Brindle

The sales pitch for automatic license plate readers is how great they are at helping cops solve crimes. From hunting down stolen cars to tracking pedophiles across jurisdictions, ALPRs supposedly make policing a breeze by gathering millions of time/date/location records every single day and making it all available to any law enforcement agency willing to buy the software and pay the licensing fees.

The systems come with civil liberties baggage -- privacy issues that aren't completely articulable, at least not in terms of what the courts have held to contain sufficient expectations of privacy. A single photo of a car on a public road isn't a privacy violation. But what about dozens or hundreds of photos that more resemble a passive tracking system than a set of public snapshots? That's a bit more of a gray area -- one that hasn't been fully explored by the courts at this point. Adjacent decisions notwithstanding, ALPRs are mildly intrusive and have troubling implications due to their capabilities, but at this point, they still operate within the confines of the Constitution.

So, if civil liberties are still intact, what's the next point of attack? Maybe it's the alleged efficiency. Are law enforcement agencies getting their money's worth?

It's a trick question. First and foremost, it's the public's money paying for these. In many cases, DHS grants have paid for ALPRs, with local agencies name-checking terrorism and extremism to increase the odds of obtaining funds. Even when paid for out-of-pocket, it's still the public footing the bill.

The systems aren't cheap. And from what VPR (NPR Vermont) has uncovered, they're not really worth the expense. (via Digital Fourth)

Over the past five years, law enforcement agencies in Vermont have invested more than $1 million in technology that gathers millions of data points every year about the whereabouts of vehicles across the state.

Yet even with the millions of scans, the system has not led to many arrests or breakthroughs in major criminal investigations, and it hasn’t led to an increase in the number of tickets written for the offenses the technology is capable of detecting.

No one sells a city council (or the general public) on the wonders of ALPRs by highlighting how many unregistered vehicles might be ticketed or pointing out other mundane traffic enforcement benefits they might provide. Probably just as well, considering these systems have had no discernible effect in these areas.

It's the "big ticket" crimes that sell ALPRs and push them past the complaints of those concerned about citizens' privacy and civil liberties. Kidnapping, auto theft, child pornographers, terrorism, etc. These are the sort of thing that put lead in legislators' collective pencils, stirring them to approve funding or sign off on grant requests, and so on. How do Vermont's ALPRs stack up against capital-C "crime?"

In the 18 months leading up to Jan. 1, 2013, the 61 license plate readers operating in the state at the time did a lot of recording. A VPR study of public information from local, state and federal law enforcement showed that during that time period, police across the state logged 7.9 million license plates and stored them in a central, statewide database along with the time and location they were scanned.

Despite the financial investment in the systems, they were helpful in solving fewer than five crimes in 2013. The number of tickets written for driving with a suspended license and driving with an expired registration (two violations that ALPRs can detect) hasn’t gone up since the technology was introduced in mid-2009.

Millions of plates. Five (5) crimes solved. Number of tickets issued flat.

So, what do you do? As a legislator who approved funding for this, do you accept this as part of the learning curve or do you demand more from the technology? Do you tell the public, "We appreciate your input but feel that a literal handful of successful criminal investigations far outweighs any privacy issues or budgetary concerns"?

An interview with an officer who uses the ALPR system adds some nuance to the discussion, including the fact that law enforcement's civil liberties precautions contribute to the perceived inefficiency of the system. But underneath it all, it's viewed as just another "tool" for local law enforcement to use, albeit one that can't seem to pull its own weight. No one wants to say the equipment is non-essential or possibly redundant, but the officer interviewed (Sergeant Cram) makes this damning statement.

Despite the $25,000 tool, Cram says the majority of the Winooski Police Department’s traffic stops are still done the old-fashioned way, with officers stopping drivers for infractions like rolling through a stop sign or failing to yield at a crosswalk.

Still, Cram says the federally-funded ALPR is a valuable tool, even though he doesn’t think the city would have put up $25,000 of its own money to buy one.

The city wouldn't have ended up with one if the DHS wasn't giving them away. That's how extraneous this "tool" is. The lack of successful criminal investigations backs this up. The fact that traffic enforcement has remained stagnant even with the addition of several million plate scans per year is the final nail in the coffin.

No one -- at least not in Vermont -- needs this technology. But if someone else is willing to pay, they'll take it. And they'll use it. And years down the road, they'll likely still have nothing to show for it but a massive database tracking the movement of millions of non-criminals.

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A few weeks ago, we wrote about how VPN company Golden Frog had quietly revealed in an FCC filing that an unnamed mobile broadband provider had been (even more) quietly blocking people from sending encrypted emails -- basically blocking users from making use of STARTTLS encryption. The Washington Post has now revealed that the mobile operator in question was Cricket -- a subsidiary of AT&T, and that it stopped blocking such encryption a few days after our post was published.

Cricket did not address repeated questions about the issue and did not alert customers, many of whom rely on Cricket as their sole Internet service, that they would not be able to protect their e-mails from prying eyes. AT&T, which absorbed Cricket when it acquired Leap Wireless last spring, did not respond to a request for comment.

Cricket said in a statement to The Post that it "is continuing to investigate the issue but does not intentionally prevent customers from sending encrypted emails."

The issue appears to be that Cricket started using some Cisco firewall equipment to block sending encrypted emails through Port 25. It's true that many ISPs block Port 25 entirely, as it's often used for spamming. What Cricket did here was to just try to block encrypted emails over Port 25, which in some ways is being more permissive than other providers who block it entirely. Yet, still, the way it did so was somewhat misleading and still concerning. While the intent here may have been reasonable, any time you have an ISP stepping in and quietly making the decision itself to block encrypted traffic while allowing other traffic it should raise questions about the security for end users. Yes, there's a constant battle against spam, but there may be better ways to deal with it than single-handedly blocking email encryption.

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Another tool supposedly "crucial" to the War on Terror is just another lowly footsoldier in the War on Drugs. Some long-delayed reports on Section 213 "sneak and peek" warrants have finally been released by the US government, providing more detail on the constantly-expanding use of delayed-notification warrants by the FBI.

While Section 213 didn't originate with the regrettable PATRIOT Act, it did coattail ride the government-expanding legislation into legitimacy. Robert Mueller, director of the FBI at the time, made this statement in 2005 defending the ongoing use of these warrants.

While not scheduled to sunset, the USA Patriot Act's delayed notice provision, Section 213, has been the subject of criticism and various legislative proposals. The FBI believes that Section 213 is an invaluable tool in the war on terror and our efforts to combat serious criminal conduct. It is important to note that delayed notice warrants were not created by the USA Patriot Act. Rather, the Act simply codified a common law practice recognized by courts across the country and created a uniform nationwide standard for the issuance of those warrants…

Delayed notice search warrants provide a crucial option to law enforcement and can only be issued if a federal judge finds that one of five tailored circumstances exists. The FBI has requested this authority in several cases. In most instances, the FBI seeks delayed notice when contemporaneous notice would reasonably be expected to cause serious jeopardy to an ongoing investigation.

Legislators expressed concern about these warrants during a 2005 Senate hearing, pointing out the significant increase in the number issued.

Apparently, the department sought and received the authority to delay notice 108 times between April 2003 and January 2005, a period of approximately 22 months. By contrast, it sought and received this authority 47 times between November 2001, when the PATRIOT Act was enacted, and April 2003, a period of about 17 months. The 5-month difference in timeframe aside, these numbers clearly reveal a substantial increase in use.

If they could have peered a little further into the future, they probably wouldn't have bothered noting this slight increase. 2010's report noted nearly 4,000 requests for delayed notification. A year later, the number had lept to 6,775. Two years later and the number has nearly doubled -- 11,129.

From 47 times in 17 months to over 30 times a day over the last ten years. This is another limited-use, for-emergency-use-only tool that has been converted into a workhouse by law enforcement. To keep it from being killed off, FBI Director Robert Mueller cited terrorism and investigations being placed in "serious jeopardy," but in reality, it's still all about drugs, drugs and more drugs.

This was the ratio in 2010.


It hasn't gotten any better.

