Source:Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, Volume 142
Author(s): Tina Malti, Tyler Colasante, Antonio Zuffianò, Marieke de Bruine
Heightened attention to sociomoral conflicts and arousal at the prospect of committing moral transgressions are thought to increase the likelihood of negatively valenced moral emotions (NVMEs; e.g., guilt) in children. Here, we tested this biphasic model of moral emotions with a psychophysiological framework. For a series of vignettes depicting moral transgressions, 5- and 8-year-olds (N =138) were asked to anticipate their emotions as hypothetical victimizers. Their responses were coded for the presence and intensity of NVMEs. In addition, their heart rate (HR) was calculated for three intervals of interest: a baseline period, the presentation of vignettes, and the anticipation of emotions following vignettes. We used multilevel modeling to examine how change in children’s HR across these intervals related to the intensity of their NVMEs. Those who experienced greater HR deceleration from baseline to vignettes and greater acceleration from vignettes to anticipated emotions reported more intense NVMEs. We discuss the potential attention- and arousal-related processes behind children’s physiological reactivity and anticipated emotions in contexts of moral transgression.
The Formin FMNL3 Controls Early Apical Specification in Endothelial Cells by Regulating the Polarized Trafficking of Podocalyxin
Measuring variation in cognition can be done, but it requires hard empirical work: a comment on Rowe and Healy
WHOO! Cross-country travel day 2 and I am sick. BUT BY JEEPERS I WILL NOT MISS AN UPDATE.
Gary J Bass in Open the Magazine (via Omar Ali):
Kissinger now [in 1971 during the India-Pakistan war] proposed three dangerous initiatives. The United States would illegally allow Iran and Jordan to send squadrons of US aircraft to Pakistan, secretly ask China to mass its troops on the Indian border, and deploy a US aircraft carrier group to the Bay of Bengal to threaten India. He urged Nixon to stun India with all three moves simultaneously.
Kissinger knew that the American public would be shocked by this gunboat diplomacy. “I’m sure all hell will break loose here,” he said. Still, Nixon quickly agreed to all three steps: “let’s do the carrier thing. Let’s get assurances to the Jordanians. Let’s send a message to the Chinese. Let’s send a message to the Russians. And I would tell the people in the State Department not a goddamn thing they don’t need to know.”
Nixon and Kissinger’s most perilous covert gambit was the overture to Mao’s China— already on poisonous terms with India. Kissinger believed that Zhou Enlai was somewhat unhinged when it came to India, and the deployment of Chinese soldiers could easily have sparked border clashes. Such a movement of Chinese troops would have made an effective threat precisely because of the danger of escalation out of control. At worst, this could have ignited a wider war. That, in turn, risked expanding into a nuclear superpower confrontation. If China was moving troops to help Pakistan, India would surely want the Soviet Union to do likewise. According to the CIA’s mole in Delhi, Indira Gandhi claimed that the Soviet Union had promised to counterbalance any Chinese military actions against India. Just two years before, China had set off hydrogen bombs in its western desert to threaten the Soviet Union. Would the Soviets dare to confront the Chinese? And if the Soviets got dragged in, how could the Americans stay out?
Back on November 23, Kissinger had enticingly suggested to a Chinese delegation in New York that India’s northern border might be vulnerable. Now, on December 6, Nixon told Kissinger that he “strongly” wanted to tell China that some troop movements toward India’s border could be very important.