US-EU divisions; and

5) and capitalize on political shifts in EU states.

Trenin also reaffirmed Russia’s new self-identity as a (Eurasian) civilization-state, the subtext being that Russians en masse are increasingly viewing themselves as different from Europeans for the first time since Russia’s experiment of emulating the West began three centuries ago. All the insight that he shared in his article pairs with what Bulatov shared in his interview and the “EU Defense Line” that’s under construction to ensure that a new Iron Curtain is inevitable. Russians are also finally accepting this too.

In terms of the bigger picture, three trends are self-evident:

1) the EU will independently continue challenging Russia regardless of however Russian-US relations develop;

2) Russia will continue prioritizing the World Majority over the West; and 3) Russian-EU tensions will become the new normal.

With Russia focusing on the western front as a result, US-backed NATO member Turkiye is expected to accelerate its power play in the south, thus sowing the seeds of another regional crisis after Ukraine.