Out of the 3,970 total requests from October 1, 2009 to September 30, 2010, 3,034 were for narcotics cases and only 37 for terrorism cases (about .9%). Since then, the numbers get worse. The 2011 report reveals a total of 6,775 requests. 5,093 were used for drugs, while only 31 (or .5%) were used for terrorism cases. The 2012 report follows a similar pattern: Only .6%, or 58 requests, dealt with terrorism cases. The 2013 report confirms the incredibly low numbers. Out of 11,129 reports only 51, or .5%, of requests were used for terrorism.

Additionally, only 11 requests were rejected and the average delay was over 60 days. The longest recorded in 2013 was well over a year -- 546 days.

This was supposed to be an option of last resort -- something deployed when it was too dangerous to do otherwise. But it never was anything more than a way to skirt the Fourth Amendment for maximum FBI efficiency. Even in its early days -- not far removed from the horror of the 9/11 attacks -- the FBI was using delayed notice warrants to conduct routine investigations.

It would astound most Americans that government agents could enter their homes while they are asleep or their places of business while they are away and carry out a secret search or seizure and not tell them until weeks or months later. It would especially astound them that this authority is available for all Federal offenses, ranging from weapons of mass destruction investigations to student loan cases. That is what Section 213 of the PATRIOT Act authorizes. Indeed, the Justice Department has admitted that it has used Section 213 sneak and peek authority in nonviolent cases having nothing to do with terrorism. These include, according to the Justice Department's October 24, 2003 letter to Senator Stevens, an investigation of judicial corruption, where agents carried out a sneak and peek search of a judge's chambers, a fraudulent checks case, and a health care fraud investigation, which involved a sneak and peek of a home nursing care business.

So, the DOJ requests an inch, takes several miles, and searches citizens' homes and places of business several thousand times a year -- all without feeling compelled to inform its targets. The justifications the FBI offers (and has offered for years) are false. Are we actually supposed to believe the danger posed to investigating officers has increased at the same rate as the deployment of "sneak and peek" warrants? The defenders of this program can't expect anyone to believe anything that ridiculous. And yet, it continues -- not just unabated, but with steady increases.

Section 213 is just another way for the DOJ to keep the pesky public from impeding its forward progress. Anything hinting of rights or civil liberties is generally viewed as a loophole for criminals to exploit. This is more of the same. It's easier to execute search warrants when you don't have to bother serving them first.

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Giving a talk at the Washington Ideas Forum, outgoing Attorney General Eric Holder spoke about two different (though, similarly named) journalists that the DOJ has been absolutely egregious in trying to abuse for the sake of questionable leak investigations. Regarding James Risen, the NY Times reporter who the DOJ has been pursuing and demanding he reveal sources concerning a leak (when it's clear the DOJ already knows the source and is just doing this to destroy Risen's credibility with sources), Holder says that the DOJ expects "a resolution" in the near future. That's not too surprising. Holder and the DOJ seem to realize that actually putting Risen in jail (the next step in the process) probably wouldn't go over very well.

But it's the other journalist where things get a bit dicier. That's Fox News reporter James Rosen (note the different letter from Risen). Rosen, you may recall, had his phone, email and security badge records grabbed by the government, after the DOJ told a court that Rosen wasn't a reporter, but "an aider and abettor and/or co-conspirator" in the "crime" of leaking classified information about North Korea from the State Department. It later came out that the DOJ actually pretended Rosen was involved in a bombing in its motions to the court.

Holder was asked if there was a decision during his tenure that he regretted, and he brought up the Rosen story:

Holder: I think that -- I think about the subpoena to the Fox reporter, Rosen. I think that I could have been a little more careful in looking at the language that was contained in the filing that we made with the court. He was labeled as a -- as a co-conspirator. I mean, you had to do that as a result of the statute, but there are ways in which I think that could have been done differently, done better. And that's one of the reasons why I thought the criticism that we received because of that -- and the AP matter as well -- was something that we had to act upon and why we put in place this review of our -- the way in which we interact with the media.

Except, as Julian Sanchez points out, that's completely bogus. Holder claiming they had to do that because of the statute is flat out opposites-ville. They had to do that because the statute doesn't allow them to spy on journalists. The law was designed to stop the DOJ from spying on journalists, and so the only way to break that was to lie to the court. The law in question -- 18 USC 793 is designed to only apply to the people actually committing the crime of leaking defense information -- and not to reporters.

Holder claiming that the statute effectively "forced" him into declaring Rosen a co-conspirator is ridiculous. The statute compels him not to seize Rosen's records. Holder is admitting that the DOJ lied to the court here and trying to blame the statute for that lie. That's astounding.

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Because who hasn't dreamed of pretending they're banging Headmistress McGonagall or Snape at Hogwarts, this is the Harry Potter themed suite at the Georgian House Hotel in London. It costs £249 (~$400) a night, which is a small price to pay for getting to put on your robe and wizard hat. *casts Lvl. 3 Eroticism*

There are two "Wizard Chamber" bedrooms that come with a four-poster, "Muggle-size" bed; potion bottles; cauldrons and other themed accessories. The rooms are available as part of a package that includes a "Muggle walking tour" of London, which takes in filming locations and various places that inspired J.K. Rowling.

Are you thinking what I'm thinking? "Almost never." I'm gonna stay there on my honeymoon and start producing some half-blooded princes of my own right away. Now I just need to find a witch to marry me. Thank goodness for magic, amirite? *chugs love potion* Now what? "I'm pretty sure you're supposed to get the person you like to drink the potion and not down it yourself." What? Oh, wow, hey -- you're beautiful. Will you marry me? "No." Okay maybe you were right. Keep going for several more shots. Thanks to siyah and AI (ai not AL), who heard from a friend of a friend of a friend that Professor Trelawney is the freaky deakiest of all the Hogwarts staff.

Last week, we learned that the GCHQ certainly isn't engaged in mass surveillance -- provided you redefine the meaning of "mass" and "surveillance" in unconventional ways. Now we discover that maybe it doesn't really need to, since it can just ask the NSA and other secret services for access to their raw data without even needing a warrant, as a group of human rights organizations have discovered:

Details of previously unknown internal policies, which GCHQ was forced to reveal during legal proceedings challenging their surveillance practices in the wake of the Snowden revelations, reveal that intelligence agencies can gain access to bulk data collected from US cables or through US corporate partnerships without having to obtain a warrant from the [UK's] Secretary of State. This position seems to conflict with reassurances by the Intelligence Services Committee in July 2013 that whenever GCHQ seeks information from the US a warrant is in place.

The "arrangements", as they are called by Government, also suggest that intercept material received from foreign intelligence agencies is not subject to the already weak safeguards that are applied to communications that are intercepted by the UK's Tempora programme. On the face of the descriptions provided to the claimants, the British intelligence agencies can trawl through foreign intelligence material without meaningful restrictions and can keep such material, which includes both communications content and metadata, for up to two years.

Once again, we see evidence that intelligence agencies are happy to do the dirty work for each other so that they can all claim to have clean hands -- just as the outgoing head of the GCHQ claimed when he said that people there would "walk out the door" rather than be involved in anything so sordid as mass surveillance. It also shows how even the weak safeguards and ineffectual oversight of spy agencies can be circumvented by this kind of mutual help, something pointed out by the organizations behind the latest information:

The disclosed "arrangements" bring into sharp relief the minimal safeguards and weak restrictions on raw intelligence sharing with foreign governments, including between the UK and the United States. The fact that GCHQ can request and receive large quantities of "unanalysed" raw bulk data from foreign intelligence agencies without a warrant in place, simply because it would "not be technically feasible" to obtain it in the UK, shows the inadequacies in [the UK's Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000] to deal with intelligence agency co-operation. Under these "arrangements", there is a clear risk that agencies can sidestep British legal restrictions to obtain access to vast amounts of data.

There is a minor silver lining to these latest revelations that the situation in the UK is even worse than previously believed. It's the fact that a legal action against GCHQ's mass surveillance has, unexpectedly, forced the UK government to admit to even more unsavory practices. Here's how that came about:

Descriptions of the policies were disclosed to the parties after a secret hearing at the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which is currently considering a challenge to GCHQ's surveillance practices that has been brought by human rights organisations including Privacy International, Liberty and Amnesty International. A public hearing of the case was held in July, but these “arrangements" were revealed to the Tribunal in a closed hearing that the claimants were barred from attending. Some details about the policies are now disclosed in order for the claimants to provide comment.

That's a useful reminder that no matter how hopeless these actions might seem, they are not only pretty much the only avenue open to human rights organizations who wish to challenge mass surveillance by governments, but they sometimes yield valuable new information that bolsters the case for greater oversight and tighter regulation of spy agencies.

Follow me @glynmoody on Twitter or identi.ca, and +glynmoody on Google+

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Uber's ride-sharing service has proven to be a handy measuring stick for corruption levels in local governments. Chances are that if there's serious opposition, it's tied to incumbent service providers -- cab companies and other for-hire services that aren't interested in making room for competitors.

Uber's move to the Washington DC market does strange things to the "corruption index" curve. The city is politics on top of politics, a nightmarish thicket of regulatory capture and bureaucracy for its own sake, powered by the perpetual motion of revolving doors and back scratching.

The DC city council voted yesterday on legislation ("Vehicle-for-Hire Act") that clears a path for Uber and Lyft to enter more markets, but asks for plenty in return. The standards codified by this bill would make Uber and Lyft drivers subject to more screening than national security contractors.

[T]he bill requires background checks on Uber drivers going back seven years, annual safety inspections, a prohibition of street hails by UberX drivers, and $1 million in liability insurance when a driver is en route to a rider and when the rider is actually being transported.

Another amendment gives DC cops and cab inspectors the right to search drivers' phones for evidence of illegal hails. (And issue fines if such "evidence" is found.) Fun stuff, that.

Councilman Jim Graham tried to push through a few amendments of his own, heavily skewed in favor of incumbent cab companies.

The only stumbling block for the bill at the meeting came when council member Jim Graham proposed an amendment to set a floor for ride prices so that Uber and Lyft couldn't undercut taxi prices, but the amendment was fairly quickly voted down. Many of the taxi drivers who had come to the council meeting... left once Graham's amendment failed.

Poor Jim Graham. Not only did he fail to win one for the "home team," but he also wore his heart alliances on his sleeve planned amendments. Martin Di Caro of DC's NPR station WAMU captured this priceless screenshot of Graham's markup sheet, which included a business card for the cab union's treasurer, Nessibu Bezabeh.

Someone forgot to take @Teamsters business card off eighth page of CM Graham's amendments to Uber bill. @wamu885news pic.twitter.com/NQxYzhcbJt — Martin Di Caro (@MartinDiCaro) October 28, 2014

If you can't see the tweet, it says:

Someone forgot to take @Teamsters business card off eighth page of CM Graham's amendments to Uber bill.

Here's a closer look at the unfortunate scanning accident:


Yeah, that's a little embarrassing. Or maybe it isn't. This is how business is done in the Beltway, after all. The treasurer "works" with a council member towards a "mutual goal" and hopes for the best. And Graham did his part by striding fearlessly to the plate and promptly striking out. Hey, it happens. The important thing is that he tried. And left behind a paper trail that clearly shows the motivating force behind his consumer-unfriendly amendment.

He'll have to live with that now, but considering one of his fellow council members managed to salvage a political career from the bottom of a crack pipe, there's a good chance this too will soon be forgotten.

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A year ago, we noted a rather odd statement from President Obama, concerning some of the Snowden leaks. He more or less admitted that with each new report in the press, he then had to go ask the NSA what it was up to. That seemed somewhat concerning to us -- suggesting that the administration wasn't actually aware of what the NSA was up to until after it leaked to the press. Combine that with our more recent story of how James Clapper is basically ignoring the substance of President Obama's called for surveillance reforms, and you might begin to wonder who really runs the show when it comes to surveillance. And, indeed, according to a guy who knows quite well, the national security bureaucracy basically calls the shots, and the President has little to no power. That's the basic summary of an interview with Michael Glennon under the title Vote all you want. The secret government won't change in the Boston Globe.

Glennon is the author of a new book called National Security and Double Government, as summarized by the Boston Globe:

Though it’s a bedrock American principle that citizens can steer their own government by electing new officials, Glennon suggests that in practice, much of our government no longer works that way. In a new book, “National Security and Double Government,” he catalogs the ways that the defense and national security apparatus is effectively self-governing, with virtually no accountability, transparency, or checks and balances of any kind. He uses the term “double government”: There’s the one we elect, and then there’s the one behind it, steering huge swaths of policy almost unchecked. Elected officials end up serving as mere cover for the real decisions made by the bureaucracy.

Glennon cites the example of Obama and his team being shocked and angry to discover upon taking office that the military gave them only two options for the war in Afghanistan: The United States could add more troops, or the United States could add a lot more troops. Hemmed in, Obama added 30,000 more troops.

And, yes, of course, there have long been conspiracy theory books about the "shadow government" and the like, but this one's from someone who actually worked on these issues.

He was legal counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a consultant to various congressional committees, as well as to the State Department. “National Security and Double Government” comes favorably blurbed by former members of the Defense Department, State Department, White House, and even the CIA. And he’s not a conspiracy theorist: Rather, he sees the problem as one of “smart, hard-working, public-spirited people acting in good faith who are responding to systemic incentives”—without any meaningful oversight to rein them in.

Basically, the story that Glennon describes is sort of an exact replica of the concerns that many people have about how lobbyists push legislators in a particular direction. While many like to ascribe nefarious intent to lobbying efforts, the reality is that oftentimes legislators don't fully understand a particular or specific area, and the people they turn to are the lobbyists. And, to some extent that's reasonable. You'd rather that regulators and legislators actually are informed about the issues they're making decisions on, but too often they don't understand those areas at all. The problem is that the "experts" who are readily available aren't unbiased purveyors of truth, but are those who have a very specific agenda.

The same thing is true of government bureaucrats within the intelligence community. They're going to advise elected officials in ways that continually push and expand their own capabilities and powers, rather than limit them. And while what happens with lobbyists is often not directly publicly viewable, there can at least be some public recognition of policies and regulations that come out of those discussions. When it comes to the intelligence community, many of the results are kept entirely secret, so there's basically no pushback and no "other side" heard. The intelligence community acts as secret lobbyists for the expansion of the surveillance state, and the government basically says "okay." And that doesn't even begin to go down the road of recognizing how much of this "expansion" of the surveillance state also happens to massively benefit the private corporations that former intelligence officials jump to right after leaving the government. Glennon covers all that and more:

It hasn’t been a conscious decision....Members of Congress are generalists and need to defer to experts within the national security realm, as elsewhere. They are particularly concerned about being caught out on a limb having made a wrong judgment about national security and tend, therefore, to defer to experts, who tend to exaggerate threats. The courts similarly tend to defer to the expertise of the network that defines national security policy.

The presidency itself is not a top-down institution, as many people in the public believe, headed by a president who gives orders and causes the bureaucracy to click its heels and salute. National security policy actually bubbles up from within the bureaucracy. Many of the more controversial policies, from the mining of Nicaragua’s harbors to the NSA surveillance program, originated within the bureaucracy. John Kerry was not exaggerating when he said that some of those programs are “on autopilot.”

And the end result is basically that elected officials don't really have the power to do anything, even if they're technically "in power."

I think the American people are deluded... that the institutions that provide the public face actually set American national security policy. They believe that when they vote for a president or member of Congress or succeed in bringing a case before the courts, that policy is going to change. Now, there are many counter-examples in which these branches do affect policy.... But the larger picture is still true—policy by and large in the national security realm is made by the concealed institutions.

All the more reason why Snowden's revelations were so important. They've helped expose just a tiny fraction of these policies being decided in near total secrecy by the intelligence community to further its own agenda -- leading to some much needed sunlight, finally forcing at least a tiny bit of debate into that corner of the world that thrives on being able to expand in secret.

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The NSA's newly-developed concern for "optics" is being tested by employees both former and current. Keith Alexander, the NSA's longtime leading man, took his snooping show on the road, offering his expertise to banks for $1 million/month. But he couldn't leave it all behind, attempting to drag the current NSA CTO along with him by offering him an interesting -- but conflicting -- part-time position with IronNet Security. The NSA said, "That's fine." Then it said, "We're looking into it." Then it said nothing while Keith Alexander pulled the plug on the deal while simultaneously denying any sort of impropriety.

The story of Teresa Shea, SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) director for the NSA is even more convoluted and shady. Buzzfeed's Aram Roston has been digging into Shea and her husband's private ventures -- the latter of which at least appear to be direct beneficiaries of Teresa Shea's position.

The NSA has refused to comment on Shea's position and her husband's various SIGINT-related businesses, other than to point out how serious the agency is about ethics and possible conflicts of interest. So serious, in fact, that it refuses to discuss the issue beyond issuing boilerplate.

Now, Buzzfeed reports that Teresa Shea is no longer head of SIGINT, a decision surely entirely unrelated to Roston's investigatory efforts.

One of the nation’s top spies is leaving her position at the National Security Agency (NSA), a spokesman confirmed Friday, amid growing disclosures of possible conflicts of interest at the secretive agency…

The NSA provided a statement Friday that said Teresa Shea’s “transition” from the SIGINT director job was routine and “planned well before recent news articles.” The agency indicated she would remain employed, but did not provide specifics.

While this could mean that an ongoing internal ethics probe reached the same conclusions Roston's work did, it seems altogether too coincidental to have been "planned well before recent news articles." Then again, no one expects a federal spy agency to announce that "due to recent acts of journalism, Teresa Shea has been busted down to Entry Level Bulk Data Processor, pending further disciplinary action." But the agency doth seemingly protest too much, especially when its standard MO has been to brusquely shove aside every accusation with practiced ease.

In a statement Friday, NSA spokesman Michael Halbig said that “NSA considers regular rotations of senior leaders as a catalyst for achieving diverse, fresh perspectives on the nation’s critical national security challenges.” He added that “We value her leadership as a senior leader and look forward to her continued contribution to the mission to help defend the nation.”

Give it up, various NSA mouthpieces. This was a clean bust. I'm sure Shea was hoping to continue her run as head of SIGINT, something she probably finds more "invigorating" than whatever position she's been hastily shoved into while the agency waits for the ethically-troubling furor to die down.

This is a positive step, both for the agency and for the general public, which has been unofficially tasked with watching the watchers (including the watchers' watchers in the halls of Congress) over the past several years. Playing to the edges of ethical confines is no longer acceptable behavior. If the agency expects to be entrusted with the data and communications of the world, it needs to be above reproach on every observable level. This much has always been obvious to the agency's critics. That it's now readily apparent to the agency itself is a welcome change.

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Sean Harrington, a 35-year-old Highway Patrol officer in Martinez, California, is under investigation for allegedly stealing nude photos off the phones of women he arrested, Inside Bay Area News reports.

During the investigation, Harrington admitted to stealing indecent photos off of a DUI suspect in August, according to a search warrant affidavit cited by Inside Bay Area News. Worse, he reportedly says he's done it "a half a dozen times in the last several years" and that it's a "game" he and other officers play.

Harrington reportedly told police he learned the steal-nude-selfies "game" while he was working in Los Angeles at another department. Stealing the photos is a felony computer theft, according to the affidavit reviewed by Inside Bay Area.

The August DUI suspect reportedly first noticed her photos had been compromised when she saw some had been sent to an unknown number on her iPad. Traces of the messages had been deleted on her phone, but they were still viewable on her iPad, which had been synced with her mobile device, according to Inside Bay Area.

Inside Bay Area explains how the officer's alleged stolen selfie "game" works:

From the affidavit: "Harrington said he first learned of this scheme when he was working in the Los Angeles office. Harrington said when he was assigned to the Dublin office, he learned from other officers that they would access the cell phones of female arrestees and look for nude photographs of them. Harrington said if photographs were located, the officers would then text the photographs to other sworn members of the office, and, to non-CHP individuals. Harrington described this scheme as a game."

Here's a disturbing text message allegedly sent by Harrington to a friend, calling the woman a "horse face" whose looks are "like a 5 or a 6 at best."

Harrington allegedly sent another set of images — this time of a 19-year-old, bikini-clad woman — to a fellow officer with the message, "Taken from the phone of my 10-15x while she's in X-rays. Enjoy buddy!!!"

The officer allegedly responded, "No f------- nudes?"

Other uncovered texts between Harrington and other officers allegedly discuss "rocking" bodies and chests of arrested women. 

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Sorry, penguin lovers -- if you thought that 2015, in the heinous wake of Windows 8, would finally be the year of desktop Linux, you were sadly mistaken. Windows 10 will actually come with a package manager. Yes, in Windows 10 you can open up a command line shell and install VLC or Firefox or thousands of other packages by typing in a single command.

We've been writing a ton about the Senate's CIA torture report, which goes into great detail on the CIA's torture program in a way that the CIA does not like (at all). The fight over the release of the report has been going on for quite a while now, even though the Senate Intelligence Committee voted to declassify the executive summary. Now a dozen Nobel Peace Prize winners have sent a letter to President Obama, himself a Nobel Peace Prize winner, asking him to release the report.

The open admission by the President of the United States that the country engaged in torture is a first step in the US coming to terms with a grim chapter in its history. The subsequent release of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence summary report will be an opportunity for the country and the world to see, in at least some detail, the extent to which their government and its representatives authorized, ordered and inflicted torture on their fellow human beings.

We are encouraged by Senator Dianne Feinstein’s recognition that “the creation of long-term, clandestine ‘black sites’ and the use of so-called ‘enhanced-interrogation techniques’ were terrible mistakes,” as well as the Senate Committee’s insistence that the report be truthful and not unnecessarily obscure the facts. They are important reminders that the justification of the torture of another human being is not a unanimous opinion in Washington, or among Americans as a whole.

We have reason to feel strongly about torture. Many of us among the Nobel Peace Prize laureates have seen firsthand the effects of the use of torture in our own countries. Some are torture survivors ourselves. Many have also been involved in the process of recovery, of helping to walk our countries and our regions out of the shadows of their own periods of conflict and abuse.

It is with this experience that we stand firmly with those Americans who are asking the US to bring its use of torture into the light of day, and for the United States to take the necessary steps to emerge from this dark period of its history, never to return.

The letter goes on about the problems with torture and then lists out four specific policies it hopes President Obama will follow:

a. Full disclosure to the American people of the extent and use of torture and rendition by American soldiers, operatives, and contractors, as well as the authorization of torture and rendition by American officials.

b. Full verification of the closure and dismantling of ‘black sites” abroad for the use of torture and interrogation.

c. Clear planning and implementation for the closure of Guantanamo prison, putting an end to indefinite detention without due process.

d. Adoption of firm policy and oversight restating and upholding international law relating to conflict, including the Geneva Convention and the UN Convention against Torture, realigning the nation to the ideals and beliefs of their founders – the ideals that made the United States a standard to be emulated.

The signatories of the letter are Desmond Tutu, Jose Ramos-Horta, Mohammad ElBaradei, Leymah Gbowee, Muhammad Yunis, Oscar Arias Sanchez, John Hume, F.W. De Klerk, Jody Williams, Carlos X. Belo, Betty Williams and Adolfo Perez Esquivel. One hopes that this would help drive things forward on actually releasing the report, except that the CIA seems dead set against it.

Last week, Senator Ron Wyden pointed out that the CIA's focus in the declassification process has been to distort the truth:

"The intelligence leadership [is] doing everything they can to bury the facts," said Wyden.

Among the things the two sides are fighting about is whether or not to use pseudonyms for CIA agents. The CIA wants those redacted, but the Senate Intelligence Committee notes that this will hide how deeply involved certain individuals were in questionable actions -- and also that other intelligence reports have used pseudonyms without problem. In response, the CIA is blaming the Senate for "delaying" the release of the report, arguing that the Senate's demand for the report to actually reflect what happened is the real stumbling block.

It is “the Committee’s objections to the redactions” that “have delayed the process,” [CIA spokesman Ryan Trapani] said.

Technically both sides are holding it up, but that's because one side wants it to be accurate, and the other is deliberately seeking to obfuscate the details of the report. Who knows if 12 Nobel Peace Prize winners can help push the debate one way or the other, but at the very least it shows that the world is watching what the Obama Administration ends up doing.

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A new book by Eric Lichtblau, The Nazis Next Door: How America Became a Safe Haven for Hitler's Men, apparently details how the FBI and CIA hired over 1,000 Nazis during the height of the cold war, forgiving them their past sins, so long as they might help spy on the Soviet Union.

At the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, law enforcement and intelligence leaders like J. Edgar Hoover at the F.B.I. and Allen Dulles at the C.I.A. aggressively recruited onetime Nazis of all ranks as secret, anti-Soviet “assets,” declassified records show. They believed the ex-Nazis’ intelligence value against the Russians outweighed what one official called “moral lapses” in their service to the Third Reich.

The agency hired one former SS officer as a spy in the 1950s, for instance, even after concluding he was probably guilty of “minor war crimes.”

You can argue whether or not this moral cost-benefit analysis was reasonable, but it appears that the CIA further sought to block investigations into those Nazis for some of their war crimes -- which seems to tilt the balance pretty strongly in favor of immoral.

And in 1994, a lawyer with the C.I.A. pressured prosecutors to drop an investigation into an ex-spy outside Boston implicated in the Nazis’ massacre of tens of thousands of Jews in Lithuania, according to a government official.

Meanwhile, the FBI was carefully hiding those Nazis from the Justice Department (which the FBI is a part of), even though the DOJ had a department trying to find them:

In 1980, F.B.I. officials refused to tell even the Justice Department’s own Nazi hunters what they knew about 16 suspected Nazis living in the United States.

The bureau balked at a request from prosecutors for internal records on the Nazi suspects, memos show, because the 16 men had all worked as F.B.I. informants, providing leads on Communist “sympathizers.” Five of the men were still active informants.

Oh, and then there's the fact that Hoover not only protected the Nazis, but he went after journalists who were investigating the US's hiding of those Nazis:

In 1968, Mr. Hoover authorized the F.B.I. to wiretap a left-wing journalist who wrote critical stories about Nazis in America, internal records show. Mr. Hoover declared the journalist, Charles Allen, a potential threat to national security.

John Fox, the bureau’s chief historian, said: “In hindsight, it is clear that Hoover, and by extension the F.B.I., was shortsighted in dismissing evidence of ties between recent German and East European immigrants and Nazi war crimes. It should be remembered, though, that this was at the peak of Cold War tensions.”

Kinda thinking that we shouldn't even bother with comments on this article, because the CIA and FBI have already hit Godwin's Law.

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Over the weekend, it came out that two giant pharmacy chains, Rite Aid and CVS, had started blocking Apple Pay, the massively hyped new payment system from Apple that has received much praise for its ease of use. The product had worked for about a week before the two companies started blocking such near field communication (NFC) payments (which also takes out other NFC payment options like Google Wallet). While Rite Aid gave a vague and slightly ridiculous explanation -- that it is "still in the process of evaluating our mobile payment options" -- pretty much everyone knows the truth. A bunch of retailers, led by Walmart, have been creating their own mobile payment system called CurrentC, which cuts out the credit card companies. But, it also builds in all the tracking and spying features of store loyalty cards, expanded across all merchant partners. Apple Pay lets people remain anonymous.

In short: CurrentC lets merchants (1) cut out credit card transaction fees and (2) get more and more data on shoppers. No wonder they want to block out other options.

But this isn't the start of such fights. Last year, mobile carriers like T-Mobile, Verizon and AT&T sought to block Google Wallet in favor of a similar consortium of mobile operators, looking to create their own NFC payment system, which was unfortunately named ISIS until world events led the consortium to change its name to Softcard.

All of these moves should be concerning. They're clearly not being done with the consumer in mind. Nearly everyone who's played with Apple Pay has agreed that the system is a huge leap ahead for mobile payments in terms of ease of use. Instead, we're seeing giant organizations looking to team up to keep competitors out of the market. At the very least, this should raise serious antitrust issues. But it also demonstrates, in a different sphere, why net neutrality is such a concern. When you have large companies that can effectively collude to block or kill certain powerful and useful apps and services, it hinders and blocks important innovations, leaving consumers significantly worse off. Not only are they left with fewer choices and lower quality apps and services, but it also pushes consumers into services -- like CurrentC -- that take away their privacy.

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The 125 members of the Seattle Police Department who sued the Dept. of Justice for violating their "right" to deploy force on their own terms (in order to "make it through work safely") have received their answer from a federal district court judge. In short, the response is, "You're wrong," along with the addedum, "and please stop asking."

A federal judge has thrown out a lawsuit brought by more than 100 Seattle police officers who said new guidelines on using force jeopardized their safety.

The officers' arguments were unsupported by the Constitution or case law, Chief U.S. District Judge Marsha Pechman said in an opinion issued Monday.

The crowdfunded lawsuit sloppily rewrote the Second Amendment as a "right" to self-defense. Any restrictions on use of force infringed on this imaginary "right." Not only did the Dept. of Justice's remedies -- prompted by years of excessive force deployment and biased policing -- somehow violate these officers' rights, but they apparently also granted "criminals" (which basically means anyone who isn't a cop in this context) extra rights.

The officers who signed on to the lawsuit, without the support of the police guild, objected, saying the policy elevates the rights of criminal suspects over those of police.

And they weren't too happy with the additional oversight, either.

They argued that Merrick Bobb, the court-appointed monitor overseeing the reforms, refused input from the police department in the drafting of the new policy, and that it violates their constitutional right to defend themselves.

As to the creative interpretation of the Second Amendment, Judge Pechman had this to say [pdf link]:

Plaintiffs can point to no case establishing that the Second Amendment codified a free-standing right to self-defense, as opposed to case law interpreting the textual Second Amendment rights to “keep and bear arms” in light of their purposes (which the Supreme Court has held include the facilitation of self-defense)...

In the criminal context, the Ninth Circuit rejected the idea that recent Supreme Court cases confirmed a Second Amendment right to use a weapon in any particular way: “[N]either [Heller nor McDonald] concerned the use of a weapon, as distinct from mere possession. . . .” United States v. Morsette, 622 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2010). Similarly, nothing in the Supreme Court’s recent Second Amendment jurisprudence lends support to Plaintiffs’ novel theory that a police department policy outlining expectations for an officer’s use of force can burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment.

Instead, the Supreme Court has been clear that “the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited” and is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. Plaintiffs selectively quote historical sources cited in Heller to suggest that so long as self-defense is a purpose for the individual claiming a Second Amendment right, the Second Amendment forbids “unreasonable” restrictions on the manner a weapon is used.

[...]

Here, the Policy represents an effort by an employer, the Seattle Police Department, to regulate the use not only of (employer-issued) weapons but of the force its employees are specially sanctioned to wield on behalf of the city government. This scenario has no relation to the Second Amendment guarantees for individuals recognized in Heller, McDonald, and Peruta.

The officers' other complaints were similarly dismissed.

Nor did she agree with the officers' insistence that the policy violated a "right of self-defense as embedded in the Fourth Amendment," which protects against unreasonable search and seizures. Pechman said the argument grossly misconstrued Fourth Amendment law.

As the Fourth Amendment argument went (which is "terribly"), so did the officers' arguments claiming violations of due process and equal protection.

In a rather amusing and slightly ironic turn of events, the officers' complaints about the court-appointed monitor (Merrick Bobb) were rebuffed by every bad cop's best friend:

Because Defendant Bobb exercised discretion in resolving a dispute at the request of a district judge, he is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from suit and the charges against him must be dismissed.

Pechman further points out that not liking a monitor's determinations isn't the same thing as them being "unjust" or "one-sided."

The suit has been dismissed with prejudice, meaning the 125 officers who filed a suit so baseless even the local police union wouldn't offer its support will now have to return to work and follow the same rules as the rest of their fellow officers. I suppose it's a good thing this case wasn't dragged out any longer than the past five months, considering its legal warchest crowdfunding effort stalled out slightly past the $3,000 mark.

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The ACLU FOIA'd up some guidelines for Amtrak staff concerning how they judge whether or not passengers are "suspicious" in terms of being "indicative of criminal activity" and the list seems fairly broad:

• Unusual nervousness of traveler
• Unusual calmness or straight ahead stare
• Looking around while making telephone call(s)
• Position among passengers disembarking (ahead of, or lagging behind passengers)
• Carrying little or no luggage
• Purchase of tickets in cash
• Purchase tickets immediately prior to boarding

Radley Balko takes this list and then compares it to a list put together by James Bovard concerning what the courts have said is conduct that shows "reasonable suspicion" for law enforcement to dig deeper:

• Being the first person off a plane
• Being the last person off a plane
• Someone authorities believe has tried to blend in to the middle of exiting passengers
• Booking a nonstop flight
• Booking a flight with a layover
• Traveling alone
• Traveling with a companion
• People who appear nervous
• People who appear “too calm”
• Merely flying to or from a city known to be a major thoroughfare in the drug pipeline

The message is pretty clear: everyone is a suspect. And anything you might do to look not like a suspect is also suspicious. In fact, you're going to be pretty hard pressed not to look suspicious under these kinds of rules, which is kind of the point.

Part of the problem is the myth out there that there's a legitimate ability to spot "suspicious" people. Sure, there are some extreme cases where people act strange before committing a criminal act, but the idea that you can scan a group of people and spot the people planning out some sort of criminal activity is a concept greatly exaggerated (often by Hollywood), but it inevitably leads to this situation where law enforcement can more or less pick and choose when they suddenly think you're "acting suspicious."

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Another argument for default phone encryption: to keep criminals from accessing your personal photos and sharing them with others.

CHP Officer Sean Harrington, 35, of Martinez… confessed to stealing explicit photos from the cellphone of a second Contra Costa County DUI suspect in August and forwarding those images to at least two CHP colleagues. The five-year CHP veteran called it a "game" among officers, according to an Oct. 14 search warrant affidavit.

That this criminal (and his criminal cohorts) happened to wear a uniform makes him no less of a criminal. The difference here is that the phone containing the photos wasn't stolen by a criminal but rather seized during a DUI arrest and accessed during booking.

[T]he investigation began with a single incident: Harrington's conduct during the Aug. 29 arrest of the San Ramon woman. The woman discovered that photos had been stolen from her phone five days after her release, when she noticed on her iPad that the photos had been sent to an unknown number. A record of the messages had been deleted from her iPhone, but the phone had been synced to the iPad.

In his investigation, Holcombe compared video surveillance and time-stamped text messages from the woman's phone and determined Harrington was in possession of the woman's phone at the moment the photos were forwarded. The woman -- who registered a blood-alcohol level of 0.29 percent, more than three times the legal limit -- was being processed in the Martinez County Jail when the photos were stolen, according to court records.

Not an isolated incident. Officer Shawn Harrington called it a "game." Harrington says other officers at the Dublin precinct routinely distributed pictures from phones of female arrestees. Images were forwarded to other officers and "non-CHP individuals." Court documents also describe a second incident in which Harrington forwarded images from a DUI arrestee's phone while she was being x-rayed.

Encryption by default keeps criminals out of people's phones, even the criminals that hide behind uniforms and the color of law. The same goes for the warrant requirement recently ordered by the US Supreme Court. In a typical DUI arrest, there's really no reason for a cop to be going through the suspect's phone. Evidence of drunk driving is usually contained within the arrestees themselves, not their phones. At best, any time a cop does this, it's a fishing expedition for bigger charges. At worst, it's Harrington and his complicit bro cops, passing around nudie pics just because they can. Access and ability are the worst enablers.

When cops complain about falling behind in the tech race while arguing against warrant requirements and encryption, one wonders whether this isn't part of the "problem." It's not so much that the criminals have gotten smarter than the cops. It's that the phones have. The incidents leading to Officer Harrington's arrest both created digital paper trails leading back to the California Highway Patrol. The minimal effort made to cover his tracks wasn't enough. Maybe this is why some cops fear the relentless forward march of technology: covering up misconduct has never been harder.

Going beyond the relation of these incidents to both search warrants and encryption-by-default, this episode of casual power abuse also implicates another hot button topic located at the intersection of policework and technology: revenge porn.

Scott Greenfield points out a couple of flaws in the plan to criminalize revenge porn, both highlighted by Officer Harrington and his coworkers' abuse of arrested citizens.

An aspect of the push for new laws criminalizing intimate conduct that hasn’t been given much attention is the underlying assumption that if such laws are enacted, they will not only be enforced, but they will be enforced by law enforcement with a level of trust and respect for the delicate subject matter and the sensibilities of the victims.

Well, these CHP officers sort of ruined that.

Not to paint cops with too broad a brush, but, ahem, some of them aren’t a whole lot better than those “frat boys” or MRAs you think so poorly of. In fact, some are pretty awful when it comes to respecting the physical integrity of female suspects, trading off sex acts for arrest because they can.

And so your grand scheme to save the internet from angry males bent on revealing the private, intimate images of women, is to turn to the guys who steal private, intimate images of women and share them amongst themselves?

So, there's that. And that's on top of the nearly-universal complaint that police officers don't take sexual assualt complaints seriously enough. Incidents like these aren't going to encourage more victims to step forward or give them the confidence needed to pursue wrongdoers. At his point, the local PD look like just another place to be victimized.

Going beyond the misconduct and abuse, there's the blind spot advocates of criminalizing revenge porn continue to induldge: the assumption that turning something into a crime will be a massive deterrent.

The idea that creating a crime will serve as a disincentive for people to post intimate images on the internet may make a lot more sense in theory than it does in practice. Of course, maybe you trust that the “new professionalism” will protect you from the ravages of improper distribution of images. But then again, it didn’t stop the California Highway Patrol cops from doing so, even though it was clearly illegal for them to steal the images off suspects’ cellphones to pass around as part of their game.

If those on the inside are not appreciably "better" than those on the outside, then incentives and deterrents mean nothing. This abuse may be limited to a few California peace officers, or it may be far more common that any law enforcement agency would like to admit. (The CHP has already issued a statement basically declaring this to be completely isolated to its Dublic precinct, rather than the more widespread "game" Officer Harrington alleges it to be.) The underlying number of abusive incidents doesn't matter (much). This incident -- isolated or not -- just provides more ammo for those pushing encryption and warrant requirements. Law enforcement should need to make an effort before obtaining access, preferably an effort that creates a paper trail.

For those pushing revenge porn laws, this incident should temper expectations. Chances are it won't, not because it may not be indicative of the general law enforcement mentality, but because many of those advocating this sort of legislation tend to value emotional arguments over pragmatic reasoning. A deterrent is only as solid as those enforcing it. And if the enforcers are willing to casually violate existing laws as part of a "game," there can be little hope that they're the best equipped to pursue revenge porn law violators.

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If there's anything our government can do well, it's take a word loaded with tension and abuse it to the point of abstraction. First, we had "war." The word described the hellish events of the First and Second World War, along with armed, bloody conflicts dating back to the rebellious creation of the nation itself. Now, it's simply a term applied to any conflict with the weight of a self-serving bureaucracy propelling it. A "war" on drugs. A "war" on illiteracy. And so on.

The horrors endured by both sides of the Vietnam "conflict" were never afforded the gravity of the word "war." The same goes with every military intervention since then. We've been in Iraq and Afghanistan for years, but there's no "war" there -- at least nothing officially declared. There's only violence and death and occasional sharp bursts of more violence and death. There's a "war" on drugs in Afghanistan, but that's even more of an abject failure than our other long-running military efforts -- $7 billion spent and poppy production at an all-time high.

There's a "war" on terror in progress as well, but this brings us to another word robbed of any gravitas by constant abuse: "terror." Terrorism is what fuels our nation's security/surveillance state. But "terror" and "terrorism" -- words that once carried some weight -- are now abstractions. They're buzzwords pressed into service by the US government as a sales pitch for an illusion of security. And it all can be yours for less than a Fourth Amendment violation a day.

Which brings us to another set of loaded words that once were evocative but now have been stripped of their ability to move masses.

For the last 30+ years, the United States has been in a "state of emergency." This is perpetual and involves more than thirty concurrent states of emergency.

An emergency declared by President Jimmy Carter on the 10th day of the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979 remains in effect almost 35 years later.

A post-9/11 state of national emergency declared by President George W. Bush — and renewed six times by President Obama — forms the legal basis for much of the war on terror.

Tuesday, President Obama informed Congress he was extending another Bush-era emergency for another year, saying "widespread violence and atrocities" in the Democratic Republic of Congo "pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the foreign policy of the United States."

Declaring a temporary state of emergency has it uses. It temporarily expands government powers in order to facilitate speedy responses. It de-gunks the system of its red tape residue and allows help to arrive when it's needed, rather than weeks after it would have any impact.

But this isn't the case here. Temporary expansions of power have morphed into the new status quo. Since 1976, the government has declared 53 "emergencies." Almost every single one still remains in effect.

Part of the problem is the office of the president. For thirty-plus years, the office has become accustomed to the extra powers granted with each flip of the "emergency" switch. States of emergency are extended. And extended again. Only one state of emergency has been allowed to lapse during the last decade. There is a curb to this power, but like the many other oversight positions its entrusted with, Congress seemingly has no interest in fulfilling its duty.

The 1976 law requires each house of Congress to meet within six months of an emergency to vote it up or down. That's never happened.

And so, "state of emergency" becomes shorthand for government abuse. It conjures up images of towns destroyed by national disasters or extreme threats from foreign nations, but in practice it's rarely anything more than a leading indicator of governmental power grabs. What can this nation's government do during a "state of emergency?" This very small sampling of "extra powers" is chilling.

Reshape the military, putting members of the armed forces under foreign command, conscripting veterans, overturning sentences issued by courts-martial and taking over weather satellites for military use.

Suspend environmental laws, including a law forbidding the dumping of toxic and infectious medical waste at sea.

Bypass federal contracting laws, allowing the government to buy and sell property without competitive bidding.

Allow unlimited secret patents for Army, Navy and Air Force scientists.

"Emergency" is the new normal. For thirty years this nation has "struggled" under multiple states of emergency. What should be a very limited, very short-term solution to unexpected or dangerous situations is now indistinguishable from everyday life. More fear is sold by government agencies and purchased -- via tax dollars -- by a public unable to prevent the checks from clearing. Like the boy who cried wolf, the government has stripped "emergency" of its galvanizing power. Hearing a "state of emergency" being declared by the president most likely won't move hearts reflexively to throats but will prompt a certain number of hands to make protective moves towards wallets and purse strings. And it will definitely move the average American closer to cynicism than patriotism.

When everything is an "emergency" that never ends, nothing is. President Obama says there's no need to declare a state of emergency over the worldwide spread of Ebola. He's likely right, but the words are meaningless. Declare it. Don't declare it. It makes no difference to anyone outside of those directly benefiting from (likely permanent) expansion of government powers.

What is the government going to do once it's used up all the evocative words? Where does it go next? Apocalypse? The government is inherently untrustworthy, and its inability to express itself without using buzzwords, hyperbole and the broadest of strokes isn't helping.

Voter apathy? Record lows in approval ratings? These are only symptoms. The disease is the government itself and its willingness to present everything as the Worst Ever in order to erode rights, expand power and appropriate public funding.

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Wyden spoke with WIRED about the difficulties of keeping mum on classified matters, about his public showdown with intelligence chief James Clapper over the NSA's data collection on Americans, and about the government's use of zero-day exploits.

The post Pro-Privacy Senator Wyden on Fighting the NSA From Inside the System appeared first on WIRED.

In the past, we've noted how unfortunate it was that the Senator who fought strongest for our civil liberties in Congress, Russ Feingold, got voted out of office back in 2010 -- in favor of a "Tea Party" candidate who has consistently voted in favor of the intelligence community since replacing Feingold. Since then, plenty of attention has gone to Senator Ron Wyden for picking up where Feingold left off, but with him on issues of civil liberties as it relates to the intelligence community has always been Senator Mark Udall -- who has been perhaps even more vocal than Senator Wyden on these issues.

And, worryingly, it appears that Udall may be facing a Feingold moment, where he's facing a candidate that has positioned himself more on "Tea Party" type issues. Udall hasn't campaigned very much on his amazing support for civil liberties, since many observers don't think that's an "election issue" in Colorado. However, recently, Udall has been willing to point to his important work on the Senate Intelligence Committee as one of a very small number of Senators who actually worked hard to push back against unconstitutional surveillance, to push for transparency and accountability for the intelligence community, and who pushed, repeatedly, to defend our civil liberties. It would be a huge loss for civil liberties if Udall were to lose this election, and a clear victory for the NSA, the intelligence community and those who like to spread FUD to retain power and take away your rights.

“I do think it would be a significant loss for the movement,” said Laura Murphy, the head of the American Civil Liberties Union’s Washington office.

[...]

“Were Sen. Udall to lose, I think he would be sorely missed,” echoed Scott Roehm, a senior counsel at The Constitution Project. “He was one of the earliest voices for meaningful surveillance reform even before the Snowden leaks.”

The Denver Post recently endorsed Udall's opponent, complaining that Udall wasn't enough of a "leader" in the Senate (not an easy thing to do as a first-term Senator). And while the editorial at least does call out Udall's work on the Intelligence Committee, it suggests that his opponent, Cory Gardner, is fine there too because he voted for the USA Freedom Act in the House. Except, of course, voting for a bill is one thing. Leading the charge on these issues is another thing altogether. Besides, the version of the USA Freedom Act that was voted on wasn't a good thing. It was the bill that the White House undermined at the last minute, leading all civil liberties groups to pull their support, and most members of the House who are big on civil liberties voted against the bill due to the compromises shoved into it. Voting for it didn't show a similar viewpoint, but rather the opposite.

There are lots of other issues for voters, of course, but feel free to check out Udall's stance on things. If you're in Colorado, please consider voting for one of the very few principled voices for civil liberties in Congress.

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Apparently, it's not just Facebook that is furious with the DEA for impersonating a woman, posting pictures from her phone, in an attempt to get evidence concerning a drug dealer. Senator Patrick Leahy has now sent an angry letter to the DOJ about this situation as well.

I am greatly concerned by recent reports that the Drug Enforcement Administration used the identity of an unsuspecting young woman to create a public Facebook profile to interact with suspected drug traffickers. This extraordinary tactic placed this woman and her family at risk, and I expect the Justice Department to reconsider the use of such techniques.

Senator Leahy didn't hold back in explaining just why this whole situation was "appalling."

Viewers of the fake profile, which was only removed from Facebook this month, could believe the woman was currently involved with illicit activities or was actively cooperating with a law enforcement investigation. The DEA agent's decision to post suggestive photographs of the woman as well as pictures of her young child and niece is appalling and placed them at even greater risk.

I understand that cooperating defendants often provide critical assistance to criminal investigations. However, the decision to cooperate and the nature of that cooperation is a decision to be made by the defendant and the defendant alone. Law enforcement agencies should not risk the safety of innocents or those who are serving their debt to society without their knowledge or consent. Although the Justice Department has indicated that this incident is under review, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of New York has thus far defended the practice. I hope the Justice Department will agree that creating an online profile using an unsuspecting person's identity to communicate with criminals is unethical, potentially dangerous, and should not be condoned by our nation's law enforcement agencies.

However, remember, this is the very same DOJ which has argued in other cases that violating the terms of service of certain websites is a violation of the CFAA. But, of course, when the government itself does it, in much more appalling situations, they don't seem to think there's any problem.

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Things have been kind of quiet on the "ridiculous statements from Rep. Mike Rogers" front lately, but as he's entering his final months in Congress before retiring to the warm embrace of national talk radio, he's apparently decided to ramp back up with the ridiculous rhetoric. His latest salvo is to argue that the US should be charging Ed Snowden with murder:

Republican Mike Rogers, the chairman of the House of Representatives intelligence committee, told an meeting in the House of Commons in London on Tuesday evening that Snowden was a "traitor" who was now living in the "loving arms" of Russian spies.

"The [US] government has pressed charges on Mr Snowden," he said. "We are treating him, as I would argue, the traitor that he is." Rogers added: "And by the way, and this is important, I would charge him for murder."

Uh, murder of whom, exactly? As far as I can tell, his argument is that because of Snowden's actions, soldiers are less safe and might get killed, and thus, murder.

"He took information that allows force protection, not only for British soldiers, but for US soldiers, and made it more difficult for us to track those activities. Meaning it is more likely that one of those soldiers is going to get their legs blown off or killed because of his actions," he said. "Anybody that provides information to the enemy is a traitor, period, pure and simple."

Except, no. Almost none of that is even close to accurate. Snowden didn't "provide information to the enemy" -- he blew the whistle on illegal programs by revealing it to the public via well-respected reporters who, you know, won the Pulitzer Prize for their reporting. Unless Rogers views the American public as "the enemy" his argument makes no sense. Furthermore, what information has Snowden provided that means a soldier is somehow more likely to get his legs blown off or killed? So far, all of the revelations have been about surveillance programs that have raised serious legal and constitutional questions, but have done little to actually "help" terrorists. That's because most terrorists were well aware of the surveillance capabilities of the NSA/GCHQ before. The new stuff is how the NSA uses that on everyone else.

Meanwhile, if doing things that might lead to more soldiers getting hurt or killed makes you guilty of murder, shouldn't Rogers be talking about getting himself and other members of Congress charged with murder? After all, remember it was Congress that failed to equip soldiers with proper body armor.

Rogers also repeats his "Snowden was working for the Russians all along" argument that he's particularly fond of. He does this despite the fact that basically everyone, including officials from both the NSA and the FBI, has said they've found no evidence to support such an argument.

Rogers also repeats the claim that Snowden handed over lots of other material that is dangerous:

Rogers said that "over 95%" of the information Snowden handed over had "nothing to do" with the NSA spying on American or European citizens private communications but was "about tactical things, military plans and operations".

However, again, this is based on the old DOD report that listed everything that Snowden ever "touched." Snowden, Greenwald and others who have seen the documents have noted -- multiple times -- that the number of documents he actually handed over was much lower than what that report claimed (in the tens of thousands of documents, rather than 1.7 million as the report claimed). Furthermore, the fact that no reports have come out "about tactical things, military plans and operations" certainly seems to support that fact, no matter what Rogers wants to claim.

Now that he's moving to a medium where nutty conspiracy theorists thrive, I imagine Rogers may get even nuttier. But, at the very least, he won't be in charge of "oversight" (stop laughing) of the NSA any more.

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Speed cameras, just like their red-light camera brethren, have been pretty well established as nothing more than revenue machines for local municipalities. Their application results in a myriad of issues, such as the fact that the cameras don't work, not to mention that the cameras don't work, oh, and the cameras don't work and the companies behind them might try to fudge the evidence if you dispute a ticket. The excuse for these cameras that don't work has always been that they are designed to make the roads safer under the theory that if motorists know that the cameras exist, they will be less likely to speed. That supposed justification is belied by two facts. The first is that some people who have tried to warn motorists that the cameras exist have been dragged to court for doing so, which sort of defeats the entire supposed purpose of the cameras. The second fact that disproves the justification is that Chicago just can't help going all Chicago on itself.

Local reporters have the glorious story of the latest Chicago budget crisis that has Mayor Emanuel scrambling for only one reason: Chicago motorists are way better behaved than he'd planned for in his previous budget.

You heard that right: Good behavior is bad for the budget. Real bad, reports CBS 2 Chief Correspondent Jay Levine. CBS 2 has learned the speed cameras caught far fewer speeders than expected. According to the Mayor's 2015 Budget Overview, there have been "lower than expected violation rates."

How much lower? Fifty million dollars lower. Emanuel's administration had figured on $90 million in fines to help balance this year's budget, but they can only count on $40 million. That's a $50 million shortfall, putting pressure on the next spending plan.

Think about the logic here for a moment: Rahm Emanuel wrote a spending budget for the third largest city in the country that relied on a certain revenue number from speed cameras. Where's the incentive for better behavior on the road in that? There is none. The fact is that Chicago drivers are far better behaved than the city expected. That's an outcome you'd think the city would be celebrating. Instead, it's considered a negative, because the speed cameras were never about safety, they were only a method to fill the city's coffers to the tune of milliions of dollars. That isn't so much public policy as it is an extortion racket that happens to have failed.

"It was a combination of the camera company’s salesmanship and the city's greed," says camera critic Barnet Fagel.

You may not want to forgive the camera company their sales tactics, but how much do you really want to fault them? They're a large company beholden to nothing beyond the profit motive. They can't be expected to have the best interests of a city's population at heart. The Chicago city government on the other hand? Most citizens likely didn't elect Mayor Emanuel out of a sense of sadomasochism or the theory that we all just have a bit too much money in our pockets. Stories like these are among the reasons that Emanuel isn't considered invulnerable in the upcoming mayoral election.

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Above the law? The Los Angeles Sheriff's Department seems to feel it is. Or, at least, it felt that way right up until seven of its members were convicted of conspiracy and obstruction of justice. The convictions -- with sentences of 21-41 months -- are being appealed, but the evidence collected by ABC 7 of Los Angeles paints a very disturbing picture of a law enforcement agency that would stop at nearly nothing to keep the feds from cramping its corrupt, brutalizing "style." Almost everything obtained either originated at the hands of those convicted or was preserved via video and audio recordings

It stems from the nasty little side business the Los Angeles Sheriff's Dept. runs: the county jails. Part of the problem was the LASD's hiring standards: there weren't any. Criminals, sex offenders, officers with severe misconduct on their records -- all were hired by the LASD. 200 officers who were rejected by other law enforcement agencies because of past problems found a welcoming home at the L.A. county jails.

The undersheriff in charge of screening applicants blamed the extra duties dropped on the LASD by the disbanding of the Dept. of Public Safety. Then he simply said he didn't remember any specifics and refused to answer any more questions. Finally, he and the rest of the LASD did everything they could to prevent this news from going public.

Beyond the misconduct-friendly screening process was the incredible amount of abuse occurring within the jails themselves. The ACLU filed suit on behalf of two LASD deputies, alleging routine abuse of inmates, claiming sheriff's deputies (themselves known to be members of a racist gang) turned over control of the jails to white supremacist factions and, perhaps most shockingly, hid an FBI informant from his handlers.

For more than two years, LASD officers worked together to "keep the FBI" out of its jails. In addition to threatening whistleblowing officers, LASD personnel also worked in concert to intimidate federal investigators.

By late September 2011, a Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department "Special Operations Group" had FBI Agent Leah Marx under surveillance for more than two weeks. Her partner, FBI Agent David Lam, was under surveillance as well…

On September 26, 2011 Sgt. Scott Craig and Sgt. Maricela Long confronted FBI Special Agent Leah Marx outside her home; they flash[ed] their LASD badges at Marx and then threaten[ed] her with arrest.

These two LASD officers didn't have the power to arrest the FBI agent. They also didn't have even the slightest legal basis for the charges they threatened her with. Supposedly, the LASD was going to take the FBI agent down for smuggling a phone into its jail (to Anthony Brown, the FBI informant who was hidden from the FBI by the LASD), even though Sheriff Baca himself had been informed of this by the head of the FBI's Los Angeles field office.

The recordings obtained by ABC 7 contain even more indications that these LASD officers believed themselves untouchable. One recording catches them laughing over a panicky phone call from FBI Agent Marx's supervisor concerning the threatened arrest. Another recording captures Lt. Steve Leavins performing a bit of tampering, hoping to turn an FBI witness into a friendly LASD voice. Further recordings capture several of the convicted officers trying to convince FBI informant Anthony Brown to give up details on the FBI's investigation.

Judge Percy Anderson, who handed out the sentences, addressed both the audacity of the LASD's actions...

"Perhaps it's a symptom of the corrupt culture within the Sheriff's Department, but one of the most striking things aside from the brazenness of threatening to arrest an FBI agent for a crime of simply doing her job and videotaping yourself doing it, is that none of you have shown even the slightest remorse."

as well as his hopes for the future:

The court hopes that if and when other deputies are faced with decisions similar to those you face, they will remember what happened here today. They will not look the other way or obstruct an investigation; that they will recognize that blind obedience to a corrupt culture has serious consequences, that they will enforce the law rather than conspire to commit crimes, that they will do what is right rather than what is easy.

When a culture of corruption runs as deep as LASD's apparently does, it will take a whole lot more than a few 2-4 year sentences to effect a turnaround. An agency of that size doesn't go from feeling so far above the law that it casually threatens federal agents to walking the straight-and-narrow -- at least, not because of a few convictions. It helps, but it's not nearly as transformative as Judge Anderson hopes. A few years of federal supervision will help as well, but the most hopeful sign is the new attitude being displayed by the LASD's Chief of Detectives, the person tasked with heading up internal investigations. Rather than shift the blame to software, policies or the public's perceptions, he takes responsibility for the unaddressed problems within the department.

The sheriff's department has an early warning system. "Our diagnostic systems were fine," said the department's Chief of Detectives, Bill McSweeney, who advised his agency on creation of the warning system. "Our managerial and supervision response was not fine. It's that simple."

The LASD is far from fixed. But at least some of its uglier characteristics have been dragged out of the darkness and publicly displayed.

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